News from Iran? Good? Bad? Who knows?

[Neil]

This, and the fact that Kodos is now the focus point for disaffected youth who are putting all of their hopes and dreams on him, who will either be crushed and disappointed when he doesn't pan out or will push his idealogical agenda to become more liberal.

But the state retains the ability to execute Mousavi and machinegun the disaffected youth.  So what does it matter?

[jimmy olsen]

I guess i don't understand the situation at all. What would happen if the regime held a recount or a new election, and said "okay you guys ... Kodos wins!"

I mean, what's the downside for them? He's their guy as well.

As I say I think the campaign is now threatening the foundations of the Islamic Republic to a degree that I don't think they fully realise.  I also think that Mousavi's campaign is very cleverly using the same tools that Khomeini used in 1979.  It must be chilling for Khameinei, who like Mousavi, was around and remembered that Khomeini encouraged the people to stand on their roofs of a night and chant 'Allah akbar' to build unity and remind the Shah that they were still there and still angry.  Right now that's happening and it's reminding the Supreme Leader.

I thought that this article has a nice breakdown on alot of the symbols being co-opted.
http://www.slate.com/id/2220605/

During the revolution that deposed the shah, the rooftops rang with nightly cries of "Allahu akbar" ("God is great"). In recent nights, the same cry has reverberated across the capital. The slogan has also been adopted during protests to afford protection to demonstrators—it would be shocking indeed for police or militias in a purportedly Islamic state to attack crowds openly professing their devotion. Displaying respect for religion may also be an indication of the protesters' hope that the divided clerical elite will come down against Ahmadinejad.

Another slogan that has been co-opted is the Muslim testament that "there is no God but God." This phrase is a subtle jab at the authority of the supreme leader and head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In Iran, the supreme leader has enormous power—he even has authority to overrule Sharia law. Consequently, there are some pious believers who oppose the theocratic state, rejecting what they see as a usurpation of the authority of God's words. Others, secularists and liberals, employ the same slogans to further their own goals. By keeping their language general and inoffensive, they avoid alienating potential allies.

In 1977 and 1978, protesters killed while opposing the shah were commemorated as martyrs. Services memorializing their passing then sparked fresh protests. On Monday, fallen protesters were already being referred to as martyrs within Iran. Another slogan from the '70s has returned: "He who kills my brother will be killed by me..."

[jimmy olsen]

I thought this was an interesting article and it adresses some of Malthus's questions.

http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2009/06/16/khamenei-on-the-ropes.aspx

Khamenei on the Ropes?

Robert Baer served in the CIA as a field operative from 1976 to 1997. His latest book is The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Crown Publishers, 2008).

In Iran nothing is ever as it seems, including presidential elections. It's arguable that Friday's election had less to do with a vote for or against Ahmadinejad than it did with a vote for or against Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. And if the elections were stolen, it was likely in an effort to maintain Khamenei's hold on power rather than Ahmadinejad's.

Iran is not a theocracy. It is a military dictatorship headed by Khamenei and advised by a coterie of generals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Army, as well as hard-liners in the secret police. Ahmadinejad is little more than the spokesman for this group. He may have a say in the day-to-day management of the economy and other parts of Iranian administration--but all important decisions, particularly those related to Iran's national security, including rigging presidential elections, are made by Khamenei.

What makes this such a tenuous situation is that Khamenei's legitimacy has been in question from the day he succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. It was widely understood among intelligence analysts that Khamenei did not have the religious credentials to succeed Khomeini as supreme leader, Iran's head of state who is supposed to be the most learned religious cleric. In fact, Khamenei is not even really an ayatollah--his license was in effect bought--and he has no popular religious following as other legitimate ayatollahs do. It doesn't help that Iranian leaders of Khomeini's generation have never particularly liked Khamenei and see him as a man who muscled his way into power, perhaps even  by killing Khomeini's son, the person most likely to challenge his rule.

A sure signal of Khamenei's political weakness occurred when Ahmadinejad attacked former president Rafsanjani for corruption during the election campaign. Rafsanjani is and always has been a threat to Khamenei's legitimacy. Not only is he more of a real ayatollah, but he is also Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council, two powerful government bodies. The Assembly of Experts has the power to remove Khamenei and appoint a new Supreme Leader. And though facts are impossible to come by, it is almost certain that Ahmadinejad's attack on Rafsanjani could not have been made without a green light from Khamenei, who knew that charges of Rafsanjani's corruption would strike a chord with Iranians. Khamenei saw and probably still sees Rafsanjani as a threat to his power, even to his position as supreme leader, and this was an effective way to pounce.

Still, if the protests and demonstrations in Tehran cannot be controlled, we should seriously start to wonder about Khamenei's future. Rafsanjani is rumored to be in the holy city of Qum plotting against Khamenei, seeing if he has enough votes in the 86-member Assembly of Experts to remove Khamenei. A vote recount is unlikely to change the results of the election, but it could lead to more demonstrations, which backed by Rafsanjani and the other mullahs, might just end Khamenei's 20 year run.

--Robert Baer

[Fireblade]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4vqWamoQgM

Basji firing into a crowd of protesters.

[Neil]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4vqWamoQgM

Basji firing into a crowd of protesters.

Not protesters.  Look at those fires.  Those are rioters, and thus deserved to be shot.

[Fireblade]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4vqWamoQgM

Basji firing into a crowd of protesters.

Not protesters.  Look at those fires.  Those are rioters, and thus deserved to be shot.

Fuck you.

[Neil]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4vqWamoQgM

Basji firing into a crowd of protesters.

Not protesters.  Look at those fires.  Those are rioters, and thus deserved to be shot.

Fuck you.

No, fuck you, you ignorant wretch.

[Tamas]

Could Moussavi end up as Imre Nagy in Hungary during the '56 revolution? He also was the child of the system, a "great old one" of the regime, only he was ready to work to make it better, and as a result, he became the sole hope of people who wanted change. So he ended up leading a process he probably would not had approved of if he knew about it in advance, but to his credit, he accepted his historical role and acted upon it.


Also, since we only get news from Teheran: why is everyone ignoring the chance that the ignorant fools of Iran did legally elect Ahmaninjariahad as president?

[Jos Theelen]

In China, 20 years ago, the protest could run so long, because there was a stalemate between hardliners and reformers in the communist party. Aren't we looking at the same scenario? If hardliners win, the demonstrations will be cracked down with a lot of violence. If the reformers win, Ahmedinejad will be replaced by Mousavi, some reforms will be allowed and the system will go on as if nothing happened.

Khamenei vs Rafsanjani ?

[Sheilbh]

Also, since we only get news from Teheran: why is everyone ignoring the chance that the ignorant fools of Iran did legally elect Ahmaninjariahad as president?

No-one's ignoring it.  A few articles have suggested it's possible.  Most have been dismissed because of a few things.  I mean not least that historically the higher the turn-out in Iran, the higher the reformist vote, which has been the case in every election.  Similarly there are reports of protests outside of Teheran, we just can't get the verified.  There's also the odd thing about Mehdi Kerroubi's vote.  He's apparently enormously popular in Western Iran, especially Lurestan, and yet Ahmadinejad won with roughly the same percentage of the vote there as anywhere else and Kerroubi's vote collapsed to around 10% of the vote he received in 20005.  No candidate but Ahmadinejad won their home town or home province and I believe that no candidate has lost their home town since the 80s.

It seems unusual that the electoral commission which is legally required to wait three days before announcing the results was able to announce them in two hours.

But there are reports and videos apparently from outside Teheran.  This is apparently from Isfahan.  At the start they're chanting something along the lines of 'mar beg dictator' which means 'death to the dictator':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hkTLaAa4tBE
If it's true and there are similar demonstrations elsewhere in Iran then this is even bigger than it appears.

Robert Fisk who is apparently skulking round Teheran - he thinks foreign journalists are taking warnings to stay off the streets too seriously - said that he saw riot police protecting Mousavi protesters from Ahmedinejad's militias, while the Mousavi supporters chanted 'thank you brothers'.  Again this may not be widespread but it's interesting.

Reza Aslan who's, I believe, an Iranian-American writer is saying that an emergency session of the Assembly of Experts - the only body that can censure or remove a Supreme Leader and the body that elects the Supreme Leader - has been called by Rafsanjani.  I assume at this stage he's got enough votes to call Khamenei's bluff and try to pry him and the rest of the state from Ahmedinejad.

[Tamas]

Sheilbh, as usual, your insights are excellent

[Sheilbh]

In China, 20 years ago, the protest could run so long, because there was a stalemate between hardliners and reformers in the communist party. Aren't we looking at the same scenario? If hardliners win, the demonstrations will be cracked down with a lot of violence. If the reformers win, Ahmedinejad will be replaced by Mousavi, some reforms will be allowed and the system will go on as if nothing happened.

Khamenei vs Rafsanjani ?

This is possibly the case.  The only thing that would seem different to me is that the hard-liners are, in theory, in charge of every armed group who can crack down: the army, the riot police, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij (a RG militia) all, I believe, answer to Khamenei.  The RG and the Basij have certainly been used by the hardliners in the last few days.  But the power structure in Iran is deliberately very confusing.  We don't know the degree to which actions have been instigated by Khamenei or Ahmadinejad, for example.  Who is the RG really loyal to?  We also don't know what's happening at the top and bottom of those organisations, are groups of police, say, growing more sympathetic?  Are there struggles at the top of them?

Most of the reformists have very few powers.  Mousavi's influence comes from his reputation in the 80s and the fact that there are people on the streets.  Rafsanjani's from the fact that he's head of the Assembly of Experts and, no doubt, a wannabe Supreme Leader.

Of course this isn't like China 1989, or Persia 1979, or Poland 1989.  It's just Iran 2009.  But it's stronger than previous Iranian protests in 1999, say, because it's not just the students.  This is a far wider movement by the looks of it.  The other difference is one of those things that we really need to know to make a judgement on the situation, but don't which is how widespread it is out of Teheran.  If there are similar demonstrations in other major cities - which have been reported - then it's even more difficult to repress.

Edit:  A couple of other points.  The demonstrators are still pretty leaderless.  A leadership could be hidden to keep them safe but so far it looks relatively spontaneous, amorphous and so on which is dangerous when confronting the strength and direction of a state.  Apparently there'll be another demonstration today - as ever we probably won't get pictures until the evening and there are some fears that there'll be a crack down.

[Jos Theelen]

Who is the RG really loyal to?  We also don't know what's happening at the top and bottom of those organisations, are groups of police, say, growing more sympathetic?  Are there struggles at the top of them?

Often those organisations like the Rg are only loyal to themselves. They chose the side of the party they think gives the most to them.
Surely there is a struggle. This struggle is already very old. This is an article http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/30/iran.topstories3, 2 years old, mentioning the rifts in the top. the conclusion of the article:

Observers claim that a power struggle is inevitable.
"A very big battle is coming. It's unavoidable," a western diplomat said. "There's a widening gulf between the two sides. There are profound divisions about which way Iran should go. It's going to get very rough."
The looming power struggle could decide whether Iran continues on a path of confrontation with the west or comes in from the cold, the diplomat said.

[Sheilbh]

Incidentally, a bit more on that rally in Isfahan.  As far as I can tell this is a picture of it from either Monday or Tuesday:


Edit:  Looks like they could be ready for a big crack down.  Human rights groups are reporting that hundreds of reformists were arrested yesterday.  Internet use is being more heavily restricted and the RG is warning people not to post provocative or tension building things on the internet or they'll face prosecution.

[Jos Theelen]

The friday prayers could be very dangerous for the top. You cannot use a lot of violence in that situation.