Question about Soviet Historiography

[dps]

Indeed, the Union was willing to take steps to prevent German expansion. But it became clear that not only the border states were all hostile to the Union, but also that the Western Powers would really not truly field their armies in such a circumstance. Something that played a large role in the 1939 calculations of what was being asked of the Union.

Yeah, I'm willing to give the Soviets their due there.  They had tried to develop some kind of collective security with the West against the Nazis--propoganda and ideology aside, I'm pretty sure that the Soviets knew that Britian and France weren't any real threat to the Soviet state, but a re-armed, expanionistic Germany certainly was--but after Munich, that was judged to have failed.  And it wasn't just the Soviets who came to that conclusion, several other states did so as well.

[Valmy]

Yeah, I'm willing to give the Soviets their due there.  They had tried to develop some kind of collective security with the West against the Nazis--propoganda and ideology aside, I'm pretty sure that the Soviets knew that Britian and France weren't any real threat to the Soviet state, but a re-armed, expanionistic Germany certainly was--but after Munich, that was judged to have failed.  And it wasn't just the Soviets who came to that conclusion, several other states did so as well.

Pity they were completely wrong...and decided to stay wrong even after the West did declare war.  I still do not know why the next step was to order the Communist Party of France to undermine the Western War Effort.

[derspiess]

My country didn't make it to Vietnam.

Thank you Harold Wilson. 

ah-ha Mister Wilson... ah-ha Mister Heath...

[dps]

Yeah, I'm willing to give the Soviets their due there.  They had tried to develop some kind of collective security with the West against the Nazis--propoganda and ideology aside, I'm pretty sure that the Soviets knew that Britian and France weren't any real threat to the Soviet state, but a re-armed, expanionistic Germany certainly was--but after Munich, that was judged to have failed.  And it wasn't just the Soviets who came to that conclusion, several other states did so as well.

Pity they were completely wrong...and decided to stay wrong even after the West did declare war.  I still do not know why the next step was to order the Communist Party of France to undermine the Western War Effort.

I'm not 100% sure here, but I think Stalin probably thought that the British and French had a bit of superiority over Hitler's Germany (most observers in 1939 and early 1940 thought that) and, collective security with the West having failed, figured it was in the Soviet Union's interest for the conflict between the West and the Nazis to be a protracted, mutually destructive war of attrition.

And yes, with hindsight we know that he was wrong about that, too, but again, he wasn't the only one who was wrong about it.

[DGuller]

Yeah, I'm willing to give the Soviets their due there.  They had tried to develop some kind of collective security with the West against the Nazis--propoganda and ideology aside, I'm pretty sure that the Soviets knew that Britian and France weren't any real threat to the Soviet state, but a re-armed, expanionistic Germany certainly was--but after Munich, that was judged to have failed.  And it wasn't just the Soviets who came to that conclusion, several other states did so as well.

Pity they were completely wrong...and decided to stay wrong even after the West did declare war.  I still do not know why the next step was to order the Communist Party of France to undermine the Western War Effort.

France and England were potential enemies during that whole Finland thing.

[derspiess]

I'm not 100% sure here, but I think Stalin probably thought that the British and French had a bit of superiority over Hitler's Germany (most observers in 1939 and early 1940 thought that) and, collective security with the West having failed, figured it was in the Soviet Union's interest for the conflict between the West and the Nazis to be a protracted, mutually destructive war of attrition.

And yes, with hindsight we know that he was wrong about that, too, but again, he wasn't the only one who was wrong about it.

IIRC Hitler himself only hoped to gain a small chunk of France rather than conquer the whole thing.

[DGuller]

I'm not 100% sure here, but I think Stalin probably thought that the British and French had a bit of superiority over Hitler's Germany (most observers in 1939 and early 1940 thought that) and, collective security with the West having failed, figured it was in the Soviet Union's interest for the conflict between the West and the Nazis to be a protracted, mutually destructive war of attrition.

And yes, with hindsight we know that he was wrong about that, too, but again, he wasn't the only one who was wrong about it.

IIRC Hitler himself only hoped to gain a small chunk of France rather than conquer the whole thing.

It's like in EU, where you declare war on an enemy you expect to be tough, only to find it bankrupt and on nearly zero morale.

[Valmy]

I'm not 100% sure here, but I think Stalin probably thought that the British and French had a bit of superiority over Hitler's Germany (most observers in 1939 and early 1940 thought that) and, collective security with the West having failed, figured it was in the Soviet Union's interest for the conflict between the West and the Nazis to be a protracted, mutually destructive war of attrition.

And yes, with hindsight we know that he was wrong about that, too, but again, he wasn't the only one who was wrong about it.

Which is a strange thing to do indeed if you do not regard the Western Allies as a threat at all but regard Germany as one.

[Valmy]

It's like in EU, where you declare war on an enemy you expect to be tough, only to find it bankrupt and on nearly zero morale.

I don't know if that is true.  The Germans gambled everything on a complete and fast victory.  If that war had been protracted at all they would have been in big trouble.  It seems weird they would have based their entire strategy on achieving the historical outcome if it was that far fetched.  The French, for their part, were not that confident.

[grumbler]

Which is a strange thing to do indeed if you do not regard the Western Allies as a threat at all but regard Germany as one.

As several (including Martim) have noted, Stalin, like everyone else, expected WW2 to continue where WW1 ended, with massive grinding battles of attrition.  Stalin was desperate to believe that the West and Germany would wear themselves out in a years-long war, and he would be the only one standing at the end.  And what Stalin desperately wanted to believe became the truth as far as the Soviet government and military were concerned.  Stalin was so wedded to his delusions that, even when Germany defeated the West and re-deployed to attack the USSR, he forbade any defensive measures, for fear the Germans would misread them as offensive measures.  German reconnaissance planes freely overflew the USSR in the days leading up to the German attack, pinpointing targets and allowing the devastating initial German attacks.

Hell, even after the Germans were over the border, Stalin insisted that the Soviets not shoot back, convinced that this was just a German provocation designed to give Hitler an excuse to renegotiate the Nazi-Soviet Pact if the Soviets fired on German troops.  Stalin appears to have had a nervous breakdown when it became apparent that the attack was in earnest.

So, there are lots of goofy Soviet decisions that only make sense when you understand that the Soviet Union was completely under the control of a severely imbalanced character.  The decision to back the Germans against the West is just one of a long string.

[PJL]

Which is a strange thing to do indeed if you do not regard the Western Allies as a threat at all but regard Germany as one.

As several (including Martim) have noted, Stalin, like everyone else, expected WW2 to continue where WW1 ended, with massive grinding battles of attrition.  Stalin was desperate to believe that the West and Germany would wear themselves out in a years-long war, and he would be the only one standing at the end.  And what Stalin desperately wanted to believe became the truth as far as the Soviet government and military were concerned.  Stalin was so wedded to his delusions that, even when Germany defeated the West and re-deployed to attack the USSR, he forbade any defensive measures, for fear the Germans would misread them as offensive measures.  German reconnaissance planes freely overflew the USSR in the days leading up to the German attack, pinpointing targets and allowing the devastating initial German attacks.

Hell, even after the Germans were over the border, Stalin insisted that the Soviets not shoot back, convinced that this was just a German provocation designed to give Hitler an excuse to renegotiate the Nazi-Soviet Pact if the Soviets fired on German troops.  Stalin appears to have had a nervous breakdown when it became apparent that the attack was in earnest.

So, there are lots of goofy Soviet decisions that only make sense when you understand that the Soviet Union was completely under the control of a severely imbalanced character.  The decision to back the Germans against the West is just one of a long string.

Yes, it's quite ironic Stalin trusted Hitler of all people, given that he was famous for being totally paranoid and never trusted anyone else at all. I suspect the trust was out of weakness, as Hitler was someone totally beyond his control, and therefore wanted to placate him until Stalin was ready. Very typical of a controlling micro-manager who will blame anyone or anything that he can influence rather than himself or outside influences.

[derspiess]

I don't know if that is true.  The Germans gambled everything on a complete and fast victory.  If that war had been protracted at all they would have been in big trouble.  It seems weird they would have based their entire strategy on achieving the historical outcome if it was that far fetched.  The French, for their part, were not that confident.

I can't remember where I read it, but it was a pretty authoritative source that said the results of the 1940 France campaign far exceeded Hitler's expectations.  Yes, they shifted to a higher risk, higher reward strategy than what the original plan entailed but it didn't seem like Hitler expected them to even take Paris.

That said, I need to revisit that source & refresh my memory

[Valmy]

Um their plan was to cut off and destroy half the French Army (along with the Dutch, Belgians, and the BEF).  If this plan was achieved, and it was, what exactly did Hitler think the French were going to defend Paris with?

[Razgovory]

From what I've read Stalin seemed to regard Britain as the main enemy at the time, rather then Germany and was constantly paranoid that Britain was try to get Germany and the Soviet Union to go war.  When Stalin cynically aligned himself the Nazis, he probably did more to help the Germans then any other country in Europe.  For this, the people of the Soviet Union would pay terrible price.

[Grey Fox]

I've always been under the impression that Hitler was pretty sure the French would just burn down Paris.