It's from a Polish newspaper so the translation may be a bit heavy.
QuoteThe Ill-Fated Pact
Bartosz T. Wieliński
The German and Soviet invasion of Poland was a prelude to a destructive war and the communist enslavement of eastern Europe, 140 German intellectuals write in a declaration.
'We thus respond to those in Russia who are trying to defend Stalin. They don't seem to be living in the 21st century,' says CSU deputy Hartmut Koschyk, one of the declaration's signatories.
The declaration is an appeal to Europe to not forget, while celebrating the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the circumstances in which the continent was originally divided seventy years ago.
'We are aware, and this is a painful awareness, that without the German-started World War II neither the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe nor the division of Europe and Germany would have happened,' write the German intellectuals. Rather than identifying 1 September 1939 - the day of the German invasion of Poland - as the beginning of the tragedy, they point at 23 August 1939, when the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was signed in Moscow. In it, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union divided Central Europe between themselves. 'It was an ill-fated pact,' reads the declaration.
The declaration was initiated by Marianne Birthler, head of the Stasi Records Authority and the Foundation for Research into the DDR Dictatorship, and former DDR dissident, Wolfgang Templin. It was signed by nearly 140 persons, including, among others, ex-president of the Bundestag, Prof Rita Süssmuth, the first head of the Stasi Records Authority, Joachim Gauck, historians Arnulf Baring, Dieter Bingen and Heirinch Winkler, journalists and politicians.
The declaration is unprecedented. To avoid being accused of historical revisionism - diminishing German responsibility for WWII - Germans seldom speak about Russia's responsibility for the war. Politicians usually steer well clear of the subject in order not to damage relations with Moscow. Yet the declaration leaves no doubt about what communism meant for eastern Europe.
'In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and part of Germany, all weakened by the war and Nazi rule, the Soviet Union introduced a new regime. That had disastrous consequences for society, the economy and culture, as well as for the masses of people who were persecuted or lost their lives because they stood in the communists' way,' reads the declaration.
Markus Meckel (SPD), one of the signatories, assures Gazeta that no one wants to whitewash Nazi Germany. 'But we need to remember that there was another totalitarianism which also committed crimes and left scars on central Europe's collective memory. People in the West have to finally acknowledge this,' says Mr Meckel.
Moreover, the German declaration comes at a time when a group of Russian historians, acting on the Kremlin's orders, is trying to defend the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. They are arguing that Stalin wanted to buy himself time to prepare for the war against Germany, that he was forced to sign the pact by the inflexible position of Poland which didn't want an alliance with Russia. Some have gone as far as to suggest that it is Poland that bears responsibility for the wear because it refused to meet Hitler's 'moderate' demands and surrender the 'Gdańsk corridor.'
Mr Meckel adds that the declaration is also an appeal to Russia to start an honest debate about the past. 'They should finally confront the vision of history of the Poles or the Balts,' says the SPD deputy. The signatories Gazeta has talked to hope that chancellor Angela Merkel speaks in a similar tone during the 1 September celebrations on Westerplatte, Gdańsk.
The German declaration is also a homage to the democratic opposition in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. 'We will never forget that it was especially the Poles who, fighting for our freedom and theirs, dealt the first blows to the communist regime,' reads the declaration.
The anniversary of the outbreak of World War II will also be celebrated by Germany's Catholic bishops. Together with Polish priests they will hold a mass on 30 August in Berlin. A joint declaration may be issued.
Źródło: Gazeta Wyborcza
Well kudos to German intellectuals, considering Russian revisionism which is being swallowed whole by German and Israeli politicians, judging from the recent statements by Merkel and Peres.
Gah could someone correct the typo in the title? :blush:
Interesting. But let's not forget that it all started with WWI. So we can blame it all on the Serbs.
Quote from: barkdreg on August 21, 2009, 06:10:42 AM
Interesting. But let's not forget that it all started with WWI. So we can blame it all on the Serbs.
But Balkan nationalism was only a serious issue because of the disastrous outcome of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1878. So we can still blame it on the Russians.
QuoteThey are arguing that Stalin wanted to buy himself time to prepare for the war against Germany, that he was forced to sign the pact by the inflexible position of Poland which didn't want an alliance with Russia.
To be completely honest I tend to agree with this, tough 'forced' is far too strong a term (and with hindsight it's quite evident that Stalin desired to 'reconquer' all the territories lost in Brest Litowsk). However, the following part
QuoteSome have gone as far as to suggest that it is Poland that bears responsibility for the war because it refused to meet Hitler's 'moderate' demands and surrender the 'Gdańsk corridor.
...is 100% unadulterated, pure, pristine bullshit. The end of Czechoslovakia did show to everyone what meeting Hitler's 'moderate' demands meant, i.e. unmoderate demands barely half a year later.
Quote from: Alatriste on August 21, 2009, 07:48:12 AM
To be completely honest I tend to agree with this,
So Stalin thought that moving the Germans closer and giving their Army, still rebuilding from the Versailles treaty, time to rebuild itself was actually advantageous to the Soviet Union? With the German economy being far larger so they could increase their forces far faster than the Soviets? Wow what an idiot.
That is the worst excuse I have heard since some Western Allies apologists claimed giving the Germans the Czech lands, along with the Skoda works, bought them time to...I don't know...fall further behind the German war machine.
I find it really hard to believe that everybody thought it was far preferable to let the Germans get stronger than to attack them when they were still weak. Maybe a sense of fairplay and sportsmanship was dominating the minds of European leaders in the 1930s.
Quote from: Martinus on August 21, 2009, 03:13:15 AM
Well kudos to German intellectuals, considering Russian revisionism which is being swallowed whole by German and Israeli politicians, judging from the recent statements by Merkel and Peres.
Can we see these statements?
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 08:27:42 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on August 21, 2009, 07:48:12 AM
To be completely honest I tend to agree with this,
So Stalin thought that moving the Germans closer and giving their Army, still rebuilding from the Versailles treaty, time to rebuild itself was actually advantageous to the Soviet Union? With the German economy being far larger so they could increase their forces far faster than the Soviets? Wow what an idiot.
For what it's worth, I believe the Wehrmacht was no longer still rebuilding in August 1939, when the M-R Pact was made reality. The RKKA, of course, was in complete shambles--Stalin was deluded as to how bad it really was, as evidenced by his decision to invade a country that could actually defend itself in November, but iirc he did realize it was no match for Germany.
Stalin was also convinced that the Allies would sacrifice Russia to save themselves. And he was probably right about that. France and Britain didn't do shit to save Poland, and I fully expect that they would have done less watching the two countries they feared and hated most slitting each others' throats while they jerked each other off behind the Maginot Line. So Stalin sacrificed them first. I can't really fault the reasoning behind this.
The thing is, no one outside Germany expected France to fold in mid-1940. Surely no one expected that Germany would suffer so little to completely destroy their perennial rival. It was easy to presume that France in 1940 was readier than in 1870 or 1914. Even in 1871, it took Germany longer, and cost Germany more, and France was not as fully prostrated as in 1940. To any contemporary observer, this was an unbelievable outcome. Stalin probably thought that by giving Germany Poland he'd buy two and a half or three years to repair the RKKA, not a mere twenty-two months, and he thought it would take less time to get the RKKA back up to snuff.
Morally, of course, taking the Baltics and Poland is still indefensible, but the non-aggression pact in itself makes great rational sense to me.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 10:18:21 AM
France and Britain didn't do shit to save Poland, and I fully expect that they would have done less watching the two countries they feared and hated most slitting each others' throats while they jerked each other off behind the Maginot Line.
Oh no not this shit again. They fucking started World War II what the hell were they supposed to do? Jesus fucking christ I can see hammering France and Britain when they fuck up but the whining about one of the times they actually did the right thing is just bullshit.
By the way it was no political decision to sit behind the Maginot line that was Gamelin's "strategy" (until France and Britain had mobilized their Empires supposedly) and not one that his Prime Minister endorsed or wanted and he spent most of the phony war desperate to fire Gamelin. This is misinformed nonsense at best and simply slander at worst.
QuoteSo Stalin sacrificed them first. I can't really fault the reasoning behind this.
Stalin had no clairovoyance, how could he possibly have known how things were going to turn out? Most people figured the French and the British were bluffing and nothing would happen. Where would he be then? Sitting in front of the German Wehrmacht totally fucked. Or he could have a Poland buffer state in front of him...
QuoteMorally, of course, taking the Baltics and Poland is still indefensible, but the non-aggression pact in itself makes great rational sense to me.
It only made sense given Stalins quite mistaken pathological belief that the Westerners were lying and would not support Poland. Given that they did, the result was that an attempt to destroy the Nazis cheaply with Western support was thrown away so the USSR could get obliterated later.
QuoteThe thing is, no one outside Germany expected France to fold in mid-1940. Surely no one expected that Germany would suffer so little to completely destroy their perennial rival. It was easy to presume that France in 1940 was readier than in 1870 or 1914. Even in 1871, it took Germany longer, and cost Germany more, and France was not as fully prostrated as in 1940. To any contemporary observer, this was an unbelievable outcome. Stalin probably thought that by giving Germany Poland he'd buy two and a half or three years to repair the RKKA, not a mere twenty-two months, and he thought it would take less time to get the RKKA back up to snuff.
If Stalin really felt this way, and he was just buying time to fight Germany, why did he continue to do things like invade Finland and take territory once the conflict started? Wouldn't that be the time to oppose Germany? When they had a dangerous rival on their other front?
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 10:18:21 AM
Stalin was also convinced that the Allies would sacrifice Russia to save themselves. And he was probably right about that. France and Britain didn't do shit to save Poland, and I fully expect that they would have done less watching the two countries they feared and hated most slitting each others' throats while they jerked each other off behind the Maginot Line. So Stalin sacrificed them first. I can't really fault the reasoning behind this.
Since M-R predates the invasion of Poland, France/UK's inactivity then didn't figure into the decision making. It was Czechoslovakia that laid the foundation for M-R.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2009, 10:35:28 AMIt was Czechoslovakia that laid the foundation for M-R.
But Munich was needed, from a British perspective, because we'd only started re-arming in 36/7. If it had come to war in 38 Britain would barely have an RAF.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:40:42 AM
But Munich was needed, from a British perspective, because we'd only started re-arming in 36/7. If it had come to war in 38 Britain would barely have an RAF.
That was what the French airforce said as well. It was nonsense, the combined forces of Czechoslovakia, France, and the UK were a better match for Germany than the situation the west would find itself in in 1939.
Plus the Soviets would have protected the Czechs who were one of the few pro-Russian peoples on Eastern Europe.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:40:42 AM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2009, 10:35:28 AMIt was Czechoslovakia that laid the foundation for M-R.
But Munich was needed, from a British perspective, because we'd only started re-arming in 36/7. If it had come to war in 38 Britain would barely have an RAF.
This may or may not be factually accurate, but it has the flavour of a post facto reason. Chamberlin was I think quite sincere in believing he could buy peace.
On its face, and lacking hindsight, it wasn't a totally unreasonable point of view. The notion was that Hitler and the Germans were rightly pissed off by the mishmash made of Germany by the post WW1 settlement, that all of his master race stuff was puffery for domestic consumption, and that if he was allowed a "fair settlement" he'd settle down and behave like Franco and Mussolini.
All crap of course, but as of yet not obviously crap.
Yes I have a hard time believing the British thought they were going to still be fighting if they gave it at Munich and were playing for time. If they did believe that then they could not have miscalculated worse.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 10:42:11 AM
That was what the French airforce said as well. It was nonsense, the combined forces of Czechoslovakia, France, and the UK were a better match for Germany than the situation the west would find itself in in 1939.
I disagree. 1939 wasn't perfect for the allies but the best time would have been 1936 or earlier, when Germany was still sufficiently weak, or some point after 1938. In 1938 the UK and France were at a bad point.
I doubt the Soviets would intervene unless they had real material benefit to gain from it.
Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2009, 10:47:10 AM
This may or may not be factually accurate, but it has the flavour of a post facto reason. Chamberlin was I think quite sincere in believing he could buy peace.
On its face, and lacking hindsight, it wasn't a totally unreasonable point of view. The notion was that Hitler and the Germans were rightly pissed off by the mishmash made of Germany by the post WW1 settlement, that all of his master race stuff was puffery for domestic consumption, and that if he was allowed a "fair settlement" he'd settle down and behave like Franco and Mussolini.
All crap of course, but as of yet not obviously crap.
I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich? I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.
1938 was a bit of a shift point for the UK and France. They became far more open to helping Republican Spain - or at least dropping sham non-interference - the spending on re-armament significantly increased and, for the first time, military production was given priority over civilian industry.
Edit: At the very least the military told Chamberlain they weren't ready for war and estimated that, given the state of the RAF, a German bombing assault would kill 500 000 in the first three weeks.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:51:15 AM
I disagree. 1939 wasn't perfect for the allies but the best time would have been 1936 or earlier, when Germany was still sufficiently weak, or some point after 1938. In 1938 the UK and France were at a bad point.
I doubt the Soviets would intervene unless they had real material benefit to gain from it.
Well they claimed they would and Romania and Poland were falling overthemselves to stop it since the Soviets would have had to cross their territory.
Losing the Czechs as an ally was bad but handing over the Skoda works and the excellent Czech 38 tanks was disastrous. I have a hard time seeing how the Allies came out ahead.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:55:47 AM
Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2009, 10:47:10 AM
This may or may not be factually accurate, but it has the flavour of a post facto reason. Chamberlin was I think quite sincere in believing he could buy peace.
On its face, and lacking hindsight, it wasn't a totally unreasonable point of view. The notion was that Hitler and the Germans were rightly pissed off by the mishmash made of Germany by the post WW1 settlement, that all of his master race stuff was puffery for domestic consumption, and that if he was allowed a "fair settlement" he'd settle down and behave like Franco and Mussolini.
All crap of course, but as of yet not obviously crap.
I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich? I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.
1938 was a bit of a shift point for the UK and France. They became far more open to helping Republican Spain - or at least dropping sham non-interference - the spending on re-armament significantly increased and, for the first time, military production was given priority over civilian industry.
Edit: At the very least the military told Chamberlain they weren't ready for war and estimated that, given the state of the RAF, a German bombing assault would kill 500 000 in the first three weeks.
Did Chamberlain say it
at the time, or after it became obvious war was inevitable? I haven't seen any sources that argued that Chamberlain wasn't sincere about his appeasement policy (the term "appeasement" wasn't considered derogatory at the time).
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:55:47 AM
Edit: At the very least the military told Chamberlain they weren't ready for war and estimated that, given the state of the RAF, a German bombing assault would kill 500 000 in the first three weeks.
The French Airforce told Daladier basically the same thing. They told the French government they were no match for the German Airforce and it was impossible that France could win. Naturally this shocking revelation removed any nerve the French had to oppose Chamberlain. The French were really agonizing over this decision prior to this moment.
It was nonsense though.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:55:47 AM
I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich? I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.
Chamberlain came home from Munich, was asked rhetorically by the Chief of Staff (I think) whether he had bought time for rearmament, Chamberlain replied "but don't you see, this means peace in our time."
I think the key difficulty appeasement highlights is the problem reasonable and rational men have in dealing with the unreasonable and irrational.
This, it should be pointed out, has nothing whatsoever to do necessarily with good and evil; Stalin was just as evil a monster as Hitler, but in his relations with other countries he was much more rational.
Hitler's irrationality did in the end doom him of course, but in the medium term it was a positive advantage: he constantly wrong-footed his rational opponents.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2009, 11:11:28 AM
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:55:47 AM
I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich? I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.
Chamberlain came home from Munich, was asked rhetorically by the Chief of Staff (I think) whether he had bought time for rearmament, Chamberlain replied "but don't you see, this means peace in our time."
Ok. It must just have been Daladier who knew war was coming (which is why the French were always more pro-war).
My argument would basically be that Chamberlain as PM made the best decisions he could while desperately trying to escape from the legacy of Chamberlain the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who starved defence and opposed rearmament until 36 and didn't fully fund it till he became 38. I think Chamberlain's sin wasn't in Munich but in the Treasury.
QuoteIt was nonsense though.
So was the idea that we could bomb our way to victory. We didn't know that then though.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 10:31:09 AM
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 10:18:21 AM
France and Britain didn't do shit to save Poland, and I fully expect that they would have done less watching the two countries they feared and hated most slitting each others' throats while they jerked each other off behind the Maginot Line.
Oh no not this shit again. They fucking started World War II what the hell were they supposed to do? Jesus fucking christ I can see hammering France and Britain when they fuck up but the whining about one of the times they actually did the right thing is just bullshit.
Alright, Valmy, calm down. I was a little glib about it--I don't know what, if anything, Britain or France
could have done in 1939 to actually help Poland--or Russia--or themselves, for that matter.
QuoteBy the way it was no political decision to sit behind the Maginot line that was Gamelin's "strategy" (until France and Britain had mobilized their Empires supposedly) and not one that his Prime Minister endorsed or wanted and he spent most of the phony war desperate to fire Gamelin. This is misinformed nonsense at best and simply slander at worst.
A strategy that would have been much more profitable if a real Eastern Front existed from day one.
QuoteStalin had no clairovoyance, how could he possibly have known how things were going to turn out? Most people figured the French and the British were bluffing and nothing would happen. Where would he be then? Sitting in front of the German Wehrmacht totally fucked. Or he could have a Poland buffer state in front of him...
What was the other option? Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?
QuoteMorally, of course, taking the Baltics and Poland is still indefensible, but the non-aggression pact in itself makes great rational sense to me.
QuoteIt only made sense given Stalins quite mistaken pathological belief that the Westerners were lying and would not support Poland.
Or correct belief that they were
unable to support Poland.
QuoteGiven that they did, the result was that an attempt to destroy the Nazis cheaply with Western support was thrown away so the USSR could get obliterated later.
Cheaply, in 1939?
QuoteIf Stalin really felt this way, and he was just buying time to fight Germany, why did he continue to do things like invade Finland and take territory once the conflict started?
Because Stalin was a monster and an opportunist? I'm not trying to defend the man here, just the rationale behind his part in the M-R Pact. ;) That said, the Baltics were more tempting as directly-administered buffer zones than as potential Nazi allies, or easy Nazi conquests. Same deal with Poland, why give Germany all of it when you can get some of it? Ironically, of course, moving formations to the new border just assisted them toward destruction, but I'm sure this wasn't the notion the Russian leadership had at the time. The Winter War was an utter miscalculation that demonstrated to everyone the terrible state the RKKA was in, in a way vindicating a decision not to get involved in an offensive with a state that dwarfed the military and industrial capacity of Finland (and, in another way, demonstrating how delusional Stalin could be, and how his purges had damaged the ability for him to get realistic assessments by competent people).
QuoteWouldn't that be the time to oppose Germany? When they had a dangerous rival on their other front?
Not if those rivals weren't able or willing to offer significant support, not when your own capacity is severely depleted, and not if you don't and can't reasonably expect your potential allies to collapse in the absence of your help, leaving an unharmed Nazi superpower alone on the continent. It's important to remember, I think, that the democracies
were Stalin's rivals as well.
I'll close on this--in perfect hindsight, it would be vastly preferable from our standpoint for the Russians to have gotten involved in 1939. It may even have been preferable from the Soviet standpoint. But given the reasonable appreciation of the situation at the time, I think the M-R pact made sense.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 11:55:40 AM
Alright, Valmy, calm down. I was a little glib about it--I don't know what, if anything, Britain or France could have done in 1939 to actually help Poland--or Russia--or themselves, for that matter.
Sorry. You don't know how many enormous threads about this I had to endure arguing with Polish nationalist fucks about this very subject. I am still rather traumatized by it.
Stupid Poles.
Breeder!
But no prob, dude. I did my B.S. thesis on the M-R pact... my conclusions could be wrong, but that's just what I saw in it. :hug:
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 11:55:40 AM
What was the other option? Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?
Ask and you shall receive :bowler:
http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-War-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0345491823
Quote from: jimmy olsen on August 21, 2009, 12:32:45 PM
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 11:55:40 AM
What was the other option? Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?
Ask and you shall receive :bowler:
http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-War-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0345491823
I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 12:00:37 PM
Breeder!
But no prob, dude. I did my B.S. thesis on the M-R pact... my conclusions could be wrong, but that's just what I saw in it. :hug:
Was it truly BS? :D
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 01:16:26 PM
I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.
Your subtext was *screaming* for it. ;)
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 01:16:26 PM
I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.
I don't think anybody ever does...
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 01:16:26 PM
Quote from: jimmy olsen on August 21, 2009, 12:32:45 PM
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 11:55:40 AM
What was the other option? Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?
Ask and you shall receive :bowler:
http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-War-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0345491823
I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.
From what I hear the Soviets "Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray."
And there will be eight books in the series and the last one will be released in 2031.
What if the Russians invaded a recalcitrant Poland, but it turned out the Poles were really
aliens?
Makes Katyn Forest seem more reasonable, I guess.
Quote from: MalthusWas it truly BS?
Haw. :p No, but it could've been better if I could've found some translated Soviet documents (or alternatively actually learned how to read Russian)... and a lot better if the translated documents I did get, a three-volume set of important documents from the Soviet foreign ministry that was supposed to include everything vital from 1920-something to 1941, had actually had all three volumes, like the listing said, instead of just the first.
Not too terribly much about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the Soviet documents from 1927.
Unfortunately, I had to rely almost entirely on the German and British documents, and make inferences about the Soviet side from various memoirs and secondary sources.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 02:51:13 PM
What if the Russians invaded a recalcitrant Poland, but it turned out the Poles were really aliens?
Makes Katyn Forest seem more reasonable, I guess.
What would the position of the Giant Ants of Brest-Litovsk be?
Quote from: Razgovory on August 21, 2009, 02:56:35 PM
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2009, 02:51:13 PM
What if the Russians invaded a recalcitrant Poland, but it turned out the Poles were really aliens?
Makes Katyn Forest seem more reasonable, I guess.
What would the position of the Giant Ants of Brest-Litovsk be?
That
Resistance was a fun a game?
I miss Hamilcar. :(
QuoteBy the way it was no political decision to sit behind the Maginot line that was Gamelin's "strategy" (until France and Britain had mobilized their Empires supposedly) and not one that his Prime Minister endorsed or wanted and he spent most of the phony war desperate to fire Gamelin.
On the Maginot line- I remember reading recently (can't remember where at all) that the French fully planned for the Germans to flank the Maginot line through the low countries (what with them having done this before).
The entire reason for the Maginot line was to encourage this flanking- thus causing the heavy fighting to tear up Belgium rather than France.
Anything to this?
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 08:27:42 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on August 21, 2009, 07:48:12 AM
To be completely honest I tend to agree with this,
So Stalin thought that moving the Germans closer and giving their Army, still rebuilding from the Versailles treaty, time to rebuild itself was actually advantageous to the Soviet Union? With the German economy being far larger so they could increase their forces far faster than the Soviets? Wow what an idiot.
That is the worst excuse I have heard since some Western Allies apologists claimed giving the Germans the Czech lands, along with the Skoda works, bought them time to...I don't know...fall further behind the German war machine.
I find it really hard to believe that everybody thought it was far preferable to let the Germans get stronger than to attack them when they were still weak. Maybe a sense of fairplay and sportsmanship was dominating the minds of European leaders in the 1930s.
With Britain they certainly DID buy time with appeasment.
The UK was in absolutely no shape to fight a war and its better economy and industry meant it benefitted more from preperation time than Germany.
Consider also falty intelligance that painted Germany as stronger than it was and its quite understandable.
QuoteThis may or may not be factually accurate, but it has the flavour of a post facto reason. Chamberlin was I think quite sincere in believing he could buy peace.
On its face, and lacking hindsight, it wasn't a totally unreasonable point of view. The notion was that Hitler and the Germans were rightly pissed off by the mishmash made of Germany by the post WW1 settlement, that all of his master race stuff was puffery for domestic consumption, and that if he was allowed a "fair settlement" he'd settle down and behave like Franco and Mussolini
Hmm, I dunno.
The idea that Chamberlin was a machivelian genius skillfully buying time for the inevitable war is of course wrong but equally false I think is the traditional widespread view that he was a ignorant moron who fell for Hitler totally.
I'd tend in the middle, he hoped Hitler could be true to his word and thought there was a chance of this but he certainly wasn't placing any bets on that.
Quote from: Tyr on August 21, 2009, 06:58:06 PM
On the Maginot line- I remember reading recently (can't remember where at all) that the French fully planned for the Germans to flank the Maginot line through the low countries (what with them having done this before).
The entire reason for the Maginot line was to encourage this flanking- thus causing the heavy fighting to tear up Belgium rather than France.
Anything to this?
No. There was a gap left on purpose in the French defenses in Alsace in WWI called the Trouee des Charmes into which they hoped to funnel a German attack. Perhaps you're confusing the Maginot line with that. The three reasons I've read about the incompleteness of the Maginot Line are: lack of funds, the high water table, and the urban density on the French/Belgian border.
QuoteOn the Maginot line- I remember reading recently (can't remember where at all) that the French fully planned for the Germans to flank the Maginot line through the low countries (what with them having done this before).
The entire reason for the Maginot line was to encourage this flanking- thus causing the heavy fighting to tear up Belgium rather than France.
Anything to this?
That is absolutely true. All of France's best armies were on the Belgian border. The plan was the Germans would attack the Netherlands and Belgium and then the French would swoop in and the Belgians and Dutch would join the cause and swell the Allied ranks. There were three problems that the French didn't consider:
1. That the Dutch would surrender in 24 hours thus taking 20 divisions out of the total the French were counting on almost immediately. This was not too surprising though as the Dutch Army was ridiculously under-funded, poorly trained, and poorly equipt. Still the French expected to be able to make it there to engage the Germans before the Dutch gave up.
2. That the huge and state of the art Belgian fortress of Eben Emael, which was expected to hold out for over a week, was taken by a handful of glider troops in just a few hours.
3. That the German main attack would be in the French center, where they had placed their weakest reserve troops.
The result of this was that the French sent in their reserves in the north to counter-act the disasters in Low Countries and did not have anything to help when the center collapsed.
The primary problem for the French, though, was not that the Germans outflanked the Maginot Line, it was they outflanked it at a place the French did not think they would.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2009, 07:25:10 PM
No. There was a gap left on purpose in the French defenses in Alsace in WWI called the Trouee des Charmes into which they hoped to funnel a German attack. Perhaps you're confusing the Maginot line with that. The three reasons I've read about the incompleteness of the Maginot Line are: lack of funds, the high water table, and the urban density on the French/Belgian border.
Well it was French policy to fight the war on Belgian and not French soil if they could manage it.
You are forgetting the most obvious reason: the French did not want to basically announce to the Belgians that in the event of a German attack the French planned to desert them.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 07:28:50 PM
You are forgetting the most obvious reason: the French did not want to basically announce to the Belgians that in the event of a German attack the French planned to desert them.
I think the most obvious reason was lack of money.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 10:42:11 AM
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:40:42 AM
But Munich was needed, from a British perspective, because we'd only started re-arming in 36/7. If it had come to war in 38 Britain would barely have an RAF.
That was what the French airforce said as well. It was nonsense, the combined forces of Czechoslovakia, France, and the UK were a better match for Germany than the situation the west would find itself in in 1939.
Plus the Soviets would have protected the Czechs who were one of the few pro-Russian peoples on Eastern Europe.
Not the to mention the possibility of getting the little Entente on board. With out Romania in the Axis camp the Germans would have some serious problems with oil.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2009, 07:32:08 PM
I think the most obvious reason was lack of money.
Well the whole thing was a waste of money that should have been spent on better weapons, training, armor, and the tragically neglected air force. If they had extended it to the Channel the French military would have been just that much more neglected for the things it really needed.
The Maginot Line was not worth a sous in my opinion.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 21, 2009, 07:33:04 PM
Not the to mention the possibility of getting the little Entente on board. With out Romania in the Axis camp the Germans would have some serious problems with oil.
Well...I would like to think they would have helped.
Quote from: Alatriste on August 21, 2009, 07:48:12 AM
...is 100% unadulterated, pure, pristine bullshit. The end of Czechoslovakia did show to everyone what meeting Hitler's 'moderate' demands meant, i.e. unmoderate demands barely half a year later.
Is dismantling Czechoslovakia really all that 'unmoderate' though? After all, it was created as part of the illegitimate settlement after the Great War. Nazi foreign policy before the war seemed to focus on the reconsolidation of the empires of the East, a laudable goal really.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 08:27:42 AM
So Stalin thought that moving the Germans closer and giving their Army, still rebuilding from the Versailles treaty, time to rebuild itself was actually advantageous to the Soviet Union? With the German economy being far larger so they could increase their forces far faster than the Soviets? Wow what an idiot.
His choice in 1939 wasn't between a Germany with its post-1919 eastern border and a Germany with its eastern border in the middle of Poland--it was a choice between a Germany with its eastern border in the middle of Poland and a Germany with its eastern border where the eastern border of Poland had been. And with a population far larger than that of Germany, in the long run it was reasonable for Stalin to think that time was on his side.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 11:07:23 AM
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2009, 10:51:15 AM
I disagree. 1939 wasn't perfect for the allies but the best time would have been 1936 or earlier, when Germany was still sufficiently weak, or some point after 1938. In 1938 the UK and France were at a bad point.
I doubt the Soviets would intervene unless they had real material benefit to gain from it.
Well they claimed they would and Romania and Poland were falling overthemselves to stop it since the Soviets would have had to cross their territory.
Losing the Czechs as an ally was bad but handing over the Skoda works and the excellent Czech 38 tanks was disastrous. I have a hard time seeing how the Allies came out ahead.
The Soviets had a tentative agreement with the Romanians to allow passage of Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia in the event the Germans attacked the Czechs. Though the Romanians put so many restrictions in it that I don't know if would have been of much use.
Quote from: Valmy on August 21, 2009, 07:35:51 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2009, 07:32:08 PM
I think the most obvious reason was lack of money.
Well the whole thing was a waste of money that should have been spent on better weapons, training, armor, and the tragically neglected air force. If they had extended it to the Channel the French military would have been just that much more neglected for the things it really needed.
The Maginot Line was not worth a sous in my opinion.
Given the trouble Patton had attacking Metz I think if the line had been extended, you'd be proven wrong.
The Russians even started an institute for historical correctness. What more do the Germans want?
Quote from: Tyr on August 21, 2009, 06:58:06 PM
Hmm, I dunno.
The idea that Chamberlin was a machivelian genius skillfully buying time for the inevitable war is of course wrong but equally false I think is the traditional widespread view that he was a ignorant moron who fell for Hitler totally.
I'd tend in the middle, he hoped Hitler could be true to his word and thought there was a chance of this but he certainly wasn't placing any bets on that.
I'm not claiming Chamberlain was a moron. I think that in hindsight he was quite obviously wrong, but his choice wasn't wholly irrational, merely based on the wrong assumptions : it was simply impossible for him to truly understand the motivations of a guy like Hitler.
He certainly was "placing bets" on Hitler keeping his word: he bet his political future on it - and lost.