New map may explain Lee's decisions at Gettysburg

[11B4V]

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/A-Cutting-Edge-Second-Look-at-the-Battle-of-Gettysburg.html

New, computer-generated map of Gettysburg suggests Lee had a poor view of the battlefield
New map may explain Lee's decisions at Gettysburg
By MICHAEL RUBINKAM | Associated Press | Jun 28, 2013 12:21 PM CDT in US
             

On the second day of fighting at Gettysburg, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee listened to scouting reports, scanned the battlefield and ordered his second-in-command, James Longstreet, to attack the Union Army's left flank.
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It was a fateful decision, one that led to one of the most desperate clashes of the entire Civil War _ the fight for a piece of ground called Little Round Top. The Union's defense of the boulder-strewn promontory helped send Lee to defeat at Gettysburg, and he never again ventured into Northern territory.

Why did the shrewd and canny Lee choose to attack, especially in the face of the Union's superior numbers?

While historians have long wrestled with that question, geographers and cartographers have come up with an explanation, by way of sophisticated mapping software that shows the rolling terrain exactly as it would have appeared to Lee: From his vantage point, he simply couldn't see throngs of Union soldiers amid the hills and valleys.

"Our analysis shows that he had a very poor understanding of how many forces he was up against, which made him bolder," said Middlebury College professor Anne Knowles, whose team produced the most faithful re-creation of the Gettysburg battlefield to date, using software called GIS, or geographic information systems.

Developed for the Smithsonian Institution to mark Gettysburg's 150th anniversary, the panoramic map went live on the Smithsonian website Friday, giving history buffs a new way to look at the Civil War's pivotal battle, which took place July 1-3, 1863.

"Our goal is to help people understand how and why commanders made their decisions at key moments of the battle, and a key element that's been excluded, or just not considered in historical studies before, is sight," Knowles said.

Long before the advent of reconnaissance aircraft and spy satellites, a general's own sense of sight _ his ability to read the terrain and assess the enemy's position and numbers _ was one of his most important tools. Especially at Gettysburg, where Lee was hampered by faulty intelligence.

"We know that Lee had really poor information going into the battle and must have relied to some extent on what he could actually see," Knowles said.

The geographer applied GIS to find out what Lee could see and what he couldn't.

To reconstruct the battlefield as it existed in 1863, researchers used historical maps, texts and photos to note the location of wooden fences, stone walls, orchards, forests, fields, barns and houses, as well as the movement of army units. High-resolution aerial photos of the landscape yielded an accurate elevation model. All of it was fed into a computer program that can map data.

Lee is believed to have surveyed the battlefield from a pair of cupolas, one at a Lutheran seminary and the other at Gettysburg College, both of which yielded generally excellent views.

But a GIS-generated map, with illuminated areas showing what Lee could see and shaded areas denoting what was hidden from his view, indicates the terrain concealed large numbers of Union soldiers.

"What really came through as a new discovery for us in this project was seeing how few federal forces Lee could see, particularly on Day 2, when he decides to send Longstreet," Knowles said.

Historian Allen Guelzo, who wasn't involved in the project, agreed that Lee's view probably misled him. Guelzo, director of Civil War-era studies at Gettysburg College, took a visitor up to the school's cupola and motioned toward the peak of Little Round Top, just visible in the distance.

"You can see a lot from up here, and Robert E. Lee might have thought on July 2 that he had seen everything," said Guelzo, who has written a new book on the Battle of Gettysburg. "But, in fact, the dips and folds of the ground, the foliage as it was on the ground in various groves and woods, all of that concealed what turned out to be the deadly truth."

Conversely, the Union Army occupied higher ground, and used it to great advantage.

Union Gen. Gouverneur Warren spied Longstreet's troops just as they were about to launch their attack on an undefended Little Round Top. Frantic, Warren dispatched an officer to round up reinforcements. They got there just in time, and withstood the Confederates.

In Warren's case, GIS confirmed what historians have long known.

For Knowles, the mapping project and the mysteries it revealed helped Gettysburg come alive.

"Commanders always had to make decisions with really limited information ... committing men's lives to scraps of information or intuition, or what you can see at a certain day or a certain time," she said. "This analysis, for me, is making the battle more human."

[grumbler]

nly problem with this theory is that there were, in fact, no Union troops on the hill when Lee ordered the attack.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I don't know why it's always so mystical, but most of Lee's performance at Gettysburg can be explained by the simple fact that he was overly arrogant and aggressive and ignored lessons he should have learned from previous experience in the war--in fact history suggests he did know better, and simply made bad decisions. Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.

[CountDeMoney]

Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.

Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee. 

He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.

[11B4V]

Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.

Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee. 

He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.

No doubt.

I do need to finnish reading Pfanz's books on Gettysburg. I read his Gettysburg--The First Day , it was good mind you. I would say very similar writing style to Glantz.

[Valmy]

Why did the shrewd and canny Lee choose to attack, especially in the face of the Union's superior numbers?

Probably the same reason he did so at the Seven Days and Chancellorsville?  Just this time the Union general did not lose his nerve.

[Valmy]

Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee. 

He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.

Lee's strategic decisions seem rather lacking in my eyes, he should have sent forces west to save Pemberton and Bragg in 1863 like many Confederate leaders wanted instead of his invasion of the North which did not distract Grant or Rosecrans at all.  His invasion of the North in 1862 was likewise disastrous for the Confederate cause.

It seems odd to celebrate a general as the greatest of all time when his two big strategic initiatives both resulted in failure.

[Admiral Yi]

Lee acted like a putz several times during the Seven Days too.

Much like Napoleon, Lee's genius was for the operational, not the grand tactical.

[11B4V]

Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee. 

He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.

Lee's strategic decisions seem rather lacking in my eyes, he should have sent forces west to save Pemberton and Bragg in 1863 like many Confederate leaders wanted instead of his invasion of the North which did not distract Grant or Rosecrans at all.  His invasion of the North in 1862 was likewise disastrous for the Confederate cause.

It seems odd to celebrate a general as the greatest of all time when his two big strategic initiatives both resulted in failure.

[Berkut]

nly problem with this theory is that there were, in fact, no Union troops on the hill when Lee ordered the attack.

I think it is saying Lee didn't know that there were a lot of Union troops behind and along Seminary Ridge to the right of his position in general. He didn't really order Longstreet to attack LRT in particular, IIRC.

[Berkut]

I don't know why it's always so mystical, but most of Lee's performance at Gettysburg can be explained by the simple fact that he was overly arrogant and aggressive and ignored lessons he should have learned from previous experience in the war--in fact history suggests he did know better, and simply made bad decisions. Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.

To be fair to Lee, one of the lessons he did likely learn earlier in the war is that the Union could not stand up to a concentrated, well prepared assault, and their leadership would generally screw up in some fashion.

[DontSayBanana]

Never has this meme been more apt...

...map sucks.

[grumbler]

I think it is saying Lee didn't know that there were a lot of Union troops behind and along Seminary Ridge to the right of his position in general. He didn't really order Longstreet to attack LRT in particular, IIRC.

But this is nothing new.  Everything "revealed" by this new map has been known for decades.  The idea that Lee would assume that there were no troops he couldn't see ("he had seen everything")  is plucked from thin air.  The idea that " a key element that's been excluded, or just not considered in historical studies before, is sight" is just bullshit made up by Professor Knowles.

Lee didn't know exactly what he faced, at Gettysburg or any other battle.  No general does.  Lee decided to attack the Union flanks because the Union army was notoriously vulnerable to such attacks (and had been the day before, in fact).

Why Lee attacked the center the next day is the puzzler.  He had to have known that he had already lost the battle.

[Drakken]

How could Lee have seen everything of the battlefield, anyway? JEB Stuart was running amok elsewhere with his cavalry regiment, having fun plucking Union supplies around Dover, while the first day of the battle started raging on. Every serious to not-so-serious narrative of the Battle of Gettysburg put the emphasis on Lee's lack of recon capability because JEB Stuart wasn't doing what he was supposed to be doing.

[Ed Anger]

Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.

Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee. 

He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.

LACES OUT. MEW.