Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Berkut]

So I'm seeing reported that LePen is saying that she wants to facilitate a strategic reconciliation between NATO and Russia "as soon as the war is over". And furthermore, she's doubtful about providing military aid to Ukraine.

Fuck, I hope the people of France do the right thing here and not elect her.

Christ.

What has happened to the world?

I would be appaled that France would even consider electing someone like that, but hey....you know....Trump.

[Jacob]

Christ.

What has happened to the world?

I would be appaled that France would even consider electing someone like that, but hey....you know....Trump.

I know

I think the thing is Putin could potentially have gotten this right if he'd timed it a little differently. And I think populist authoritarians in the West could still help him get out of trouble at a much lower price than he deserves - and at a much higher price for Ukraine than it should be.

At least it looks like Sweden and Finland will join NATO, so that's a big own goal from Putin no matter what.

[Tamas]

Orban's human wallet gave a substantial loan to Le Pen, so I would not be the least bit surprised there's some Russian angle there somewhere.

[Sheilbh]

RN got loans from obscure Russian banks in 2014 during the Crimean annexation - I think maybe €10 million. I don't think it's even subtle or hidden enough to need to run through Hungary.

She's also been pretty open about her admiration of Putin - although I think she's plaing that down a bit now.

[Barrister]

Orban's human wallet gave a substantial loan to Le Pen, so I would not be the least bit surprised there's some Russian angle there somewhere.

Didn't Russian banks loan Le Pen's party millions of dollars awhile ago?

Yup, they did:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-france-politics-idUKKBN23F1AH

Whether there was an explicit quid pro quo, or the Russians saw her as the kind of "useful idiot" worth supporting, who can say.  But there's definitely a connection.


Edit: Ninja'd by Sheilbh.

[Duque de Bragança]

Orban's human wallet gave a substantial loan to Le Pen, so I would not be the least bit surprised there's some Russian angle there somewhere.

Sarkozy almost bankrupting his party by campaign overpending in 2012 made French banks giving up on loans to political parties. Foreign parties (pun intended) were quick to use the opportunity. RN is still paying back a 2014 originally from a Czech bank (russian-aligned) but now held by some russian institution which sued them for not paying it back. An agreement was reached later on.

https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/06/03/poursuivi-en-justice-le-rassemblement-national-trouve-un-accord-avec-son-creancier-russe_6041663_823448.html

[Zanza]

No longer helping Ukraine will show that the Germans haven't really changed though and that they were looking for an excuse to do less to nothing asap though.

But given that Ukraine is in the middle of a war for it's survival, that tens of thousands of its citizens have been killed, and millions displaced, I really think Germany should question whether they are going to withhold aid because Zelenskyy was impolite to your leaders.

Germany will not stop providing aid, but this has made it harder domestically, especially in his party, for Scholz to do so. Which in the end means less aid from Germany. 

Not sure what the point of it was from a Ukrainian perspective. It's one thing to just use diplomatic channels to say he is not welcome, another to leak it to Germany's biggest tabloid. Anyway, just an anecdote in this war.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Orban's human wallet gave a substantial loan to Le Pen, so I would not be the least bit surprised there's some Russian angle there somewhere.

Didn't Russian banks loan Le Pen's party millions of dollars awhile ago?

Yup, they did:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-france-politics-idUKKBN23F1AH

Whether there was an explicit quid pro quo, or the Russians saw her as the kind of "useful idiot" worth supporting, who can say.  But there's definitely a connection.


Edit: Ninja'd by Sheilbh.

doesn't have to be "or". Both can be true at the same time.

[Barrister]

No longer helping Ukraine will show that the Germans haven't really changed though and that they were looking for an excuse to do less to nothing asap though.

But given that Ukraine is in the middle of a war for it's survival, that tens of thousands of its citizens have been killed, and millions displaced, I really think Germany should question whether they are going to withhold aid because Zelenskyy was impolite to your leaders.

Germany will not stop providing aid, but this has made it harder domestically, especially in his party, for Scholz to do so. Which in the end means less aid from Germany. 

Not sure what the point of it was from a Ukrainian perspective. It's one thing to just use diplomatic channels to say he is not welcome, another to leak it to Germany's biggest tabloid. Anyway, just an anecdote in this war.

Ukraine is just making the calculation that this will increase pressure on Germany to do more, rather than status quo or less.

I mean - is the typical German on the street really going to go "man those Ukrainians are rude - screw 'em", or "maybe there is more we should be doing"?

[Zanza]

As I say I think the counter-factual that matters for Ukraine is - would Germany be sending them more weapons and ammo if they were more polite, or do they get more by kicking up a fuss. I'm not sure they'd be getting more German support if they were appropriately polite. Not least because I'm not sure the target audience is Germany as much as Germany's EU and NATO partners, because I think (as Alex Clarkson put it) I'm not sure Germany is really as much in control of how much support it gives if all of NATO and EU except Hungary want to do more. I think it will boil down to the same choice we've seen all through the crisis of Scholz can look pro-active and win credit and trust, or he can look reluctant and a bit clumsy, eroding trust during the delay and not earning any credit for ultimately doing the right thing.

I fear there is a chance that enough parlimentarians in Scholz coalition could be annoyed (e.g. Kubicki), russophile (e.g. Mützenich), pacifist (e.g. Stegner or so) to make his life really hard when it comes to further support for Ukraine or the planned defence spending. International pressure only goes so far, in the end you need domestic support in a democracy. I fail to see an upside for Ukraine here.

[Jacob]

I mean - is the typical German on the street really going to go "man those Ukrainians are rude - screw 'em", or "maybe there is more we should be doing"?

Well, it's not just the typical German on the street that matters but also the political establishment of Germany that makes things happen.

In any case, there are times where a slap in the face accompanied by a "that's not good enough" motivates you to try harder, and other times when it makes you go "I was working pretty hard here. If it's not appreciated why do I even fucking bother?"

Whether that's the case here or not remains to be seen. And obviously there's stil the fact that going all in to support Ukraine is the morally correct thing to do, so this may have the desired effect.

[Zanza]

Ukraine is just making the calculation that this will increase pressure on Germany to do more, rather than status quo or less.

I mean - is the typical German on the street really going to go "man those Ukrainians are rude - screw 'em", or "maybe there is more we should be doing"?

I have not seen any survey, so I can't tell. Initial reaction from politicians was rather negative. For the man on the street, I could image both. The last survey on Ukraine was before this and showed that 45% want more action on Ukraine, 37% feel the current level is sufficient and 11% think it is too much and Germany should do less. But that's fickle.

[Sheilbh]

Well, it's not just the typical German on the street that matters but also the political establishment of Germany that makes things happen.

Yeah - and it's worth flagging that the Greens especially have been very good on this and were calling out these problems and risks around Germany policy years ago.

But I think it's a paricular challenge for the SPD. I have limited sympathy because I think this point by the SPD leader is basically correct. There was a fairly catastrophic misjudgement:

Were people in the SPD too naive? "In retrospect, of course, we have to ask ourselves whether we should have assessed the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, or the Russian contract killings in London and Berlin differently," Klingbeil asked self-critically. "Whether we misjudged the signs of the times."

And many other countries - including Ukraine - were warning Germany about this.

From a Ukrainian perspective I think the self-examination of Germany's elite is good - but weapons are better and I think the calculation they've made is that for Germany they only get results when they push. That calculation may be wrong.

In any case, there are times where a slap in the face accompanied by a "that's not good enough" motivates you to try harder, and other times when it makes you go "I was working pretty hard here. If it's not appreciated why do I even fucking bother?"

Yes - I think the Ukrainian view is whether, in their view, Germany is working hard. Part of this may just be, at the risk of stereotyping, bureaucracy. I've read a few reports of Ukraine being very frustrated at how long it takes from a public statement by the German government to receiving anything and my understanding is that a lot of that is process, particularly around Scholz being quite slow and reactive. I wonder how much of that is just a question of experience and not fully having a practiced, well-oiled machine around him given that he's only been Chancellor for a few months.

It's the standard thing of the time when you probably have the most public goodwill is normally the time when politicians are least able to achieve anything/deliver.

Whether that's the case here or not remains to be seen. And obviously there's stil the fact that going all in to support Ukraine is the morally correct thing to do, so this may have the desired effect.

Yeah, I think the other side is linked to the view that we shouldn't go all in now, so we have somewhere to go when Russia escalates. I think Russia will escalate. I think there is a relatively strong chance we will see chemical weapons being used - and when that happens I suspect public opinion everywhere in the world, including Germany, will want to do more.

I think that sadly the direction of the war will be more that public opinion ends up wishing we'd done more sooner, not praising a more judicious, incrememtal approach.

I fear there is a chance that enough parlimentarians in Scholz coalition could be annoyed (e.g. Kubicki), russophile (e.g. Mützenich), pacifist (e.g. Stegner or so) to make his life really hard when it comes to further support for Ukraine or the planned defence spending. International pressure only goes so far, in the end you need domestic support in a democracy. I fail to see an upside for Ukraine here.

It's fair - I think the Ukrainian view is that it's worked so far in getting arms which is what they care about most. But also I think it's not just international pressure but also how that interacts with domestic - my impression is Germany doesn't like being out on its own. So even if the international pressure doesn't have an impact the fact that Germany is in a club without many key allies (say if it's on its own with Hungary in opposing certain measures) might have its own effect on domestic politics?

[Zanza]

It's fair - I think the Ukrainian view is that it's worked so far in getting arms which is what they care about most. But also I think it's not just international pressure but also how that interacts with domestic - my impression is Germany doesn't like being out on its own. So even if the international pressure doesn't have an impact the fact that Germany is in a club without many key allies (say if it's on its own with Hungary in opposing certain measures) might have its own effect on domestic politics?

The international reception of Nordstream 2 and Germany forging ahead with regardless is an example to the contrary. Being part of the in group is important, but not necessarily  the definitive consideration of decision makers. The morale case to help Ukraine is certainly a bigger motivation at least for Habeck and Baerbock, probably also Scholz.

[Legbiter]

Russians trying to finish off Mariupol and then fight a reverse-Kursk against Ukrainian in-depth defenses in the Donbas.