Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Habbaku]

Do the Russians have any radio stations nearby that are especially attuned to the Ukrainian need to shoot at them?

[Tamas]

Well let's hope that rogue "Ukrainian elements" do not stage a huge provocation against Russia, then.

Lavrov was going on about something around American provocation like the removal of embassy staff potentially forcing a reply from them. It would be kind of pathetic really if they didn't have all those nukes.

To me it feels clear there is a big push from within Russians powers that be (probably Putin himself) to get a big win out of this, ideally stabilising Crimea with extra territorial gains next to it. This leaves Lavrov in an unenviable position of having to manufacture a casus belli from some very, very meager material.

Makes me think the Belarus trolling of Poland with the migrants WAS part of a larger plan, probably intended to drive a wedge within Europe. Which it failed because the unspoken truth is that the rest of the EU wants new third world migrants exactly as much as Poland and Hungary (i.e. not at all) the only difference is they are too polite to admit this openly. But just like in the case of Turkish and Libyan cruelty, they are perfectly fine to look the other way from the high horse while somebody else does the dirty work of starving/freezing those people to death. 

[Tamas]

Do the Russians have any radio stations nearby that are especially attuned to the Ukrainian need to shoot at them?

I believe Donbass Russians traditionally keep a lot of tanks and SPGs in their sheds, these became extremely useful already in 2014. These could be easy and convenient targets to be shot at by the aggressors, be they Ukrainian conscripts or relocating families of US embassy staff.

[Jacob]

Makes me think the Belarus trolling of Poland with the migrants WAS part of a larger plan, probably intended to drive a wedge within Europe. Which it failed because the unspoken truth is that the rest of the EU wants new third world migrants exactly as much as Poland and Hungary (i.e. not at all) the only difference is they are too polite to admit this openly. But just like in the case of Turkish and Libyan cruelty, they are perfectly fine to look the other way from the high horse while somebody else does the dirty work of starving/freezing those people to death.

It's not even that unspoken, to be honest. Not that it makes anyone get off their high horse.

[Sheilbh]

Agreed and especially on the Belarus/Poland border point.

Though Schengen has visa free travel for Ukrainians so what happens there will lead to a form of refugee crisis in Europe from a country with easy travel access and on the border - I'm also not sure that Europe would like the look of their first action after a friendly country was attacked was to end that country's agreement with the Schengen area. Presentationally I feel that doesn't look great.

I saw the Guardian's Russia correspondent today and he repeated what I'd said about Putin's New Year's press conference - Ukraine is not the leading story on Russian TV at the minute. It isn't talked about much in government statements. It feels like if you were preparing for a major war you'd be preparing the population a bit more for that to build up support - especially if, as many people here seem to think, that's all for domestic consumption anyway.

Similarly I'd note the Ukrainian defence ministers comments that they are not seeing the types of re-inforcements that you'd need for any major conflict or occupation (limited logistics, no hospital tents etc). I remember someone flagging that watching if Russia was topping up its troops and bringing logistics units to the front would be big signs that an invasion might be about to happen. In terms of military risk (and I know nothing about military stuff at all) it feels more geared to, if anything, a quick attack for a limited purpose where they want to be in and out rather than anything more long-term?

[Jacob]

Agreed and especially on the Belarus/Poland border point.

Though Schengen has visa free travel for Ukrainians so what happens there will lead to a form of refugee crisis in Europe from a country with easy travel access and on the border - I'm also not sure that Europe would like the look of their first action after a friendly country was attacked was to end that country's agreement with the Schengen area. Presentationally I feel that doesn't look great.

Yeah, that has some pretty unfortunate echoes.

I saw the Guardian's Russia correspondent today and he repeated what I'd said about Putin's New Year's press conference - Ukraine is not the leading story on Russian TV at the minute. It isn't talked about much in government statements. It feels like if you were preparing for a major war you'd be preparing the population a bit more for that to build up support - especially if, as many people here seem to think, that's all for domestic consumption anyway.

Yeah, and I mean we also have Gaijin du Moscu's statements that the public discourse in both Ukraine and Russia indicates calm. It does make me wonder what Putin is looking to get out of all of this. A few weeks of high intensity conversations and moving soldiers around? That was the end goal? Or was it a matter of ratching up the pressure and hoping for cracks, but none materialized and he's dialling back down until next time?

Similarly I'd note the Ukrainian defence ministers comments that they are not seeing the types of re-inforcements that you'd need for any major conflict or occupation (limited logistics, no hospital tents etc). I remember someone flagging that watching if Russia was topping up its troops and bringing logistics units to the front would be big signs that an invasion might be about to happen.

That was me

In terms of military risk (and I know nothing about military stuff at all) it feels more geared to, if anything, a quick attack for a limited purpose where they want to be in and out rather than anything more long-term?

But a quick attack for a limited purpose would probably still trigger pretty solid responses I think, at which point Putin would have to be confident he could negotiate something that looks like a victory rather than something that looks like he has to back down.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah, and I mean we also have Gaijin du Moscu's statements that the public discourse in both Ukraine and Russia indicates calm. It does make me wonder what Putin is looking to get out of all of this. A few weeks of high intensity conversations and moving soldiers around? That was the end goal? Or was it a matter of ratching up the pressure and hoping for cracks, but none materialized and he's dialling back down until next time?

Yeah that's the bit I still don't get. What's the motivation? I keep coming back to it but the comparison with 2014 which was quick and surprising is really striking to me.

I think actually in general the West has been more united in its response than anticipated - and the arms supplies are our side of coercive diplomacy because every shipment increases the cost of moving. That may have had an impact and I suspect if there isn't the troops just leave it will be portrayed as unnecessary when for all we know all of that work on sanctions and arms shipments etc may well have been a successful deterrent.

That was me

Glad to know it's not just Raz I read and then accidentally repurpose into my own opinion

Edit: And the negative side is there's lots of talk about an LNG transport arriving in Kaliningrad - as would be necessary if certain pipelines were cut off for some reason.

[Jacob]

Maybe the West is hindered a bit by seeing Putin through a fairly one-dimensional lens, and perhapas we tend to be a bit ignorant of the domestic nuances in Russia and the area Putin would like to claim as Russia's sphere. Conversely, I think there's a distinct possibility that Putin is viewing the West through the "degenerate and failing" lens of his rhetoric more than reality actually warrants, and that he anticipated a different set of responses.

Maybe he's waiting for 2024 or 2025 when Trump is in office again.

[Berkut]

I think that this was probably pretty standard brinsmanship.

Putin said "Lets see what happens if I mass what looks like an invasion army!"

He did so, the response was pretty significant and it was clear that the consequences would be considerable - not likely another repeat of the warnings not to invade the Crimea.

So he can back down, and part of that is pushing this story that there was never actually a crisis to begin with! Why, what 100,000 troops are you even talking about? Why is the Evil West and their "mass western media" just making all this up! Those demands we made along with overt threats of imminent military action? Those were invented by Biden as well!

And then he can try it again in a couple more years. It's not like credibility is an asset he has to worry about squandering, right? He is like Trump - the complete lack of integrity, credibility, and basic humanity is already factored in by his faithful.

It's so amusing to watch. If he invades, then its the fault of the West for having civilians in Ukraine, or the fault of the US for taking civilians out of Ukraine. And if he doesn't invade, then obviously all these concerns about him invading are also evidence the West is "out to get" Russia, because *obviously* Russia is super duper peaceful and only cares about the UN Charter, otherwise they would have invaded!

[Berkut]

Maybe the West is hindered a bit by seeing Putin through a fairly one-dimensional lens, and perhapas we tend to be a bit ignorant of the domestic nuances in Russia and the area Putin would like to claim as Russia's sphere.

If Russia invades Ukraine in a manner broadly similar to what was feared, that won't change my "fairly one dimensional" view of Putin.

If Russia does not invade Ukraine, that also will not change my fairly one dimensional view of Putin.

My fairly one dimensional view is the Putin wants a Russian sphere, of not just influence but of political and military domination. He wants vassal states on his borders, and will not be happy until he gets them (where it is remotely feasible). Nothing he has done in the last 8 weeks has caused me any reason to doubt that viewpoint, and lots of reasons to confirm it.

[Sheilbh]

Maybe the West is hindered a bit by seeing Putin through a fairly one-dimensional lens, and perhapas we tend to be a bit ignorant of the domestic nuances in Russia and the area Putin would like to claim as Russia's sphere. Conversely, I think there's a distinct possibility that Putin is viewing the West through the "degenerate and failing" lens of his rhetoric more than reality actually warrants, and that he anticipated a different set of responses.

Maybe he's waiting for 2024 or 2025 when Trump is in office again.

I think all of those are plausible.

The other one I keep thinking of is basically Berk's, whether this has always been primarily reactive from Putin. He has a set of issues/concerns that he wants to address. He moves troops as a threat to basically centre the world's attention on his set of issues and his (and Belarus's) border with Ukraine. But aside from forcing the issue and the timescale - he's just going to play reactively to see what he can get.

[Jacob]

Putin as Littlefinger, guess.

[Eddie Teach]

Let's be clear on one thing, there is zero chance of Trump becoming President again before January 2025. 

[Jacob]

Let's be clear on one thing, there is zero chance of Trump becoming President again before January 2025. 

Right -  I should've said 2025 or 2026.

[mongers]

'Regime change' may be Putin's main aim, so less chance of a conventional invasion, but instead attacks to destabilise the Ukrainian government.
I've heard suggested limited fighting combined with massive cyber attacks, attempts to destroy/bringdown the electric grid and targeted attacks on Ukraine's military top brass and political leaders. That might mainly leave individuals ready to comprise with Putin and form a new government.