Naval history buffs to me!

[grumbler]

I don't care what firing solution you used - if you shoot an unguided torpedo underwater at a submerged target than knows they are coming and maneuvers at all, and you hit them...that is just dumb, blind luck.

Well, yes and no.  The wiki article is inaccurate, as most wiki articles are, but the firing solution was based on some good guesswork and  the prediction that the U-boat would dive.  Launders knew the initial depth of the U-boat, as he was tracking its periscope so it had to be at periscope depth.  There certainly was a strong element of luck in the kill, but there was also some very sound judgement.

[grumbler]

They may have to share that honour with the US submarine service in the pacific - tpgether with the RN's, it was instrumental in paralizing Japan's economy, but is rarely discussed. 

In the US, it is discussed quite a bit.  Maybe even over-played.

[Malthus]

They may have to share that honour with the US submarine service in the pacific - tpgether with the RN's, it was instrumental in paralizing Japan's economy, but is rarely discussed. 

In the US, it is discussed quite a bit.  Maybe even over-played.

That's not the impression I get, at least outside of professional naval circles: most authors seem to think it is understated. Of course, those who are stating that may simply want to drum up interest in their own books! 

[Berkut]

I don't care what firing solution you used - if you shoot an unguided torpedo underwater at a submerged target than knows they are coming and maneuvers at all, and you hit them...that is just dumb, blind luck.

Well, yes and no.  The wiki article is inaccurate, as most wiki articles are, but the firing solution was based on some good guesswork and  the prediction that the U-boat would dive.  Launders knew the initial depth of the U-boat, as he was tracking its periscope so it had to be at periscope depth.  There certainly was a strong element of luck in the kill, but there was also some very sound judgement.

Fair enough - what I meant was that it seems to me at the ranges in question, firing four torpedoes using the best possible knowledge about the current location and speed of the target, your best case scenario is still a miss 9 times out of 10, if not 19 times out of 20.

That is certainly better odds than the 0.1% you would have NOT making very sound judgement, but still pretty much damn lucky.

These torpedoes are contact igniters right - they require a direct hit to take out the target?

[derspiess]

Wouldn't they have been magnetic rather than contact?

[grumbler]

Fair enough - what I meant was that it seems to me at the ranges in question, firing four torpedoes using the best possible knowledge about the current location and speed of the target, your best case scenario is still a miss 9 times out of 10, if not 19 times out of 20.

That is certainly better odds than the 0.1% you would have NOT making very sound judgement, but still pretty much damn lucky.

These torpedoes are contact igniters right - they require a direct hit to take out the target?

Agreed that it was far more likely to fail than succeed.

In 1945, as derspiess notes, they would likelier have been magnetically fused.  I think the Brits had a workable magnetic fuse first, and their late-war torps had good depth control.

[grumbler]

That's not the impression I get, at least outside of professional naval circles: most authors seem to think it is understated. Of course, those who are stating that may simply want to drum up interest in their own books! 

H.P. Wilmott (a Brit historian who publishes mostly in the US) argues that the case for the submarine force impact on merchant shipping has been over-stated; that it wasn't until Nov 1944 that the submarine force was really able to take big bites out of the Japanese merchant fleet.  The loss of the Philippines restricted Japanese shipping routes, and the many US subs were reassigned from fleet support and island interdiction.

That's not to say the US submarine force wasn't effective in doing what it was tasked to do; by that point they had crippled Japanese auxiliary shipping (tankers, tender, transports, and the like under IJN and IJA control) to the point that the Japanese couldn't operate their fleets effectively nor hold their bases.  Still, something like half the Japanese merchant shipping lost in the war was lost in the last nine months of it.

[Malthus]

That's not the impression I get, at least outside of professional naval circles: most authors seem to think it is understated. Of course, those who are stating that may simply want to drum up interest in their own books! 

H.P. Wilmott (a Brit historian who publishes mostly in the US) argues that the case for the submarine force impact on merchant shipping has been over-stated; that it wasn't until Nov 1944 that the submarine force was really able to take big bites out of the Japanese merchant fleet.  The loss of the Philippines restricted Japanese shipping routes, and the many US subs were reassigned from fleet support and island interdiction.

That's not to say the US submarine force wasn't effective in doing what it was tasked to do; by that point they had crippled Japanese auxiliary shipping (tankers, tender, transports, and the like under IJN and IJA control) to the point that the Japanese couldn't operate their fleets effectively nor hold their bases.  Still, something like half the Japanese merchant shipping lost in the war was lost in the last nine months of it.

I haven't read H.P. Wilmott's work - here are some contrary views:

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/pac-campaign.html

have attempted to roughly calculate costs of each side's effort in order to determine whether the U.S. campaign was "efficient." The cost of merchant ships and warships lost to U.S. submarine attack were calculated using actual Japanese prices and added to the cost of all Japanese ASW frigates and corvettes (but not fleet destroyers or ASW aircraft).(48) Using U.S. Navy figures I calculated the cost of the entire fleet of 288 U.S. submarines that served or were built during the war (regardless of whether they served in the Pacific). The result is impressive although not surprising: the Japanese spent at least 42 times more on anti-submarine warfare and in losses attributed to submarines than the U.S. spent on her Submarine Force. When one considers the fact that the Japanese economy was only 8.9% of the size of the U.S. economy in 1937, the submarine campaign was clearly both an extraordinarily cost efficient and effective means to employ U.S. forces against Japan.(49) Regardless of the cost effectiveness of the U.S. submarine campaign, the military effects were stunningly clear. Fully a year before the end of the war, and before the extensive bombing of mainland Japan, the war against Japanese lines of communication resulted in decisive impact on the Japanese war economy and on the Japanese military logistical system.

[emphasis]

And from here:

http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm

The overall impact that the United States Navy's submarine forces had on the outcome of the war in the Pacific is often understated.

Not being a professional historian, I dunno who is right.

[grumbler]

That's not the impression I get, at least outside of professional naval circles: most authors seem to think it is understated. Of course, those who are stating that may simply want to drum up interest in their own books! 

H.P. Wilmott (a Brit historian who publishes mostly in the US) argues that the case for the submarine force impact on merchant shipping has been over-stated; that it wasn't until Nov 1944 that the submarine force was really able to take big bites out of the Japanese merchant fleet.  The loss of the Philippines restricted Japanese shipping routes, and the many US subs were reassigned from fleet support and island interdiction.

That's not to say the US submarine force wasn't effective in doing what it was tasked to do; by that point they had crippled Japanese auxiliary shipping (tankers, tender, transports, and the like under IJN and IJA control) to the point that the Japanese couldn't operate their fleets effectively nor hold their bases.  Still, something like half the Japanese merchant shipping lost in the war was lost in the last nine months of it.

I haven't read H.P. Wilmott's work - here are some contrary views:

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/pac-campaign.html

have attempted to roughly calculate costs of each side's effort in order to determine whether the U.S. campaign was "efficient." The cost of merchant ships and warships lost to U.S. submarine attack were calculated using actual Japanese prices and added to the cost of all Japanese ASW frigates and corvettes (but not fleet destroyers or ASW aircraft).(48) Using U.S. Navy figures I calculated the cost of the entire fleet of 288 U.S. submarines that served or were built during the war (regardless of whether they served in the Pacific). The result is impressive although not surprising: the Japanese spent at least 42 times more on anti-submarine warfare and in losses attributed to submarines than the U.S. spent on her Submarine Force. When one considers the fact that the Japanese economy was only 8.9% of the size of the U.S. economy in 1937, the submarine campaign was clearly both an extraordinarily cost efficient and effective means to employ U.S. forces against Japan.(49) Regardless of the cost effectiveness of the U.S. submarine campaign, the military effects were stunningly clear. Fully a year before the end of the war, and before the extensive bombing of mainland Japan, the war against Japanese lines of communication resulted in decisive impact on the Japanese war economy and on the Japanese military logistical system.

[emphasis]

And from here:

http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm

The overall impact that the United States Navy's submarine forces had on the outcome of the war in the Pacific is often understated.

Not being a professional historian, I dunno who is right.

Your "contrary views" are not contrary at all. 

[Neil]

The Allied submarine campaign became markedly more effective as the Allies gained bases closer and closer to the line between Indonesia and Japan.

At any rate, make sure to talk about the U-class subs and their adventures in the Med.  That was good stuff.

You could also mention that Robert Whitehead, the guy who invented the torpedo (which made submarines useful weapons of war) was an Englishman, although one who was working in Austria.

[Scipio]

Gotta talk about the K-class steam-powered subs.  They were designed to work with surface ships (hence steam engines to get the speed required), but they were un-maneuverable and a large number were lost to collisions.  IIRC, they were of such poor design/workmanship (no one had built a sub of that size before) that their safe depth was less than their length, and so a normal 30-degree down bubble would put the bow past its safe depth while the stern was still on the surface.

For the cool shit, look up the RN's submarine operations in the Sea of Marmara during WW1.  Passage of the Dardanelles minefields was so hazardous that, once a sub made it into the SoM, the RN didn't want to have it try to leave.  They'd bring in new torpedoes sling under float planes, and use captured diesel or olive (or any other kind of suitable) oil to run the engines.   Food was mostly captured to stretch out the rations they went in with.  In the end, 8 of 13 subs were lost, but they pretty much shut down the Sea of Marmora and sank 8 warships (including 2 battleships), a bunch of steamers, and many, many fishing and work boats.

I was going to write my book about these SoM operations, back when I had ambitions to write a book.  Here's a piece about the sub ops  during the Gallipoli campaign: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_8/daring_dardanelles.html

Also write about the U class ops out of Malta.  All the subs did well there for as long as they lived (13 out of 15 died, IIRC), but HMS Upholder was, ton for ton, the most successful ship of the war.  She should be spoken of in the same breath as HMS Warspite and USS Enterprise (and Upholder died in '42, so didn't even have a whole war to rack up stats).

British subs are probably the most under-reported and under-rated fighting service in the war.

As an additional plus, the Sea of Marmara stuff really chaps the Turks' asses. It is by far the most hardcore WWI operation in subs. Makes the Germans look like punks.

[Brazen]

Brilliant, thanks guys, just the sort of "I'm actually interested in this stuff" insight I was hoping for

I shall make my own decisions over the more controversial choices then post the final article for you to ridicule.

[Malthus]

Your "contrary views" are not contrary at all.

I know this is Grumbler argument time ... but how is "The overall impact that the United States Navy's submarine forces had on the outcome of the war in the Pacific is often understated" not contrary to "Maybe even over-played"? 

It seems to me at least that the one is saying something rather different than the other ... unless there is some sense in which the overall impact can be both "often understated" and "overplayed".

[grumbler]

I know this is Grumbler argument time ... but how is "The overall impact that the United States Navy's submarine forces had on the outcome of the war in the Pacific is often understated" not contrary to "Maybe even over-played"? 

I know that you are a lawyer and so statements in Just Plain English confuse you, but it is entirely possible that something is "often' understated and, at other times, "maybe even" over-stated. They are not at all mutually exclusive conditions, and so not contrary.

It seems to me at least that the one is saying something rather different than the other ... unless there is some sense in which the overall impact can be both "often understated" and "overplayed".

What "it seems to [you]" doesn't constitute evidence about anything but your own ability to understand logic and cases.

Dunno why you are picking this fight, but if you want to continue it, you should probably pick a better horse to ride than that some people might understate the contribution of submarines to something something.

[mongers]

I'm researching an article on the centenary of the Royal Navy's Submarine Service inspired by this article:


It will take the form of an interactive illustrated timeline and I need to identify the 10-15 most significant or influential (or downright rotten) classes, submarines or operations that would best illustrate the past 100 years of British submarine since 2014.
.....

Brazen, number 11 or 16 on you list should be below the surface of discussions on submarine warfare, there are treacherous hidden depths.