Fighting Ebola with Freedom

[Razgovory]

Well I found out something today.  Adam Smith was a libertarian. And Rousseau was a "anti-libertarian".  No wonder Grumbler is a teacher.  You learn something from him everyday.

[crazy canuck]

It is attractive to want to maximize everything you think is good, but being attractive doesn't make it possible.  That's why there is no philosophy of maximizing everything good.

Yes there is, it's called Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism isn't a philosophy, it's a theory of normative ethics.

Perhaps the most artful dodge Grumbler has made to date to avoid having to admit he was wrong.

[PJL]

It is attractive to want to maximize everything you think is good, but being attractive doesn't make it possible.  That's why there is no philosophy of maximizing everything good.

Yes there is, it's called Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism isn't a philosophy, it's a theory of normative ethics.

And normative ethics is a part of moral philosophy.

[Berkut]

I don't see why you wouldn't maximize everything good (not "everything") if you are setting out to maximize many variables simultaneously. 

Optimizing many variables simultaneously is not equivalent to maximizing all those variables in isolation if the variables are not independent.

Yeah, exactly.

And yeah, though quantifying this stuff is basically impossible, for the sake of argument I think something like:

Freedom = 0.7; Equality = 0.65; Justice = 0.8; General Material Welfare = 0.75

is superior to

Freedom = 1.0; Equality = 0.02; Justice = 0.2; General Material Welfare = 0.4.

It's super abstract, of course, and leaves out all sorts of different social goods but it illustrates the main point.

Now, if libertarianism means something like "let's weigh the value of the 'Freedom' score to be worth 1.3 points of Equality, and 1.1 points of Justice and General Material Welfare while striving for the highest possible score" then that's fine (and the same with, say, some sort of "Social Welfare" philosophy that posits "1 General Material Welfare = 1 Equality = 1.2 Justice = 1.3 Freedom; let's drive up the aggregate score").

As long as the other values are considered worthwhile in themselves, we can have endless and possibly constructive arguments about how to balance that out and how to apply it (not to mention about exactly what we mean by General Material Welfare or Freedom).

But once we get to arguments that "we have to get Freedom as close to 1 as possible, without regard to any of the other values" then I think we're looking at something very counterproductive, to say the least; even more so if we get into "we should push Equality as close to 0 as we can, rather than 1" or "I actually prefer Justice at around 0.5, because [members of group X] does not deserve Justice, only people like me". And lest this is taken to be specifically about libertarianism, I feel the same way about any approach that places one value as the pinnacle of philosophical ideals at the cost of all others.

Good post.

The only issue is that I don't think there are really libertarians who feel the way you describe - that liberty should be held with such weight as to trump all others.

I don't see why you wouldn't maximize everything good (not "everything") if you are setting out to maximize many variables simultaneously. 

Optimizing many variables simultaneously is not equivalent to maximizing all those variables in isolation if the variables are not independent.

Yeah, exactly.

And yeah, though quantifying this stuff is basically impossible, for the sake of argument I think something like:

Freedom = 0.7; Equality = 0.65; Justice = 0.8; General Material Welfare = 0.75

is superior to

Freedom = 1.0; Equality = 0.02; Justice = 0.2; General Material Welfare = 0.4.

It's super abstract, of course, and leaves out all sorts of different social goods but it illustrates the main point.

Now, if libertarianism means something like "let's weigh the value of the 'Freedom' score to be worth 1.3 points of Equality, and 1.1 points of Justice and General Material Welfare while striving for the highest possible score" then that's fine (and the same with, say, some sort of "Social Welfare" philosophy that posits "1 General Material Welfare = 1 Equality = 1.2 Justice = 1.3 Freedom; let's drive up the aggregate score").

As long as the other values are considered worthwhile in themselves, we can have endless and possibly constructive arguments about how to balance that out and how to apply it (not to mention about exactly what we mean by General Material Welfare or Freedom).

But once we get to arguments that "we have to get Freedom as close to 1 as possible, without regard to any of the other values" then I think we're looking at something very counterproductive, to say the least; even more so if we get into "we should push Equality as close to 0 as we can, rather than 1" or "I actually prefer Justice at around 0.5, because [members of group X] does not deserve Justice, only people like me". And lest this is taken to be specifically about libertarianism, I feel the same way about any approach that places one value as the pinnacle of philosophical ideals at the cost of all others.

Great post Jacob.

As someone who very much self describes as a libertarian, and yet laughs regularly when people like Raz and DG try to tell me what "libertarians" believe, I think your assesment is very reasonable, except that

"we have to get Freedom as close to 1 as possible, without regard to any of the other values" is not a position held by any libertarians I know - and if there are, they should be mocked. I suspect though that is more of a caricature.

Now, back to your previous point that noted that "liberty" is one of several (often competing) values. What I mean when I claim to be "libertarian" is that I DO in fact think that these values are not all the same, and that in fact freedom and liberty are special compared to the others. That humans have a inate "right" to their own personal freedom, and that inate right is in fact the starting point that we should consider when discussing how society ought to organize itself, and certainly how governments should maximize the greater good overall.

In other words, it isn't just evaluating several competing values or even assigning a heavier weight to "liberty" versus "equality" (as an example). It is saying that freedom is so important, that the dangers of the state taking away human freedom is so common and pernicious throughout human history, that when we discuss and debate proposals to maximize that greater good, we must start with the presumption that any decrease in liberty MUST be explicitly justified by a objective and measured increase in the greater good. It is not enough to simply claim that that good will be served - it must be shown to be the case in some convincing fashion.

There is an obvious philosophical stance here around basic human rights, but there is also (at least for me) an extremely pragmatic stance as well. Throughout human history, if there is one thing that is consistent, it is that people continually restrict liberty for reasons that have NOTHING to do with maximizing your formula about. They might *claim* that is the reason, but mostly it is actually about maximizing some groups share of the pie at the expense of others, or simply forcing people to act in a manner that some minority or majority likes.

But honestly, it is mostly just about a political elite attempting to retain and secure their hold on power, and personal freedom (whether that be freedom of expression or even the simple freedom to have a say in government) is anathema to that, and so throughout history we see example after example of the state restricting freedom in the interests of what they *always* claim is the greater good, but in reality it is just for some segments greater good.

I have to agree with grumbler - if we say all these things are equally good, then in fact none of them are good. I claim that not only should "freedom" be weighted highly against other "goods", but that it actually enjoys a "first among equals" status. That no amount of security or equality or prosperity can justify significant restrictions on freedom, even to the extent of saying that the true equation of the "greatest good" includes a basic ceiling on the value placed on freedom. Without freedom, the rest matters little.

[The Minsky Moment]

I'd say the libertarians like Smith and Locke ended up with far more coherent and human (and, ultimately, influential) political-economic theories than the non-libertarians like Rousseau and Mun.

I wouldn't consider Smith to be a libertarian; his moral philosophy is consistent either with libertarian and non-libertarian point of view, and his political economy is essentially pragmatic.  As for Locke, the Two Treatises are libertarian-y, but his account of property is pretty incoherent.   And the Locke that wrote the Carolina Constitutions isn't really libertarian at all.

I also think Rousseau is misunderstood/gets a bad rap based on subsequent misuse but that is an argument for another time and place.

[crazy canuck]

That no amount of security or equality or prosperity can justify significant restrictions on freedom, even to the extent of saying that the true equation of the "greatest good" includes a basic ceiling on the value placed on freedom. Without freedom, the rest matters little.

Is that really the argument?  If there was a system that could provide superior security, equality and prosperity then that system would be superior. Isnt the argument that there is no such system and that the best system for giving security, equality and prosperity is one that grants liberty and freedom with reasonable limits.

[DGuller]

As someone who very much self describes as a libertarian, and yet laughs regularly when people like Raz and DG try to tell me what "libertarians" believe, I think your assesment is very reasonable, except that

Berkut, you're definitely a libertarian by my definition. 

[grumbler]

I wouldn't consider Smith to be a libertarian; his moral philosophy is consistent either with libertarian and non-libertarian point of view, and his political economy is essentially pragmatic.  As for Locke, the Two Treatises are libertarian-y, but his account of property is pretty incoherent.   And the Locke that wrote the Carolina Constitutions isn't really libertarian at all.

I also think Rousseau is misunderstood/gets a bad rap based on subsequent misuse but that is an argument for another time and place.

Libertarian = "classical liberal" by every definition I have seen (and that is precisely how the phrase was coined, to the best of my knowledge).  I'd be interested in an argument that Locke or Smith were not classical liberals based on something other than arguments by definition.

[grumbler]

Isnt the argument that there is no such system and that the best system for giving security, equality and prosperity is one that grants liberty and freedom with reasonable limits.

This is pretty much the basic premise of classical liberalism/libertarianism.

[crazy canuck]

Isnt the argument that there is no such system and that the best system for giving security, equality and prosperity is one that grants liberty and freedom with reasonable limits.

This is pretty much the basic premise of classical liberalism/libertarianism.

Exactly.  Which is why I was a bit surprised by Berkut's position.

[Berkut]

Isnt the argument that there is no such system and that the best system for giving security, equality and prosperity is one that grants liberty and freedom with reasonable limits.

This is pretty much the basic premise of classical liberalism/libertarianism.

Exactly.  Which is why I was a bit surprised by Berkut's position.

Is my position in contrast to that? It certainly is not intended to be...

[crazy canuck]

Isnt the argument that there is no such system and that the best system for giving security, equality and prosperity is one that grants liberty and freedom with reasonable limits.

This is pretty much the basic premise of classical liberalism/libertarianism.

Exactly.  Which is why I was a bit surprised by Berkut's position.

Is my position in contrast to that? It certainly is not intended to be...

Fair enough, I thought you were going so far as to argue that Liberty is so important that even if a system could be created that gave more security, equality and prosperity it should be rejected if it sacrificed Liberty.   

[Jacob]

Great post Jacob.

As someone who very much self describes as a libertarian, and yet laughs regularly when people like Raz and DG try to tell me what "libertarians" believe, I think your assesment is very reasonable, except that

"we have to get Freedom as close to 1 as possible, without regard to any of the other values" is not a position held by any libertarians I know - and if there are, they should be mocked. I suspect though that is more of a caricature.

Now, back to your previous point that noted that "liberty" is one of several (often competing) values. What I mean when I claim to be "libertarian" is that I DO in fact think that these values are not all the same, and that in fact freedom and liberty are special compared to the others. That humans have a inate "right" to their own personal freedom, and that inate right is in fact the starting point that we should consider when discussing how society ought to organize itself, and certainly how governments should maximize the greater good overall.

In other words, it isn't just evaluating several competing values or even assigning a heavier weight to "liberty" versus "equality" (as an example). It is saying that freedom is so important, that the dangers of the state taking away human freedom is so common and pernicious throughout human history, that when we discuss and debate proposals to maximize that greater good, we must start with the presumption that any decrease in liberty MUST be explicitly justified by a objective and measured increase in the greater good. It is not enough to simply claim that that good will be served - it must be shown to be the case in some convincing fashion.

There is an obvious philosophical stance here around basic human rights, but there is also (at least for me) an extremely pragmatic stance as well. Throughout human history, if there is one thing that is consistent, it is that people continually restrict liberty for reasons that have NOTHING to do with maximizing your formula about. They might *claim* that is the reason, but mostly it is actually about maximizing some groups share of the pie at the expense of others, or simply forcing people to act in a manner that some minority or majority likes.

But honestly, it is mostly just about a political elite attempting to retain and secure their hold on power, and personal freedom (whether that be freedom of expression or even the simple freedom to have a say in government) is anathema to that, and so throughout history we see example after example of the state restricting freedom in the interests of what they *always* claim is the greater good, but in reality it is just for some segments greater good.

I have to agree with grumbler - if we say all these things are equally good, then in fact none of them are good. I claim that not only should "freedom" be weighted highly against other "goods", but that it actually enjoys a "first among equals" status. That no amount of security or equality or prosperity can justify significant restrictions on freedom, even to the extent of saying that the true equation of the "greatest good" includes a basic ceiling on the value placed on freedom. Without freedom, the rest matters little.

Thanks! And likewise, great post Berkut.

I see two parts to it, which I'll address separately.

The matter of "we'll have to get Freedom to 1, with no regard to other values" being a caricature - if we allow a change from "no regard" to "little regard" then it's something that seems to come up fairly frequently in discourse. I'd certainly put the libertarian-response-to-ebola that Raz posted initially in that bucket, and you (or rather I) do come across it when it comes to a number of other issues as well, especially in an American context.

Now, it may be that those arguments are made purely for trolling reasons or in attempts to move the Overton window, rather than as serious attempts at formulating real policy. I still feel it's worthwhile to explicitly reject those, even if they are hyperbolic. If you and grumbler reject that sort of absolutist libertarian extremism as being silly, and you both have in this thread in different words it seems, then great and good; we're in agreement

So, with the extreme case and potential strawman out of the way by mutual agreement, the meat of your argument seems to come down to the following: you say that you consider Freedom to be a "first among equals" when it comes to the various values and social goods, and you put forth your very reasonable reasoning for that.

I don't have any real beef with that kind of libertarianism in the abstract. It seems to me that you've basically refined the equation, so that there's a a high value on Freedom, and posit some sort of relationship where other values tend to deteriorate if the Freedom score gets lowered.

I don't know if I agree with exactly how you look at those relationships, but as a broad philosophical approach I think it's sound enough. The real issue comes up when "we must start with the presumption that any decrease in liberty MUST be explicitly justified by a objective and measured increase in the greater good" (as you say). Because different people will be convinced more easily, and sometimes a decrease in your Freedom for my Other Benefit is a lot more palatable to me than to you (and vice versa); on the other hand it seems some people refuse a decrease in any kind of value that affect them, no matter how minuscule, if the benefit applies primarily to others, no matter how big.

When you say...

Throughout human history, if there is one thing that is consistent, it is that people continually restrict liberty for reasons that have NOTHING to do with maximizing your formula about. They might *claim* that is the reason, but mostly it is actually about maximizing some groups share of the pie at the expense of others, or simply forcing people to act in a manner that some minority or majority likes."

... I think you are correct.

But I also think that people have used arguments for Liberty to increase their share of the pie and deny other people benefits; it's not immune to being misused as a banner for non-related and unpleasant objectives. I do think that for a not insignificant part of the modern discourse involving Libertarianism, it is either being used as an argument for other ends (often personal financial benefit), or the non-Freedom benefits of others are counted as being at a really low value.

It's possible to theoretically accept the idea that Freedom needs not be absolute if other worthwhile goals can be achieved, but reject it in all practical matters. In that case, I think we're back at the position we both dismissed at the beginning.

In the end, though, if you accept - as you do - that sometimes there needs to be a trade off of Freedom for other things, and at a reasonable valuation where non-Freedom goods does matter, it comes down to what formula you use and how you apply it in real life.

Which means, to me, that we are ultimately back at "muddling through it". I think coming at "muddling through it" from a perspective of "undermining liberty tends to cause serious problems" and "liberty is the most important value (but it can be sacrificed for other things when necessary)" is perfectly reasonable and valid, even if I don't necessarily agree with any given individual conclusion drawn from those premises.

... but at least we can have some potentially constructive conversations about desired outcomes and possible ways of achieving them. And if we can find common ground there, I don't really care that much if you're coming at it from a Libertarian premise, a Socialist premise, or some other approach.

[DGuller]

Throughout human history, if there is one thing that is consistent, it is that people continually restrict liberty for reasons that have NOTHING to do with maximizing your formula about. They might *claim* that is the reason, but mostly it is actually about maximizing some groups share of the pie at the expense of others, or simply forcing people to act in a manner that some minority or majority likes."

... I think you are correct.

I wouldn't word it so strongly.  I think Berkut views government restrictions on liberties too narrowly.  The rule of law is a restriction on liberties itself, and in that regard, pretty much any Western government is far more restrictive than, say, Russian government.  You can perpetually live outside the law in Russia in a way that would be inconceivable to Western minds, provided that you have the street smarts to grease the right people.  I'd still take the Western system, though.

[Martinus]

Yeah, muddling through it is not the most philosophically coherent approach - you can even call it a "non approach" and I won't argue. I still prefer it, though. As you said, it's possible to take libertarianism too far; and I think that's true for other basic principles we can frame - be it justice, equality, material welfare, etc. They have to be modulated by practical concerns and other basic principles that are worthwhile.

The problem with muddling through, though, is that it tends to create dogmatism as a reaction.  Personally, I also definitely favor pragmatism over almost any other -ism, with the caveat that the pragmatism be based on the long-range outlook.  I do reject the idea of "maximizing everything good," because that's impossible, and I can accept the idea that liberty is one of the key MOEs of any policy (along with its opposite, justice).  Thus, I think it useful to see policies weighed by how much liberty they trade for justice, and vice-versa.

A quibble but I think the opposite of justice is mercy, while the opposite of liberty is equality.