Aukus

[Sheilbh]

Details confirmed - from Sydney Morning Herald - as it's now been announced. This seems like a pretty vast commitment for Australia specifically and a big shift in their role in the Pacific. Also it seems like almost unprecedented degree of military, strategic and industrial entanglement (that needs to survive at least four Presidential terms ):

New fleet of eight nuclear submarines to be built in Australia in $368 billion deal
By David Crowe
Updated March 14, 2023 — 7.36amfirst published at 7.01am

Key points
    Australia will build a new fleet of eight nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide to begin service in the 2040s.
    The government expects the full cost of the program, including construction and maintenance and service, to range from $268 billion to $368 billion up to 2055.
    The United States Navy and the Royal Navy will station nuclear-powered submarines in Perth from 2027 in the first step toward filling the capability gap.
    Australia will buy between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States at a cost of $50 billion to $58 billion, which are expected to arrive from the early 2030s. It is not yet decided if these will be new or older submarines.
    Australia's own SSN-AUKUS nuclear-powered fleet will be based on Britain's Astute-class submarines, and will be built in Adelaide from the 2040s. The first one may be built in the UK.

San Diego: Australia will build a new fleet of eight nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide to begin service in the 2040s under a mammoth transformation in national defence that will cost up to $368 billion by 2055.

The government expects the full cost of the program, including construction and maintenance and service, to range from $268 billion to $368 billion up to 2055.

The sweeping plan will begin by hosting more visits to Australian ports by United States submarines this year and United Kingdom vessels from 2026, clearing the way for a fixed rotation of naval power in Perth.

Over time, Australia will aim to build a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to a joint design with the United Kingdom so that vessels made in Adelaide can enter service in the 2040s.

The long-term fleet, made in Australia with a design called the SSN-AUKUS, will consist of eight submarines and will be fitted with vertical launch systems to fire cruise missiles.

The next steps in the AUKUS alliance with the US and UK will cost $9 billion over the next four years including $2 billion for infrastructure in Adelaide and $1 billion for an expanded naval base in Perth.

Australia will contribute about $3 billion to the efforts in the US and UK to develop the submarine technology, including the design and development of the SSN-AUKUS.

The US will commit $US4.6 billion to its industry to support the Australian project, while the UK will spend 2.2 billion pounds.

With the government setting out a two-decade effort to develop the industrial capacity to build the new fleet in Australia, it will commit to hosting more foreign vessels and buying US-made submarines to fill a looming gap in the nation's defences.

While US submarines already visit Australia, the visits will increase from this year and Royal Australian Navy personnel will begin serving with the US and UK fleets.

Details of AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines plan to be unveiled by PM Anthony Albanese and US, British leaders.

The United States Navy and the Royal Navy will station nuclear-powered submarines in Perth from 2027 in the first step toward filling the capability gap. The rotational forces will include up to four Virginia-class US vessel and one Astute-class UK vessel.

Bridging the capability gap

From the early 2030s, the federal government will buy at least three and up to five Virginia-class submarines from the US, but this will depend on approval from the US Congress.

The result will give Australia an interim fleet with more capability and firepower than any Australian vessels to date, giving the country more capacity to project force throughout the region.

The three or more Virginia-class vessels will be under Australian command with Australian crews and will mark the first time the US has sold these submarines to another country.

The US and Australian governments are yet to decide whether Australia will buy new or used Virginia-class vessels.

Later in the 2030s, the UK will take delivery of new submarines from shipbuilders in the UK to a new design to replace the Astute-class and to be known as the SSN-AUKUS.

Only after this point is Australia forecast to have the shipbuilding and technology capacity to deploy the SSN-AUKUS design with vessels built in Adelaide and due to enter service in the 2040s.

The plan forecasts the delivery of a new SSN-AUKUS every two years and assumes all are built in Adelaide, but the government is not ruling out buying the first of this fleet from the UK, depending on the strategic outlook.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is due to announce the new steps alongside US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak at the US Navy's Point Loma base in San Diego at 8am on Tuesday morning, AEDT, in the most significant decisions since the three nations struck the AUKUS agreement in September 2021.

At a photo opportunity with three world leaders before the speeches, Sky's Kieran Gilbert asked US President Joe Biden if the US could be relied on to honour the AUKUS deal, and the President replied: "We can always be relied upon."

All the submarines in the new plan will be powered by nuclear propulsion systems made overseas and fitted with nuclear fuel that will last the lifetime of the vessel, in the first time the US has shared the technology with another country since it agreed to do so with the United Kingdom in 1958. None of the submarines in the Royal Australian Navy will have nuclear weapons.

The new plans mark a major new step in the AUKUS pact after the intensely controversial move by then prime minister Scott Morrison and federal cabinet in September 2021 to end an agreement with France to supply conventional submarines to be built in Adelaide.

Albanese will set out a deadline for the Adelaide shipbuilding project that is in line with Morrison's assurance that Australia would build its own submarines for delivery during the 2040s, a target that triggered argument over whether it would take too long to replace the Collins-class fleet, which are powered by diesel-electric engines and entered service from 1996.

The RAN has sought a dramatic shift to a more powerful submarine design out of concern at the vulnerability of the Collins-class vessels in an era of more powerful satellite surveillance and the limitations of diesel-electric engines compared to nuclear propulsion systems that can power vessels for greater distances at faster speeds and with less noise and exposure to detection.

Searching for the next generation of submariners

The need for skilled workers has been identified as a key challenge in the AUKUS project because of the scale of the construction as well as the shortage of submariners on the existing Collins-class submarine fleet before personnel move to the nuclear-powered fleets.

The government expects to need 20,000 jobs over the next 30 years including workers supporting AUKUS in the Australian Defence Force, domestic industry and the Australian public service. This includes 8500 direct jobs in Australia's building and servicing the submarines, with jobs including scientists, engineers, project managers, operators, technicians, welders, construction workers, electricians, metal fitters and builders.

Albanese has preciously named Adelaide and Western Australia as two locations that would win work from the AUKUS project.

The $9 billion cost over the next four years will include $6 billion for Australian industry and workforce, separate from the infrastructure upgrades in Adelaide and Perth.

Overhauling our shipyards and ports

HMAS Stirling in Perth will be upgraded to host more visits by US and UK vessels and become the base for the new fleet, in a plan that assumes the creation of 3,000 jobs.The plan for Adelaide requires a mammoth investment in a new shipyard at Osborne to build the SSN-AUKUS, with up to 4,000 workers involved at its peak.

In addition, the construction of the new submarines will require 4,000 to 5,000 workers at the shipyard at the peak of the work two decades from now.

The government estimate for the decade to 2033 ranges from $50 billion to $58 billion and could include some of the cost of buying the first Virginia-class vessels in the next decade.

The cost is at least twice that of the $24 billion for the Attack-class submarines under the contract cancelled with the French.

Over the longer-term, the project will cost 0.15 per cent of GDP each year on average, highlighting the vast cost when total defence spending is forecast to surpass 2 per cent of GDP.

Australia has 900 serving submariners but needs at least 200 more as soon as possible so it can deploy personnel to US and British vessels to prepare for the transformation in the fleet. Over time, however, many more would be needed, depending on the number of submarines purchased.

The plan to be unveiled commits Australia to using propulsion systems from the US that are installed in the submarines with a supply of nuclear fuel that lasts the lifetime of the vessels, avoiding the need for a civil nuclear industry.

The nuclear reactors are to be inserted into the submarines during their construction, resulting in a fully self-contained power source with no need for refuelling - a crucial assumption in the AUKUS agreement because it means Australia would not need a civil nuclear industry to support the maintenance of the vessels.

A transformation in regional defence that will require at least $170 billion in new spending to develop an industrial base capable of building a new fleet in Adelaide over the next two decades.

The government will not disclose the cost per unit for the new submarines.

The program assumes the government will not begin the disposal of any nuclear waste until the 2050s and the government is looking for a future site for this on Australian Defence Force land at a future date.

Again the really striking thing here is how Australia's read of its strategic environment must have changed so much for this radical (and expensive) a shift in policy. Especially given that the deal was brokered by a Liberal government and is now being finalised under a Labor government.

[Zanza]

I just googled it: 368 AUD = 245 USD

[mongers]

I think they could have handled the signalling involved in this announcement better, say by holding the signing ceremony onboard a USN CV 20 miles off the East coast of Tiawan.

[Sheilbh]

I just googled it: 368 AUD = 245 USD

Yeah - as Albanese put it from an Australian perspective the biggest single defence project in Australian history.

As I say the thing I find really striking (and alarming) is the shift in Australia's risk perception since 2012 that they've gone, I think, from a project of A$36 billion to ten times that. That in itself feels like a flashing red light on the Pacific and China's conduct and intentions.

Edit: And indicative of that just yesterday Xi used his first speech of his new term to vow to build China's military into a "great wall of steel" for the purposes of "effectively safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests" - later referencing "'Taiwan independence' separtists and external interference".

[Jacob]

Yeah, my gut is that Xi's going to pull the trigger.

He's intellectually vacuous and emotionally insecure and he genuinely believes the rhetoric about China's destiny and Chinese nationalism. If he was part of the older style CCP, there'd be checks and balance and some sort of consensus driven decision making. Maybe, in that case, there'd be a chance that it'd be posturing for advantage, but I don't believe it is. Xi has consolidated power - and he'll continue to do so - which means it'll be up to one (vacuous and insecure) person's judgement.

If Xi remains in power, he'll take his shot at Taiwan. I hope I'm wrong, but all the signs are there IMO.

[Josquius]

Its perfectly understandable that this shift happened. Back in the 2000s things did seem to year on year be getting better in China. The hope that it would open up naturally wasn't completely unfounded. Loads of articles out there from journalists comparing their experience during the summer and winter olympics.
The peak and decline seems to predate Xi becoming premier. I wonder what triggered it- surely its not so simple as the financial crisis, though that likely plays a role.

[Sheilbh]

Its perfectly understandable that this shift happened. Back in the 2000s things did seem to year on year be getting better in China. The hope that it would open up naturally wasn't completely unfounded. Loads of articles out there from journalists comparing their experience during the summer and winter olympics.
The peak and decline seems to predate Xi becoming premier. I wonder what triggered it- surely its not so simple as the financial crisis, though that likely plays a role.

I think there's two cycles that ended up rhyming with Xi. The Economist's Prince podcast is really good on this. But it's the thing I often wonder - to what extent was Xi exactly the type of leader the CCP wanted at that point (given that another main candidate was Bo Xilai it doesn't seem implausible) or to what extent this has all been a bit of a surprise for them.

One cycle is China's rise and I think the global financial crisis is key to that moment because I think the perception within China (and outside to an extent) is that they respond pretty effectively to that. Their success in dealing with it is contrasted with the US and the EU who in different ways get it really wrong and have a decade of relatively low growth while China continues to grow and modernise.

I think for the party and for China that isn't the only sign but is indicative of China needing a larger role in the world to reflect its power. I do think 2008-12 is really important in that. But I think the view of the financial crisis was a bit like China's covid policy (until vaccines came along). It was successful in its goals and it compared favourably with the West.

So I think regardless of who became leader China's politics were taking a turn to more assertive policy internationally. The challenge in our system is, as Lawrence Summers has pointed out, whether it is even possible for our system which is American led to include another leader. Is America capable of sharing leadership/power and I'm not sure it is. So I think more assertive policy was part of that cycle and it was likely that would lead to increasing clashes with the rest.

But I think there was another cycle that also produced/shaped Xi. I think the combination of corruption scandals, environmental scandals - a lot of which I think was perceived as coming from the various patronage networks around the leadership (like the Youth League network). Xi rose in areas that were at the heart of opening and where there was a lot of corruption. Xi was never directly implicated in those party scandals - and, in the Economist pod they talk to an old CIA China hand who says the easiest explanation might be true, he wasn't really part of it. Maybe he turned a blind eye while that was politically the best option but he was perceived not corrupt. Of course in part he didn't need to be corrupt because unlike, say, a Chinese peasant becoming a businessman or someone trying to make their way in the party, Xi is a princeling with incredible connections married to one of China's most famous singers.

Western journalists have dug around since he's come to power - there have been allegations about some relatives with huge property assets, but not much compared to your standard kleptocrat and not much directly linked to Xi. Again the CIA guy said that Western observers underestimate at their peril Xi's ideological fervour and his nostalgia for the days of a purer, cleaner Chinese revolutionary system (that profoundly punished his family). And almost as a matter of taste views the corrupt and China's nouveau riche as "debauched and undignified".

I think when you combine those two cycles you have the party and China wanting to take a more assertive, leadership role in the world; and you have within the party a desire to clean up/fear that corruption could undermine or destroy party rule so you go for someone with a relatively untainted background and the task of cleaning house. I don't think it means any leader would end up like Xi but I think it creates the domestic conditions for someone to get rid of consensus leadership and target patronage networks of other senior leaders, weakening their powerbase and creates the incentives on the world stage to take a more confrontational approach. And obviously both of those can be aligned as almost two sides of the same coin.

Yeah, my gut is that Xi's going to pull the trigger.

He's intellectually vacuous and emotionally insecure and he genuinely believes the rhetoric about China's destiny and Chinese nationalism. If he was part of the older style CCP, there'd be checks and balance and some sort of consensus driven decision making. Maybe, in that case, there'd be a chance that it'd be posturing for advantage, but I don't believe it is. Xi has consolidated power - and he'll continue to do so - which means it'll be up to one (vacuous and insecure) person's judgement.

If Xi remains in power, he'll take his shot at Taiwan. I hope I'm wrong, but all the signs are there IMO.

One problem I always have with this - and I think it's probably true of most of the world in a post-colonial world - is that I think in really broad brushes the Chinese nationalist myth is kind of true. Great civilisation state, century of humiliation and chaos, CCP dominating and presiding over the rise of China back to great civilisation state strikes me as, at a very high level, a pretty accurate summary of recent Chinese history. I don't necessarily agree with the ends they use it for or at all with the way they write out other figures and movements in Chinese history to always give the CCP a starring role (which is nonsense). But I mention it just because it's something I've also thought of with India - as much as I don't like Modi - and I think one of the things Western and especially European (although in China's case also especially America) needs to do is find a way to accommodate that story in our system, because a lot of it is true.

On Taiwan though - I agree. I think US assessments are basically that something will happen in the latter half of this decade. It is striking with China's modernising it's armed forces into a "great wall of steel" is that it seems reminiscent of Putin's modernisation of Russia's armed forces (and may be just as successful).

I also thought this was interesting from the NPC - Xi formally updating China's foreign policy from Deng's. Again it's like moving on from Deng's goal of "create a moderately prosperous society" as having been achieved:

Moritz Rudolf
@MoritzRudolf
Mar 9
On Monday,  Xi Jinping introduced a 24-character phrase that is likely to develop into the new 🇨🇳 foreign policy mantra.

What is it?
Why is it relevant?

Short 🧵
With risks & challenges increasing, Xi stated

沉着冷静    Be calm,
保持定力    keep determined,
稳中求进    seek progress & stability,
积极作为    be proactive & achieve things,
团结一致    unite (under the banner of the party),
敢于斗争    & dare to fight

(loose translation)
Compare this to Deng Xiaoping's 24-character strategy

冷静观察   Observe calmly
稳住阵脚   secure our position
沉着应付   cope with affairs calmly
韬 光养晦   hide our capacities and bide our time
善于守拙   be good at maintaining a low profile
决不当头   never claim leadership
The 24-characters are framed in the context of the PRC's past achievements (e.g., fight against poverty). They acknowledge the complexity of the current domestic and international environment highlighting a need to prepare for black swans (黑天鹅) and grey rhinos (灰犀牛).
A Xinhua video puts it this way: Today, it is not enough to follow (Deng's) "securing our position" (稳住阵脚) approach. There is a need to be proactive. Unity and daring to fight (& being good at it) will enable the PRC that nothing can stop it moving forward.
The 24-characters have both a domestic and a foreign policy dimension. Given the sharp contrast from and reference to Deng's 24-character strategy, I expect we will hear much more about the foreign policy dimension. The grey rhino appears to be an increasingly likely US-China war.
Here some links:
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/07/nw.D110000renmrb_20230307_3-02.htm


http://views.ce.cn/view/ent/202303/09/t20230309_38432847.shtml

http://news.cn/politics/2023-

[Admiral Yi]

Shelf, what you call an America incapable of sharing power/leadership to me looks more like a ROTW unwilling to assume the burden.

[Sheilbh]

Shelf, what you call an America incapable of sharing power/leadership to me looks more like a ROTW unwilling to assume the burden.

What do you mean? I'm not sure I see the connection.

[Admiral Yi]

It's in response to your Lawrence Summers quote.

[Sheilbh]

This is the quote:

"Can the US imagine a viable global economic system" in which it is no longer the dominant player? Could an American "political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?... Can China be held down without inviting conflict?"

I still don't really understand the connection with burden sharing not least because the countries sharing the burden of an American led system are, almost by definition, part of it but following American leadership. There is no potential for credible (and maybe a little bit justified) challenge to American leadership in the way I think there is with the rise of China (and maybe in the future India and Nigeria etc).

[crazy canuck]

Shelf, what you call an America incapable of sharing power/leadership to me looks more like a ROTW unwilling to assume the burden.

So you want ROTW to assume the burden of carrying out American policy. Good luck with that.

[Admiral Yi]

This is the quote:

"Can the US imagine a viable global economic system" in which it is no longer the dominant player? Could an American "political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?... Can China be held down without inviting conflict?"

I still don't really understand the connection with burden sharing not least because the countries sharing the burden of an American led system are, almost by definition, part of it but following American leadership. There is no potential for credible (and maybe a little bit justified) challenge to American leadership in the way I think there is with the rise of China (and maybe in the future India and Nigeria etc).

I didn't realize Larry (that's what we call him at Harvard  ) was talking only about sharing power with China.

I think the issues with allowing China as an equal partner are self evident.

[Sheilbh]

I didn't realize Larry (that's what we call him at Harvard  ) was talking only about sharing power with China.

I think the issues with allowing China as an equal partner are self evident.

Right - but I think that's part of what ties the crash and Xi's rise. China sees the 2002-12 as a lost decade of a lot of missed opportunities, some from their own side. But I think the crash is the key moment because China handled it comparatively well and the central importance of China to the world economy because clear. But they were not really ushered into any form of leadership or partnership in shaping the global economic system.

I get the issues but I also think that in reality on trade and economics and, essentially, climate - nothing can happen without China. Either deliberately diverting around it or in partnership - and that's going to be a central challenge for the US as it's trying to prevent China from advancing technologically, managing a form of "de-coupling"/re-shoring next generation manufacturing and wanting to work with China on climate, stuff like nuclear non-proliferation and, actually ideally, getting China on side about Ukraine. It's a big challenge - especially if you think, as I do, that climate is key because while China's carbon per capita is still way below the US it's now at about the level of Germany (and almost double that of, say, the UK or France) but with a lot of people. Action on climate is increasingly a primarily Chinese story which needs to be integrated into any global approach. As I say my general view is that I think Biden is doing very well on this generally.

[Jacob]

Sheilbh, I don't disagree with that analysis of Xi's rise, though as with many retrospective analyses there's a bit of an "inevitability of present conditions" air about it. I'll just note that fighting corruption may well be something the party had an appetite for (and for good reason), but it is also an incredibly useful political cudgel to wield against enemies or the merely inconvenient in a system such as the Chinese.

I also broadly agree that there are strong elements of truth in the Chinese national narrative - the century of humiliation and all that - but it is also heavily shaped and spun. This isn't really that different from most national narratives. They all have to build on something resembling reality one way or the other.

So nothing there to disagree about. As a systemic analysis what you're saying makes sense.

My assessment was more on character, and to the extent that Xi's character influences the direction of the CCP and PRC I think he's inclined towards drastic action on Taiwan whereas other hypothetical leaders might not have been.

On a personal level, I think it means we need to visit China (for family reasons) and Taiwan (for pleasure) sooner rather than later as it may not be long before such visits are impossible.