New map may explain Lee's decisions at Gettysburg

[lustindarkness]

Why are historians still spending time and money on Gettysburg? All the remaining questions were answered during the Languish Gettysburg Meet.

[CountDeMoney]

Lulz, "Little Round Toppings"

[Berkut]

I think it is saying Lee didn't know that there were a lot of Union troops behind and along Seminary Ridge to the right of his position in general. He didn't really order Longstreet to attack LRT in particular, IIRC.

But this is nothing new.  Everything "revealed" by this new map has been known for decades.  The idea that Lee would assume that there were no troops he couldn't see ("he had seen everything")  is plucked from thin air.  The idea that " a key element that's been excluded, or just not considered in historical studies before, is sight" is just bullshit made up by Professor Knowles.

Lee didn't know exactly what he faced, at Gettysburg or any other battle.  No general does.  Lee decided to attack the Union flanks because the Union army was notoriously vulnerable to such attacks (and had been the day before, in fact).

True enough, I don't disagree with the basic premise of what you are saying, just pointing out that the article wasn't saying Lee couldn't see troops on LRT - I doubt Lee was ever anywhere that he could have seen troops there even if he could see the feature itself.

But more basically, I think the article fails because it presumes that "What my eyeballs can see" was somehow of primary importance to a Civil War general when it came to him deciding where he though the enemy was at.

[Razgovory]

I think we can assume that Lee knew if he attacked the center of the line, he'd run into someone.  Even if he couldn't see them at that very moment.   I mean, he was a trained surveyed, so he knew how features could be hidden by terrain.

[Drakken]

I think we can assume that Lee knew if he attacked the center of the line, he'd run into someone.  Even if he couldn't see them at that very moment.   I mean, he was a trained surveyed, so he knew how features could be hidden by terrain.

I agree. The issue wasn't that Lee didn't have a map or understanding of terrain (he very well knew that Gettysburg and its surroundings were higher, uneven terrain, and for God's sake the man had passed West Point without a single blemish on his cadet record). Lee's problem was that he didn't correctly assess the number of Union soldiers that had been massed in front of him, partly due to bad recon and a bit of wishful thinking.

Lee knew that Hancock's Corps was in front of him allright, and logically came to the argument that since Meade had reinforced his flanks in the past two days the center must be weaker, and that he had the right odds with Longstreet's Corps to perform what was basically a fort-taking breakthrough assault. On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.

[PDH]

The problem was that he was Martin Sheen and a pretty piss-poor Lee at Gettysburg.

[Drakken]

The problem was that he was Martin Sheen and a pretty piss-poor Lee at Gettysburg.

Sheen wasn't that bad, but Duvall had it, he was the shit. And the dude literally has Lee in him as one of his direct descendants.

[CountDeMoney]

Sheen wasn't that bad, but Duvall had it, he was the shit.

Bullshit.  Sheen was better.  Duvall was just shitkicker Duvall, without any of the self-absorbed evangelicalism.

And the dude literally has Lee in him as one of his direct descendants.

All the fanbois say that.  B.F.D. Stuart.

[11B4V]

Sheen. Duvall was OK.

[Valmy]

The problem was that he was Martin Sheen and a pretty piss-poor Lee at Gettysburg.

You have to be kidding me, Sheen was a great Lee.  Granted there have not been very many competent Lees in film history.

[Valmy]

On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.

Yeah Meade called it the night before and he was no military genius.

[grumbler]

Lee knew that Hancock's Corps was in front of him allright, and logically came to the argument that since Meade had reinforced his flanks in the past two days the center must be weaker, and that he had the right odds with Longstreet's Corps to perform what was basically a fort-taking breakthrough assault. On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.

Lee knew that the AoP had more soldiers than he did, knew that the AoP had been concentrating on Gettysburg for two days already, and knew that a frontal attack was the riskiest and bloodiest option in the commander's repertoire.  There was absolutely no reason for him to attack on the third day; he had already lost the battle.  Sure, the Union center or reserve would be weaker after reinforcing the flanks; that doesn't say that it was weak enough to fold in a frontal assault.

It was ego.  Lee just couldn't believe he could be beaten, so he grasped at straws, and his men paid for it.

[dps]

Lee knew that Hancock's Corps was in front of him allright, and logically came to the argument that since Meade had reinforced his flanks in the past two days the center must be weaker, and that he had the right odds with Longstreet's Corps to perform what was basically a fort-taking breakthrough assault. On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.

Lee knew that the AoP had more soldiers than he did, knew that the AoP had been concentrating on Gettysburg for two days already, and knew that a frontal attack was the riskiest and bloodiest option in the commander's repertoire.  There was absolutely no reason for him to attack on the third day; he had already lost the battle.  Sure, the Union center or reserve would be weaker after reinforcing the flanks; that doesn't say that it was weak enough to fold in a frontal assault.

It was ego.  Lee just couldn't believe he could be beaten, so he grasped at straws, and his men paid for it.

I don't think that Lee had so much ego that he thought that he couldn't be beaten;  it was more that the situation really worked against his strengths.  Lee was always best as a counterpuncher, and with Meade sitting on the defensive, Lee didn't have an opportunity to do that.  And strategically, since in this case, Lee was invading the North, if he couldn't counterpunch, his options were to either attack or simply go home and admit that the invasion had been a bad idea--and the latter was something his ego probably wouldn't let him do.

Of course, the invasion was a bad idea, but that's a different issue.

[grumbler]

I don't think that Lee had so much ego that he thought that he couldn't be beaten;  it was more that the situation really worked against his strengths.  Lee was always best as a counterpuncher, and with Meade sitting on the defensive, Lee didn't have an opportunity to do that.  And strategically, since in this case, Lee was invading the North, if he couldn't counterpunch, his options were to either attack or simply go home and admit that the invasion had been a bad idea--and the latter was something his ego probably wouldn't let him do.

Of course, the invasion was a bad idea, but that's a different issue.

The invasion was a gamble.  The gamble had failed by nightfall on the 2nd.  Lee had no reason to believe that a frontal assault would actually break the Union line, but he had every reason to believe that, win or lose, a frontal assault would be horrendously expensive in terms of his own army's casualties.  Forced to choose between retreat or a gamble that at best would give him a Pyrrhic victory, Lee gambled.  It was a sucker's gamble, and I can find only ego to explain it.

[derspiess]

It was a sucker's gamble, and I can find only ego to explain it.

That's pretty much it, I think.  Victim of his own success & whatnot.