I found this article/blog post to be a pretty engaging read about the inadequacies of the Afghan riflemen on both sides. During the Victorian period and up until WW I, these guys were renowned as amongst the best by the British running up against them. Now? Not so much.
Quotehttp://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/afghan-marksmen-forget-the-fables/?hp
The recent Marine operations in and near Marja brought into sharp relief a fact that contradicts much of what people think they know about the Afghan war. It is this: Forget the fables. The current ranks of Afghan fighters are crowded with poor marksmen.
This simple statement is at odds with an oft-repeated legend of modern conflict, in which Afghan men are described, in clichés and accounts from yesteryear, as natural gunmen and accomplished shots. Everyone who has even faintly followed the history of war in Central Asia has heard the tales of Afghan men whose familiarity with firearms is such a part of their life experience that they can pick up most any weapon and immediately put it to effective work. The most exaggerated accounts are cartoonish, including tales of Afghan riflemen whose bullets can strike a lone sapling (I've even heard "blade of grass") a hilltop away.
Without getting into an argument with the ghost of Rudyard Kipling, who was one of the early voices popularizing the wonders of Afghan riflery, an update is in order. This is because the sum of these descriptions does not match what is commonly observed in firefights today. These days, the opposite is more often the case. Poor marksmanship, even abysmally poor marksmanship, is a consistent trait among Afghan men. The description applies to Taliban and Afghan government units alike.
Over the years that Tyler Hicks and I have worked in Afghanistan's remote and hostile corners, we have been alongside Afghan, American and European infantrymen in many firefights and ambushes. These fights have involved a wide set of tactical circumstances, ranges, elevations, and light and weather conditions. Some skirmishes were brief and simple. Others were long and complex, involving as many as a few hundred fighters on both sides. One result has been consistent. We have almost always observed that a large proportion of Afghan fire, both incoming and outgoing, is undisciplined and errant, often wildly so. Afghans, like most anyone else with a modicum of exposure to infantry weapons, might be able to figure out how to make any firearm fire. But hitting what they are aiming at, assuming they are aiming at all? That's another matter.
There are exceptions. The Taliban snipers in Marja were one recent example. We will revisit them here soon. Now and then a disciplined Afghan soldier or police officer also bucks the trend. Credible accounts of Northern Alliance fighters in the 1990s and early 2000s chronicled impressive shooting skills among seasoned Panjshiris. But the larger pattern is firmly established and consistent with the experience and observations of countless soldiers and Marines we have passed time with, including many people who have trained and fought beside Afghan security forces during the past decade.
Today At War will share a few observations about inaccurate Taliban rifle fire. Naturally, this will deal with what can be assessed of incoming fire; we do not embed with Taliban units and thus we have no chance of an unfiltered side-by-side look at their marksmanship habits. (Watching videos that the Taliban and their sympathizers post on the Internet or circulate in bazaars has its limits; these are self-selected excerpts chosen in part to show Taliban prowess. Taking them at face value would be much like trying to measure the American Army's performance in the field by watching a recruiting ad, or like sitting through some of the cheery PowerPoint presentations that officials in capitals serve up for visitors.) The next post in the series will discuss several factors that contribute to poor Taliban marksmanship. A post soon thereafter will address the shooting skills and habits of Afghan soldiers and police officers. That third post will cover more fully what can be seen of outgoing fire, accounts that are possible because Afghan government shooting is readily observable, at least for those who log enough weeks in rural firebases or on patrol.
Let's start with a few rough numbers. During the month and a half we spent in Helmand Province, Tyler and I combined firsthand observations with queries to officers commanding Marine rifle companies we worked beside. Three of these companies had been engaged in what, by the standards of the Afghan war, was heavy fighting. Here is what their experiences turned up.
Before the full offensive into Marja began, the Marine ground unit engaged in the most regular fighting with the area's Taliban was Bravo Company, First Battalion, Third Marines. The company served for a little more than two months on what Marines call the "forward line of troops." In this capacity, it rotated platoons through positions several miles to Marja's east, a pair of lonely outposts on the steppe overlooking Route Olympia, which was the road leading into Taliban turf. The Taliban had an interest in watching for American movement along this road, and the Marines patrolled constantly near it. Thus the tactical climate was violent and busy. The insurgents harassed the outposts and frequently skirmished with Marine patrols.
In this contest, the Taliban also had the sort of local advantages common in guerrilla war. They knew the network of irrigation canals and used them as trench lines. They littered the fields and small terrain features with hidden bombs rigged to pressure plates. They deployed spotters with radios on motorcycle patrols, which tried to find the Marines and relay word of their movements and activities. They also chose when to fight, and often opened fire on the Marines in the late afternoon, when the sun was low in the sky. Why? Because Marine patrols originated to the Taliban's east, and as the Marines walked generally westward across the flat steppe toward the area where the Taliban hid, the Marines were walking into the angled sunlight, which illuminated them perfectly for the Taliban, but forced the Marines to look into hard light, and squint. This was an environment in which small-arms clashes were almost inevitable, and in which the Taliban would often get to fire the opening shots. It should have been a place where the Taliban might succeed. What did the numbers show? By early February, when Marine units began massing for the push on Marja, Capt. Thomas Grace, Bravo Company's commander, estimated that his platoons had been in at least two dozen firefights, often in open terrain. Some of the fights lasted several hours. At least one lasted a full day and into the night. How many of the company's Marines and the Afghan soldiers who accompanied them had been shot? Zero.
Farther west along Route Olympia is an intersection known as Five Points, so named because several dirt roads meet there. The juncture provides access to northern Marja. Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, the command that planned the attack on Marja, deemed this essential terrain for securing the region. In January, another unit — Charlie Company, First Battalion, Third Marines – was assigned to fly in by helicopter and seize and hold the intersection. This happened in February, a few days before the larger assault began. It prompted a determined Taliban response.
Once the Taliban realized the Marines had leapt by air over their outer defenses, they clustered near Five Points and fought Charlie Company intensely, especially in the first few days. During this time, according to the company commander, Capt. Stephan P. Karabin II, his Marines were in about 15 firefights. Again the Taliban had certain advantages. They knew the ground well enough that their fighters stashed small motorcycles in canals that had been drained. After ambushing the Marines, they sometimes dropped into a dry canal, ran through the maze, jumped on their bikes, started the engines and blasted away at speeds that no one pursuing on foot could hope to match. Smart tactics. But the Taliban did not always run. They often held their ground and fought, perhaps feeling protected by the canals that did contain water, which typically separated them from the Marine patrols they chose to fire upon.
To change the character of the fighting, Captain Karabin ordered his Marines to patrol on foot with their .50-caliber machine guns. These would be lugged along in pieces, and when a firefight began, the Marines assigned to them would put them together, mount the weapons on their tripods, load belts of ammunition and open fire. (A M2 Browning machine gun and tripod weighs nearly 130 pounds; this does not include the weight of the ammunition.) The heavy guns tilted the fighting more fully in the Marines' favor. But the fact that M2s were used this way said something about how the Taliban fought; some of this fighting was pitched. How many of Charlie Company's Marines were struck by Taliban bullets in these engagements? Once again, none.
Neither of these companies was spared casualties. Four separate bomb blasts killed two Marines from Bravo Company and wounded nine Marines from Charlie Company. But the Taliban's rifles were another story. Together the two companies were in about 40 firefights against the main guerrilla force in a nation that is considered, by the conventional wisdom, to be a land of born marksmen. And not a single bullet fired by the Taliban found its mark.
Obviously, American and Afghan soldiers do get shot, which brings us to the third Marine company, which suffered the effects of more accurate fire. As Charlie Company was fighting at Five Points, Kilo Company, Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, was inserted at night by helicopter into three landing zones in northern Marja, where it was soon met by what may have been the stiffest Taliban resistance of the offensive. For nearly 10 days, Kilo Company was engaged in small-arms fighting. In the first four or five days, the fighting was widespread, often with several firefights occurring simultaneously as different patrols and different platoons on different missions were locked up in skirmishes at once. On the second day of fighting, one skirmish alone, between two platoons and large groups of Taliban fighters, lasted off and on from early morning until night.
Within a week or 10 days, eight of the company's Marines had been shot, two fatally, and two Afghan soldiers had been shot as well, including one who died. This is a large number compared with the experiences of the other two companies, but it is a small number when set against Kilo Company's size, and when considered in the context and the volume of Taliban fire.
First, about the size. In all, Kilo Company had on the order of 300 men assigned to it, including engineers, dog handlers, bomb disposal and intelligence specialists, interpreters and an Afghan infantry platoon. (Note: Embed rules forbid precise descriptions of unit and team sizes, so the numbers of the various units that made up Kilo Company on this mission are mashed together here and rounded.)
Now the context. On many days, Kilo Company's patrols would be ambushed while crossing flat, open ground, with no vegetation concealing the Marines' movements and no place to take cover without running a couple of hundred yards or more. Often many Taliban gunmen would open fire simultaneously, and a large number of rounds would fly into the area where the patrol walked. Rounds would snap and buzz past helmets. Rounds would thump all around in the dirt. But usually no one would be struck. It happened again and again.
When Marines did get hit, it often appeared that the fire came from PK machine guns or the local contingent of snipers – not the riflemen who make the Taliban's rank-and-file. One day, after a few hours of fighting in which the Taliban had not yet hit any Marines, a corporal from Second Platoon stood upright, exposing himself above the waist and looking over a wall as bullets flew high overhead. He didn't flinch. "What's everybody ducking for?" he said. He cupped his hand to his mouth and shouted an expletive-laden taunt at the Taliban gunmen shooting from concealment on the opposite side of a field. The editors would never allow the corporal's words to be printed here. But they amounted to this: You guys can't shoot.
Yes, some of this was probably adrenaline and undiluted cockiness, the kind of behavior that Marines can thrive on. But this cockiness was not just attitude. It reflected a discernible truth. Much of the incoming fire was not coming close. (Later in that same fight, some of the fire did come close, as at least one sniper arrived on the Taliban side; we'll show video of that soon). But at this point in the battle, any number of adjectives might be applied to the Taliban fighters on the far side of the open ground. They were resourceful, organized, clever, brave. In the main, however, they could not shoot.
For those of you who have served in Afghanistan, or been exposed to gunfighting there via other jobs, your input would be welcome. One of the company commanders shared his insights in an interview soon after the fighting at Marja tapered off. In the annals of the Afghan war, Afghans are supposedly crack shots, some of the best marksmen on earth. Captain Karabin, a veteran of the war in Iraq, summed up neatly a rifle company's experience that pointed otherwise. "I used to say in Iraq that I'm only alive because Iraqis are such bad shots," he said. "And now I'll say it in Afghanistan. I'm only alive because the Afghans are also such bad shots."
The Afghans have forgotten the faces of their fathers. :osama:
Interesting.
I wonder what happened? Is it the Russian gear that sucks? Lack of training? Both? Too much time pass praying?
Maybe Afghans are used to fighting in line infantry formation.
Quote from: Grey Fox on March 26, 2010, 11:22:08 AM
Interesting.
I wonder what happened? Is it the Russian gear that sucks? Lack of training? Both? Too much time pass praying?
They are probably becoming more civilized and don't depend on using a gun as regularly as their ancestors.
Quote from: Grey Fox on March 26, 2010, 11:22:08 AM
Interesting.
I wonder what happened? Is it the Russian gear that sucks? Lack of training? Both? Too much time pass praying?
I would guess it's some mix of a lack of formal military training & worn-out rifle bores that no longer have much rifling. The AK47 isn't the most accurate weapon in the world, but I suspect when you have a full auto weapon, 30 round mag, and little to no training, you're going to adopt the "spray & pray" tactic, which probably isn't too effective in a wide-open environment.
A) remember, this is a blog, and so not a reliable account of anything in particular. I am sure that some of it is true, just as I am sure that much of it is a strawman about the "tales one hears" about Afghans.
B) most Afghans no longer rely on hunting for food, and so don't have the opportunities to become great shots their ancestors had.
C) Modern weaponry relies much more on rate of fire and much less on accuracy than did the weapons the Afghans used in the Great game era.
So, yeah, Afghans are not such great shots anymore, but that doesn't make the previous generations' skill a "fable," author's contentions or not.
It would not surprise me to find out that the previous reputation for markmanship was over-stated, but at the same time it seems pretty obvious that modern combat does not particularly rely on the same skills anymore, and modern life does not impart any particular skill with a firearm outside military training anyway, even for your typical Pakistani or Afghan who is going to end up in the Taliban.
Add in shit weapons, almost no actual training on how to use them, and the result is not surprising. I've heard Alcy make the same remarks about the insurgents in Iraq - they couldn't hit water if they fell out of a boat.
The nature of the modern weapon is very different from those long rifles that made the Afghans famous. Rather than focusing on the single, well-aimed shot with a low rate of fire, the AK-47 allows the Afghan to spray and pray, often simultaneously.
Between them the AK and the supermarket have devastated third-world marksmanship the world over.
Spending time on placing/making bombs is probably more effective for them.
What Neil said. The jezzail was rifled, the Brown Bess was not.
I didn't think anyone thought of the Afghans as good shots. I mean when footage of the first battle in the war was shown on television during the Battle of Tora Bora Afghans were often shooting with out even looking at the enemy.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 26, 2010, 04:07:25 PM
What Neil said. The jezzail was rifled, the Brown Bess was not.
Indeed, as I noted several posts before Neil.
OTOH, even Sir Harry Flashman was impressed with Afghan marksmanship, and he wasn't exactly dgullible. The Afghans didn't get their rep by joining college sharpshooter clubs.
Grumbler, do you have any other purpose in life other than to pick needless fights on the Internet?
Quote from: DGuller on March 26, 2010, 06:00:14 PM
Grumbler, do you have any other purpose in life other than to pick needless fights on the Internet?
Remember, Grumbler only responds to the posts never the Poster.
Quote from: DGuller on March 26, 2010, 06:00:14 PM
Grumbler, do you have any other purpose in life other than to pick needless fights on the Internet?
Is this an attempt to pick a needless fight on the internet? FIAL
Quote from: Razgovory on March 26, 2010, 06:07:06 PM
Quote from: DGuller on March 26, 2010, 06:00:14 PM
Grumbler, do you have any other purpose in life other than to pick needless fights on the Internet?
Remember, Grumbler only responds to the posts never the Poster.
True. That is worth remembering.
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 05:40:50 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 26, 2010, 04:07:25 PM
What Neil said. The jezzail was rifled, the Brown Bess was not.
Indeed, as I noted several posts before Neil.
OTOH, even Sir Harry Flashman was impressed with Afghan marksmanship, and he wasn't exactly dgullible. The Afghans didn't get their rep by joining college sharpshooter clubs.
Most jezzails were not rifled; I believe it was the longer barrel length, tight fit of the ball and relatively high calibre that gave it its' impressive range and accuracy, and required a skilled shot to use it to its full potential.
If I recall my history and what I've read correctly, Afghan marksmanship was still pretty good in the era of bolt-action rifles such as the Lee-Enfield. I am fairly certain that it is the spread of, and also the easy availability of, automatic weapons that has changed the situation, as has been pointed out earlier in the thread.
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 06:37:58 PM
Quote from: DGuller on March 26, 2010, 06:00:14 PM
Grumbler, do you have any other purpose in life other than to pick needless fights on the Internet?
Is this an attempt to pick a needless fight on the internet? FIAL
It looks like a pretty clearcut attempt to rile a poster, at least.
QuoteOTOH, even Sir Harry Flashman was impressed with Afghan marksmanship, and he wasn't exactly dgullible.
And you appear to have misspelt FAIL, incidentally. Unless you have invented a clever acronym?
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 06:38:38 PM
Most jezzails were not rifled; I believe it was the longer barrel length, tight fit of the ball and relatively high calibre that gave it its' impressive range and accuracy, and required a skilled shot to use it to its full potential.
Probably so. Remember that it was always
relative accuracy that would impress.
QuoteIf I recall my history and what I've read correctly, Afghan marksmanship was still pretty good in the era of bolt-action rifles such as the Lee-Enfield. I am fairly certain that it is the spread of, and also the easy availability of, automatic weapons that has changed the situation, as has been pointed out earlier in the thread.
Indeed. The Afghans used Lee-Enfields against the Soviets early in the invasion, IIRC, and the CIA types had a tough job weaning them off those bolt-action weapons because, when ammo has to be carried by donkeys, a fight's worth of AK-47 ammo would take a quarter-donkey-load, or something, while a hundred men could be kept in action by a donkey-load of Lee-Enfield ammo.
I read
Charlie Wilson's War a long time ago, but it dealt with all this stuff.
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 06:38:38 PM
Most jezzails were not rifled;
Where did you pick this up?
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 06:42:16 PM
It looks like a pretty clearcut attempt to rile a poster, at least.
It is called perpetuating a meme. If the meme irritates someone, I suppose that is just a bonus.
QuoteAnd you appear to have misspelt FAIL, incidentally. Unless you have invented a clever acronym?
Nope. That's l33t speak. Which "fail" also is, on the internet.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 26, 2010, 06:44:41 PM
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 06:38:38 PM
Most jezzails were not rifled;
Where did you pick this up?
From my memory, initially. I've read quite a bit on muskets and rifles over the years, to the extent that my limited personal library includes a couple of books on the topic (one of which I've had since I was about 10!) I did take the precaution of locating two internet sources that were not copying each others text just to check my memory was not faulty before posting though.
http://www.warlordsofafghanistan.com/jezail-musket.php
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jezail
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 06:45:57 PM
Nope. That's l33t speak. Which "fail" also is, on the internet.
Ah. I see. I avoid "l33t speak" like the proverbial plague, hence my incomprehension.
Thanks for the explanation. :hug:
This is a very interesting thread regarding jezails (with other digressions of course) on another forum.
http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/t=141121/postdays=0/postorder=asc/start=0.html
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 05:40:50 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 26, 2010, 04:07:25 PM
What Neil said. The jezzail was rifled, the Brown Bess was not.
Indeed, as I noted several posts before Neil.
When Neil speaks, people listen.
QuoteOTOH, even Sir Harry Flashman was impressed with Afghan marksmanship, and he wasn't exactly dgullible. The Afghans didn't get their rep by joining college sharpshooter clubs.
One would wonder how Flashy saw, since he would always have been running away from the action.
An article I have come across from early 2009 that seems to have some bearing on the subject of Afghan marksmanship. Please note the story involving the goat.
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/Afghans-Rediscover-The-Lee-Enfield-1-22-2009.asp
QuoteAfghans Rediscover The Lee-Enfield
by James Dunnigan
January 22, 2009
Afghan traditionalists are changing the way the Taliban fight. This can be seen by the increase in the use of sniping by the Taliban. In the last year, NATO units in southern Afghanistan estimate there has been a 25 percent increase in sniping incidents. This is not seen as a major danger. NATO troops wear protective bests and helmets that can stop bullets fired at long range, making it very frustrating for the Taliban shooters trying to hit a distant target in a vulnerable spot.
This shift in tactics is largely a reaction to the better training, and weapons, of U.S. and NATO infantry. Afghans, and especially the Taliban, consider themselves great warriors. But they are getting tired of being defeated every time they get into a firefight with the foreign troops. Worse yet, if the Taliban stay put during a fight, the damned foreigners bring in a warplane that drops a smart bomb or two, bringing an inglorious (for the Taliban) end to the action.
Then some of the young guys remembered grandpa decrying the decline in marksmanship years ago. Back before the Russians showed up, in the 1980s, the best an Afghan could hope to have was a World War II, or World War I, era bolt action rifle. These weapons were eclipsed in the 1980s by full automatic AK-47s and the RPG rocket launcher. The young guys took to the AK, and the thrill of emptying a 30 round magazine on full automatic. Not bad for a brief firefight, and suddenly hardly anyone, except a few old timers, wanted to use the old bolt action rifle.
What was not noticed much outside of Afghanistan, was that this shift in weaponry brought to an end a long Afghan tradition of precision, long range shooting. Before the 1980s, this skill was treasured for both hunting and warfare. When doing neither, Afghan men played games centered on marksmanship. One, for example, involved a group of men chipping in and buying a goat. The animal was then tethered to a rock, often on a hill, and then the half dozen or so men moved several hundred meters away and drew lots to see who would fire in what order. The first man to drop the goat, won it. Since Afghanistan was the poorest nation in Asia, ammo was expensive, and older men taught the young boys all the proper moves needed to get that first shot off accurately.
During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars to arm Afghans with all the AK-47s and ammo they could use, and they used lots of it. But rarely for target practice. Compared to bolt-action rifles like the British Lee-Enfield, the AK-47 was much less accurate when one shot at a time was fired. The old timers, or a few young traditionalists, kept their Lee-Enfields, and made themselves useful picking off Russian soldiers at long distances, on those rare occasions where that was needed.
The Lee-Enfield is one of the oldest, and still widely used, rifles on the planet. Over 17 million were manufactured between 1895 and the 1980s. While there are more AK-47s out there (over 20 million in private hands), these are looked down on by those who use their rifles for hunting, or killing with a minimum expenditure of ammunition. The 8.8 pound Lee-Enfield is a bolt-action rifle (with a ten round magazine) noted for its accuracy and sturdiness. The inaccurate AK-47 has a hard time hitting anything more than a hundred meters away, while the Lee-Enfield can drop an animal, or a man, at over 400 meters.
There are millions of Lee-Enfields still in use throughout India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Iraq and other Persian Gulf nations. These are largely World War II leftovers. In the early half of the 20th century, the British gave out millions of these weapons to allies, or those being courted. Noting the accuracy of the Lee-Enfield (.303 caliber, or 7.7mm), the locals came to prize the rifle for hunting, and self-defense. There are still many gunsmiths throughout the region (and at least one factory in India) that will refurbish century old Lee-Enfields to "like new" condition. Ammunition is still manufactured, with the high quality stuff going for a dollar a round, and lesser quality for 25 cents a round. These rifles sell in the west for $500-1,000. The Lee-Enfield will carry on well into the 21st century.
One place where the Lee-Enfield found lots of fans was Afghanistan. There, the Afghans had been introduced to rifles in the 19th century, and they treasured these weapons. This was particularly true with the introduction of smokeless powder rifles in the late 19th century. Many Afghans were still using black powder rifles well into the 20th century. But once Lee-Enfields began show up in large numbers after World War I (1914-18), no one wanted the larger, heavier and less accurate black powder rifles (which always gave off your position, with all that smoke, after you fired a round.) Now, wealthy drug lords are buying expensive hunting and sniper rifles for their militias, but so far, the Taliban Snipers appear to be using grandpa's old Lee-Enfield
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 07:21:39 PM
Please note the story involving the goat.
Looks like someone hasn't seen the movie about Sgt. York.
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 06:53:49 PM
From my memory, initially. I've read quite a bit on muskets and rifles over the years, to the extent that my limited personal library includes a couple of books on the topic (one of which I've had since I was about 10!) I did take the precaution of locating two internet sources that were not copying each others text just to check my memory was not faulty before posting though.
http://www.warlordsofafghanistan.com/jezail-musket.php
This entry, of course, completely mis-states the issue of the British armies that invaded Afghanistan 3 times, but what can on expect from an amateur site like this?
Unfortunately for Afghans, NATO soldiers typically don't tether themselves to a rock.
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 07:21:39 PM
An article I have come across from early 2009 that seems to have some bearing on the subject of Afghan marksmanship. Please note the story involving the goat.
Indeed. The problem the author ignores is supplying ammo. The Afghan Taliban isn't relying on sniping because it is traditional, but because it is what their infrastructure will support.
One cannot understand war by examining tactics alone. One must look at logistics as the real argument of kings.
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 07:48:48 PM
This entry, of course, completely mis-states the issue of the British armies that invaded Afghanistan 3 times, but what can on expect from an amateur site like this?
Assuming you mean the bit where he speaks of 3 invasions in the 1800s, it is technically true (1839, 1842 and 1878) so I'll let him by on that one. It's the bit below it in the paragraph which makes me shudder, given the way it reeks of casual racism. Does he know the average height of a British soldier of the era?
Quote from: Agelastus on March 26, 2010, 08:00:41 PM
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 07:48:48 PM
This entry, of course, completely mis-states the issue of the British armies that invaded Afghanistan 3 times, but what can on expect from an amateur site like this?
Assuming you mean the bit where he speaks of 3 invasions in the 1800s, it is technically true (1839, 1842 and 1878) so I'll let him by on that one. It's the bit below it in the paragraph which makes me shudder, given the way it reeks of casual racism. Does he know the average height of a British soldier of the era?
Plus, the Brown Bess wasn't the arm of the Indian Army in 1878, and not much in 1842 (which was really just a continuation of 1839, when only a portion of the troops still had the brown Bess). the fact that the "warlike tribes' of India were better soldiers than many British troops was demonstrated in the Mutiny, but I have never seen any indication that arms were scaled differently for Indian troops than British.
Quote from: grumbler on March 26, 2010, 08:06:16 PM
Plus, the Brown Bess wasn't the arm of the Indian Army in 1878, and not much in 1842 (which was really just a continuation of 1839, when only a portion of the troops still had the brown Bess). the fact that the "warlike tribes' of India were better soldiers than many British troops was demonstrated in the Mutiny, but I have never seen any indication that arms were scaled differently for Indian troops than British.
He may, again to be charitable, be being mislead by the fact that the "Indian pattern" Brown Bess had the shortest barrel length of all the land-pattern muskets of the type, and was used by the East India company forces before the British army adopted it, without realising that post 1802 the newer British designs of Brown Besses were produced to the same length. The India pattern muskets are still the lightest of all the patterns though, which puzzles me...assuming that the information readily available on the internet is accurate, of course. :hmm:
The overall tone of the paragraph doesn't leave me feeling very charitable, however. It sounds racist, as I said.
Quote from: Razgovory on March 26, 2010, 05:31:22 PM
I didn't think anyone thought of the Afghans as good shots. I mean when footage of the first battle in the war was shown on television during the Battle of Tora Bora Afghans were often shooting with out even looking at the enemy.
When I saw that, I figured they were just
that good. :hmm:
Taliban sniper training:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrvvC9YeCRQ&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qk7RGT5LbI4&feature=related
:lol:
(Yeah, those are not taliban, and that's not a combat rifle, but hey ... it's fun!)
This is more on the spot, though:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zL9AKXxDW0&annotation_id=annotation_919890&feature=iv
Failiban: "We don't care about our lives!" ... "And it's cold, too!"
In their defense, I challenge any of you to sit still and fire very well placed shots under fire without training.....It's hard enough when you've been trained to. :homestar:
Quote from: Syt on March 27, 2010, 03:14:19 AM
This is more on the spot, though:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zL9AKXxDW0&annotation_id=annotation_919890&feature=iv
Failiban: "We don't care about our lives!" ... "And it's cold, too!"
Shit, this would make a great comedy series. "It's D!"
Quote from: Alcibiades on March 27, 2010, 03:16:05 AM
In their defense, I challenge any of you to sit still and fire very well placed shots under fire without training.....It's hard enough when you've been trained to. :homestar:
Never hit anything with my G3 at 100m lieing still in bright weather. MG3 was a different matter, though.
Who were you firing at? :P
( Let me guess, J-O-Os? :D)
Quote from: Syt on March 27, 2010, 03:14:19 AM
This is more on the spot, though:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zL9AKXxDW0&annotation_id=annotation_919890&feature=iv
Failiban: "We don't care about our lives!" ... "And it's cold, too!"
:lol:
Mines are useless. Everyday, we press the button and nothing happens
Quote from: Grey Fox on March 26, 2010, 11:22:08 AM
Interesting.
I wonder what happened? Is it the Russian gear that sucks? Lack of training? Both? Too much time pass praying?
I can't tell about afghans. I haven't fought them yet. But about arabs, I can tell you that it is their stupid religion. Arabs think their moongod will guide their weapons, and that relying on training and skill is lack of faith. They believe too much in fate, that what's going to happen is going to happen.
I thought the Talibani were better shots, because I know not all muslims are that retarded. Beduins, for example, are very practical folks, and have some serious marksmanship skills. Also, we faced a couple chechenian snipers last deployment, and they were good, but then, there were only two of them. Too small a sample to make a judment.
In the end it all comes to training. Arabs don't like training. They think it is not necesary because their moongod will deliver. What that means in reality, is that only the real nutcases fight the good fight. The average brave arab warrior fire a burst without even taking the time to aim and flees running like hell. They call that "tactics".
Now, if they manage to hit a couple of us and pin down the rest, they get like wild dogs after a wounded cat, and try to overrun our position. But the moment we start shooting down their dudes, their break their assault and run for cover, trying to put some buildings in between, to break contact with us.
They are not stupid, they just can't shoot, because they have a lot of cultural bagage that don't allow them to improve their marksmanship skills.
I remember I told you about a few firefights with them, and how much they suck with guns. There is a reason why IEDs have become their favor weapons system.
Quote from: Syt on March 27, 2010, 03:14:19 AM
This is more on the spot, though:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zL9AKXxDW0&annotation_id=annotation_919890&feature=iv
Failiban: "We don't care about our lives!" ... "And it's cold, too!"
Maybe they are taliban because they can't get work anywhere else.
Quote from: Siege on March 27, 2010, 03:40:56 PM
In the end it all comes to training. Arabs don't like training. They think it is not necesary because their moongod will deliver.
You say things like that all the time, about how no bullet can kill you because you think you're a superjew.
Quote from: Alcibiades on March 27, 2010, 01:55:42 PM
Who were you firing at? :P
Immobile target displays. :blush:
I think that one of the reasons for the lack of marksmanship, among the Taliban is the fact that they employ mostly young local punks to do much of the fighting. $1000 for the family and a well used AK-47 clone, and a new Taliban fighter is born. Seasoned fighters is after 10 years of fighting in short supply...
Also as they have lost most of their safe heavens, doesnt they have the training facilities they used to have...
Quote from: Habbaku on March 26, 2010, 11:01:03 AM
I found this article/blog post to be a pretty engaging read about the inadequacies of the Afghan riflemen on both sides. During the Victorian period and up until WW I, these guys were renowned as amongst the best by the British running up against them. Now? Not so much.
Tainted.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1265320/Deadly-Taliban-sniper-stalks-British-troops-echoes-Hollywood-blockbuster.html#ixzz0kuF2zHgb
QuoteHunt for Taliban sniper who has shot dead seven British troops in 5-month killing spree
By Matt Fortune
Last updated at 12:00 PM on 12th April 2010
It echoes the plot of a Hollywood blockbuster, but the deaths of seven British troops at the hands of a highly-trained and highly-skilled Afghan sniper in Sangin is a very real problem.
During a five-month killing spree, the sniper has stalked the 3rd Battalion, the Rifles, picking off individuals including a British sniper who was on the lookout for the shooter himself.
Three of those killed were considered among the best in their field.
Now the SAS is hunting the sniper who is stalking them across the streets of the city considered the most dangerous in Afghanistan.
The scene is chillingly reminiscent to the storyline of the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates, in which Jude Law and Ed Harris play rival Soviet and German snipers stalking each other across Stalingrad during World War II.
Sharp shooters: Snipers are a vital tool in Britain's fight and the loss of several has been a blow (pictured, Irish Defence forces 99th Infantry battalion)
It is thought the Taliban killer may have been trained in neighbouring Iran or by Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. His youngest victim was just 19.
'Their sniper is giving us real problems and we've not yet worked out how to take him down,' said a senior British Army officer who recently visited the town in Helmand province.
'Our snipers are some of the best-trained and capable soldiers we have. When you lose one it is telling you something.'
Another soldier added: 'The Taliban sniper must watch our guys for days to wait for the best situation to open fire and still make his escape.
'So far he has not been taken down, even though the SAS have carried out several forays into the area.'
In total some 53 British servicemen have been killed in the vacinity of Sangin in the last 12 months, with 12 times the average casualty rate for Nato forces in the country
The senior officer added: 'There seem to be enough spy drones and troops for the size of area. The conclusion is the Taliban have outside help — from either Iran or Al-Qaeda in Pakistan — to train up their guys.'
Major-General Gordon Messenger, UK spokesman for operations in Afghanistan, said: 'The casualty toll in Sangin is tragically high but our forces remain very much on the front foot and are determined to maintain the progress that they and their predecessors have achieved.
Quote from: Syt on March 27, 2010, 03:14:19 AM
This is more on the spot, though:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zL9AKXxDW0&annotation_id=annotation_919890&feature=iv
Failiban: "We don't care about our lives!" ... "And it's cold, too!"
That's a hilarious video. Reminds me of Spinal Tap, when the band gets lost under the stage in Cleveland.
Quote from: jimmy olsen on April 13, 2010, 10:47:59 PM
The scene is chillingly reminiscent to the storyline of the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates, in which Jude Law and Ed Harris play rival Soviet and German snipers stalking each other across Stalingrad during World War II.
Christ, modern journalism sucks so bad.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on April 14, 2010, 05:19:00 AM
Quote from: jimmy olsen on April 13, 2010, 10:47:59 PM
The scene is chillingly reminiscent to the storyline of the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates, in which Jude Law and Ed Harris play rival Soviet and German snipers stalking each other across Stalingrad during World War II.
Christ, modern journalism sucks so bad.
At least it's so bad it's funny.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on April 14, 2010, 05:19:00 AM
Quote from: jimmy olsen on April 13, 2010, 10:47:59 PM
The scene is chillingly reminiscent to the storyline of the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates, in which Jude Law and Ed Harris play rival Soviet and German snipers stalking each other across Stalingrad during World War II.
Christ, modern journalism sucks so bad.
Even the editing sucks.
Wait a minute. Tim, the KING OF TAINT calling something tainted? I call bullshit.
Why do I get the feeling that Monkeybutt pwns Timothy?
Quote from: jimmy olsen on April 13, 2010, 10:47:59 PM
Quote from: Habbaku on March 26, 2010, 11:01:03 AM
I found this article/blog post to be a pretty engaging read about the inadequacies of the Afghan riflemen on both sides. During the Victorian period and up until WW I, these guys were renowned as amongst the best by the British running up against them. Now? Not so much.
Tainted.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1265320/Deadly-Taliban-sniper-stalks-British-troops-echoes-Hollywood-blockbuster.html#ixzz0kuF2zHgb (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1265320/Deadly-Taliban-sniper-stalks-British-troops-echoes-Hollywood-blockbuster.html#ixzz0kuF2zHgb)
QuoteHunt for Taliban sniper who has shot dead seven British troops in 5-month killing spree
He has a few more before he gets promoted to the higher league.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simo_H%C3%A4yh%C3%A4
Quote from: Lucidor on April 14, 2010, 11:11:27 AM
QuoteHunt for Taliban sniper who has shot dead seven British troops in 5-month killing spree
He has a few more before he gets promoted to the higher league.
I thought you were going to mock the idea of a 5-month "killing spree" in which a mere 7 people were killed.
Quotehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simo_H%C3%A4yh%C3%A4
That record always has had a strong odor of bullshit to me. He killed a lot of people, for sure, but those kills were not "confirmed" by any reasonable standard, and the tacking on of hundreds more "probable kills" doesn't freshen the air.
Quote from: grumbler on April 14, 2010, 11:53:48 AM
I thought you were going to mock the idea of a 5-month "killing spree" in which a mere 7 people were killed.
The expression is stretched rather thin, yes. I'm guessing the Coalition has a few snipers of his calibre already.
Quote
That record always has had a strong odor of bullshit to me. He killed a lot of people, for sure, but those kills were not "confirmed" by any reasonable standard, and the tacking on of hundreds more "probable kills" doesn't freshen the air.
True, but he was the first name I came up with.
British snipers:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.motifake.com%2Fimage%2Fdemotivational-poster%2F1004%2Feveryone-chill-the-f-out-whats-up-doc-demotivational-poster-1270839304.jpg&hash=28ec25e19411eb1e34c5c98a15132ac2a31fe911)
What is wrong with you?
Quote from: CountDeMoney on April 14, 2010, 05:19:00 AM
Quote from: jimmy olsen on April 13, 2010, 10:47:59 PM
The scene is chillingly reminiscent to the storyline of the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates, in which Jude Law and Ed Harris play rival Soviet and German snipers stalking each other across Stalingrad during World War II.
Christ, modern journalism sucks so bad.
At least he's making a reference to something most reporters actually know something about, movies