Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[viper37]

But what do I know?

Sadly, you are not a 5D chess player. 

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Except there is no clear gain for the United States.

sure there is. The US gets a whole bunch of states, and not the most insignificant either, on which it generally can count for at the very least diplomatic support on the international stage.
That's a lot of influence at pretty low cost right there.

It's something no other country in the world has! And it's something other states either want, or want to take away from the US (Putin or Xi trying to break up NATO, or seperate the EU nations from the US, is done because these two know that it'll greatly weaking the US)

[alfred russel]

Defending Ukraine is in the US's interest because it's part of defending the entire post WWII international order.

that order is gone and was obsolete long ago.

Russia is a dysfunctional country with an economy roughly the size of canada. Its military spending is not especially significant. The US is not needed to provide a counterweight to russia in europe, excluding in the nuclear realm, and even then only because it isn't in anyone's interests to have nuclear weapons proliferate across the countries of europe.

[Jacob]

sure there is. The US gets a whole bunch of states, and not the most insignificant either, on which it generally can count for at the very least diplomatic support on the international stage.
That's a lot of influence at pretty low cost right there.

It's something no other country in the world has! And it's something other states either want, or want to take away from the US (Putin or Xi trying to break up NATO, or seperate the EU nations from the US, is done because these two know that it'll greatly weaking the US)

Yeah, the article I linked in this post and which can be found in full here is sort of relevant I think

The argument is a history nerd thing, about applying the Zuozhan as a lens to examine Sino-American rivalry rather than (or in addition to) the more traditional Thucydides Athens-Sparta conflict that is a more traditional foundation for great power strategic analysis - but I think the overall framing makes sense.

The Jin-Chu rivalry mirrors the dynamics of the Sino-U.S. rivalry better than the Athens-Sparta construct. Like Jin, the United States was instrumental in shaping and leading the current international system and has the most to lose in being displaced from its position at the top of the hierarchy. Like Chu, China initially existed outside this system, but as its power expands, the benefit of co-opting, modifying, and potentially leading the existing system on its own terms drives its quest for international status.

Neither Jin nor Chu, though, was in a position to effectively destroy their greatest rival. Their fear was not that their opponent might gain military superiority sufficient to threaten their survival, but rather that their adversary might become perceived as the legitimate leader amongst the other states. Warfare, therefore, was generally limited and focused on efforts to either protect or poach the allegiance of weaker domains.

The lessons from the Zuozhuan imply that great-power permanence rests on two pillars: internal domestic stability and skillfully managed alliances. Despite China's impressive economic and military growth, its domestic support remains brittle and it struggles to form lasting and mutually beneficial partnerships. Although the United States has traditionally been relatively strong in these two areas, since at least the turn of this century, the bases of these pillars have eroded quickly. If America hopes to avoid a zero-sum conflict with China over the fate of the international system, it would be prudent to begin repairing and strengthening these supports.

If the framing is correct - and I think it is - that the great power competition between the US (as the current greatest power, at the pinnacle of the international system) and China (contending for replacing the US at the pinnacle), then keeping the lesser powers aligned is the scoreboard. Europe is a pretty substantial lesser power.

If the US can keep Europe supporting its position in the international system without committing to European defense, then perhaps it is in the US' interest to save the money & effort. But I'd think that the risk of letting Europe slide out of the US' camp and the risks of a new international order being less favourable to the US makes it not worth it.

Of course, that's for the US to decide, but that's how I see it.

[The Minsky Moment]

That order is gone and was obsolete long ago.

it would seem not.

[Jacob]

Interesting twitter thread on the Russian resistance to the draft by Sam Greene: https://twitter.com/samagreene/status/1574792144237350918

[Admiral Yi]

If the US can keep Europe supporting its position in the international system without committing to European defense, then perhaps it is in the US' interest to save the money & effort. But I'd think that the risk of letting Europe slide out of the US' camp and the risks of a new international order being less favourable to the US makes it not worth it.

Of course, that's for the US to decide, but that's how I see it.

This touches on the lack of agency issue that seems to crop up over and over when discussing the US's role in the world order.

Even if the US were to withdraw from NATO the countries of Europe, one would presume, have a self interest in protecting the international rule of law and free trade, and a humanitarian interest in prevention of violence to solve disputes and human rights in other countries.

I as an American have no interest in "managing" the alignment of lesser states but I do have interest in a partnership of like minded states each pulling their weight.

[grumbler]

That order is gone and was obsolete long ago.

it would seem not.

Obvious troll contrarian is obvious.

[alfred russel]

That order is gone and was obsolete long ago.

it would seem not.

It would seem so.

There are a number of frozen conflicts and not so frozen conflicts in the world but especially in the post soviet sphere of influence that involve de jure revisions of borders. The previous order of two superpowers around which the developed world oriented has completely evaporated. We aren't sponsoring coups of anti communist authoritarians and they aren't trying to forment communist revolutions.

In this specific case, we are actively intervening in what would have been recognized as clearly within the soviet sphere of influence.

[Josquius]

Because the people there asked.

[The Minsky Moment]

There are a number of frozen conflicts and not so frozen conflicts in the world but especially in the post soviet sphere of influence that involve de jure revisions of borders. The previous order of two superpowers around which the developed world oriented has completely evaporated. We aren't sponsoring coups of anti communist authoritarians and they aren't trying to forment communist revolutions.

In this specific case, we are actively intervening in what would have been recognized as clearly within the soviet sphere of influence.

We are talking about different things.

Obviously the USSR doesn't exist.  If you define the postwar order in terms of spheres of influence exercised by the US-led alliance and the USSR-led alliance, then by definition that order ended when the USSR ended. That's just stating a defintional truism.

In you define the postwar order in terms of institutions like the NATO alliance and the Bretton Woods institutions and in terms of animating principles of economic and cultural cooperation and exchange and collective security, then the postwar order is not only alive, it has been reinvigorated.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I agree with you that Europe should carry its weight. That said, whether protecting Europe is or is not in America's interest - as a counterweight to China, as a counterweight to Russia (as an ally to China or other bad actors), as a large allied economy, or whatever else - doesn't change that much whether Europe "cares" or not.

Though I absolutely get that whether Europe does "care" can affect how the US sees its interests.

The cares part matters in part because, in truth, I do not think the geopolitical strategic importance of us being Europe's bodyguard is that relevant any longer. Europe is not going to become a vassal of China for any number of reasons that have nothing to do with us explicitly guaranteeing European defense. Russia has shown it is likely too dysfunctional to be a significant threat to most of Europe. We are then left with our main reason for defending Europe is because we feel like they are part of some sort of valuable club of democratic, Western countries and that is "worth" defending on ideological grounds, frankly. If these countries themselves do not buy into it, it raises the very serious question of what system are we really fighting for? We're about to send another $12.5bn over to Ukraine on top of I think $25bn we have already sent. We're talking many multiples more than several trillion dollar European economies combined have sent.

Defending Ukraine is in the US's interest because it's part of defending the entire post WWII international order.  Nation states do not invade and conquer other nation states.  Lots of armed interventions, but borders do not change.  That's what Putin is trying to do in Ukraine.

Hell, defending in Ukraine is in the US's interests just for the fact that doing so will deter the Chinese from invading Taiwan, which due to Taiwan's semiconductor industry is vital to the US economy.

Is that true though, or is it just "old thinking"? China is too big for the sort of economic pressure campaign (which so did not work to stop Putin) to even do much if they attack Taiwan. The main reason they haven't attacked Taiwan is they fear war with the United State. That fear is there whether we helped Ukraine or did not help Ukraine.

sure there is. The US gets a whole bunch of states, and not the most insignificant either, on which it generally can count for at the very least diplomatic support on the international stage.
That's a lot of influence at pretty low cost right there.

It's something no other country in the world has! And it's something other states either want, or want to take away from the US (Putin or Xi trying to break up NATO, or seperate the EU nations from the US, is done because these two know that it'll greatly weaking the US)

Except we don't "get" these countries in any real sense. We protect a bunch of countries, at exorbitant cost--and I include Ukraine in that, because frankly almost the entire reason we are helping Ukraine is because we viewed Russia's incursion there as a threat to our European allies--the reality is America does not care about Ukrainian independence and never has. In exchange, when it suits their needs these countries walk in step with us. We're essentially bribing them on the hope that they won't walk out of step with us a little more than they already do. The reality is most of our European allies are not going to help us with much of anything where it doesn't suit them, and yet we are helping them because of a Cold War era thinking that somehow it helps us. With the wool removed from our eyes, I sincerely question the value of our European military alliances at all, frankly.

Europe is not going to ally with China or Russia for any number of reasons. They don't provide us meaningful military support in any conflict outside of their direct areas of concern (certainly not in the Pacific), and almost the entire rest of our relationship with Europe is one based on common areas of mutual legal / commercial / trade etc benefit, and is not predicated on the military alliances.

The argument is a history nerd thing, about applying the Zuozhan as a lens to examine Sino-American rivalry rather than (or in addition to) the more traditional Thucydides Athens-Sparta conflict that is a more traditional foundation for great power strategic analysis - but I think the overall framing makes sense.

If the framing is correct - and I think it is - that the great power competition between the US (as the current greatest power, at the pinnacle of the international system) and China (contending for replacing the US at the pinnacle), then keeping the lesser powers aligned is the scoreboard. Europe is a pretty substantial lesser power.

If the US can keep Europe supporting its position in the international system without committing to European defense, then perhaps it is in the US' interest to save the money & effort. But I'd think that the risk of letting Europe slide out of the US' camp and the risks of a new international order being less favourable to the US makes it not worth it.

Of course, that's for the US to decide, but that's how I see it.

I do not think us providing defense for Europe is instrumental in our "place" in the international system. We are the most powerful Western, democratic, free market country. There are strong barriers to deep cooperation between other Western, democratic, free market countries and countries like Russia and China. There is tons of room for economic entanglements with those countries: see how entangled Europe was with Russia economically, or how entangled America is with China economically. On many other areas of concern, the revanchist, authoritarian, anti-democratic and anti-rules behaviors of Russia and China would make deeper cooperation between them and Western democracies very difficult regardless of what the U.S. did with NATO and its commitments to Europe.

[PJL]

On many other areas of concern, the revanchist, authoritarian, anti-democratic and anti-rules behaviors of Russia and China would make deeper cooperation between them and Western democracies very difficult regardless of what the U.S. did with NATO and its commitments to Europe.

I think you are gravely mistaken on this and far too optimistic that Western democracies would not co-operate more with Russia & China. It's been pretty obvious in the last 10-15 years that Putin has tried to Finlandize Europe and to some success especially with their energy policy and to the political elites. In fact I think that has been the reason why Europe has not stood up more to Putin, because of their addiction to Russian oil & gas.  Even now after all that has happened in Ukraine, there are still support / sympathy for Putin in all over Europe. Hell we've seen it with the US under Trump.

[Barrister]

Russia has shown it is likely too dysfunctional to be a significant threat to most of Europe.

With respect it has not shown that.

Russia is dysfunctional, sure.  But it's still a significant threat to it's immediate neighbourhood, including Europe.  It has frozen conflicts in three of it's neighbours.  Ukraine was able to stop the Russians and fight back due to their own tremendous bravery and sacrifice, but through the West supplies billions of dollars of equipment, and invaluable intelligence.

Even weak, dysfunctional Russia could still steamroll the Baltics and make serious trouble for Poland.

[mongers]

Putin's strategy could be to wait for Winter to set in, then activate the soviet-era weather control program he's been told is so effective, wait for Europeans to start freezing to death and then blackmail the EU into surrendering to Russia's demands?