WW2: German Intellectuals Tells It Like It Is

[Sheilbh]

This may or may not be factually accurate, but it has the flavour of a post facto reason. Chamberlin was I think quite sincere in believing he could buy peace.

On its face, and lacking hindsight, it wasn't a totally unreasonable point of view. The notion was that Hitler and the Germans were rightly pissed off by the mishmash made of Germany by the post WW1 settlement, that all of his master race stuff was puffery for domestic consumption, and that if he was allowed a "fair settlement" he'd settle down and behave like Franco and Mussolini.

All crap of course, but as of yet not obviously crap.

I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich?  I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.

1938 was a bit of a shift point for the UK and France.  They became far more open to helping Republican Spain - or at least dropping sham non-interference - the spending on re-armament significantly increased and, for the first time, military production was given priority over civilian industry.

Edit:  At the very least the military told Chamberlain they weren't ready for war and estimated that, given the state of the RAF, a German bombing assault would kill 500 000 in the first three weeks.

[Valmy]

I disagree.  1939 wasn't perfect for the allies but the best time would have been 1936 or earlier, when Germany was still sufficiently weak, or some point after 1938.  In 1938 the UK and France were at a bad point. 

I doubt the Soviets would intervene unless they had real material benefit to gain from it.

Well they claimed they would and Romania and Poland were falling overthemselves to stop it since the Soviets would have had to cross their territory.

Losing the Czechs as an ally was bad but handing over the Skoda works and the excellent Czech 38 tanks was disastrous.  I have a hard time seeing how the Allies came out ahead.

[Malthus]

This may or may not be factually accurate, but it has the flavour of a post facto reason. Chamberlin was I think quite sincere in believing he could buy peace.

On its face, and lacking hindsight, it wasn't a totally unreasonable point of view. The notion was that Hitler and the Germans were rightly pissed off by the mishmash made of Germany by the post WW1 settlement, that all of his master race stuff was puffery for domestic consumption, and that if he was allowed a "fair settlement" he'd settle down and behave like Franco and Mussolini.

All crap of course, but as of yet not obviously crap.

I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich?  I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.

1938 was a bit of a shift point for the UK and France.  They became far more open to helping Republican Spain - or at least dropping sham non-interference - the spending on re-armament significantly increased and, for the first time, military production was given priority over civilian industry.

Edit:  At the very least the military told Chamberlain they weren't ready for war and estimated that, given the state of the RAF, a German bombing assault would kill 500 000 in the first three weeks.

Did Chamberlain say it at the time, or after it became obvious war was inevitable? I haven't seen any sources that argued that Chamberlain wasn't sincere about his appeasement policy (the term "appeasement" wasn't considered derogatory at the time).

[Valmy]

Edit:  At the very least the military told Chamberlain they weren't ready for war and estimated that, given the state of the RAF, a German bombing assault would kill 500 000 in the first three weeks.

The French Airforce told Daladier basically the same thing.  They told the French government they were no match for the German Airforce and it was impossible that France could win.  Naturally this shocking revelation removed any nerve the French had to oppose Chamberlain.  The French were really agonizing over this decision prior to this moment.

It was nonsense though.

[Admiral Yi]

I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich?  I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.

Chamberlain came home from Munich, was asked rhetorically by the Chief of Staff (I think) whether he had bought time for rearmament, Chamberlain replied "but don't you see, this means peace in our time."

[Malthus]

I think the key difficulty appeasement highlights is the problem reasonable and rational men have in dealing with the unreasonable and irrational.

This, it should be pointed out, has nothing whatsoever to do necessarily with good and evil; Stalin was just as evil a monster as Hitler, but in his relations with other countries he was much more rational.

Hitler's irrationality did in the end doom him of course, but in the medium term it was a positive advantage: he constantly wrong-footed his rational opponents. 

[Sheilbh]

I thought that Daladier and Chamberlain both privately said that they thought they were just buying time at Munich?  I know Daladier did and I think I've read that Chamberlain did too.

Chamberlain came home from Munich, was asked rhetorically by the Chief of Staff (I think) whether he had bought time for rearmament, Chamberlain replied "but don't you see, this means peace in our time."

Ok.  It must just have been Daladier who knew war was coming (which is why the French were always more pro-war).

My argument would basically be that Chamberlain as PM made the best decisions he could while desperately trying to escape from the legacy of Chamberlain the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who starved defence and opposed rearmament until 36 and didn't fully fund it till he became 38.  I think Chamberlain's sin wasn't in Munich but in the Treasury.

It was nonsense though.

So was the idea that we could bomb our way to victory.  We didn't know that then though.

[Ideologue]

France and Britain didn't do shit to save Poland, and I fully expect that they would have done less watching the two countries they feared and hated most slitting each others' throats while they jerked each other off behind the Maginot Line.

Oh no not this shit again.  They fucking started World War II what the hell were they supposed to do?  Jesus fucking christ I can see hammering France and Britain when they fuck up but the whining about one of the times they actually did the right thing is just bullshit.

Alright, Valmy, calm down.  I was a little glib about it--I don't know what, if anything, Britain or France could have done in 1939 to actually help Poland--or Russia--or themselves, for that matter.

By the way it was no political decision to sit behind the Maginot line that was Gamelin's "strategy" (until France and Britain had mobilized their Empires supposedly) and not one that his Prime Minister endorsed or wanted and he spent most of the phony war desperate to fire Gamelin.  This is misinformed nonsense at best and simply slander at worst.

A strategy that would have been much more profitable if a real Eastern Front existed from day one.

Stalin had no clairovoyance, how could he possibly have known how things were going to turn out?  Most people figured the French and the British were bluffing and nothing would happen.  Where would he be then?  Sitting in front of the German Wehrmacht totally fucked.  Or he could have a Poland buffer state in front of him...

What was the other option?  Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?

Morally, of course, taking the Baltics and Poland is still indefensible, but the non-aggression pact in itself makes great rational sense to me.

It only made sense given Stalins quite mistaken pathological belief that the Westerners were lying and would not support Poland.

Or correct belief that they were unable to support Poland.

Given that they did, the result was that an attempt to destroy the Nazis cheaply with Western support was thrown away so the USSR could get obliterated later.

Cheaply, in 1939?

If Stalin really felt this way, and he was just buying time to fight Germany, why did he continue to do things like invade Finland and take territory once the conflict started?

Because Stalin was a monster and an opportunist?  I'm not trying to defend the man here, just the rationale behind his part in the M-R Pact.   That said, the Baltics were more tempting as directly-administered buffer zones than as potential Nazi allies, or easy Nazi conquests.  Same deal with Poland, why give Germany all of it when you can get some of it?  Ironically, of course, moving formations to the new border just assisted them toward destruction, but I'm sure this wasn't the notion the Russian leadership had at the time.  The Winter War was an utter miscalculation that demonstrated to everyone the terrible state the RKKA was in, in a way vindicating a decision not to get involved in an offensive with a state that dwarfed the military and industrial capacity of Finland (and, in another way, demonstrating how delusional Stalin could be, and how his purges had damaged the ability for him to get realistic assessments by competent people).

Wouldn't that be the time to oppose Germany?  When they had a dangerous rival on their other front?

Not if those rivals weren't able or willing to offer significant support, not when your own capacity is severely depleted, and not if you don't and can't reasonably expect your potential allies to collapse in the absence of your help, leaving an unharmed Nazi superpower alone on the continent.  It's important to remember, I think, that the democracies were Stalin's rivals as well.

I'll close on this--in perfect hindsight, it would be vastly preferable from our standpoint for the Russians to have gotten involved in 1939.  It may even have been preferable from the Soviet standpoint.  But given the reasonable appreciation of the situation at the time, I think the M-R pact made sense.

[Valmy]

Alright, Valmy, calm down.  I was a little glib about it--I don't know what, if anything, Britain or France could have done in 1939 to actually help Poland--or Russia--or themselves, for that matter.

Sorry.  You don't know how many enormous threads about this I had to endure arguing with Polish nationalist fucks about this very subject.  I am still rather traumatized by it.

Stupid Poles.

[Ideologue]

Breeder!

But no prob, dude.  I did my B.S. thesis on the M-R pact... my conclusions could be wrong, but that's just what I saw in it.

[jimmy olsen]

What was the other option?  Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?

Ask and you shall receive 

http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-War-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0345491823

[Ideologue]

What was the other option?  Invade a recalcitrant Poland and fight Germany east of Warsaw, getting absolutely slaughtered because their army was in complete disarray?

Ask and you shall receive 

http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-War-Harry-Turtledove/dp/0345491823

I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.

[Malthus]

Breeder!

But no prob, dude.  I did my B.S. thesis on the M-R pact... my conclusions could be wrong, but that's just what I saw in it.

Was it truly BS? 

[Eddie Teach]

I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.

Your subtext was *screaming* for it.

[PDH]

I did not ask for a Harry Turtledove novel, Tim.

I don't think anybody ever does...