Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Sheilbh]

I don't think the speech was a good idea from a political perspective, but I feel like he's been quite selectively quoted:

It would be reasonable to think that a common framework of global standards combined with the common basis of the rules – since the UK transposed EU rules from the outset – would be enough to base equivalence on global standards. Less than this was enough when Canada, the US, Australia, Hong Kong and Brazil were all deemed equivalent. Continuing with the example of central clearing, the EU has recently made the US SEC equivalent for CCPs, subject to certain conditions. These conditions are already met by UK CCPs as they are a legal requirement in the onshored legislation, but equivalence beyond the temporary extension remains uncertain.

The EU has argued it must better understand how the UK intends to amend or alter the rules going forwards. This is a standard that the EU holds no other country to and would, I suspect, not agree to be held to itself. It is hard to see beyond one of two ways of interpreting this statement, neither of which stands up to much scrutiny.

The first interpretation is that the rules should not change in the future, and to do so would be unwelcome. This is unrealistic, dangerous and inconsistent with practice. As the world around us changes, so must the rules to accommodate these changes. As evidence of this, look at what the authorities have had to do in response to Covid and the shock that created for financial markets. The EU is almost constantly revising, or contemplating revising its own rules, and that's a good thing. So, I dismiss this argument.

The second argument is that UK rules should not change independently of those in the EU. I am being careful to phrase this point. It's not that UK rules might change independently – the equivalence process provides for re-assessment of such decisions, so this should not be a problem. So, it must be the stronger form that they should not change independently. But that is rule-taking pure and simple. It is not acceptable when UK rules govern a system 10 times the size of the UK GDP and is not the test up to now to assess equivalence. 

He then gives a few examples of changes the UK is considering (two banking, one insurance). I can't find the "isn't going to work" line in the actual speech, that might have been in a Q&A or something.

Edit: Incidentally the changes he's mentioned are: not applying Basel rules to purely domestic small banks (in line with the US and Switzerland), not allowing software to be included as bank capital calculations especially for stress-testing (this strikes me as very sensible and given the size of the financial sector to UK GDP very important) and changing the Solvency 2 regulations so they don't apply to life/annuity insurance.

For what it's worth the Reuters story I read doesn't include the "isn't going to work" line so I'm not sure where that's from.

[The Minsky Moment]

Thanks guys.

Time to party like its 1599

[Sheilbh]

Love Michael D Higgins - this is what you can have with a parliamentary system plus President

Empire shaped Ireland's past. A century after partition, it still shapes our present
Michael D Higgins
Only by remembering complex, uncomfortable aspects of Britain and Ireland's shared history can we forge a better future
    Michael D Higgins is president of Ireland

Thu 11 Feb 2021 13.00 GMT
Last modified on Thu 11 Feb 2021 19.19 GMT

Ireland is currently engaged in a process of recalling the transformative events of a century ago that culminated in partition of the island. Six of the nine Ulster counties remained in the United Kingdom and the rest of the island opted for self-determination and what would become an independent republic.

As president of Ireland, I have been engaging with our citizens in an exercise of ethical remembering of this period. This is not only to allow us to understand more fully the complexities of those times. It is also to allow us to recognise the reverberations of that past for our societies today and for our relationships with each other and our neighbours.

A feigned amnesia around the uncomfortable aspects of our shared history will not help us to forge a better future together. The complex events we recall and commemorate during this time are integral to the story that has shaped our nations, in all their diversity. They are, however, events to be remembered and understood, respecting the fact that different perspectives exist. In doing this, we can facilitate a more authentic interpretation not only of our shared history but also of post-sectarian possibilities for the future.

This journey of ethical remembering has allowed us to examine the nature of commemoration itself and how it might unburden us of history's capacity to create obstacles to a better, shared future. It has entailed uncomfortable interrogations of the events and forces that shaped the Ireland of a century ago and the country we know today. Class, gender, religion, democracy, language, culture and violence all played important roles, and all were intertwined with British imperialist rule in Ireland.

It is vital to understand the nature of the British imperialist mindset of that time if we are to understand the history of coexisting support for, active resistance to, and, for most, a resigned acceptance of British rule in Ireland. While our nations have been utterly transformed over the past century, I suggest that there are important benefits for all on these islands of engaging with the shadows cast by our shared past.

In my work on commemoration, memory, forgetting and forgiving I have sought to establish a discourse characterised by what the Irish philosopher Richard Kearney calls "a hospitality of narratives", acknowledging that different, informed perspectives on the same events can and do exist. The acceptance of this fact can release us from the pressure of finding, or subscribing to, a singular unifying narrative of the past.

In previous years I pursued this task by addressing issues neglected in the public discourse or in the historiography: Irish participants in the first world war, the struggle of trade unionists, and what was suffered, and achieved, by women activists in campaigning for the vote, and by those excluded on the basis of social class.

More recently, I have given the title Machnamh 100 to a series of reflections which examine the period 1920-1923, including the war of independence, civil war and partition. "Machnamh" is an Irish word encompassing reflection, contemplation, meditation and thought. The next seminar, which I will host on 25 February, will examine the motivations and practices of imperialism and of resistance to it, how both reacted to changing local and global circumstances.

As I reflect on the topic, I am struck by a disinclination in both academic and journalistic accounts to critique empire and imperialism. Openness to, and engagement in, a critique of nationalism has seemed greater. And while it has been vital to our purposes in Ireland to examine nationalism, doing the same for imperialism is equally important and has a significance far beyond British/Irish relations.

It may be fruitful to consider the relationship of what has been titled – and not without dissent – the "European Enlightenment" within the project of imperial expansion for an understanding of how the mask of modernity has been used for cultural suppression, economic exploitation, dispossession and domination.

Such consideration also helps explain a reluctance in former imperial powers to engage now with their imperialist past and to examine that past with descendants of those previously colonised, many of whom still live with the complex legacies of that colonialism.

As I reflect on the instincts of those who have defended imperialism, I can see how the tool of an alleged "progressive modernity" could be so effective. Those on the receiving end of imperialist adventurism were denied cultural agency, assumed to be incapable of it, and responsible for violence towards the "modernising" forces directed at them.

From the perspective of the British imperialist mind of its time, attitudes to the Irish for example, were never, and could never be, about a people who were equal, had a different culture, or could be trusted in a civilised discourse of equals. From the perspective of the Irish, who had their own ancient language, social and legal systems and a rich monastic contribution to the world, this view had to be resisted.

Some resistance was through an intensified cultural activity, literature, poetry, music and song. Others sought it within the domain of parliaments or through exerting political pressure from engaged emigrant populations in the United States. In other circumstances, the Irish found it through covert and overt violence. Most resorted to available strategies of escape through emigration, or survival within the empire, with a widespread, if suppressed, anger over humiliation experienced or remembered.

Both the imperialists and those they dominated developed a strategy of accommodation. At home in Britain, the imperialist experience was transmitted down through the classes; there was perhaps the glow associated with belonging to a global empire that could distract from problems of class rejection, an unjust society or an exploitative economic system. But anti-imperialist struggles weren't free of the traits of empire either. They also at times lacked a consciousness of class exploitation.

At its core, imperialism involves the making of a number of claims that are invoked to justify its assumptions and practices – including its inherent violence. One of those claims is the assumption of superiority of culture and it is always present in the imperialising project. Forcing an acceptance on those subjugated of the inferiority of their culture as a dominated Other is the reverse side of the coin.

Injustices perpetrated in the name of imperialism, and in resistance to it, often had a brutalising effect, leaving a bitter residue of pain and resentment, sometimes passed down through generations and left available to those willing to reignite inherited grievances.

What our current reflection consists of, I suggest, is not the offering of a set of competing rationalisations for different kinds of violence. Instead it is about understanding the contexts in which they occurred.

The rewards for this will come in the form in restoring the connection between moral instinct and public policy. That is an authenticity for which so many of our citizens, on this shared, vulnerable planet, yearn.

    Michael D Higgins is president of Ireland

[Zanza]

I don't think the speech was a good idea from a political perspective, but I feel like he's been quite selectively quoted:

It would be reasonable to think that a common framework of global standards combined with the common basis of the rules – since the UK transposed EU rules from the outset – would be enough to base equivalence on global standards. Less than this was enough when Canada, the US, Australia, Hong Kong and Brazil were all deemed equivalent. Continuing with the example of central clearing, the EU has recently made the US SEC equivalent for CCPs, subject to certain conditions. These conditions are already met by UK CCPs as they are a legal requirement in the onshored legislation, but equivalence beyond the temporary extension remains uncertain.

The EU has argued it must better understand how the UK intends to amend or alter the rules going forwards. This is a standard that the EU holds no other country to and would, I suspect, not agree to be held to itself. It is hard to see beyond one of two ways of interpreting this statement, neither of which stands up to much scrutiny.

The first interpretation is that the rules should not change in the future, and to do so would be unwelcome. This is unrealistic, dangerous and inconsistent with practice. As the world around us changes, so must the rules to accommodate these changes. As evidence of this, look at what the authorities have had to do in response to Covid and the shock that created for financial markets. The EU is almost constantly revising, or contemplating revising its own rules, and that's a good thing. So, I dismiss this argument.

The second argument is that UK rules should not change independently of those in the EU. I am being careful to phrase this point. It's not that UK rules might change independently – the equivalence process provides for re-assessment of such decisions, so this should not be a problem. So, it must be the stronger form that they should not change independently. But that is rule-taking pure and simple. It is not acceptable when UK rules govern a system 10 times the size of the UK GDP and is not the test up to now to assess equivalence. 

He then gives a few examples of changes the UK is considering (two banking, one insurance). I can't find the "isn't going to work" line in the actual speech, that might have been in a Q&A or something.

Edit: Incidentally the changes he's mentioned are: not applying Basel rules to purely domestic small banks (in line with the US and Switzerland), not allowing software to be included as bank capital calculations especially for stress-testing (this strikes me as very sensible and given the size of the financial sector to UK GDP very important) and changing the Solvency 2 regulations so they don't apply to life/annuity insurance.

For what it's worth the Reuters story I read doesn't include the "isn't going to work" line so I'm not sure where that's from.

Granting or not granting equivalence is a political, not a technical question. Even if the UK fulfill every EU regulation to the letter, there is no obligation to grant equivalence.

The UK made a deliberate political choice to become a competitor of the EU. If the EU now treats it as such, the British should take it with a stiff upper lip and stop this constant whining. If it is in the EU's interest, it might grant equivalence. If not, we can easily get financial services from NYC.

Having lying assholes like Johnson and Gove as top leadership is enough not to want to any further deals with Britain whatsoever. They are not even fulfilling their obligations from the last deals we made.

[Sheilbh]

Granting or not granting equivalence is a political, not a technical question. Even if the UK fulfill every EU regulation to the letter, there is no obligation to grant equivalence.

The UK made a deliberate political choice to become a competitor of the EU. If the EU now treats it as such, the British should take it with a stiff upper lip and stop this constant whining. If it is in the EU's interest, it might grant equivalence. If not, we can easily get financial services from NYC.

Agreed. But I don't see his comments as whining, or that the UK should - to nick Gavin Williamson's phrase () - "shut up and go away". We should be making the case.

Having said that I'm not sure Bailey's the person to make it. The BofE has a very strong rule-writing role in the UK, so it's not just a regulator applying the law, to a large extent it writes the regulations. But I think this sort of argument should be coming from the Treasury or politicians not technocrats. It feels inappropriately political to me. (Also as an aside we really need to rename the BofE as the Central Bank of the United Kingdom )

It is all about what's in the EU's interests and certain sectors have been exemption or equivalence decisions because there is no similar market in the EU, so it's not in the EU's interests to not trade in London. But I think on certain issues it makes absolute sense for the EU to want its financial business done in Europe and under the regulation of the ECB. So far no one centre has emerged across the different types of products - my money would be on Amsterdam or Dublin - but it may also mean financial markets might fragment within Europe with multiple smaller centres. On the one hand that probably reduces the risk of a financial crisis in Europe, but, potentially, increases the cost of accessing those financial services for European companies. There is probably a trade off for the European regulators to assess.

From London's perspective I think one factor would probably be doubling down on those sectors Europe can't easily on-shore. There also probably needs to be a lot of investment in tech - Europe is far behind Asian or American financial centres. and that may be something that multiple smaller European centres may struggle to match And a focus on new markets/products - I think Green Bonds and green financial instruments in general are probably going to be a huge new sector, also ESG finance in general is growing very rapidly and becoming more important. I think London probably will be good at taking advantage of new opportunities based on the way London's taken advantage of them before - London's the biggest centre for Islamic finance and RMB trading (outside of China) for example.

But, ultimately, as with almost everything related to Brexit what matters isn't necessarily the jobs lost now (and 7,000 re-located is far lower than the Treasury or companies like PwC were projecting in 2016) or new jobs created now. It's the loss of future jobs and, in the long-run, falling behind. It'll be like Hemingway's bankrupt - slowly then quickly.

Having lying assholes like Johnson and Gove as top leadership is enough not to want to any further deals with Britain whatsoever. They are not even fulfilling their obligations from the last deals we made.

As you say equivalence isn't really a deal it's a unilateral decision made by the EU. There are no obligations or deals involved.

[Sheilbh]

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/feb/06/fury-at-gove-as-exports-to-eu-slashed-by-68-since-brexit

Part of this is the pandemic for sure but apparently export traffic through British ports was down 65% compared to last January.

And the UK hasn't really started import checks properly, that's only coming in June.

Interesting update from Faisal Islam at the BBC looking at the indicators and trying to work out which sectors are mainly hit by covid v Brexit. Basically it looks like things are flowing but at a lower rate, hauliers and exporters/importers seem to have adapted to the new system and have the correct paperwork. And there are covid impacts - so flows to France may be hit by their stricter covid testing protocol for hauliers v the Netherlands (on a separate note - should Europe consider a single Schengen approach on covid testing or incoming travel restrictions?) and fashion manufacturers are probably hit by covid. But some of the disruption is permanent for the lower rate of trade-flow and certain sectors, especially fisheries and agriculture will take a permanent Brexit hit.

Obviously still waiting on official stats:

Brexit lorry chaos avoided as freight flows 'back to normal'
By Faisal Islam
Economics editor

The Government is confident that its post-Brexit worst-case scenario of disruption from queues of thousands of lorries in Kent has now been avoided.

Overall freight flows have returned to the same levels as last year.

Internal figures seen by the BBC show outbound roll-on roll-off lorry traffic for Great Britain for the month so far at 98% of last February's levels.

Inbound traffic is at 99% of last year's levels.

The transition period after the UK left the EU is now over, and a new regime is in place.

One official says the government is "pleased that overall flows are back to normal".

About 80-90% of laden lorries are arriving border-ready.

Larger manufacturing firms in particular appear to have taken advantage of new systems designed to prepare loads for the border on leaving premises.

Officials say they are pleased that overall flows are back to normal.


However, their analysis of data from multiple sources - ferry manifests, port traffic, the Channel Tunnel, French officials and Kent Permit checks - also shows:
    significantly lower traffic in January
    a notable rise in the number of empty lorries returning from Great Britain to the European Union, and
    specific industries clearly affected by the end of the Brexit transition period

Lorry traffic on the crossing from Kent to the EU on ferries and via the Channel Tunnel in January was 67% of the same month in 2020, and 82% in February.

Although there is no formal count of empty lorries, a variety of ferry company, French, and UK official data suggest the proportion of empty lorries going back to the EU at around 50%.

French sources suggested Eurotunnel, which tends to transfer higher-value loads, was seeing 50-60% empty loads.

Industry sources said the existence of such empty lorries was not new, but that this was normally at 25-30%.



So far this year, there is also evidence of freight routes changing and more traffic going via Harwich and Immingham to the Netherlands, though this will also reflect the recent French Covid testing policy.

The Government's data on lorries turning back due to the wrong documentation is now below 2.5%, having been closer to 8% in the first days of the new regime.

Combining the reduction in traffic flow with the increased number of empty lorries, it is possible to calculate that actual lorry transfers of freight in January from Kent to the EU were substantially down, by around 2,000 lorries a day compared to January 2020.

Even now, with overall levels back to normal, there are around 1,000-2,000 fewer lorries exiting the whole of Great Britain with actual freight.

This is partly down to pre-Christmas stockpiling, but that effect is likely to be waning now.

The government has also internally identified what type of exports are in the lorries, as that information is reported in ferry manifest data.

From this, it has concluded internally that exports of clothing and apparel have been hit mainly by a Covid lockdown impact.

But the fall in food, agriculture and sea fish exports is the impact of the post-Brexit transition period.

The big picture is that the worst-case scenario queues have not materialised. But the economic impact in specific areas of the economy is noticeable in the same data.

French officials confirmed this same general picture, and both sides of the Channel reported a good level of cooperation in ironing out problems with, for example, IT systems.

Official statistics on this will only start to be available with trade figures for July published next month.

Internally, the Government's hope is that the lack of congestion can now tempt cautious traders back into fully using these trade routes.

[Zanza]

Empty lorries rising from 25-30% to 50% suggest a third less exports. Maybe not by value though. That's pretty bad, but was to be expected from abruptly rising trade barriers that much.

Once Britain introduces inbound checks in April and July, the other direction will be impacted as well.

In the end, it will hit SME on both sides of the channel as they have a smaller market to sell to. And consumers as they have less choice at higher prices.

Multinationals will not care as they have the means to demonstrate origin, large consignments and can handle paperwork. The often referenced German carmakers for example.

Italian prosecco will be hit though as groupage of smaller consignments got much harder...

[Sheilbh]

Yep.

As has been the case all the way through the areas (of the economy and the country) that voted Remain are probably in the best position to deal with the consequences of Leave, while the Leave areas will likely be worst hit

[Zanza]

Also if the British government says everything is fine EU <> GB then why do they claim there are so many issues GB <> NI? Same rules apply, so presumably what work for Calais-Dover should work for the smaller volume to Northern Ireland as well... #teethingproblems

[Josquius]

It is pretty disturbing to see all the reporting that after some early blips everything is fine and normal. It really isn't and its bizzare even the saner sections of the press are letting those numbers be the story.

[mongers]

Empty lorries rising from 25-30% to 50% suggest a third less exports. Maybe not by value though. That's pretty bad, but was to be expected from abruptly rising trade barriers that much.

Once Britain introduces inbound checks in April and July, the other direction will be impacted as well.

In the end, it will hit SME on both sides of the channel as they have a smaller market to sell to. And consumers as they have less choice at higher prices.

Multinationals will not care as they have the means to demonstrate origin, large consignments and can handle paperwork. The often referenced German carmakers for example.

Italian prosecco will be hit though as groupage of smaller consignments got much harder...

Yes, that's the key fact, most of the rest of the item is a distortion or government spin partially swallowed by the reporter.

Given the tight margins hauliers work on, for them to suddenly face that significant a revenue loss on top of the other problems will force more than a few into a restructuring or liquidation.

[Sheilbh]

Also if the British government says everything is fine EU <> GB then why do they claim there are so many issues GB <> NI? Same rules apply, so presumably what work for Calais-Dover should work for the smaller volume to Northern Ireland as well... #teethingproblems

GB - NI isn't meant to be like Calais-Dover - it's a unique, sui generis border created by both sides acknowledging the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland. Ultimately GB-EU is an international frontier which also maps onto a division between customs areas and single markets; NI-GB is not an international frontier and NI is in some ways part of the EU and UK customs areas and markets. They're not the same and they're not meant to be the same . If they were there'd be no need for an NIP and the agreement could just say that the wider provisions also apply to trade between NI-GB.

Practically it's also a different type of "trade. It's more likely that GB-NI trade is made up of general supply chain for bigger companies but also far more internal consumer and SME movements of lots of possibly small deliveries in mixed consignments because lots of companies will have their distribution network for NI in the GB; Calais-Dover is more likely to be classic international trade from one distribution network to another. I'm not sure I've ever bought anything from the EU as an individual (unless Amazon's tax establishment of the day counts), but everyone who's done any online shopping in NI is likely to have done some purchases from a GB company. And I also imagine there are relatively few big retailers, say, in GB whose distribution is sourced from the Netherlands or France. There are smaller ones - especially shops like delis and restaurants who will make small purchases directly from, say, Spain, Italy or France who are going to be hard hit - but I think that's likely to be a far bigger issue in NI.

The other key point is the politics and part of the "unique circumstances" of Northern Ireland which is why the NIP exists. It's the peace process. The basis of all politics in Northern Ireland after the GFA is consent and an acknowledgement and shared commitment by all sides to cross-community politics, because majoritarianism does not work in Northern Ireland. You need real, substantial cross-community support. I think the EU, Ireland and UK are being sensible - the statements from the joint committee always seem pretty reasonable and cooperative to me.

Hopefully they can work together to make the NIP work, which will then build support from the relative moderates in the unionist community particularly Arlene Foster's wing of the DUP and the UUP who want to make it work. I think if it doesn't work smoothly - and the unforced error over Article 16, though separate, was huge news in Northern Ireland; it's really difficult to underestimate the impact that's had on the debate - then we will see a continued drift to hard-line unionists who oppose the NIP utterly. I think there's also a risk that as the consent of the unionist community ebbs that you see physical force loyalism come back. I already think it's very likely that the Northern Ireland Assembly collapses at some point this year over the NIP (I mean it last fell apart over subsidies for renewable heating - it doesn't take much ).

I thought this thread from Peter Foster was good and ideally the best solution would be if all sides almost carve out Northern Ireland from the rest of the Brexit deal because of the "unique circumstances" and the risk of a return to violence. I think the suggestions of Irish MEPs around allowing Stormont to have an office in the European Parliament and a structure for the EU to engage with Northern Ireland are really helpful. Becaues I think the more contact between EU-NI the better. Plus I think, ultimately, the nationalist position is very, very similar and aligned to the Irish position so the EU knows that; especially under Johnson I don't think the unionist position or interest is aligned with the UK government's (which is mainly focused on GB) and some way for unionists to engage with Europe would be helpful:

Peter Foster
@pmdfoster
It's OUT! My latest #Brexit Briefing for @FinancialTimes - examining @BorisJohnson "buy now, pay later" Northern Ireland Protocol, why the EU-UK trust deficit is killing it, how that can be restored - because it needs to work. /1
The danger here is that lingering animus over the opportunistic nature Johnson's Faustian bargain - dividing his Kingdom in order to 'get #Brexit done' and win an 80-seat majority - is clouding judgement on both sides of the Channel /2
The facts of the Protocol are no less true for Johnson's constant denial of them - that there would be checks, that there really is a trade border that now prevents plants and pets from travelling freely from Bedford to Ballymena as M.Gove reminds us. But these are other facts/3
Firstly, NI remains part of UK, even if it is now has EU customs rules.

Secondly, NI remains politically divided and fragile; the Good Friday Agreement is a constant work in progress.

Thirdly, both the EU and the UK agreed to this unsatisfactory arrangement jointly. /4
Fourthly, therefore, they have a joint responsibility to make it work because

Fifthly - and most importantly — there is no alternative to it. /5
The last three years established that a technological north-south border isn't happening - technologically OR politically.

And the UK will not agree to the strictures of "no regulatory divergence" that underpinned May's decision to say in the EU single market for goods./6
Which leaves everyone - London, Brussels, Dublin and Belfast - stuck with this unsatisfactory arrangement that needs to be made to work in as unobtrusive and politically sensitive way as possible - everyone's grievances to one side, which is stupidly easy to say, I know /7
But it does need to *work* - that means the border needs to function properly as @MarosSefcovic has said - or you start to create the conditions for the very same north-south border that we're all trying to avoid here. /8
The UK does recognise this need for functionality - even if its behaviour last year by unilaterally threatening to break the terms of the deal - has raised doubts on the EU side about London's real commitment to the deal. /9
But at the same time, if the EU keeps on treating the GB-NI border like the Dover-Calais border and as a 'test' of UK probity and trustworthiness, there is a risk of a downward spiral that, in the absence of alternatives, leads nowhere good /10
It was interesting listening to NI logistics operators this week talking to @CommonsNIAC  about how processes could be simplified and streamlined whilst still giving the EU the data/certainty they need /11
This is v technical stuff, but it is surely worth exploring more deeply - in the light of the 'unique circumstances' of Northern Ireland how both sides can - to coin a bitter phrase - have their cake and eat it here /12
In his letter @MarosSefcovic says that functionality is a "prerequisite" for further easements and facilitations - but it is important that the EU really means that, and can approach this in a outcomes-based, not legalistic way. /13
The problem - as we all know - is that this deeply unsatisfactory deal really requires trust and good relations on both sides. And the reality is that that is sadly lacking - @michaelgove dinging Brussels for its "integrationist theology" (and EU return fire) all symptomatic /14
On the upside, it seems that @MarosSefcovic and @michaelgove did manage to lower the temperature last night over their London Deliveroo dinner party and seek "workable solutions" /15
UK officials are pretty guarded in their optimism - this is far from sorted - BUT the willingness of the EU side to engage/listen with NI business is taken as a positive, both in Whitehall but also in NI as @MichaelAodhan tells me in that news report. /16
The danger, talking to folk in Brussels, is that France, Germany are failing to separate out the Protocol form the rest of the deal - and are determined to keep both London (and Dublin) "honest" here, and in the process are deepening a mess they don't really understand/17
Of course, they might "understand" better if @michaelgove @DavidGHFrost @BorisJohnson all did more to settle the relationship that, on many fronts, looks testy - and likelier to get testier as more and more realities of the Canada-style trading start to land /18
There needs to be a really collective effort not to make Northern Ireland the casualty of this post-divorce feuding. If the border can bed in, then there are even some upsides - ask the NI shellfish operators, they can send to Europe, no depuration required /19
Anyway. On the upside, this week has ended in a better place than it began, and that - in #Brexit world - is surely progress. Fingers crossed it continues.

Good weekend all. ENDS

[Sheilbh]

Yes, that's the key fact, most of the rest of the item is a distortion or government spin partially swallowed by the reporter.

Faisal Islam's wider thread on this is worth reading - it's here. And I don't think he's a reporter who just swallows spin:
https://twitter.com/faisalislam/status/1360511149268234241

I think the key point from the government perspective is the "reasonable worst case scenario" is now very unlikely to happen -  eg queues of 7k lorries, food shortages etc. I wonder if the experience of covid has helped. I've always felt the worst case scenario impacts were unlikely, but really unlikely after supermarket supply chains basically held up during the first weeks of the first lockdown (except for loo roll and flour ).

Given the tight margins hauliers work on, for them to suddenly face that significant a revenue loss on top of the other problems will force more than a few into a restructuring or liquidation.

Yeah - though I think the worst hit sectors will still be the really impacted exporters like fisheries and agrifood.

[Zanza]

The British prime minister could make a great start to building trust by actually acknowledging what he signed up to instead of constantly lying about Northern Ireland.

As it is, it looks like Britain didn't sign the NIP in good faith. The Internal Market Bill, lack of implementation of the Joint Council meetings and prominent Tories that were in the past successful in pushing for this very hard Brexit barging on about breaking the NIP do not increase trust or goodwill.

Of course the reaction of the EU is overly legalistic as that's the nature of the EU and that clearly does not help either.

But unlike the British government, the EU at least publicly states that it understands the complexity of the situation and the compromises made in the NIP. Johnson, Lewis, Foster et al don't.

Or maybe if the British opposition would at least point out these lies instead of complete silence on Brexit.

[Sheilbh]

But isn't that exactly his point - that Northern Ireland shouldn't be the test of the Johnson government's "sincerity" or commitment to the deal. There's no argument about taking an extremely legalist approach to the wider agreement and the EU is entirely within its rights to insist on strict application/adherence to the letter of any part of the deal. Both parties have recognised that NI is unique because it's creating a different type of border than any other frontier that's in and out of the EU and, frankly, Kent and Pas-de-Calais aren't fragile post-conflict societies that have only really had peace in the last 15-20 years.

FWIW I think Arlene Foster understands the complexity of NI better than the EU But more importantly I think she understands the unionist community because that's her life and I think the real right now is that the debate in unionist circles is about whether to withdraw their consent from the NIP and actively resist it (through democratic politics and direct action - not violence), and  withdraw Stormont if necessary. The former leader Peter Robinson - who I think is understood to have a better "read" on grassroots unionism than Foster basically said the choice is: accept the protocol and carry on working to implement it in Stormont; or reject the protocol and boycott Stormont - or as he put it they move to a position of "defiance".

He didn't pick sides, but there is a bit of logic to his view that the DUP can't simultaneously oppose the NIP while being responsible for implementing it through Stormont (which is Foster's current position). The risk if they accept the protocol is they will get the blame for any difficulties and that unionism might fracture with harder-line elements winning out (both politically and with the paramilitaries). The risk if they collapse Stormont to oppose the protocol is they will get blamed for doing it during covid (rightly - but this may just be a timing issue) and it restores direct rule (including fully implementing the NIP) by a Tory government that's already betrayed the unionists once and, in their view, is far closer and more receptive to Irish and nationalist opinion than unionists. On the other hand I've seen unionists suggest the only way to make London actually take their side on the protocol is to threaten something London really cares about: Stormont.

From everything I've read from unionists, the unionist view is (not unreasonably) that they've been sold out by the Tories in this Brexit deal. Johnson has joined Bonar Law as a great betrayer of Ulster unionism and in their view the UK government is very weak to the Irish government and nationalist perspectives. I don't think they're yet at the point of admitting that agitating against May's deal was a huge mistake.

As I say I think the key is for the EU, the UK and Ireland to work together and sensibly - which seems to be happening the Joint Committee - to create conditions for the NIP to operate more smoothly and in a way that creates space for both communities to support it. Not least because I don't really know what the alternative is.

My biggest fear is that this ends up being like the Good Friday Agreement which Seamus Mallon famously called Sunningdale for slow learners. Sunningdale was the agreement that set out power-sharing etc in 1973. It collapsed after growing unionist opposition eventually ending in a loyalist paramilitary orchestrated (and enforced) general strike. Then you have 25 years of violence before all parties end up agreeing to something that is, basically, very similar to Sunningdale. I worry that there's a risk that pattern happens again and we end up with the NIP for slow learners.

Edit: Incidentally there's reports in Westminster that a number of proposed policies are being put on hold because they might not apply to NI - at the minute there's a sensitivity to not emphasise the difference between NI and GB.