If you read Wiki articles on many German generals, one common template seems to be: "He was found guilty and sentenced to death for executing 1387 American and 654 Canadian POWs. His sentence was later commuted to life in prison, and he was released in 1953. He died in 1979 due to complications from extreme old age."
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
Quote from: DGuller on August 31, 2011, 12:30:42 PM
If you read Wiki articles on many German generals, one common template seems to be: "He was found guilty and sentenced to death for executing 1387 American and 654 Canadian POWs. His sentence was later commuted to life in prison, and he was released in 1953. He died in 1979 due to complications from extreme old age."
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
WW2 was so 1945. The Western Allies were way too fabulous to give a fuck about that old crap.
Quote from: DGuller on August 31, 2011, 12:30:42 PM
If you read Wiki articles on many German generals, one common template seems to be: "He was found guilty and sentenced to death for executing 1387 American and 654 Canadian POWs. His sentence was later commuted to life in prison, and he was released in 1953. He died in 1979 due to complications from extreme old age."
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
I wonder that myself. I think there were still a lot of German sympathizers in the US.
Quote from: DGuller on August 31, 2011, 12:30:42 PM
If you read Wiki articles on many German generals, one common template seems to be: "He was found guilty and sentenced to death for executing 1387 American and 654 Canadian POWs. His sentence was later commuted to life in prison, and he was released in 1953. He died in 1979 due to complications from extreme old age."
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
Communism.
Quote from: DGuller on August 31, 2011, 12:30:42 PM
If you read Wiki articles on many German generals, one common template seems to be: "He was found guilty and sentenced to death for executing 1387 American and 654 Canadian POWs. His sentence was later commuted to life in prison, and he was released in 1953. He died in 1979 due to complications from extreme old age."
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
I think we thought they might prove useful in getting Germany ready to resist the Soviets or had some other piece of information or expertise we found useful. So we bargained with them.
Didn't the allies go even easier on the Japanes with war crimes?
Stanley Kramer and Abby Mann deal with this question effectively at the end of Judgment at Nuernberg.
Judy Garland was amazing as Irene Hoffmann-Wallner.
Quote from: Habsburg on August 31, 2011, 02:51:59 PM
Judy Garland was amazing as Irene Hoffmann-Wallner.
Did she sing? 'Somewhere over the V-2 vapor trail...'
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 02:56:31 PM
Quote from: Habsburg on August 31, 2011, 02:51:59 PM
Judy Garland was amazing as Irene Hoffmann-Wallner.
Did she sing? 'Somewhere over the V-2 vapor trail...'
You haff naught seen da film!??! :huh:
Not veryu many generals fit that template, but the template surely applies to the 1948 Einsatzgruppen Trial for the leaders of the SS death squads. All 26 defendents were found guilty, and 14 sentenced to death. Four of the fourteen were executed by 1951, and at that time the sentences of the remainder were commuted to long prison terms, but all had been released by the end of 1958.
In the earlier Buchenwald trials, 12 of 22 defendants sentenced to death were actually executed.
A fair number of sentence reductions were ordered by General Lucius Clay, USA, the interim military governor of the US occupation zone from 1947-1949. Based on what i have seen, he commuted sentence where he thought evidence was not credible to support the original sentences. He did let a number of sentences stand as ordered, though, so it wasn't a blanket thing.
Quote from: KRonn on August 31, 2011, 02:45:09 PM
Didn't the allies go even easier on the Japanes with war crimes?
Not if the Japanese in question had won humiliatingly easy victories over the allies.
Quote from: grumbler on August 31, 2011, 03:04:51 PM
Quote from: KRonn on August 31, 2011, 02:45:09 PM
Didn't the allies go even easier on the Japanes with war crimes?
Not if the Japanese in question had won humiliatingly easy victories over the allies.
So I take it the guy who took Singapore was first on the chopping block.
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 03:05:49 PM
Quote from: grumbler on August 31, 2011, 03:04:51 PM
Quote from: KRonn on August 31, 2011, 02:45:09 PM
Didn't the allies go even easier on the Japanes with war crimes?
Not if the Japanese in question had won humiliatingly easy victories over the allies.
So I take it the guy who took Singapore was first on the chopping block.
Come on, he went on a long bike ride to get there.
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 03:05:49 PM
So I take it the guy who took Singapore was first on the chopping block.
I can't remember if Yamashita got slung up, but I think grumbler is referring to the dude who commanded the invasion of the Phillipines. IIRC he had cleared out by the time of the Bataan death march, but McArthur had a grudge for getting his ass pounded.
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 03:05:49 PM
So I take it the guy who took Singapore was first on the chopping block.
Second. Homma, who defeated MacArthur, was first.
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 03:02:56 PM
Quote from: Habsburg on August 31, 2011, 02:58:23 PM
You haff naught seen da film!??! :huh:
Nein :(
Let's just say Saint Winslet's Oscar winning "
Noh! Noh! was "borrowed" from Miss Garland.
1. They didn't really do anything wrong.
2. Their expertise was needed to design the plans to defeat the Russians.
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 06:38:51 PM
2. Their expertise was needed to design the plans to defeat the Russians.
They didn't do a very good job the first time.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 06:51:42 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 06:38:51 PM
2. Their expertise was needed to design the plans to defeat the Russians.
They didn't do a very good job the first time.
They lacked the resources. There was also a view amongst many important Allied leaders (and fostered by German leaders) that Hitler's presence at the top had hobbled them. They also had experience and information regarding Russian warmaking, something that the Western Allies did not.
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:07:30 PM
There was also a view amongst many important Allied leaders (and fostered by German leaders) that Hitler's presence at the top had hobbled them.
Is this merely a 'view'? I actually thought it was universally accepted as truth that Hitler was atrocious at grand strategy.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Worse than the Belgians and the Dutch?? Every WP-NATO game I've ever played rated the Krauts as very good.
Except their ridiculous Starfighters.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 31, 2011, 07:22:04 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Worse than the Belgians and the Dutch?? Every WP-NATO game I've ever played rated the Krauts as very good.
Except their ridiculous Starfighters.
It's possible that war games are not the best way to learn about military capabilities of armies. Also, most WP-NATO games take place in the 1980's.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless.
Hard to say. After all, the CIA wasn't especially useful itself. NASA, on the other hand, found them to be useful.
QuoteAnd the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers.
Not everyone in the Bundeswehr was a Nazi, you filthy racist.
QuoteWe would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Unfortunately they were in short supply, since Poland was in the hands of the Russians, who murdered anyone worth two shits. Besides, Poland's most recent war against the Russians had been pretty disastrous, and the heroes of the early 20s were all dead.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:25:52 PM
Also, most WP-NATO games take place in the 1980's.
True.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 06:51:42 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 06:38:51 PM
2. Their expertise was needed to design the plans to defeat the Russians.
They didn't do a very good job the first time.
Maybe not, but they gave it good go.... :bowler: :lmfao:
You channeling Slargos now Neil? English is his second language, you have no such excuses.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:54:32 PM
You channeling Slargos now Neil? English is his second language, you have no such excuses.
I'll accept that as your surrender.
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:58:41 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:54:32 PM
You channeling Slargos now Neil? English is his second language, you have no such excuses.
I'll accept that as your surrender.
Is there anything I would say that you wouldn't accept as a surrender?
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 08:01:11 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:58:41 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:54:32 PM
You channeling Slargos now Neil? English is his second language, you have no such excuses.
I'll accept that as your surrender.
Is there anything I would say that you wouldn't accept as a surrender?
If you had attacked my post based on what I said, rather than trying to avoid it and slander me.
Quote from: Caliga on August 31, 2011, 07:18:38 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:07:30 PM
There was also a view amongst many important Allied leaders (and fostered by German leaders) that Hitler's presence at the top had hobbled them.
Is this merely a 'view'? I actually thought it was universally accepted as truth that Hitler was atrocious at grand strategy.
Well, until the war actually started, you can make a good argument that Hitler had done quite well at grand strategy. He got the British and French to give in to all of his demands without a fight until Poland, and then on the eve of war, he completely unhinged the Allies attempt to forge a common front against him with the Soviets via the Molotov-Ribbentorp pact. Really, it's hard to show that he really blundered as far as grand strategy was concerned until he attacked the Soviets while the British were still fighting.
Beyond that, though, the German generals tended to blame Hitler for every operational decision that didn't work out in Germany's favor, and a lot of the tactical ones. And while that was certainly true in some cases, in many instances it wasn't really Hitler making those decisions.
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
Quote from: dps on August 31, 2011, 09:13:16 PM
Quote from: Caliga on August 31, 2011, 07:18:38 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:07:30 PM
There was also a view amongst many important Allied leaders (and fostered by German leaders) that Hitler's presence at the top had hobbled them.
Is this merely a 'view'? I actually thought it was universally accepted as truth that Hitler was atrocious at grand strategy.
Well, until the war actually started, you can make a good argument that Hitler had done quite well at grand strategy. He got the British and French to give in to all of his demands without a fight until Poland, and then on the eve of war, he completely unhinged the Allies attempt to forge a common front against him with the Soviets via the Molotov-Ribbentorp pact. Really, it's hard to show that he really blundered as far as grand strategy was concerned until he attacked the Soviets while the British were still fighting.
Beyond that, though, the German generals tended to blame Hitler for every operational decision that didn't work out in Germany's favor, and a lot of the tactical ones. And while that was certainly true in some cases, in many instances it wasn't really Hitler making those decisions.
Kursk is the best example of this. Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation. They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.
@dps Yeah, true, I guess you could make that argument. I'm more inclined to make the argument that Britain and France were themselves exceptionally bad at grand strategy, though (at least in the pre-Churchill days), making Hitler look competent by comparison.
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 08:06:49 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 08:01:11 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:58:41 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:54:32 PM
You channeling Slargos now Neil? English is his second language, you have no such excuses.
I'll accept that as your surrender.
Is there anything I would say that you wouldn't accept as a surrender?
If you had attacked my post based on what I said, rather than trying to avoid it and slander me.
Your post was way out in left field it was something like Slargos would post. Since Slargos doesn't know English very well, he has an excuse.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:35:22 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
Fail too see your point.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:38:38 PM
Kursk is the best example of this. Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation. They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.
By the time that Kursk rolled around, the point had already turned. There's a stronger case for the gates of Moscow in 1941 than there is for Kursk.
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 09:43:59 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:35:22 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
Fail too see your point.
Sparing German officers from jail and execution was not productive if the army was still shit by '62.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:49:31 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 09:43:59 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:35:22 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
Fail too see your point.
Sparing German officers from jail and execution was not productive if the army was still shit by '62.
Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 09:47:40 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:38:38 PM
Kursk is the best example of this. Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation. They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.
By the time that Kursk rolled around, the point had already turned. There's a stronger case for the gates of Moscow in 1941 than there is for Kursk.
In '41 and '42 the German Army broke through the Soviet lines and captures thousands of miles of territory. In '43 they failed to break through and the initiative permanently shifted. I'd consider '43 more important the '41 and '42.
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 09:52:57 PM
Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.
What do you believe the cause to be? My argument was to counter the idea that Germans were released because they would be helpful in building an army to fight the Soviets. Since the army was very poor, then they couldn't have been that helpful.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:56:33 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 09:52:57 PM
Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.
What do you believe the cause to be? My argument was to counter the idea that Germans were released because they would be helpful in building an army to fight the Soviets. Since the army was very poor, then they couldn't have been that helpful.
If it were
accurate to say the Bundeswehr was crap in 62. I would point to the overall morale/will of the German people. Which was probably not what you would call "High".
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:39:22 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 08:06:49 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 08:01:11 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 07:58:41 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:54:32 PM
You channeling Slargos now Neil? English is his second language, you have no such excuses.
I'll accept that as your surrender.
Is there anything I would say that you wouldn't accept as a surrender?
If you had attacked my post based on what I said, rather than trying to avoid it and slander me.
Your post was way out in left field it was something like Slargos would post. Since Slargos doesn't know English very well, he has an excuse.
I disagree. My post (for the most part) attacked specific points you made. I attacked the unsupported claims you made on behalf of the CIA by pointing out that the CIA isn't exactly the gold standard of intelligence agencies and that clearly German officers had their uses. The racist thing wasn't sensible, but neither was your ragging on a barely-existant Bundeswehr as evidence for the low quality of former Nazi officers. The unreasonableness of both statements cancels out. And the last part was to correct your misconception that it would be possible to recruit some Polish military talent, as that talent had been in large part destroyed by the war.
Quote from: Caliga on August 31, 2011, 09:39:09 PM
I'm more inclined to make the argument that Britain and France were themselves exceptionally bad at grand strategy
You are not kidding man. The French leadership was so unsure of itself and so at a loss about what to do (and even those who DID have a vision were powerless against the general malaise). Their strategic ideas seem like wishful thinking. At least the guys in 1914 were determined and decisive despite their obvious strategic and tactical shortcomings.
I was mostly critical of your racist thing. That's something Slargos would say.
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 10:00:20 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:56:33 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 09:52:57 PM
Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.
What do you believe the cause to be? My argument was to counter the idea that Germans were released because they would be helpful in building an army to fight the Soviets. Since the army was very poor, then they couldn't have been that helpful.
If it were accurate to say the Bundeswehr was crap in 62. I would point to the overall morale/will of the German people. Which was probably not what you would call "High".
Why would it be inaccurate? And what does the will of the people have to do with peace time combat maneuvers?
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 10:18:00 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 10:00:20 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:56:33 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 09:52:57 PM
Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.
What do you believe the cause to be? My argument was to counter the idea that Germans were released because they would be helpful in building an army to fight the Soviets. Since the army was very poor, then they couldn't have been that helpful.
If it were accurate to say the Bundeswehr was crap in 62. I would point to the overall morale/will of the German people. Which was probably not what you would call "High".
Why would it be inaccurate? And what does the will of the people have to do with peace time combat maneuvers?
I am fronting you that maybe there a sherd of truth to the CIA report.
That little event called WW2. Morale and Will everything.
From personnel experince stationed in Germany from '87-92, the Bundeswehr were every bit the professionals and capable of holding there own.
This would include personnal experience with line Panzer Grenadiers formations and more extensively Fernspähkompanies.
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 10:07:15 PM
Quote from: Caliga on August 31, 2011, 09:39:09 PM
I'm more inclined to make the argument that Britain and France were themselves exceptionally bad at grand strategy
You are not kidding man. The French leadership was so unsure of itself and so at a loss about what to do (and even those who DID have a vision were powerless against the general malaise). Their strategic ideas seem like wishful thinking. At least the guys in 1914 were determined and decisive despite their obvious strategic and tactical shortcomings.
I think that their strategic shortcomings flowed from their economic shortcomings. They had built their armies to win The Great War, and so they had infantry support tanks and static defence lines. Their strategy was set by the investments of the previous generation. They had rebuilt their armies in the 20s, whereas the Germans were building from scratch in the 30s.
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 10:38:39 PM
They had built their armies to win The Great War, and so they had infantry support tanks and static defence lines. Their strategy was set by the investments of the previous generation. They had rebuilt their armies in the 20s, whereas the Germans were building from scratch in the 30s.
Well that is theoretically true I think in actuality they looked at the lessons of WWI and drew rather bizarre conclusions. Defense in WWI was just as devastating on your troops as attacking. Success came from massing armor and airpower and infantry in a combined assualt like how the Allies smashed the Hindenburg Line or the Americans cleared the St. Mihiel salient. Seeing the Hindenberg line fall so quickly in 1918 and then thinking 'Wow if only we had a bigger Hindenburg Line we would win the next war easily' just baffles me. It is as if they took the Chemin des Dames of 1917 as the eternal truth of warfare and refused to study whatever happened after it.
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 10:27:01 PM
I am fronting you that maybe there a sherd of truth to the CIA report.
That little event called WW2. Morale and Will everything.
From personnel experince stationed in Germany from '87-92, the Bundeswehr were every bit the professionals and capable of holding there own.
This would include personnal experience with line Panzer Grenadiers formations and more extensively Fernspähkompanies.
What does that have to do with 1962? WW2 proved that Morale and Will do not win wars. The Japanese had more Will then anyone, the Germans quite a bit as well. The Will to win is nice, but it is a poor substitute for food, ammunition, fuel, and weaponry.
Quote from: Valmy on August 31, 2011, 10:58:11 PM
Quote from: Neil on August 31, 2011, 10:38:39 PM
They had built their armies to win The Great War, and so they had infantry support tanks and static defence lines. Their strategy was set by the investments of the previous generation. They had rebuilt their armies in the 20s, whereas the Germans were building from scratch in the 30s.
Well that is theoretically true I think in actuality they looked at the lessons of WWI and drew rather bizarre conclusions. Defense in WWI was just as devastating on your troops as attacking. Success came from massing armor and airpower and infantry in a combined assualt like how the Allies smashed the Hindenburg Line or the Americans cleared the St. Mihiel salient. Seeing the Hindenberg line fall so quickly in 1918 and then thinking 'Wow if only we had a bigger Hindenburg Line we would win the next war easily' just baffles me. It is as if they took the Chemin des Dames of 1917 as the eternal truth of warfare and refused to study whatever happened after it.
I think much lower manpower the the major factor. Going on the offensive takes more manpower simply because you have to defend the areas you are not attacking at the same time you are building a large superiority in the area you are attacking. For a successful attack in WWII your typically needed a local superiority of 4:1.
Quote
What does that have to do with 1962?
You have no clue what it takes to successfully train even a unit at the lowest level (the building blocks) do you. Say a squad or Platoon.
Let alone training and coordinating large manuever formations. Have you ever worked at a Division and/or Corps Level staff and see what it takes, along with all the pieces in play, I have. If you had any practical experience with the above you could answer that.
But your claim that it was the fault of the supposed former Nazi Officer Corps is clueless.
QuoteWW2 proved that Morale and Will do not win wars.
True
Poland
Denmark
France
China
Korea
Austria
Czech
Baltic States
etc
etc
But then we were talking about the Bundeswehr. Werent we.
How many high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?
Quote from: Habbaku on September 01, 2011, 12:32:19 AM
How many high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?
Unsure, but I think the number would be suprising.
Quote from: 11B4V on September 01, 2011, 12:28:42 AM
Quote
What does that have to do with 1962?
You have no clue what it takes to successfully train even a unit at the lowest level (the building blocks) do you. Say a squad or Platoon.
Let alone training and coordinating large manuever formations. Have you ever worked at a Division and/or Corps Level staff and see what it takes, along with all the pieces in play, I have. If you had any practical experience with the above you could answer that.
But your claim that it was the fault of the supposed former Nazi Officer Corps is clueless.
QuoteWW2 proved that Morale and Will do not win wars.
True
Poland
Denmark
France
China
Korea
Austria
Czech
Baltic States
etc
etc
But then we were talking about the Bundeswehr. Werent we.
I have no idea what you are on about here. Korea and Czechia weren't even belligerents in the war. The CIA thing was about recruiting German intelligence agents. The US generally found them dishonest, unmotivated and incompetent (German intelligence proved inept during the war, so that should prove no surprise). I brought up the 1962 since it was a famous incident and it happened within a decade of the founding of the new German army. Nobody really knows the quality of the German army since it's never been tested. I also find the '62 event interesting because it happened around the same time as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Chinese invasion of India. This was probably the time when NATO and the WP were closest to war.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:35:22 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
QuoteKursk is the best example of this. Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation. They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.
Quote
The CIA thing was about recruiting German intelligence agents. The US generally found them dishonest, unmotivated and incompetent (German intelligence proved inept during the war, so that should prove no surprise). I brought up the 1962 since it was a famous incident and it happened within a decade of the founding of the new German army.
Nowhere in your posts, up until your last one, are you talking about
German Intel agents. You were talking about the ww2 german army leadership in the Bundeswehr.
Quote from: Habbaku on September 01, 2011, 12:32:19 AM
How many high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?
All high-ranking officers of the Bundeswehr in 1962 were Wehrmacht veterans. The leadership was mostly former generals and staff officers of the Wehrmacht. The inspector general (= chief of staff) was the former head of operations of the OKH, Adolf Heusinger. The top civilian advisor of the government regarding the military was Erich von Manstein, who had been sentenced for war crimes by the Allies but was later cleared by a German court.
Quote from: Zanza on September 01, 2011, 02:11:23 AM
Quote from: Habbaku on September 01, 2011, 12:32:19 AM
How many high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?
All high-ranking officers of the Bundeswehr in 1962 were Wehrmacht veterans. The leadership was mostly former generals and staff officers of the Wehrmacht. The inspector general (= chief of staff) was the former head of operations of the OKH, Adolf Heusinger. The top civil advisor of the government regarding the military was Erich von Manstein, who had been sentenced for war crimes by the Allies but was later cleared by a German court.
Good info Zanza, thanks.
Quote from: DGuller on August 31, 2011, 12:30:42 PM
If you read Wiki articles on many German generals, one common template seems to be: "He was found guilty and sentenced to death for executing 1387 American and 654 Canadian POWs. His sentence was later commuted to life in prison, and he was released in 1953. He died in 1979 due to complications from extreme old age."
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
I was under the impression that it was often German courts that could make the decision to free them as the Allies actually only held very few of the prisoners in allied prisons.
Some of the Wehrmacht field marshals were later buried with military honors by the way, e.g. von Manstein or Kesselring. Others were shunned, e.g. Schörner or Dönitz.
That doesn't sound fair to Donitz. What did he ever do?
Wasn't he accused of ordering U-boat crews to not rescue survivors of the ships they sunk? I think that order came after an incident where a U-boat tried, and was bombed by US aircraft... but I guess that didn't matter to the Allies. :hmm:
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 01, 2011, 02:36:24 AM
That doesn't sound fair to Donitz. What did he ever do?
He was too much of a Hitler fanboy.
Quote from: 11B4V on September 01, 2011, 01:29:08 AM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:35:22 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
QuoteKursk is the best example of this. Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation. They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.
Quote
The CIA thing was about recruiting German intelligence agents. The US generally found them dishonest, unmotivated and incompetent (German intelligence proved inept during the war, so that should prove no surprise). I brought up the 1962 since it was a famous incident and it happened within a decade of the founding of the new German army.
Nowhere in your posts, up until your last one, are you talking about German Intel agents. You were talking about the ww2 german army leadership in the Bundeswehr.
I should have made that more clear. I figured it would be obvious what the CIA would be interested in. What was that list about?
Quote from: Razgovory on September 01, 2011, 07:05:38 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on September 01, 2011, 01:29:08 AM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 09:35:22 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 31, 2011, 08:02:10 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 31, 2011, 07:17:30 PM
I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force. At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers. We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.
Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.
It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.
QuoteKursk is the best example of this. Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation. They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.
Quote
The CIA thing was about recruiting German intelligence agents. The US generally found them dishonest, unmotivated and incompetent (German intelligence proved inept during the war, so that should prove no surprise). I brought up the 1962 since it was a famous incident and it happened within a decade of the founding of the new German army.
Nowhere in your posts, up until your last one, are you talking about German Intel agents. You were talking about the ww2 german army leadership in the Bundeswehr.
I should have made that more clear. I figured it would be obvious what the CIA would be interested in.
Cool
Quote
What was that list about?
Being a smart ass. :P
Quote from: Habbaku on September 01, 2011, 12:32:19 AM
How many high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?
Probably very few. This would have been 17 years after the war, after all, and officers who were in their mid-40s during the war would be at or past retirement age by 1962.
Probably an overwhelming majority of senior officers in 1962 had been junior officers in WW2, but the original thread was about the generals.
I don't think the utility of the Germans involved had much, if anything, to do with the commutation of death sentences. That's a facile and popular argument, but suffers from the small flaw that it is unsupported by the facts.
Inform us of those facts, of wise one. Don't merely allude. We can never approach your infinite knowledge if you do that.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 01, 2011, 02:36:24 AM
That doesn't sound fair to Donitz. What did he ever do?
Nazi head of state?
The German military of WW2 had 92 field marshals, colonel-generals, grand admirals and general-admirals. Of these 92 top officers of the Wehrmacht, most weren't alive in 1960 anymore and the only one that had any role in the creation of the Bundeswehr was Erich von Manstein.
There were a couple of lieutenant generals, major generals and colonels, usually from general staffs, that formed the new leadership. So while I wouldn't say it was only junior officers, it is fair to say that no top officers made the transition.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 01, 2011, 02:36:24 AM
That doesn't sound fair to Donitz. What did he ever do?
Apparently he read the eulogy at Raeder's burial at the request of the then commanding admiral of the navy.
Quote from: Zanza on September 01, 2011, 10:20:09 AM
The German military of WW2 had 92 field marshals, colonel-generals, grand admirals and general-admirals. Of these 92 top officers of the Wehrmacht, most weren't alive in 1960 anymore and the only one that had any role in the creation of the Bundeswehr was Erich von Manstein.
There were a couple of lieutenant generals, major generals and colonels, usually from general staffs, that formed the new leadership. So while I wouldn't say it was only junior officers, it is fair to say that no top officers made the transition.
A Major General is not a top officer?
I can't find a figure, but they must have had hundreds of major generals in the Wehrmacht, so it's not really a top rank. You have to consider that militaries during WW2 were much, much bigger than they are today, so there was obviously an "inflation" of generals.
Quote from: DGuller on August 31, 2011, 12:30:42 PM
Why were the western Allies so reluctant to deal rertibution to Nazi war criminals that often committed crimes against their own troops? Were they pussified, did they really need to go to such lengths to appease the Germans after Cold War started, or was there something else?
Antisemitism.
One thing to keep in mind is that some of the people convicted of war crimes were convicted of complicity in atrocities--stuff that we commonly think of war crimes, which were called "Class B" warcrimes--but others were convicted of being "planners of offensive war" or "Class A" warcrimes.* Senoir Allied military leaders were quite opposed to the concept of "Class A" warcrimes, because planning wars is the job of military leaders in peacetimes, and whether those wars are offensive or defensive is more of a political decision made by a country's civilian leadership (at least in countries that adhere to the principle of civilian control over the military). I'm not sure that being convicted and sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or a long prison term and then being released after 10 years or so is a "common template", but to the extent that it is, I bet a high percentage of those involved were convicted of "Class A" type stuff, not the "Class B" crimes.
* I think that technically, the "Class A" and "Class B" designations were only used in the warcrime trials of Japanese leaders, but the concept of "Class A" warcrimes seems functionally equivalent to the "planner of offensive war" charge that some German leaders were convicted for.
Quote from: dps on September 02, 2011, 04:56:03 PM
One thing to keep in mind is that some of the people convicted of war crimes were convicted of complicity in atrocities--stuff that we commonly think of war crimes, which were called "Class B" warcrimes--but others were convicted of being "planners of offensive war" or "Class A" warcrimes.* Senoir Allied military leaders were quite opposed to the concept of "Class A" warcrimes, because planning wars is the job of military leaders in peacetimes, and whether those wars are offensive or defensive is more of a political decision made by a country's civilian leadership (at least in countries that adhere to the principle of civilian control over the military). I'm not sure that being convicted and sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or a long prison term and then being released after 10 years or so is a "common template", but to the extent that it is, I bet a high percentage of those involved were convicted of "Class A" type stuff, not the "Class B" crimes.
* I think that technically, the "Class A" and "Class B" designations were only used in the warcrime trials of Japanese leaders, but the concept of "Class A" warcrimes seems functionally equivalent to the "planner of offensive war" charge that some German leaders were convicted for.
The OP claims that "many German generals" were "found guilty and sentenced to death," so that doesn't seem to have anything to do with your (true) point. I would argue that the question raised in the Op is based on a faulty perception of history; those sentenced to death were either a very few high=level political generals, or fairly low-level actual criminals in charge of death squads and the like.
The argument that some of those sentenced to death were reprieved because the Allies wanted their expertise in running death squads seems to fail based on the fact that they were never used again.
I suspect that a bigger reason for reprieves was that some of the trials and evidence were rather dicey. Having read about Lucius Clay, I have a hard time believing that he commuted sentences because of his desire to employ former Nazis.
Quote from: dps on September 02, 2011, 04:56:03 PM
Senoir Allied military leaders were quite opposed to the concept of "Class A" warcrimes, because planning wars is the job of military leaders in peacetimes, and whether those wars are offensive or defensive is more of a political decision made by a country's civilian leadership
If you're not prepared to die for your country maybe you shouldn't be an officer.
Quote from: grumbler on September 02, 2011, 05:32:01 PM
Quote from: dps on September 02, 2011, 04:56:03 PM
One thing to keep in mind is that some of the people convicted of war crimes were convicted of complicity in atrocities--stuff that we commonly think of war crimes, which were called "Class B" warcrimes--but others were convicted of being "planners of offensive war" or "Class A" warcrimes.* Senoir Allied military leaders were quite opposed to the concept of "Class A" warcrimes, because planning wars is the job of military leaders in peacetimes, and whether those wars are offensive or defensive is more of a political decision made by a country's civilian leadership (at least in countries that adhere to the principle of civilian control over the military). I'm not sure that being convicted and sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or a long prison term and then being released after 10 years or so is a "common template", but to the extent that it is, I bet a high percentage of those involved were convicted of "Class A" type stuff, not the "Class B" crimes.
* I think that technically, the "Class A" and "Class B" designations were only used in the warcrime trials of Japanese leaders, but the concept of "Class A" warcrimes seems functionally equivalent to the "planner of offensive war" charge that some German leaders were convicted for.
The OP claims that "many German generals" were "found guilty and sentenced to death," so that doesn't seem to have anything to do with your (true) point. I would argue that the question raised in the Op is based on a faulty perception of history; those sentenced to death were either a very few high=level political generals, or fairly low-level actual criminals in charge of death squads and the like.
The argument that some of those sentenced to death were reprieved because the Allies wanted their expertise in running death squads seems to fail based on the fact that they were never used again.
I suspect that a bigger reason for reprieves was that some of the trials and evidence were rather dicey. Having read about Lucius Clay, I have a hard time believing that he commuted sentences because of his desire to employ former Nazis.
Yes, that's why I put the sentence, "I'm not sure that being convicted and sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or a long prison term and then being released after 10 years or so is a 'common template' " in my post. There weren't a lot of generals who were sentenced to death but instead spent a decade in prison, then got released, even if DGuller seems to think there were.