Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Josquius]

Devils advocating for a second and assuming there's validity to the talk of Russia being scared of NATO surrounding them, controlling a large swathe of the European plain, etc...
And no doubt that ship has sailed since the invasion...
But would a Finlandised Ukraine not have been a viable and politically tolerable compromise on this?
A beefed up Budapest memorandum to say NATO members and Russia all guarantee Ukrainian independence (in reality of course this means NATO protecting it from Russia but in Putin's head who knows), it promises not to be part of any military alliances (thus the EU remains open).
I have to suspect somebody must have mooted this. It can't have been a black and white union state or NATO. Obviously its about gas really.
But strange there's not been much mentioned of this middle way.

[Syt]

Devils advocating for a second and assuming there's validity to the talk of Russia being scared of NATO surrounding them, controlling a large swathe of the European plain, etc...
And no doubt that ship has sailed since the invasion...
But would a Finlandised Ukraine not have been a viable and politically tolerable compromise on this?
A beefed up Budapest memorandum to say NATO members and Russia all guarantee Ukrainian independence (in reality of course this means NATO protecting it from Russia but in Putin's head who knows), it promises not to be part of any military alliances (thus the EU remains open).
I have to suspect somebody must have mooted this. It can't have been a black and white union state or NATO. Obviously its about gas really.
But strange there's not been much mentioned of this middle way.

The thing is, at that point it might turn into a game of trying to influence the country/government to take sides "voluntarily" - which is what Russia accuses the West of doing in 2014 (and which Russia has been doing with Yanukovych etc.).

[OttoVonBismarck]

Finland and Ukraine are different--the Russian Empire held Ukraine for years and the region is a center of the history of Russian civilization in a sense, Putin has a genuine emotional desire to see Ukraine controlled by Russia as part of his revisionary views. He, and Russian leaders before him, have never had such views toward Finland. Stalin wanted to conquer Finland for the same reason he conquered the Warsaw Pact countries "because he could, and he thought he could do it easily", but it was never seen as an integral part of Russia.

[OttoVonBismarck]

It's worth noting that even the Soviets didn't control most of their countries via brute force, they created systems and processes that could convert lots of people to the "Soviet way" of doing things, and lead people to genuinely believe they had benefits from being part of the Soviet system. The Soviets would crack down on open rebellions, but those were actually relatively rare. The Soviets did have to keep significant military presences in many of its satellite countries, and those did have a negative impact on Soviet resources. Putin is very far from a compliant Ukraine at least right now, it appears even Russian speaking Ukrainians are widely opposed to his rule of the country.

[Syt]

That will make even the current invasion difficult. Because for every mile you advance you have to decide - leave troops behind to secure the rear or push forward with everyone. The former will lead to fewer frontline troops for the next offensive, the latter may lead to the troops being cut off from supplies and surrounded by hostiles.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I've found it interesting how much Russia is losing the "information war." At least part of the reason Ukraine is perceived as doing so well is because it is an almost one-sided information environment. Russia isn't crowing much about its victories using typical social media or etc channels, while Ukraine is highlighting (and likely exaggerating) any of its successes. There is a real cost, I think, in Russia ceding the information field to Ukraine in that it affects how the war is perceived--this will be true even in Russia, which is not quite so closed off as most people think.

[alfred russel]

That will make even the current invasion difficult. Because for every mile you advance you have to decide - leave troops behind to secure the rear or push forward with everyone. The former will lead to fewer frontline troops for the next offensive, the latter may lead to the troops being cut off from supplies and surrounded by hostiles.

A question is whether they really plan to do anything west of the Dnieper. If they limit themselves to the east of the river, that leaves what would probably be the more problematic territory outside of their worries. They would only have maybe 1/3 of Ukraine to occupy. They could more or less stop at the river, sign a cease fire, and we have another frozen conflict in the world. If they try to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine that is an entirely different ball game.

I realize they are currently west of the Dnieper but that could be for military reasons rather than long term intent.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I think the big issue isn't what territory Russia wants to annex so much as what they want Ukraine to be, they really want Yanukovych era Ukraine back, and while I can see Zelensky making territorial concessions to guarantee a free independent remnant Ukraine, I cannot see him agreeing to turn Ukraine into a Russian vassal--why even fight at all if that is an acceptable outcome.

[Tamas]

Re. Kyiv I would imagine it largely depends on what the population is willing to put up with and what the defenders are willing to do i.e. will they have the determination to see their capital turned into rubble to stop the Russians.

The siege of Budapest in 44-45 took almost two months, and it wasn't a city of almost 3 million, with myriad of high rises and an extensive metro system. If there's determined guerilla resistance who knows how long and what destruction it will take to subdue the city.

Budapest's 1956 example is a mixed bag on this. The Hungarian army largely stepped aside (honorary mention to notable but overall sporadic exceptions) and watched from the sidelines so it wasn't a clear-cut national forces against foreign invader like in Ukraine. This way, organised centralised defense of the city I think collapsed on the very day the Soviets started their offensive (4th November) but there were fierce fighting with the holdouts, but these have ended by the 11th. This success did not involve artillery shelling but did involve a lot of indiscriminate firing by Soviet tanks into residential buildings where resistance was anticipated/assumed.

[Sheilbh]

I've found it interesting how much Russia is losing the "information war." At least part of the reason Ukraine is perceived as doing so well is because it is an almost one-sided information environment. Russia isn't crowing much about its victories using typical social media or etc channels, while Ukraine is highlighting (and likely exaggerating) any of its successes. There is a real cost, I think, in Russia ceding the information field to Ukraine in that it affects how the war is perceived--this will be true even in Russia, which is not quite so closed off as most people think.

Yes - and also the reason for it. It feels, for example, that they need to keep the propaganda to a "special military operation" because a war would be hugely unpopular. I saw yesterday that Russian authorities have banned the use of the word "war" in relation to Ukraine - plus the measures around throttling social media access and closing down some of the few remaining independent media outlets.

I think on one of the news sites, the news was basically just a list of statements from the Ministry of Defence.

Now I don't think Russians are stupid and I think if there's one country where people are very able to read between the lines, it's Russia. So I think they will be piecing this together - plus the Telegram channels which are, reortedly, flooded with Ukrainian content.

The other thing that is interesting, I think, is that this is a very social media war and it is incredible how little content there is about Ukrainian troops. It feels like Ukrainian people have really got and internalised the message about not releasing content that could help Russia locate or assess Ukrainian forces. Again this makes the information war very one-sided. It's really interesting that people have understood that risk, seem to be following through with it as well as a type of popular propaganda.

A question is whether they really plan to do anything west of the Dnieper. If they limit themselves to the east of the river, that leaves what would probably be the more problematic territory outside of their worries. They would only have maybe 1/3 of Ukraine to occupy. They could more or less stop at the river, sign a cease fire, and we have another frozen conflict in the world. If they try to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine that is an entirely different ball game.

I think it's likely they would, just because - based on Putin's justifications/explanations I think they'll want to go for Kyiv and Odessa. I can see them leaving the Western third of the country. In effect the bit that was once Austria and Poland not Russia.

But also I don't see why Ukrainians would necessarily sign a ceasefire in that event.

[celedhring]

The siege of Madrid lasted two years and a half, but Franco never managed to encircle the city after the first attempts were repulsed - eventually he had to divert troops to the more active fronts. You do need a shitload of troops to surround a large European capital.

[alfred russel]

I think the big issue isn't what territory Russia wants to annex so much as what they want Ukraine to be, they really want Yanukovych era Ukraine back, and while I can see Zelensky making territorial concessions to guarantee a free independent remnant Ukraine, I cannot see him agreeing to turn Ukraine into a Russian vassal--why even fight at all if that is an acceptable outcome.

The larger context is the Russian sphere of influence and whether it will continue to exist. Obviously it has disintegrated in all but the post soviet states less the Baltics, and it isn't hard to see why: the Russian model is a losing one versus the EU model. Maintaining the sphere of influence is based on some variety of corruption, fear and intimidation, and force.

Yeah Russia wants the Yanukovych era back but it obviously isn't coming back. Ukraine is a democracy and the people want to follow more of the Baltic route. If the most significant non russian soviet state (Ukraine) is allowed to just leave and join the EU/NATO or whatever a western orientation means, that is going to be a terrible look for keeping order in the rest of the states. It is a big step toward the entire (and increasingly pathetic) sphere of influence evaporating, and Russia being just one more country on the world stage, probably getting any relevance from being a suck up to China. The nationalists that back up Putin won't accept this, and that means Putin can't.

So yeah this may be in part about Russia wanting something in their relationship with Ukraine, but in a larger sense it is about breaking shit in Ukraine to set an example to others.

[Legbiter]

Gazprom has lost 97% of it's market valuse on the LSE.

[mongers]

Aren't we ignoring another possibility? That the US has made a backroom deal, green-lighting some limited Russian victory like annexing eastern Ukraine. The fact that opposition over the northern gas pipe has stopped would point toward this.

It also would be very very far from being the first example of the West talking the talk but secretly promising not to walk the walk when it comes to defending Eastern Europe.

Well I'm glad this didn't turn out to be the case.

Sorry Tamas. :-)

[Syt]

From Novaya Gazeta. School children arrested in Russia for laying flowers at the Ukrainian embassy while holding signs "no to war". (according to second Tweet they were released when a laywer stepped in)







https://twitter.com/novaya_gazeta/status/1498784549639229444?s=20&t=MtGW9dqLKKMs5xAAvmDc4Q