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#71
Gaming HQ / Re: The Miscellaneous PC & vid...
Last post by Syt - Today at 02:43:15 AMSW Racer Trailer:
I think besides Jakku I spotted Ando Prime (Tibet style ice world) and Malastare?
I think besides Jakku I spotted Ando Prime (Tibet style ice world) and Malastare?
#72
Gaming HQ / Re: The Miscellaneous PC & vid...
Last post by Syt - Today at 02:27:40 AMIt has joyful music, though 
#73
Gaming HQ / Re: The Miscellaneous PC & vid...
Last post by Solmyr - Today at 02:20:15 AMThis new Divinity trailer from Larian is also pretty WTF. 
#74
Gaming HQ / Re: The Miscellaneous PC & vid...
Last post by Syt - Today at 02:16:51 AMI'm strangely hyped for the Star Wars racing game they announced. I love Star Wars Episode I Racer. 
With TW:WH40K it doesn't look like they include space battles, but my first thought was - Star Wars Total Conversion.
With TW:WH40K it doesn't look like they include space battles, but my first thought was - Star Wars Total Conversion.
#75
Off the Record / Re: What does a TRUMP presiden...
Last post by Crazy_Ivan80 - Today at 01:56:28 AMQuote from: Valmy on December 11, 2025, 09:20:28 PMQuote from: Tamas on December 11, 2025, 05:08:37 PMI fear the European leaders are convincing themselves that all they need to do is survive 4 years to have a Democrat in the White House again, resetting time to like 2014. Ain't gonna happen.
Show strength to Trump he might get wet enough between his legs like with Putin to start showing respect.
That's so stupid. Even if a Democrat does return Trump has clearly demonstrated a large minority of Americans are their bitter enemies and will return their foes to power over and over again.
European leaders are weak willed, like most of their populations. Combined with an atmosphere of oikophobia and subsequent lack of belief in the superiority of our cultures and societies...
Why would they bother defending? They've been beaten already.
#76
Gaming HQ / Re: The Miscellaneous PC & vid...
Last post by Solmyr - Today at 01:51:34 AMSo there are announcements of Total War: Warhammer 40K as well as a new Star Wars Old Republic game.
#77
Off the Record / Re: The EU thread
Last post by Zoupa - Today at 01:37:13 AMI agree that Tallinn is just as important as Berlin. Then again, the Finns could thunder-run to Mourmansk. The Poles could rush Minsk. Romanians could be in Tiraspol in 2 hours. We're not feckless. Exercises simulating that can be a deterrent.
I think that Macron was once again right and that we need strategic ambiguity when it comes to russia. Yes, maybe the French Marines could be in Odesa next month. Never rule out anything. You can just DO things. During the blockade of Berlin, the Soviets built a watchtower right before the landing strip at Tegel I believe, preventing planes from landing safely. The French blew it up the next day. When the Soviet ambassador complained to the French commander, crying that it was in the Soviet sector and "How could you do this?", he responded "With French Sappers and dynamite, Mr Ambassador".
I think that Macron was once again right and that we need strategic ambiguity when it comes to russia. Yes, maybe the French Marines could be in Odesa next month. Never rule out anything. You can just DO things. During the blockade of Berlin, the Soviets built a watchtower right before the landing strip at Tegel I believe, preventing planes from landing safely. The French blew it up the next day. When the Soviet ambassador complained to the French commander, crying that it was in the Soviet sector and "How could you do this?", he responded "With French Sappers and dynamite, Mr Ambassador".
#78
Off the Record / Re: The EU thread
Last post by Sheilbh - Today at 12:14:55 AMI agree - and to be clear I think Ukraine absolutely has sovereignty and agency. I think it is above all Ukrainian willingness to fight that has been key.
In terms of wrecking our societies internally and not marching on Berlin I agree. But there isn't a hierarchy of Europe. Estonia and the Baltics and Poland are in the EU - Estonia and the Baltics are in the Eurozone. From a purely EU perspective they are as core as Denmark or Italy. And I think it's important not to underestimate the peril to everything in Europe if Europe (whether through non-American NATO or the EU) is not able to meaningfully deter and defend its frontier. It's about whether we're able to deter or stop an attack on Tallinn - because I'm not sure what happens to the EU, the Euro or non-American NATO, or even just opposition to divvying up Europe with that type of loss of credibility. I think the consequences of America, at best not caring, and Eastern expansion of the last 25 years is Europe needs to be able to defend that 100 miles from Russia to Tallinn just as much as a march on Berlin.
So I don't think it's a threat of marching on Berlin but that you don't need to in order to blow it all up and be in a position of picking off states that feel weak and isolated one by one. I go on about it but the public assessments of European intelligence agencies are that within 2-5 years of a deal in Ukraine, Russia would be in a position to engage in a lighter conflict in the Baltics or 5-10 years a broader European conflict. Mark Rutte on this literally yesterday saying many in Europe are: "quietly complacent, and too many don't feel the urgency. Nato's own defences can hold for now but with its economy dedicated to war, Russia could be ready to use military force against Nato within five years."
Edit: And this is why I think that point of how quickly can Europe move forces and whether we have the logistics to sustain deployments in the Baltics and Poland is really key. Because I don't think Europe can survive it becoming a question of how many Eastern EU member states, Euro countries, NATO members we can write off before Europe can stabilise a line. I think if it's that point we will have already lost - albeit, perhaps, a rather strange defeat.
In terms of wrecking our societies internally and not marching on Berlin I agree. But there isn't a hierarchy of Europe. Estonia and the Baltics and Poland are in the EU - Estonia and the Baltics are in the Eurozone. From a purely EU perspective they are as core as Denmark or Italy. And I think it's important not to underestimate the peril to everything in Europe if Europe (whether through non-American NATO or the EU) is not able to meaningfully deter and defend its frontier. It's about whether we're able to deter or stop an attack on Tallinn - because I'm not sure what happens to the EU, the Euro or non-American NATO, or even just opposition to divvying up Europe with that type of loss of credibility. I think the consequences of America, at best not caring, and Eastern expansion of the last 25 years is Europe needs to be able to defend that 100 miles from Russia to Tallinn just as much as a march on Berlin.
So I don't think it's a threat of marching on Berlin but that you don't need to in order to blow it all up and be in a position of picking off states that feel weak and isolated one by one. I go on about it but the public assessments of European intelligence agencies are that within 2-5 years of a deal in Ukraine, Russia would be in a position to engage in a lighter conflict in the Baltics or 5-10 years a broader European conflict. Mark Rutte on this literally yesterday saying many in Europe are: "quietly complacent, and too many don't feel the urgency. Nato's own defences can hold for now but with its economy dedicated to war, Russia could be ready to use military force against Nato within five years."
Edit: And this is why I think that point of how quickly can Europe move forces and whether we have the logistics to sustain deployments in the Baltics and Poland is really key. Because I don't think Europe can survive it becoming a question of how many Eastern EU member states, Euro countries, NATO members we can write off before Europe can stabilise a line. I think if it's that point we will have already lost - albeit, perhaps, a rather strange defeat.
#79
Off the Record / Re: The EU thread
Last post by Zoupa - December 11, 2025, 11:51:28 PMBroadly agree but the truth is Europe would not fight the russian way, so the comparison feels inadequate. Ukraine doesn't fight the soviet way. If it did, it would have lost years ago.
Just 4 HIMARS batteries crippled russian logistics in the summer of 2022, arguably stalling their advance. The russian threat is much more salient in how they can wreck our societies internally, not really how they're gonna be marching on Berlin.
Just 4 HIMARS batteries crippled russian logistics in the summer of 2022, arguably stalling their advance. The russian threat is much more salient in how they can wreck our societies internally, not really how they're gonna be marching on Berlin.
#80
Off the Record / Re: The EU thread
Last post by Sheilbh - December 11, 2025, 11:34:06 PMSure but isn't that part of the calculation? It feels like it's having it both ways because on one side of the ledger we discount the political constraints while on the other we're acknowledging them.
What I mean is that Europe has the building blocks of power but is temporarily embarrassed by delusions of national sovereignty. Russia doesn't have those advantages (but has some other, different, ones particularly on energy) and is sustained a higher level of indifference to the life of their own citizens or the suffering of their own people.
I don't totally agree with the framing but that's sort of my point. Europe has all the capacity to be able to defend itself in real terms - but it is not in that place now because of political obstacles and decisions (which I mean broadly and not to diminish them), and I don't see urgency in changing that. Similarly Russia has a lower base but for a variety of reasons is able to leverage more from that because people will accept a higher level of suffering (and I get Minsky's point on Italy but I do think a history of victory through national suffering like the Great Patriotic War or Napoleonic Wars isan important rhetorical/political/propaganda resource).
I agree Russia's not the Soviet Union but this was true in WW2 as well. The Soviets (and Nazis) were profoundly indifferent to human life. The Western allies weren't and in different ways had different, but deep aversions to casualties. The response was to shape the way they fought the war to maintain that political support and avoid casualties. From very early in the war they're focusing on the production of equipment and material precisely to preserve life, minimise casualties and maintain political support for fighting. Again I don't see the evidence that Europe is doing this - or that it is willing to fight a Russian style war. That to me seems relevant - and is still part of NATO. That is what we mean by American standards is a lot of steel around our boys.
Again I think that is where the longer-term challenge for Russia is. Even with their indifference to life a lot of production and spending is being re-directed to war production. That means there's less money for everything else. I think this is staring to undermine the political basis of consent to Putinism - there is a question of how long that can be sustained in the long run (plus I think the next generation of leaders are anxious about China). But I think we are talking in the next 5-10 years which may include further conflict with Europe. I also think Russia is absolutely leveraging power in things like crime and that will have long term costs.
I think it's also to Minsky's point on European NATO forces moving to American standards - where's the threshold on necessity and the willingness to see European troops moving or fighting at a lower standard than that? I've mentioned it before and I think it was pre-Ukrain and this would change if there was an incident but the polling on the willingness of different European countries to fight if countries like the Baltics or Poland were invaded. It was alarmingly low in most countries. So I think there's a question, to Minsky's point, of when that sense of necessity would kick in and what might make it fall away.
I'd add that on Yugoslavia, I think that is actually a comparison as well. Yugoslavia had an insanely large arms industry after the Cold War. It was able to go to war and commit genocide and war crimes on the European continent. At the point of the first Balkan wars I think Jean-Claude Juncker famously said "this is Europe's moment" - and Europe had far more military capability as we weren't as far into exploiting the peace dividend as we are now. Europe did not have the military capacity or will to stop that war and end a genocide without American support (the same was true in Kosovo). I think Europe is in a weaker position militarily and it's economy is less essential/central to the world than it was in 1995 and Russia is a more signficant problem than Serbia.
Edit: Very long winded but basically if power isn't just a spreadsheet of economy and population etc but an ability to leverage the capacities you have, isn't the pain threshold a really key part of that? If it's high you can do more with less, if it's low you need to build up more.
What I mean is that Europe has the building blocks of power but is temporarily embarrassed by delusions of national sovereignty. Russia doesn't have those advantages (but has some other, different, ones particularly on energy) and is sustained a higher level of indifference to the life of their own citizens or the suffering of their own people.
I don't totally agree with the framing but that's sort of my point. Europe has all the capacity to be able to defend itself in real terms - but it is not in that place now because of political obstacles and decisions (which I mean broadly and not to diminish them), and I don't see urgency in changing that. Similarly Russia has a lower base but for a variety of reasons is able to leverage more from that because people will accept a higher level of suffering (and I get Minsky's point on Italy but I do think a history of victory through national suffering like the Great Patriotic War or Napoleonic Wars isan important rhetorical/political/propaganda resource).
I agree Russia's not the Soviet Union but this was true in WW2 as well. The Soviets (and Nazis) were profoundly indifferent to human life. The Western allies weren't and in different ways had different, but deep aversions to casualties. The response was to shape the way they fought the war to maintain that political support and avoid casualties. From very early in the war they're focusing on the production of equipment and material precisely to preserve life, minimise casualties and maintain political support for fighting. Again I don't see the evidence that Europe is doing this - or that it is willing to fight a Russian style war. That to me seems relevant - and is still part of NATO. That is what we mean by American standards is a lot of steel around our boys.
Again I think that is where the longer-term challenge for Russia is. Even with their indifference to life a lot of production and spending is being re-directed to war production. That means there's less money for everything else. I think this is staring to undermine the political basis of consent to Putinism - there is a question of how long that can be sustained in the long run (plus I think the next generation of leaders are anxious about China). But I think we are talking in the next 5-10 years which may include further conflict with Europe. I also think Russia is absolutely leveraging power in things like crime and that will have long term costs.
I think it's also to Minsky's point on European NATO forces moving to American standards - where's the threshold on necessity and the willingness to see European troops moving or fighting at a lower standard than that? I've mentioned it before and I think it was pre-Ukrain and this would change if there was an incident but the polling on the willingness of different European countries to fight if countries like the Baltics or Poland were invaded. It was alarmingly low in most countries. So I think there's a question, to Minsky's point, of when that sense of necessity would kick in and what might make it fall away.
I'd add that on Yugoslavia, I think that is actually a comparison as well. Yugoslavia had an insanely large arms industry after the Cold War. It was able to go to war and commit genocide and war crimes on the European continent. At the point of the first Balkan wars I think Jean-Claude Juncker famously said "this is Europe's moment" - and Europe had far more military capability as we weren't as far into exploiting the peace dividend as we are now. Europe did not have the military capacity or will to stop that war and end a genocide without American support (the same was true in Kosovo). I think Europe is in a weaker position militarily and it's economy is less essential/central to the world than it was in 1995 and Russia is a more signficant problem than Serbia.
Edit: Very long winded but basically if power isn't just a spreadsheet of economy and population etc but an ability to leverage the capacities you have, isn't the pain threshold a really key part of that? If it's high you can do more with less, if it's low you need to build up more.