
Quote from: Baron von Schtinkenbutt on Today at 04:15:23 PMIt wouldn't be Languish without regularly-derailed threads. We need to figure out how to make it about the American Civil War, though.![]()
(via BlueSky so all can watch):QuoteMujtaba Rahman
@Mij_Europe
A bombshell? Not quite but President Macron went further than expected this afternoon in announcing progress towards a strengthened "European dimension" for France's nuclear deterrent. 1/
He said at least 8 European countries are considering exercises with FR on nuclear "support infrastructure" in the near future. He listed six of them: German, Poland, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark. The French and British are already engaged in similar cooperation. 2/
In a much flagged speech at France's nuclear submarine base at Ile Longue near Brest, Macron also announced that France intended to increase its stock of nuclear warheads, now just under 300. He refused to give a figure for the increase. 3/
President Macron, standing in front of the "Temeraire", a French nuclear attack sub about to go out on extended patrol, also announced that France and the UK were studying possible joint development of long-range ballistic missiles. 4/
Macron made it clear there was no question of "sharing" France's deterrent with other EU countries. Decisions on use of nukes would remain purely French. But he said it was time to clarify Fr's long-standing French assertion its "Force de frappe" had a "European dimension" 5/
This would involve, he said. participation by allies in the conventional "support infrastructure" for the French deterrent. It might also mean basing nuclear-capable Fr aircraft in other Eur countries to "complicate the calculations for our enemies". 6/
The speech had been much flagged in advance and is regarded in the Elysée Palace as one of Macron's final big contributions to European and world politics before he leaves office in 14 months' time. 7/
Despite his remarks on French "final control" of the deterrent & despite assertions of a "European dimension" in Fr nuclear doctrine going back to the 1970s, the PR speech will be controversial. He has already been accused by the Far Right of "giving away the deterrent to Bxl" 8/
It was known that Germany, Sweden and Poland were interested in talking to France about the French deterrent – as a second insurance policy rather than a replacement (at this stage) for the US nuclear guarantee. 9/
Macron surprised his audience yesterday by adding Belgium, DK, Greece and Sweden and "possibly others"to this list and suggesting that some or all might be involved in conventional exercises related to the French deterrent by the end of this year. ENDS
QuoteBruno Tertrais
@BrunoTertrais
A short thread on Macron's deterrence speech:
(1/9) The speech delivered today at Île Longue is *the most significant update to French nuclear deterrence policy in thirty years*. In my view, it represents a major step forward, with two important turning points and three omissions.
(2/9) A major step forward: "forward" deterrence with the possibility of deploying strategic forces (including, but perhaps not limited to, Rafale fighter jets) to the east of mainland France as part of a reassurance and/or deterrence maneuver, in partnership with willing countries. The interests of these countries will be taken into account.
(3/9) Two important turning points: (1) the announcement of an increase in the size of the arsenal and the abandonment of the notion of "sufficiency." Perhaps, in part, to anticipate the eventual deployment of French missiles—without sharing the decision to use them—by European aircraft. And to take into account the possibility of a Russian-Chinese alliance.
(4/9) (2) The abandonment, in public discourse, of the concepts of "unacceptable damage" and targeting "centers of power" in favor of a broader and vaguer criterion: the opposing state must not be able to "recover" or "recover" from a French strike.
(5/9) Three omissions: (1) the absence of any technical details regarding capabilities and options available to the head of state for planning, even though our European partners consider this to be an important criterion for our credibility as a protector.
(6/9) (2) The absence of any *explicit* reference to an "Asian" scenario (countering blackmail by a distant country), even though North Korea's military presence in Russia confirms that the security of our continents is linked, and that taking distant countries into account was partly a determining factor in shaping our current deterrent.
(7/9) (3) The absence of the concept of "holistic deterrence," despite it being mentioned by Emmanuel Macron a few weeks ago. A reference would have been welcome—in line with what is now known as "shouldering"—given that Paris is often accused of seeing deterrence as solely nuclear.
(8/9) Clarifications would be useful on the consistency of planning with accepted IHL standards, the format of forces by 2035, and the conditions under which our European partners who would so wish could participate in the nuclear mission.
(9/9) PS: in the meantime, there is no point in asking "who wrote the speech": not only was it prepared through a long collective effort and a complete overhaul of nuclear policy—as had been the case in 1998-2000—but there is no doubt that, like his predecessors, Emmanuel Macron, who has strong views on this subject which is at the heart of presidential power, will have taken full ownership of this text.
Quote from: Zanza on Today at 03:57:59 PMQuote from: Threviel on Today at 03:07:18 PMWe have rich deposits of both coal and uranium. On the timescale needed to rebuild our energy infrastructure it is entirely feasible to restart coal mines and start uranium mining.Well, if we have time, then we should rather mine for lithium in Europe and build batteries.
Quote from: Jacob on Today at 01:49:07 PMWhat's the response in the US? I'm less looped in to American domestic media than I used to be, but I'm still curious -
How much rallying around the flag "defending freedom" are you seeing in American media and among the public?
I mean, I assume that the core of the Trumpists are 100% on board, and committed anti-Trumpists are against. But are there cracks in Republican unity on this? Are there Democrats who are "serious foreign policy people" who are in favour? And what are the prevailing "main street" narratives right now?
QuoteCnn poll
77% of republicans support the war
32% of indies
17% of dems
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