The Ultimate Tank?

[Warspite]

Grumbler touches on a good point.

Yes, the Sherman was woeful when meeting Tigers and Panthers. But how often did they meet? As an infantry support vehicle, it was more than decent. And unlike the Germans, Allied strategy was not about winning the war as quickly as possible to compensate for structural economic deficiencies (which was the strategic essence of blitzkrieg).

[Berkut]

Well, running into a Panther was not unusual after Normandy, but it wasn't common either - the 76mm Sherman was certainly adequate against the majority of armor it ran into.

I think the better argument can be made that even as an infantry support vehicle it was pretty mediocre though, as its armor could be easily defeated by a wide variety of common German AT weapons - even the measly 50mm gun that armed many lighter German AFVs and was a very common AT gun could take out a Sherman from the side, and the 75mm fun could take it out from any angle, at least until the field expedient armor packages became common later in the year.

I would include the Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust as well, but to be honest, they could pretty much take out anything anyway, including a Pershing.

The mistake made by the US, IMO, wasn't so much the Sherman, which did its job in an adequate manner, but the M-10/M-18 and the entire TD concept. The resources spent on those could have been spent creating a real tank destroyer - a "heavy" medium tank similar in capability to the Panther as a much better supplement to the Sherman force. But that would require the right choices being made in 1942 or early 43, and those choices simply were not made.

[Mr.Penguin]

The T-72 was an attempt to make a cheaper version of the T-64 from 1967, they succeded in not only making a cheaper version, but also a more crappy version. The only thing on the Iraqi T-72's that wasnt 60's erea tech was the laser range finder some of them had installed...

The T-72 was mostly a cheaper version of the very sophisticated (and expensive) T-64. It was accepted in 1973 and entered in service in 1975, but it was seen as a very good tank for the export market. It was not intended to be the main tank of the Soviet formations - the true enemy of 1970s NATO would have been the T-64, which was kept secret and never exported.

Note that Soviet tank design was split into two main branches - the cheap, lesser and export-oriented series, represented mainly by the T-72 and later by the T-90 (which improved the T-72 design in the area of fire control, night vision and a more advanced armor package), and the sophisticated, not-for-export tanks, the T-64 and the T-80 (the T-80A is basically the T-64B without problems).

That said, note that by doctrine a Soviet tank is not meant to engage a Western tank on a one-to-one basis. To do that would be a tactical failure by the Soviet commander. They were meant to outnumber their Western counterparts by (at least ) 5 to 1, preferrably more.

Which means that to recreate actual battle conditions, both the M1A2 and the L2A6 need to engage solo at least five T-80U.

As for the ultimate tank, it varies with the times, the FT-17 being top spot in WWI and the Panther the best pick in WW2, but the Soviet T-54/55 model has had an amazing run so far.

It was quite modern when it came out, it was an huge sucess in the export market, was built in numbers like no other [indeed it was the core of the chinese tank force as the locally-produced version of the Type 59] and is still in use today (not only in Africa, but note that the iranian T-72Z is actually a T-54/55 or a Type 59 with its 100mm gun replaced by a 105mm one).

In fact, several countries have tried to upgrade it to become more modern- anyone remembers the Jaguar, made by China State Factories and Textron Marine & Land Systems of the US? It was a Type 59 built to modern standards. Even Israel used the T-54/55 for a while.

The T-72 was an upgrade of the T-62 not the T-64.  The T-62 was a upgraded version of the T-55/54 hurried in to production to be able to counter the new M60A1.  The T-64  was a different tank entirely and is the ancestor of the T-80(T-80U is a post cold war configuration).  Why exactly the Soviets had multiple MBTs in production at the same time is not entirely known.  It's claimed that some are "quality" and some are "quantity" models.  Personally I think the real reasons lie with the bureaucratic politics of  the Soviet Union.  In practice the combat differences between tanks like the T-72 and T-80 were fairly small though the Soviets had hoped otherwise.  I should be noted that when the Soviet Union broke up 80% of the tank inventory was T-54/55s/62s.

The first T-64 was Kharkov design bureau's improved version of the T-62 (a URAL design). First with a 115mm gun like the T-62 later upgraded with a 125mm gun, both versions came with an autoloader and a 3 man crew, the 125mm version was accepted into first line service. However the army didnt like this new disign as they fund it to expensive, unreliable and all to "conscript unfriendly" with its advanced fire controls, compact engine and hydraulic-mechanical suspension. So the Army asked the compiting URAL design burearu to design a cheaper and more practical alternative to the T-64, the result the T-72.   

[grumbler]

The mistake made by the US, IMO, wasn't so much the Sherman, which did its job in an adequate manner, but the M-10/M-18 and the entire TD concept. The resources spent on those could have been spent creating a real tank destroyer - a "heavy" medium tank similar in capability to the Panther as a much better supplement to the Sherman force. But that would require the right choices being made in 1942 or early 43, and those choices simply were not made.

Exactly.  The US Army stuck with an outmoded doctrine because they had created a bureaucracy designed around that doctrine, which made it difficult to do any "tradeoff" studies on the effectiveness of the doctrine.  It was kinda like the battleship versus carrier debate: both sides had an entrenched bureaucracy that was fighting for its life, and so decisions were made for bureaucratic, not military, reasons.

[The Minsky Moment]

B/c if your biggest strategic problems inlcude: shortages of oil, shortages of transport, shortages of steel,  and shortages of spare parts - basing your operational strategy on a machine that guzzles gas, is relatively mechanically unreliable, and requires a lot of servicing and maintenance is perhaps not the best idea.

It's not like there was a viable alternative to combined arms warfare. They needed tanks, no matter how expensive or unreliable they were.

Except that the Germans didn't really begin WW2 with that concept in mind.  The original campaign against France was designed as a kind of souped-up version of a WWI offensive where the strategic objective was seizing industrial areas in NE France and the channel ports.  The Germans actually ramped down on aircraft and tank production in early 1940 to focus on artillery shell production because the assumption is that the war in the west would be a long slog, and that shell shortages would arise.  The idea of using concentrated armormed spearheads only arose late in the planning process after the war was already under way, and was not incorprated into the plan until just before the invasion.

One could say that the Germans discovered the operational possibilities of the "blitzkrieg" in connection with the 1940 strike in the West, and in a way were just as surprised as everyone else.  The question was what then to do after the fall of France.  The danger in concocting a grand strategic plan driven by the operational advantages of combined arms warfare was that even after the conquest in the West, Germany lacked the resources (paricularly oil and transport infrastructure) to sustain very large-scale combined operations for a significant period of time.  An obvious response to that reality would have been to scale back Germany's strategic ambitions to place them more in line with their capabilities.  The choice that Hitler made was to attempt to seize by force the resources needed to drive German operational superiority, even though that plan directly put into question Germany's material capability for carrying our such a seizure.  I.e. Germany approached the problem ass-backward - they allowed operational considerations to drive their overall strategic thinking instead of vice-a-versa.  The same logic reinforced itself with decisions to ensure operational and tactical superiority in ways that basically involved doubling down on a very long odds bet - i.e. emphasizing the development and deployment of extremely resource intensive and mechancially complex machines like heavy tanks and jet aircraft, at the expense, of simpler, cheaper, less energy intensive and more reliable designs.  And disaster ensued.

[DGuller]

BTW, are there any good tactical WW2 games out there?  Something like Panzer General, only made in this millenium?

[grumbler]

Except that the Germans didn't really begin WW2 with that concept in mind.  The original campaign against France was designed as a kind of souped-up version of a WWI offensive where the strategic objective was seizing industrial areas in NE France and the channel ports.  The Germans actually ramped down on aircraft and tank production in early 1940 to focus on artillery shell production because the assumption is that the war in the west would be a long slog, and that shell shortages would arise.  The idea of using concentrated armormed spearheads only arose late in the planning process after the war was already under way, and was not incorprated into the plan until just before the invasion.

I think I am going to disagree with you on this.  The Germans used concentrated armored spearheads in Czechoslovakia and Poland.  What the Germans discovered in these campaigns was that they had too many tanks per division, and too many light tanks, period.  They didn't "ramp down" production of the Mk III or Mk IV in early 1940, they simply stopped producing Mk IIs until they could complete the recon version.  I know the Germans stopped production of the Do 17 during this period as well, but have never read that they slowed production of the Me-109 nor the Ju-88.

What was incorporated late in the campaign planning was the thrust through the Ardennes.  Prior to the decision to strike through the Ardennes, the idea was a Poland-style tactical encirclement battle using Panzer spearheads as the hammer and the infantry as the anvil.  That is still "Blitzkrieg," though.

One could say that the Germans discovered the operational possibilities of the "blitzkrieg" in connection with the 1940 strike in the West, and in a way were just as surprised as everyone else. 

Blitzkrieg was an operational concept, not a strategic one.  I would agree that the Germans were surprised at the speed with which the strategic use of Blitzkrieg (the Ardennes thrust) forced the collapse of France, but I am not aware of any German commander writing that the tactic was a surprising success on an operational basis.

The question was what then to do after the fall of France.  The danger in concocting a grand strategic plan driven by the operational advantages of combined arms warfare was that even after the conquest in the West, Germany lacked the resources (paricularly oil and transport infrastructure) to sustain very large-scale combined operations for a significant period of time.  An obvious response to that reality would have been to scale back Germany's strategic ambitions to place them more in line with their capabilities. 

The Germans had counted on the defeat of France to force the collapse of British morale and a negotiated end to this "warm up round" before the big fight with the USSR.  Germany's strategic ambitions had always been to defeat the USSR.  To say that they should have waited for the Soviet invasion of Germany is not supportable given that the Germans would be throwing away their single advantage - operational superiority, and not invading the USSR was pretty much the only way they could "scale back" their "strategic ambitions to place them more in line with their capabilities."

The choice that Hitler made was to attempt to seize by force the resources needed to drive German operational superiority, even though that plan directly put into question Germany's material capability for carrying our such a seizure.  I.e. Germany approached the problem ass-backward - they allowed operational considerations to drive their overall strategic thinking instead of vice-a-versa.

I actually have no idea what argument you are making here.  Can you be a teeny bit less vague and general?

The same logic reinforced itself with decisions to ensure operational and tactical superiority in ways that basically involved doubling down on a very long odds bet - i.e. emphasizing the development and deployment of extremely resource intensive and mechancially complex machines like heavy tanks and jet aircraft, at the expense, of simpler, cheaper, less energy intensive and more reliable designs.  And disaster ensued.

Certainly the Germans wasted vast amounts of resources developing tanks that were simply not operationally justifiable:  the Maus, Ratte, Elephant, King Tiger, Jagdtiger, Elephant, etc.  The Tiger itself does not fall into that category.  It was built for a specific mission: to allow the Germans to attain tank superiority in a given locale, even though their main battle tanks were inferior to the opposition's.  This is exactly why these were deployed in independent battalions, not attached to any division.  That particular tank worked very well in its role.

Jet aircraft were, of course, were simpler and used less refined fuel than piston-engined aircraft.  They just couldn't be manufactured very well using the materials available at the time (though, if you had enough spare engines, thsis wasn't a big deal, as an engine change-out was pretty simple).  Where Hitler blundered, in absolutely typical Nazi fashion, was deciding that "good enough" should be sacrificed for "better" in this and all other things.

The Weird Reich was notable for the baronies that made decision-making so bureaucratic, and for an extreme element of wishful thinking that translated directly into operational planning.  The mistake was not inverting strategic and operational thinking, the mistake was thinking that operational miracles would always occur to fulfill unrealistic strategic thinking.  Germany had no realistic chances of defeating the USSR in a strictly military campaign, and the political campaign that might have brought them a glimmer of hope was anathema to Germany's leadership.

[Neil]

Also, let's not forget the antiquated dreadnought design that the Germans used.