Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Iormlund]

We already have a respectable blue water navy. By 2030 we should have ten modern escorts (based on AEGIS) plus 4 AIP subs and an amphibious warfare taskforce.

The biggest problem is we don't have enough money to keep the ships at full strength. We lost our embarked aviation, as we haven't replaced the Harrier with the F-35 yet. And we have a laughably low number of missiles.

[Admiral Yi]

Spain is really far from Russia

Not as far as the US.

[crazy canuck]

Spain is really far from Russia

Not as far as the US.

Actually quite a bit further away than the US.

[Josquius]

As I've said what bothers me about this spending more malarkey is the massive inefficiencies in it.
Sure in total it will add up to the amount needed to fund a very good force indeed but in practice it'll just give two dozen ineffective ones.
I know during the cold war nato had a fair bit of member specialisation. This seems to have dropped out in more recent years?
For the UK for instance... We don't need to be funding the army much at all. We just need a token force. Emphasis should be on the sea and air - which in an age of drones means quite different spending to what we've been doing historically.

Spain is really far from Russia

Not as far as the US.

Actually quite a bit further away than the US.

The US is what, 50 miles from Russia?

[Grey Fox]

As I've said what bothers me about this spending more malarkey is the massive inefficiencies in it.
Sure in total it will add up to the amount needed to fund a very good force indeed but in practice it'll just give two dozen ineffective ones.
I know during the cold war nato had a fair bit of member specialisation. This seems to have dropped out in more recent years?
For the UK for instance... We don't need to be funding the army much at all. We just need a token force. Emphasis should be on the sea and air - which in an age of drones means quite different spending to what we've been doing historically.

Spain is really far from Russia

Not as far as the US.

Actually quite a bit further away than the US.

The US is what, 50 miles from Russia?

The Diomede islands are seperated by 2.4 miles.

[Sheilbh]

As I've said what bothers me about this spending more malarkey is the massive inefficiencies in it.
Sure in total it will add up to the amount needed to fund a very good force indeed but in practice it'll just give two dozen ineffective ones.
I know during the cold war nato had a fair bit of member specialisation. This seems to have dropped out in more recent years?

I think this goes to American leadership during the Cold War, with a clear security focus for Europe in Europe. European countries specialised for their role in a general plan against the Soviets because we knew where the opponents would be. Within that overall framework here was space for European states to noodle in their near neighbourhood or wider areas. The French were involved in Africa, the Brits (even after Suez) were playing a role in the Gulf and Red Sea, the Italians have interests in North Africa and the Middle East as well.

I think part of the challenge is that both of those elements have disappeared. I think the American leadership is gone, not least because I think America's focus on where Europe can help has been more diffuse in recent years (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya etc) which has led some allies, like the Brits, to cannibalising more traditional forces designed to fight the Soviets into an absolute plethora of special forces because that's a way to add value to a distractable superpower. Other states have kept the structures of their Cold War forces but more or less hollowed them out so there's nothing there.

But even in intending to rebuild it is not clear what it would look like because European countries don't have a common view of risks or priorities. If you're Polish or Baltic it's going to be about building conventional forces that can defend (and deter) Russia. If you're France or Britain you probably still want enough special forces, lift etc to play a role in an American-led coalition or (sort of) do your own thing in Africa, both need traditional navies. The Italians again have sides in Libya and Syria - while Meloni is very much against Russia, Italian foreign policy is focused on the Med. And from Brussels or Dublin or Berlin you probably just want this all to go away.

But I think without a leadership of some form, or a common view Europe can't specialise because Europe doesn't agree what they're supposed to be doing. I know I bang on about it but I think it is a really important example that France and Italy are still supporting opposing sides in Libya - which is a country both consider very important for their security (and plays an important role in preventing migration to the EU). It's one of several sources of ongoing tension between France and Italy.

For the UK for instance... We don't need to be funding the army much at all. We just need a token force. Emphasis should be on the sea and air - which in an age of drones means quite different spending to what we've been doing historically.

Maybe. I agree that would be the focus - if Europe were focused on Russia and coordinated I think basically Britain would be interested in the High North, supporting the Nordics and the Baltic Sea. Poland and Germany on the frontier with Russia and France on the Med and supporting South-East Europe (particularly Romania where they have a very close defence relationship). But that's not where we are.

I think the naval side of that isn't really changed all that much and everyone I've read who knows anything about naval stuff is in absolute despair about the state of the navy. More generally I don't think there's a more wasteful, chaotic bit of government than defence procurement (for a variety of reasons). I think there are similar issues in the US but you just spend more money fixing the problems which is fine if you're spending 3.5% on defence, when you're just at 2% that's not really an issue. The other model is the French where there's really a private-public partnership with the defence industry being very, very closely integrated into the state's requirements - and it is supported by exports because France is the world's number 2 arms exporter while Britain is number 7 between Italy and Spain. On the upside there is a jets project with the UK, Japan and Italy that so far seems to be going relatively well.

The US is what, 50 miles from Russia?

Alright Sarah Palin.

[Zoupa]

The point Yi was making is that Spain is closer to Russia than Spain is to the US.

At least that's how I read it.

[crazy canuck]

The point Yi was making is that Spain is closer to Russia than Spain is to the US.

At least that's how I read it.

That would've been a meaningless statement of fact to in the context of this discussion. 

[Josquius]

As I've said what bothers me about this spending more malarkey is the massive inefficiencies in it.
Sure in total it will add up to the amount needed to fund a very good force indeed but in practice it'll just give two dozen ineffective ones.
I know during the cold war nato had a fair bit of member specialisation. This seems to have dropped out in more recent years?

I think this goes to American leadership during the Cold War, with a clear security focus for Europe in Europe. European countries specialised for their role in a general plan against the Soviets because we knew where the opponents would be. Within that overall framework here was space for European states to noodle in their near neighbourhood or wider areas. The French were involved in Africa, the Brits (even after Suez) were playing a role in the Gulf and Red Sea, the Italians have interests in North Africa and the Middle East as well.

I think part of the challenge is that both of those elements have disappeared. I think the American leadership is gone, not least because I think America's focus on where Europe can help has been more diffuse in recent years (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya etc) which has led some allies, like the Brits, to cannibalising more traditional forces designed to fight the Soviets into an absolute plethora of special forces because that's a way to add value to a distractable superpower. Other states have kept the structures of their Cold War forces but more or less hollowed them out so there's nothing there.

But even in intending to rebuild it is not clear what it would look like because European countries don't have a common view of risks or priorities. If you're Polish or Baltic it's going to be about building conventional forces that can defend (and deter) Russia. If you're France or Britain you probably still want enough special forces, lift etc to play a role in an American-led coalition or (sort of) do your own thing in Africa, both need traditional navies. The Italians again have sides in Libya and Syria - while Meloni is very much against Russia, Italian foreign policy is focused on the Med. And from Brussels or Dublin or Berlin you probably just want this all to go away.

But I think without a leadership of some form, or a common view Europe can't specialise because Europe doesn't agree what they're supposed to be doing. I know I bang on about it but I think it is a really important example that France and Italy are still supporting opposing sides in Libya - which is a country both consider very important for their security (and plays an important role in preventing migration to the EU). It's one of several sources of ongoing tension between France and Italy.

[

What if, rather than one European army we had 3?
Sure it's a lot less efficient than 1...but a lot more efficient than 30.
Iirc the EU was sort of hinting this was with its battlegroups...but not quite

That the baltics remain so diffuse in particular is weird.

[Zoupa]

The point Yi was making is that Spain is closer to Russia than Spain is to the US.

At least that's how I read it.

That would've been a meaningless statement of fact to in the context of this discussion. 

And why's that?

[Admiral Yi]

The point Yi was making is that Spain is closer to Russia than Spain is to the US.

At least that's how I read it.

The point I was trying to make is that Spain is closer to the Russia/West front line than the US is.

[crazy canuck]

The point Yi was making is that Spain is closer to Russia than Spain is to the US.

At least that's how I read it.

That would've been a meaningless statement of fact to in the context of this discussion. 

And why's that?

He was trying to make the point that the US is farther away from Russia so has less to fear than Spain, the implication being that Spain has more reason to spend on their military.  But our geographically challenged American friend has at least one fundamental problem with his argument.

[grumbler]

He was trying to make the point that the US is farther away from Russia so has less to fear than Spain, the implication being that Spain has more reason to spend on their military.  But our geographically challenged American friend has at least one fundamental problem with his argument.

How utterly pedantic.  Spain is much closer to the Russian threat than the US.  Russian forces in the Far East will be annihilated in a matter of days, so pose no threat to the US. Yi's point is correct even if he worded it imprecisely.

[Iormlund]

Russia would have to go through Poland, Germany and a nuclear France to even get close to the Pyrenees.

The chances of that happening are effectively zero.

[Tamas]

Didn't even war plan Dropshot had the Pyrenees as the line in the sand to make a stand in the 50s?