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#31
Off the Record / Re: Iran War?
Last post by mongers - Today at 06:13:09 PMQuote from: Legbiter on Today at 05:41:44 PMInteresting post about the current situation in Iran.QuoteHere is the current situation in and around Iran.
I won't go over the scale of the strikes on Iranian infrastructure — you can read about that yourselves. I will only note that Israeli and U.S. air forces fully control Iranian airspace, and in that sense the war increasingly resembles a shooting gallery. The main objective is the complete degradation of Iran's defense capabilities.
Overnight, official IRGC channels circulated information about the cancellation of Khamenei's fatwa banning nuclear weapons. This is being interpreted as a final act of blackmail that prompted the coalition to prepare strikes on underground facilities in Fordow. These are senseless statements that once again point to further fragmentation of operational command.
The deepest conflict in the past 40 years is reportedly unfolding between the regular army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Let me note right away that verification is extremely difficult. However, signals are emerging (possibly as part of disinformation), so I am sharing them with you.
Local clashes in Tehran have been verified (in the government district and near the Vali-e Asr headquarters). Artesh units reportedly refused to transfer air defense reserves to the IRGC and declined to participate in suppressing street protests.
There are reports that the Artesh high command is distancing itself from what it calls "suicidal" IRGC orders to attack tankers and U.S. bases. The army is positioning itself as an "institution of national salvation" for a post-revolutionary period. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Israeli strikes on IRGC headquarters (Thar-Allah) have significantly undermined the Guards' ability to control the capital.
Following confirmation of the Rahbar's death, protests flared up with renewed intensity in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz. The slogans include direct calls for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
Mass transfers of political prisoners from Evin and Rajai Shahr prisons have been confirmed. They are reportedly being moved to strategic sites (Natanz and IRGC headquarters) to be used as "human shields." This has forced the coalition to adjust the schedule of strikes in the city center.
Prince Reza Pahlavi has officially called on security forces to side with the people, stating that "the regime is living its final hours."
Good news: thanks to the intervention of Mohsen Rezaei and pressure from China, the Strait of Hormuz has been reopened ahead of Monday's trading session. This has eased panic in the oil market (Brent is trading at $78–80).
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have successfully repelled massive IRGC missile attacks (True Promise IV). The position of Arab capitals is clear — full neutralization of the Iranian threat. The fact that Ukraine is being mentioned as an important element in strengthening Gulf air defense is a positive sign. Zelensky's timely statement on this works in our favor.
The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have expressed support for the Iranian people's right to a democratic transition, which amounts to a diplomatic "green light" for coalition actions.
Moscow's refusal to intervene on Tehran's side has been heard in Beijing and Pyongyang as a signal of Russia's weakness. Attempts by Moscow to contact Washington directly on this issue have reportedly failed.
Beijing is moving toward more direct management of the crisis (in the case of the Strait of Hormuz). Whether this is good or bad remains unclear, but it has calmed market turmoil.
To summarize: Tehran is experiencing a form of "dual power" between a paralyzed Transitional Council and a radical IRGC faction prepared for nuclear escalation. The next 48 hours will be decisive — either formalizing the regime's capitulation or leading to further escalation, if it still has the means to escalate.
Source: translated and adapted from Ihor Semyvolos
https://x.com/rshereme/status/2028465634925806003
If true it's the Syrian civil war brewing. Die-hard regime holdovers vs. the "People" factions.
I'm not buying that, it reads too much like a wis-list of what should happen to prove the IDF/trump 'strategy' was justified.
#32
Off the Record / Re: Iran War?
Last post by Legbiter - Today at 05:41:44 PMInteresting post about the current situation in Iran.
https://x.com/rshereme/status/2028465634925806003
If true it's the Syrian civil war brewing. Die-hard regime holdovers vs. the "People" factions.
QuoteHere is the current situation in and around Iran.
I won't go over the scale of the strikes on Iranian infrastructure — you can read about that yourselves. I will only note that Israeli and U.S. air forces fully control Iranian airspace, and in that sense the war increasingly resembles a shooting gallery. The main objective is the complete degradation of Iran's defense capabilities.
Overnight, official IRGC channels circulated information about the cancellation of Khamenei's fatwa banning nuclear weapons. This is being interpreted as a final act of blackmail that prompted the coalition to prepare strikes on underground facilities in Fordow. These are senseless statements that once again point to further fragmentation of operational command.
The deepest conflict in the past 40 years is reportedly unfolding between the regular army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Let me note right away that verification is extremely difficult. However, signals are emerging (possibly as part of disinformation), so I am sharing them with you.
Local clashes in Tehran have been verified (in the government district and near the Vali-e Asr headquarters). Artesh units reportedly refused to transfer air defense reserves to the IRGC and declined to participate in suppressing street protests.
There are reports that the Artesh high command is distancing itself from what it calls "suicidal" IRGC orders to attack tankers and U.S. bases. The army is positioning itself as an "institution of national salvation" for a post-revolutionary period. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Israeli strikes on IRGC headquarters (Thar-Allah) have significantly undermined the Guards' ability to control the capital.
Following confirmation of the Rahbar's death, protests flared up with renewed intensity in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz. The slogans include direct calls for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
Mass transfers of political prisoners from Evin and Rajai Shahr prisons have been confirmed. They are reportedly being moved to strategic sites (Natanz and IRGC headquarters) to be used as "human shields." This has forced the coalition to adjust the schedule of strikes in the city center.
Prince Reza Pahlavi has officially called on security forces to side with the people, stating that "the regime is living its final hours."
Good news: thanks to the intervention of Mohsen Rezaei and pressure from China, the Strait of Hormuz has been reopened ahead of Monday's trading session. This has eased panic in the oil market (Brent is trading at $78–80).
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have successfully repelled massive IRGC missile attacks (True Promise IV). The position of Arab capitals is clear — full neutralization of the Iranian threat. The fact that Ukraine is being mentioned as an important element in strengthening Gulf air defense is a positive sign. Zelensky's timely statement on this works in our favor.
The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have expressed support for the Iranian people's right to a democratic transition, which amounts to a diplomatic "green light" for coalition actions.
Moscow's refusal to intervene on Tehran's side has been heard in Beijing and Pyongyang as a signal of Russia's weakness. Attempts by Moscow to contact Washington directly on this issue have reportedly failed.
Beijing is moving toward more direct management of the crisis (in the case of the Strait of Hormuz). Whether this is good or bad remains unclear, but it has calmed market turmoil.
To summarize: Tehran is experiencing a form of "dual power" between a paralyzed Transitional Council and a radical IRGC faction prepared for nuclear escalation. The next 48 hours will be decisive — either formalizing the regime's capitulation or leading to further escalation, if it still has the means to escalate.
Source: translated and adapted from Ihor Semyvolos
https://x.com/rshereme/status/2028465634925806003
If true it's the Syrian civil war brewing. Die-hard regime holdovers vs. the "People" factions.
#33
Off the Record / Re: [Canada] Canadian Politics...
Last post by Baron von Schtinkenbutt - Today at 05:31:09 PMWould that make BC the first locality in the world to go permanently to DST?
#34
Off the Record / Re: The EU thread
Last post by Sheilbh - Today at 05:28:33 PMThose are all very fair points Jake despite my doom and gloom.
I think Canada would make sense as an addition but I would resist expanding this - instead I'd suggest taking it as a model.
The reason I say that is that I think fundamental challenge for European defence is not actually lack of material or even lack of political will - but that there is not a shared strategic and risk perception. Which makes perfect sense - the view fom different bits of Europe of where and how threats are materialising is different. I don't think there's a cynical or negative reason for that - I simply think things look differently in Dublin and Riga or Oslo and Athens. Which is why I think in that context European coopertion has been hugely enabled by American hegemony. Because there was an external, overwhelming power doing quite a lot of heavy lifting and basically setting the strategic direction (which has been fraying increasingly since the end of the Cold War).
So for me post-American hegemony the question of how you get Europe capable of acting is how you deal with those different strategic perceptions? And I think this is where and why the EU has historically struggled on this (while it being a source of strength in other areas). There isn't a hegemon, foregn and security policy requires unanimity, there is always small state suspicion of big states and fundamentally there are very different views of where risk is. So I think adding more states even with the best intentions would dilute the effectiveness if there's not a clear strategic rationale.
That's why I think expanding the JEF to include Canada, but also (if they want in) Iceland and Greenland would make sense and use it to focus on the North Atlantic/Baltic Seas/High North region - probably coordinated (in that constellation) by the UK and Canada. I think similarly Germany and Poland are investing hugelt - and their focus is obviously on land forces and again I'd suggest they could coordinate with the Baltics on land and other interested (non-hostile) CEE states on that "theatre" for want of a better phrase. France has already developed very close defence relationships with Romania and Greece - so that to me looks like another strategic region around South-East Europe and the Med. I think that way you build from a shared strategic region - with optionalities depending on who can contribute what and who is "willing". There may be some countries that just aren't interested/actively hostile and in many current European constellations that's a serious obstacle. But I think you would then hope to have coordination between those "theatres" in a way that respects the risks and strategic assessments of each area without the direction of a hegemon.
FWIW the British (and I assume Canadian) focus on the High North and North Atlantic, (West) German focus on land forces in Central Europe and Italy in the Med would also basically replicate the more specific roles those nations played in Cold War NATO. So you'd hope it kind of echoes existing capabilities and strategic thinking.
I think Canada would make sense as an addition but I would resist expanding this - instead I'd suggest taking it as a model.
The reason I say that is that I think fundamental challenge for European defence is not actually lack of material or even lack of political will - but that there is not a shared strategic and risk perception. Which makes perfect sense - the view fom different bits of Europe of where and how threats are materialising is different. I don't think there's a cynical or negative reason for that - I simply think things look differently in Dublin and Riga or Oslo and Athens. Which is why I think in that context European coopertion has been hugely enabled by American hegemony. Because there was an external, overwhelming power doing quite a lot of heavy lifting and basically setting the strategic direction (which has been fraying increasingly since the end of the Cold War).
So for me post-American hegemony the question of how you get Europe capable of acting is how you deal with those different strategic perceptions? And I think this is where and why the EU has historically struggled on this (while it being a source of strength in other areas). There isn't a hegemon, foregn and security policy requires unanimity, there is always small state suspicion of big states and fundamentally there are very different views of where risk is. So I think adding more states even with the best intentions would dilute the effectiveness if there's not a clear strategic rationale.
That's why I think expanding the JEF to include Canada, but also (if they want in) Iceland and Greenland would make sense and use it to focus on the North Atlantic/Baltic Seas/High North region - probably coordinated (in that constellation) by the UK and Canada. I think similarly Germany and Poland are investing hugelt - and their focus is obviously on land forces and again I'd suggest they could coordinate with the Baltics on land and other interested (non-hostile) CEE states on that "theatre" for want of a better phrase. France has already developed very close defence relationships with Romania and Greece - so that to me looks like another strategic region around South-East Europe and the Med. I think that way you build from a shared strategic region - with optionalities depending on who can contribute what and who is "willing". There may be some countries that just aren't interested/actively hostile and in many current European constellations that's a serious obstacle. But I think you would then hope to have coordination between those "theatres" in a way that respects the risks and strategic assessments of each area without the direction of a hegemon.
FWIW the British (and I assume Canadian) focus on the High North and North Atlantic, (West) German focus on land forces in Central Europe and Italy in the Med would also basically replicate the more specific roles those nations played in Cold War NATO. So you'd hope it kind of echoes existing capabilities and strategic thinking.
#35
Off the Record / Re: Football (Soccer) Thread
Last post by Duque de Bragança - Today at 05:18:10 PMQuote from: Jacob on Today at 05:08:43 PMI thought Norgy meant Iran
More of a football country than Qatar, more hotels, shia vs wahhabi fundamentalism (tie) but right now not the best moment.
Plus, no cut for Gianni, so no.
#36
Off the Record / Re: Football (Soccer) Thread
Last post by HVC - Today at 05:10:37 PMYeah that makes more sense
#37
Off the Record / Re: Football (Soccer) Thread
Last post by Jacob - Today at 05:08:43 PMI thought Norgy meant Iran
#38
Off the Record / Re: Iran War?
Last post by Duque de Bragança - Today at 05:08:27 PMQuote from: Zanza on Today at 04:04:14 PM@Duque: Alright, got your point, but disagree. I will stop here as I guess we detailed the Iran War thread enough.
Fine.
#39
Off the Record / Re: [Canada] Canadian Politics...
Last post by Jacob - Today at 05:08:17 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on Today at 05:06:14 PMBC is making the sensible choice and moving permanently to Summer time this weekend.
Excellent news!
#40
Off the Record / Re: [Canada] Canadian Politics...
Last post by Grey Fox - Today at 05:06:14 PMBC is making the sensible choice and moving permanently to Summer time this weekend.