We're all here, more or less, because we've played (and continue to play?) grand strategy games, and we have a long history of talking history and geo-politics.
Right now it seems we are at a crisis point - or rather a convergence of several crisis points.
What do we think is going to happen? What are likely scenarios to play out in a big picture scale in the next 5-10-20 years? Where are we going, and what are the likely inflection points that could drastically change the direction?
Quote from: Jacob on February 12, 2025, 04:37:35 PMWe're all here, more or less, because we've played (and continue to play?) grand strategy games, and we have a long history of talking history and geo-politics.
Right now it seems we are at a crisis point - or rather a convergence of several crisis points.
What do we think is going to happen? What are likely scenarios to play out in a big picture scale in the next 5-10-20 years? Where are we going, and what are the likely inflection points that could drastically change the direction?
Who knows?
I certainly don't, shall probably withdraw from the wider political BS world and concentrate on other stuff.
I honestly don't think there's much point looking at the 10 or 20 year timeframe.
I was thinking of starting, what would now be a companion thread to yours Jacob, called something along the lines of:
"The End of Days, what do you intend to do with your remaining time on Earth?"
I definitely get the feeling of 'the avalanche has already started, it's too late for the pebbles to vote' vibes right now geopolitically. We're in the post-post Cold War era, which does have a decidedly 19th century feel. The fight of the big ideologies of the 20th century from 1919-1991 are long gone.
The big 3 Nuclear powers are now autocratic countries bent on imperial dominance. The liberal democratic model is in deep trouble. The most healthiest democracy with actual nuclear power is France followed by India.
Millions of people are about to die in imperialistic wars. Good job, America.
It's going to be quite interesting learning to make IED to blow American occupation forces up.
Quote from: mongers on February 12, 2025, 04:42:30 PMQuote from: Jacob on February 12, 2025, 04:37:35 PMWe're all here, more or less, because we've played (and continue to play?) grand strategy games, and we have a long history of talking history and geo-politics.
Right now it seems we are at a crisis point - or rather a convergence of several crisis points.
What do we think is going to happen? What are likely scenarios to play out in a big picture scale in the next 5-10-20 years? Where are we going, and what are the likely inflection points that could drastically change the direction?
Who knows?
I certainly don't, shall probably withdraw from the wider political BS world and concentrate on other stuff.
I honestly don't think there's much point looking at the 10 or 20 year timeframe.
I was thinking of starting, what would now be a companion thread to yours Jacob, called something along the lines of:
"The End of Days, what do you intend to do with your remaining time on Earth?"
That's how I made it through the preceding Trump term. "This too shall pass". But right at this moment, I don't want to withdraw - you know the whole "for evil to win all it requires is for good people to do nothing" type reasoning. Basically, I think we're being flooded with bad news as a strategy to wear us down, and I'm not quite ready to give up yet. Also a bunch of this stuff strikes a whole lot closer to home now. It very much seems like it's coming right at me, whether or not I stick my head in the sand.
(Though I do intend to enjoy my remaining time on earth as much as possible also)
I feel fine for myself but feel sorry for younger people. When I think about the future of my younger son, 23 and profoundly mentally disabled, I am plunged into existential despair :(
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on February 12, 2025, 04:49:25 PMI feel fine for myself but feel sorry for younger people. When I think about the future of my younger son, 23 and profoundly mentally disabled, I am plunged into existential despair :(
Yeah I have that too, so many old people* are fucking nuts, they just want to tear down the world around them, rather than come to the benign understanding that the world has to belong to the young.
Quote from: Grey Fox on February 12, 2025, 04:45:44 PMThe big 3 Nuclear powers are now autocratic countries bent on imperial dominance. The liberal democratic model is in deep trouble. The most healthiest democracy with actual nuclear power is France followed by India.
Millions of people are about to die in imperialistic wars. Good job, America.
Yeah... so... I don't think the battle is lost in the US yet. There's definitely a trajectory where Trumpist-Elonism becomes entrenched in the US and we'll head for a world dominated by three autocratic imperialist powers (very 1984). But I think there's also a scenario in which Trump and his various Fascist enablers overplay their hand before they grind down American institutions to Russian - or even Hungarian - levels. A lot depends, I think, on how much the Trump administration continues to generate chaos and economic damage.
For the EU they're as always slow walking it. But it's another crisis point. In how many places will Orban-likes gain power and entrench themselves? Will it be enough to cripple Europe or will they rise to the occasion?
China has got to be laughing right now. Sure they're autocratic imperialist bullies, but at least they're consistent. If the US continues being this erratic, China looks a lot better by comparison.
Then of course there's the impending global climate catastrophe. Just because it's become less of a political priority doesn't mean it's gone away.
On the whole Yarvinist tech-bro libertarian post-national enclave, installing the likes of Musk and Thiel as "CEOs" of network states, I think they'll get completely wrecked when push comes to shove. But they'll do a lot of damage along the way.
China must be laughing. They got so much more than anticipated when they left Tesla operate in the country.
World events make the "I should buy a boat" retirement plan a look a bit better...moreso if it is ocean-going.
And if climate change intensifies...also have the Waterworld scenario covered. Just need some gills.
As GF pointed out, Liberal Democracy is over as the dominant political ideology. What is going to replace it? anarcho-capitalist fascism seems most likely in the short term - at least in the US. Where do Europe and the other current Liberal Democracies become? I don't know. Some will likely follow the US down the fascist hole. Not sure what happens elsewhere.
The likelihood of nuclear annihilation becomes much more real again.
I'm hopeful Musk will be such a disaster for the US that this taints fascism for the rest of the world. The rise of reform in the UK for instance goes into reverse.
The issue is how much damage gets done over the next 4 years.
Hyper hopium at work... Especially considering America failed to learn it's lesson last time... But could the recoil from this shit even propel the US in a positive direction.
I bet Malthus's aunt is kicking herself, turns out she needed to have envisaged a much darker future world.
Quote from: Josquius on February 12, 2025, 05:17:44 PMI'm hopeful Musk will be such a disaster for the US that this taints fascism for the rest of the world. The rise of reform in the UK for instance goes into reverse.
The issue is how much damage gets done over the next 4 years.
Hyper hopium at work... Especially considering America failed to learn it's lesson last time... But could the recoil from this shit even propel the US in a positive direction.
We are in a post truth era, so who would know that trump is disastrous. It is all going to be a Huge win.
Quote from: mongers on February 12, 2025, 05:18:56 PMI bet Malthus's aunt is kicking herself, turns out she needed to have envisaged a much darker future world.
:lol:
I was thinking the same thing. :)
Turns out she was way too optimistic.
Trump makes this difficult to predict as he is so mercurial, but from an American context, I think Trump's tariffs and general unreliability on trade will create a recession. Manufacturing will likely increase in the United States, but manufacturing jobs won't increase significantly.
The United States will relinquish its academic lead in the pure sciences and possibly medicine as well.
The United States will abandon a global cooperative philosophy for a purely transactional philosophy that focuses solely on US interest.
The United States will suffer some sort of preventable calamity due to the reduced bureaucracy and/or weakened consumer safety protections.
I'm not at all sure what this means in a global context. I do think that there will be a broader worldwide recession and tariff wars. Will European nations really increase military spending and take a more active role in the ROTW? Academics will probably leave, will they all head to a new hub or be spread out to various nations?
Oh, one other thing to add to your list Sav - epidemics, polio, and measles return to the US as vast numbers of children go unvaccinated. The US becomes depopulated.
The survivors (those who were vaccinated) get to start again.
There, some hope. :D
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 12, 2025, 05:19:39 PMQuote from: Josquius on February 12, 2025, 05:17:44 PMI'm hopeful Musk will be such a disaster for the US that this taints fascism for the rest of the world. The rise of reform in the UK for instance goes into reverse.
The issue is how much damage gets done over the next 4 years.
Hyper hopium at work... Especially considering America failed to learn it's lesson last time... But could the recoil from this shit even propel the US in a positive direction.
We are in a post truth era, so who would know that trump is disastrous. It is all going to be a Huge win.
Could be.
But it worked with brexit. After the UK started self harming support for the EU shot up across the rest of the union. Even far right parties pivoted away from outright saying they wanted to leave.
The big potential problem I can see is in what gets communicated. If they can emphasise achievements like their glorious eradication of the trans menace and avoid anyone mentioning the boring stuff like people being able to afford food, then they might still appeal to the ignorant and nihilistic.
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 12, 2025, 05:24:23 PMOh, one other thing to add to your list Sav - epidemics, polio, and measles return to the US as vast numbers of children go unvaccinated. The US becomes depopulated.
The survivors (those who were vaccinated) get to start again.
There, some hope. :D
With cheaper housing too; just like after the Black Death. We should send RFK Jr. to Canada, he could help solve your housing crises. ;)
I was thinking about adding reduced life expectancy as well; but I don't get RFK Jr. and what he's planning to do. The largest job of Health and Human Services is to administer Medicaid and Medicare; something that RFK Jr. is not only spectacularly unqualified to do, but also spectacularly uninterested in doing. Maybe the bureaucracy will triumph at HHS.
And also my list is only valid if Trump lives out the majority of his term. MAGA nation won't flock to Vance the way they have to Trump, and consequently congressional Republicans won't fear crossing him.
Quote from: Savonarola on February 12, 2025, 05:47:40 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on February 12, 2025, 05:24:23 PMOh, one other thing to add to your list Sav - epidemics, polio, and measles return to the US as vast numbers of children go unvaccinated. The US becomes depopulated.
The survivors (those who were vaccinated) get to start again.
There, some hope. :D
With cheaper housing too; just like after the Black Death. We should send RFK Jr. to Canada, he could help solve your housing crises. ;)
:D
QuoteI was thinking about adding reduced life expectancy as well; but I don't get RFK Jr. and what he's planning to do. The largest job of Health and Human Services is to administer Medicaid and Medicare; something that RFK Jr. is not only spectacularly unqualified to do, but also spectacularly uninterested in doing. Maybe the bureaucracy will triumph at HHS.
I thought that might happen, but now it is becoming fairly obvious there will be no bureaucracy left in the areas the Trumpists don't consider important. Also all funding for research is frozen now so good luck when the next big one hits. Which might not be long now with the latest strain of bird flu making the cross species jump.
You guys make me want to slash my wrists.
Quote from: Josephus on February 12, 2025, 05:57:04 PMYou guys make me want to slash my wrists.
C'mon man, you are tougher than that. We grew up believing the world was going to be blown apart at any moment.
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 12, 2025, 06:02:59 PMQuote from: Josephus on February 12, 2025, 05:57:04 PMYou guys make me want to slash my wrists.
C'mon man, you are tougher than that. We grew up believing the world was going to be blown apart at any moment.
Yeah, but we were young then and idealistic.
Suicide is obviously irrational and dumb.
And when you're in that place you are hardly in a situation for planning and action.
But surely there's some good blazes of glory out there.
QuoteAnd also my list is only valid if Trump lives out the majority of his term. MAGA nation won't flock to Vance the way they have to Trump, and consequently congressional Republicans won't fear crossing him
I've heard the believable (conspiracy) theory put forth that the plan is to remove trump during this term. I believe there was some stuff about his obviously declining mental state.
Then vance installed as incumbent has a key advantage going into the next election that the other I can't believe it's not trump candidates lacked.
Quote from: Josquius on February 12, 2025, 05:17:44 PMI'm hopeful Musk will be such a disaster for the US that this taints fascism for the rest of the world.
You'd think Hitler would have caused that already. :P
Quote from: Solmyr on February 13, 2025, 01:51:47 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 12, 2025, 05:17:44 PMI'm hopeful Musk will be such a disaster for the US that this taints fascism for the rest of the world.
You'd think Hitler would have caused that already. :P
Or mao, or maduro, or Mugabe...
Quote from: Solmyr on February 13, 2025, 01:51:47 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 12, 2025, 05:17:44 PMI'm hopeful Musk will be such a disaster for the US that this taints fascism for the rest of the world.
You'd think Hitler would have caused that already. :P
He did for a while. Lessons seem to be forgotten as they drift out living memory though.
Unfortunately, authoritarianism/fascism/dictatorship seems to be the human "default" for government and politics, and we too often easily gravitate towards it. It takes a lot of work (and education) to stray far away from it.
People, even in Democracies, want leaders.
Leaders are dangerous and generally suck. I want boring functionaries who just blandly carry out the laws our representatives pass. But it is not what the people want.
Quote from: Josephus on February 12, 2025, 05:57:04 PMYou guys make me want to slash my wrists.
It was kind of reassuring when I learned as a teen my parents were initially reluctant to have kids - they were so worried about the fate of the world. Global nuclear war, pollution, inflation (it was the 70s), possible global ice age...
We know things got better from there.
You can go to any era and find people worried about the future.
Now I'm not saying we can just sit back with faith that the "arc of progress" is on our side. Things do regress or stagnate. But generally - we as societies, as peoples, and a human race, go on.
Quote from: Tonitrus on February 13, 2025, 12:29:51 PMUnfortunately, authoritarianism/fascism/dictatorship seems to be the human "default" for government and politics, and we too often easily gravitate towards it. It takes a lot of work (and education) to stray far away from it.
Excellent point. We had a nice run of a period of Liberal Democracy, that is but a blink of the eye in the history of how humans have organized themselves politically. When Liberal Democracy "won" and became the dominant ideology, I suppose everyone just took for granted that it would continue and there was no need to continually reinforce why it should continue to win.
When it was a battle of ideologies, governments could justify spending a lot more resources on socializing the importance of strong Liberal Democratic institutions.
Quote from: Barrister on February 13, 2025, 12:45:14 PMQuote from: Josephus on February 12, 2025, 05:57:04 PMYou guys make me want to slash my wrists.
It was kind of reassuring when I learned as a teen my parents were initially reluctant to have kids - they were so worried about the fate of the world. Global nuclear war, pollution, inflation (it was the 70s), possible global ice age...
We know things got better from there.
You can go to any era and find people worried about the future.
Now I'm not saying we can just sit back with faith that the "arc of progress" is on our side. Things do regress or stagnate. But generally - we as societies, as peoples, and a human race, go on.
Human history is generally a shit show. We had a nice little window that's to a world War or two and, more importantly, MAD. But all good things must come to an end.
Where we're heading?
We're running head first into a brick wall of AI controlled by a libertarian oligarchy, climate change with fairly unknown ramifications outside of more migration and that arable land will disappear, species disappearing, authoritarianism in Europe, population decline and uncertainty. All factors that either will bring out the worst in most people or the best in some.
And then there will be readjustment and realignment.
I have come to think that AI will in many ways make the future world as unrecognisable as today's world would be to a Visigothic chieftain.
The rate of change, or progress, depending on your outlook has picked up enormous pace.
Quote from: Valmy on February 13, 2025, 12:31:57 PMPeople, even in Democracies, want leaders.
Leaders are dangerous and generally suck. I want boring functionaries who just blandly carry out the laws our representatives pass. But it is not what the people want.
There have been lots of consensus polities in history (hunter-gatherers, pastoralists) - where charismatic leaders are followed, but also have their authority constrained in favor of building consensus.
And blind bureaucrats can be no less dangerous than charismatic leaders.
Quote from: Oexmelin on February 13, 2025, 01:16:39 PMQuote from: Valmy on February 13, 2025, 12:31:57 PMPeople, even in Democracies, want leaders.
Leaders are dangerous and generally suck. I want boring functionaries who just blandly carry out the laws our representatives pass. But it is not what the people want.
There have been lots of consensus polities in history (hunter-gatherers, pastoralists) - where charismatic leaders are followed, but also have their authority constrained in favor of building consensus.
And blind bureaucrats can be no less dangerous than charismatic leaders.
I think it's interesting though that even the most autocratic of nations all put up at least a charade or lip service to democracy and the consent of the governed. Even North Korea has elections (according to Wiki they're not secret and only one candidate is on the ballot, but still they think at least a show of having elections is important).
Similarly every nation around the world adopts some notion of human rights. They're not always the same rights (Bhutan's Right to Happiness, or Saudi Arabia's right to Islamic sharia law), and they're definitely not all fully implemented, but the notion that humans have rights is accepted around the world.
Francis Fukuyama wasn't entirely wrong when he wrote The End of History...
In terms of very big picture stuff there's obviously climate (though I am broadly an optimist). I think increased risk and vulnerability to pandemics/disease. An ageing population globally but especially in the developed West (I think Korea and France, for example, both have more people living who were born in 1945 than 2024) and the general decline in people having kids - I've no idea how that will play out. Related to that, the region where birthrates are declining from a later peak is Africa which on current projections means over half the population growth in the world between now and 2050 will be African and around 25% of the world's population will be African, and a vast proportion of the world's youth (this is, coincidentally about the time Asia's population should peak). How all of those interact I have no idea.
I also think we have to take seriously the potential impact of AI on our societies and economies - I think it could do for white collar work what automation/robotics have done to blue collar works from say mid-century industry. Also - given the scale of money involved - the billionaires' interest in space (and their competing visions for it). Especially given China's interest and, last year, being first to do a mission to the dark side of the moon.
On the other stuff I've no idea - but some thoughts.
I agree that liberal democracy is relatively new and may well not last. But I wonder if it's something possibly more significant - modern states are relatively new and I wonder if we're moving into an age where the state itself becomes increasingly empty and irrelevant? We may have elections and governments but they move to a more decorative stage (like constitutional monarchies), particularly in the face of increasing corporate/capital power. The states that achieve most may either be ones that suborn capital to them (like China) or the ones that are effectively fusing with economic interests like the Gulf states and Saudi (which I used to dismiss but think is actually important), or, say, Erdogan's Turkey or Modi's India which are political projects with very close corporate connections. (And FWIW I don't think proponents have to make an argument for liberal democracy, though they should - but for politics itself.)
I think China might pull off what they're trying to do - but I also wonder if we'll see centrifugal/federalist forces emerge if there's any obstacles. Direction of China for the last 100 years has been to unification with both KMT and CCP being Leninist-derived believers in a strong party state. I wonder if that'll last - if there's a challenge, there's also a strong history of disintegrating forces in China (even within PRC history). Having said that my default is that the Chinese state has been very effective in doing what they've set out to achieve in recent years - I still don't really see any big reason to make me doubt that. But my other standard heuristic for the world is no-one's made much money betting against America - those two may contradict and I'm not sure which way :ph34r:
On unification projects, I think the key challenges for the EU are not external. In terms of its ambitions - I think it's at the edges of what's possible under Lisbon and no-one wants to do another treaty because I think the expectation would be that it would be very difficult to pass (like the European Constitution). The next leap will include issues that have helped drive populist forces across Europe such as common debt and budgets (AfD, Wilders, the Finns) or defence (particularly in Ireland but elsewhere too). So I don't see a great leap forward, but also probably not disintegration. Having said that the EU advance through crisis - I'm just not sure what that crisis could be to move forward. (Again I think Macron's got many flaws which is why he couldn't deliver this - but I also think he's the only European leader in the last 25 years who has had anything like an analysis and a solution for Europe - but he failed.)
At the same time I think the EU is basically values-neutral. It's a set of tools and institutions that responds to the elected governments of member states - so one thought I have is that we should start thinking about what a far-right EU would look like as I think that is as likely the direction of travel in the near term with the possibility of Le Pen, Wilders, Meloni, Orban and the far-right in coalition or growing elsewhere. I'd expect more on "defending our European way of life" and more of a defensive focus of a common European civilisation v other powers. I think we've already seen some of it in the Commission ditching the Green Deal as one of the priority policy areas - it's now under sustainable prosperity and global competitiveness.
The US and the world I don't know. I posted that Gideon Rachman piece on possible outcomes recently and I think that I thought the three most likely outcomes were: G2/great power politics, a globalised world without America or Trumpism works. I'm not sure which I'd find more alarming - or which I think is more likely (it changes a lot :lol:).
With there being so much else going on at the moment I've sort of dropped worrying about the climate...
Though perhaps this is because the outlook is now so beyond awful.
Previously things were crap but I was optimistic our rate of change was on track. If nothing else teh powa of teh market would ensure a green transition was on the cards.
Not on a time frame enough to avoid trouble. Even with an active green government a total avoidance would be hard. But... To avoid the worst for sure.
With the rise of modern fascism though, it's not just indifference to climate change that is an issue, it's active hostility to the idea of stopping it. Vice signalling denial is coming back in vogue.
They're purposefully wanting to undo the green economy even when it costs them money to do so.
This is a huge worry.
It's weird. But between the woke brain worm infected us and Russia it's China who are left as the "good guys" on this.
On the US internally, one of the things that I think is important (to say the least) to see how far the anti-democratic slide goes.
Will the current Trumpist oligarch regime push fully towards a dictatorship that drops even the pretence of democracy?
Are they aiming for a Putin-style "democracy" where the forms are maintained, but everyone knows the system is thoroughly corrupt and controlled?
Are they actually going to attempt to implement a Yarvinist post-national capitalist libertarian order?
Or is it sufficient to leave American democracy mostly functioning, with just enough thumbs on just enough scales that Republican supremacy is maintained for the foreseeable future, while leaving the roots of democracy untouched?
Or does democracy and pluralism make a comeback? Does Trumpist disorganization and overreach trigger a pushback strong enough to overcome whatever anti-democratic tendencies?
One of the factors in my mind here is that America has a very strong mythology of freedom and democracy, a pretty robust civil society, and a long history of civil resistance. How is that going to play into the Trumpist plans?
Couple of thoughts.
There are ideologues on both the MAGA/nationalist side and the TechBro side.
As an aside - I do wonder how long that alliance will last - on the other hand perhaps that's 21st century fusionism with anti-Woke serving as the solvent that anti-Communism was in the 20th?
But on the TechBro side especially I'm not sure there is a plan or a thing they're aiming for. I think in part it's a different mindset - I think they have projects they're interested in. There are some inchoate ideas with many sources and off-shoots in the ideological mulch. I think what they are aiming for is disruption. To an extent I think the means is the end. I don't think they have an end goal or ideological idea they're working towards any more than capital in general does.
One other point is I think there's a tension in your questions - which is something that I've been wondering about since the Brexit referendum - which is the idea of a "post-national" order. But the answer to that is not the "nation" but "democracy and pluralism". And I wonder if that's right or if, in fact, there's a choice there? I don't know but I am struck more and more that the entities that have best enabled individuals to exercise meaningful democratic control in their society have been nations, they've been countries. You think of that IT projects triangle of you have to pick two of quick, good, fast - I wonder if there's a similar trilemma of globalised capital, national sovereignty and democratic control?
Domestically in the US in the first Trump administration I think the most important "resistance" was states and local government. I think America has a very deep democracy and I think that is where I'd place my trust - I think at a Federal level the legislature, courts, administrative state will be transformed. Which is why any fightback will not be through the courts or lobbyists but ground up politics.
Quote from: Jacob on February 18, 2025, 01:52:01 PMOn the US internally, one of the things that I think is important (to say the least) to see how far the anti-democratic slide goes.
Will the current Trumpist oligarch regime push fully towards a dictatorship that drops even the pretence of democracy?
Are they aiming for a Putin-style "democracy" where the forms are maintained, but everyone knows the system is thoroughly corrupt and controlled?
Are they actually going to attempt to implement a Yarvinist post-national capitalist libertarian order?
Or is it sufficient to leave American democracy mostly functioning, with just enough thumbs on just enough scales that Republican supremacy is maintained for the foreseeable future, while leaving the roots of democracy untouched?
Or does democracy and pluralism make a comeback? Does Trumpist disorganization and overreach trigger a pushback strong enough to overcome whatever anti-democratic tendencies?
One of the factors in my mind here is that America has a very strong mythology of freedom and democracy, a pretty robust civil society, and a long history of civil resistance. How is that going to play into the Trumpist plans?
The problem is that the concept of freedom has come to be understood as freedom from the state, rather than the state guaranteeing freedoms. As I said in another thread/post, that kind of thinking has become a staple of the right since at least Reagan. We are now seeing the most extreme version of that ideology, to date.
All of the versions you have proposed are possible, and represented within the groups supporting Trump. Hard to know which one will win out, and it is likely there will be no clear way forward. It will really just be who Trump spoke to last before he makes a decision.
So while the next four years is likely going to break the American system, we won't know what takes its place until we see who wins the power struggle after Trump dies.
China steps into the US role of "global police" and investor in developing nations a la their increased investment in Africa the past few years. Overall, the global leader position is much more firmly unilaterally China's like it once was the United States'. The US continues its trajectory into a Putin-ist state with collapsing economic and social conditions, perhaps leading to talks and actual actions of dissolution of the United States as it currently stands a la the breaking up of the former USSR. In the meantime, the US becomes much more of a Russian level player on the global scene, sending mercenary forces abroad and operating solely for its own benefit instead of any type of perceived global order and stability or alliance building concepts. Europe, Latin America, Pacific Asia, Australia, and South America drift into or actively pursue joining China in pursuing the goals of global stability and order and maintain or improve upon their current power levels. India becomes closer to Iran in terms of its "democracy" as Modi and other radical Hindu leader continue to pull it in a fundamentalist direction. Israel overplays their hand and is trounced in a war with Iran (with Chinese and united Middle Eastern support combined with European indifference) and left a global pariah or eliminated entirely after the US is unable to match the financial and military support levels they rely on. NATO is dead. As is the Pacific Alliance. Once again, China steps up to form replacements. The UN becomes a modern League of Nations as Russia and/or the US leave, making it much more difficult to do the actions it does now.
https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2025/02/11/the-path-to-american-authoritarianism/content.html
Let me know if the link shows the full article. It's in reply to Jacobs post 39 in the thread.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 18, 2025, 03:14:46 PMhttps://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2025/02/11/the-path-to-american-authoritarianism/content.html
Let me know if the link shows the full article. It's in reply to Jacobs post 39 in the thread.
It does not. At least not for me.
Quote from: Sophie Scholl on February 18, 2025, 03:20:17 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 18, 2025, 03:14:46 PMhttps://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2025/02/11/the-path-to-american-authoritarianism/content.html
Let me know if the link shows the full article. It's in reply to Jacobs post 39 in the thread.
It does not. At least not for me.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/redeem/btEg3VndBXo
edit: screw it, here is a copy and paste
QuoteThe Path to American Authoritarianism
What Comes After Democratic Breakdown
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
Donald Trump's first election to the presidency in 2016 triggered an energetic defense of democracy from the American establishment. But his return to office has been met with striking indifference. Many of the politicians, pundits, media figures, and business leaders who viewed Trump as a threat to democracy eight years ago now treat those concerns as overblown—after all, democracy survived his first stint in office. In 2025, worrying about the fate of American democracy has become almost passé.
The timing of this mood shift could not be worse, for democracy is in greater peril today than at any time in modern U.S. history. America has been backsliding for a decade: between 2014 and 2021, Freedom House's annual global freedom index, which scores all countries on a scale of zero to 100, downgraded the United States from 92 (tied with France) to 83 (below Argentina and tied with Panama and Romania), where it remains.
The country's vaunted constitutional checks are failing. Trump violated the cardinal rule of democracy when he attempted to overturn the results of an election and block a peaceful transfer of power. Yet neither Congress nor the judiciary held him accountable, and the Republican Party—coup attempt notwithstanding—renominated him for president. Trump ran an openly authoritarian campaign in 2024, pledging to prosecute his rivals, punish critical media, and deploy the army to repress protest. He won, and thanks to an extraordinary Supreme Court decision, he will enjoy broad presidential immunity during his second term.
Democracy survived Trump's first term because he had no experience, plan, or team. He did not control the Republican Party when he took office in 2017, and most Republican leaders were still committed to democratic rules of the game. Trump governed with establishment Republicans and technocrats, and they largely constrained him. None of those things are true anymore. This time, Trump has made it clear that he intends to govern with loyalists. He now dominates the Republican Party, which, purged of its anti-Trump forces, now acquiesces to his authoritarian behavior.
U.S. democracy will likely break down during the second Trump administration, in the sense that it will cease to meet standard criteria for liberal democracy: full adult suffrage, free and fair elections, and broad protection of civil liberties.
The breakdown of democracy in the United States will not give rise to a classic dictatorship in which elections are a sham and the opposition is locked up, exiled, or killed. Even in a worst-case scenario, Trump will not be able to rewrite the Constitution or overturn the constitutional order. He will be constrained by independent judges, federalism, the country's professionalized military, and high barriers to constitutional reform. There will be elections in 2028, and Republicans could lose them.
But authoritarianism does not require the destruction of the constitutional order. What lies ahead is not fascist or single-party dictatorship but competitive authoritarianism—a system in which parties compete in elections but the incumbent's abuse of power tilts the playing field against the opposition. Most autocracies that have emerged since the end of the Cold War fall into this category, including Alberto Fujimori's Peru, Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, and contemporary El Salvador, Hungary, India, Tunisia, and Turkey. Under competitive authoritarianism, the formal architecture of democracy, including multiparty elections, remains intact. Opposition forces are legal and aboveground, and they contest seriously for power. Elections are often fiercely contested battles in which incumbents have to sweat it out. And once in a while, incumbents lose, as they did in Malaysia in 2018 and in Poland in 2023. But the system is not democratic, because incumbents rig the game by deploying the machinery of government to attack opponents and co-opt critics. Competition is real but unfair.
Competitive authoritarianism will transform political life in the United States. As Trump's early flurry of dubiously constitutional executive orders made clear, the cost of public opposition will rise considerably: Democratic Party donors may be targeted by the IRS; businesses that fund civil rights groups may face heightened tax and legal scrutiny or find their ventures stymied by regulators. Critical media outlets will likely confront costly defamation suits or other legal actions as well as retaliatory policies against their parent companies. Americans will still be able to oppose the government, but opposition will be harder and riskier, leading many elites and citizens to decide that the fight is not worth it. A failure to resist, however, could pave the way for authoritarian entrenchment—with grave and enduring consequences for global democracy.
THE WEAPONIZED STATE
The second Trump administration may violate basic civil liberties in ways that unambiguously subvert democracy. The president, for example, could order the army to shoot protesters, as he reportedly wanted to do during his first term. He could also fulfill his campaign promise to launch the "largest deportation operation in American history," targeting millions of people in an abuse-ridden process that would inevitably lead to the mistaken detention of thousands of U.S. citizens.
But much of the coming authoritarianism will take a less visible form: the politicization and weaponization of government bureaucracy. Modern states are powerful entities. The U.S. federal government employs over two million people and has an annual budget of nearly $7 trillion. Government officials serve as important arbiters of political, economic, and social life. They help determine who gets prosecuted for crimes, whose taxes are audited, when and how rules and regulations are enforced, which organizations receive tax-exempt status, which private agencies get contracts to accredit universities, and which companies obtain critical licenses, concessions, contracts, subsidies, tariff waivers, and bailouts. Even in countries such as the United States that have relatively small, laissez-faire governments, this authority creates a plethora of opportunities for leaders to reward allies and punish opponents. No democracy is entirely free of such politicization. But when governments weaponize the state by using its power to systematically disadvantage and weaken the opposition, they undermine liberal democracy. Politics becomes like a soccer match in which the referees, the groundskeepers, and the scorekeepers work for one team to sabotage its rival.
This is why all established democracies have elaborate sets of laws, rules, and norms to prevent the state's weaponization. These include independent judiciaries, central banks, and election authorities and civil services with employment protections. In the United States, the 1883 Pendleton Act created a professionalized civil service in which hiring is based on merit. Federal workers are barred from participating in political campaigns and cannot be fired or demoted for political reasons. The vast majority of the over two million federal employees have long enjoyed civil service protection. At the start of Trump's second term, only about 4,000 of these were political appointees.
The United States has also developed an extensive set of rules and norms to prevent the politicization of key state institutions. These include the Senate's confirmation of presidential appointees, lifetime tenure for Supreme Court justices, tenure security for the chair of the Federal Reserve, ten-year terms for FBI directors, and five-year terms for IRS directors. The armed forces are protected from politicization by what the legal scholar Zachary Price describes as "an unusually thick overlay of statutes" governing the appointment, promotion, and removal of military officers. Although the Justice Department, the FBI, and the IRS remained somewhat politicized through the 1970s, a series of post-Watergate reforms effectively ended partisan weaponization of these institutions.
Professional civil servants often play a critical role in resisting government efforts to weaponize state agencies. They have served as democracy's frontline of defense in recent years in Brazil, India, Israel, Mexico, and Poland, as well as in the United States during the first Trump administration. For this reason, one of the first moves undertaken by elected autocrats such as Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Chávez in Venezuela, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Narendra Modi in India, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey has been to purge professional civil servants from public agencies responsible for things such as investigating and prosecuting wrongdoing, regulating the media and the economy, and overseeing elections—and replace them with loyalists. After Orban became prime minister in 2010, his government stripped public employees of key civil service protections, fired thousands, and replaced them with loyal members of the ruling Fidesz party. Likewise, Poland's Law and Justice party weakened civil service laws by doing away with the competitive hiring process and filling the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the military with partisan allies.
Trump and his allies have similar plans. For one, Trump has revived his first-term effort to weaken the civil service by reinstating Schedule F, an executive order that allows the president to exempt tens of thousands of government employees from civil service protections in jobs deemed to be "of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character." If implemented, the decree will transform tens of thousands of civil servants into "at will" employees who can easily be replaced with political allies. The number of partisan appointees, already higher in the U.S. government than in most established democracies, could increase more than tenfold. The Heritage Foundation and other right-wing groups have spent millions of dollars recruiting and vetting an army of up to 54,000 loyalists to fill government positions. These changes could have a broader chilling effect across the government, discouraging public officials from questioning the president. Finally, Trump's declaration that he would fire the director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, and the director of the IRS, Danny Werfel, before the end of their terms led both to resign, paving the way for their replacement by loyalists with little experience in their respective agencies.
Once key agencies such as the Justice Department, the FBI, and the IRS have been packed with loyalists, governments can harness them for three antidemocratic ends: investigating and prosecuting rivals, co-opting civil society, and shielding allies from prosecution.
SHOCK AND LAW
The most visible means of weaponizing the state is through targeted prosecution. Virtually all elected autocratic governments deploy justice ministries, public prosecutors' offices, and tax and intelligence agencies to investigate and prosecute rival politicians, media companies, editors, journalists, business leaders, universities, and other critics. In traditional dictatorships, critics are often charged with crimes such as sedition, treason, or plotting insurrection, but contemporary autocrats tend to prosecute critics for more mundane offenses, such as corruption, tax evasion, defamation, and even minor violations of arcane rules. If investigators look hard enough, they can usually find petty infractions such as unreported income on tax returns or noncompliance with rarely enforced regulations.
Trump has repeatedly declared his intention to prosecute his rivals, including former Republican Representative Liz Cheney and other lawmakers who served on the House committee that investigated the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. In December 2024, House Republicans called for an FBI investigation into Cheney. The first Trump administration's efforts to weaponize the Justice Department were largely thwarted from within, so this time, Trump sought appointees who shared his goal of pursuing perceived enemies. His nominee for attorney general, Pam Bondi, has declared that Trump's "prosecutors will be prosecuted," and his choice for FBI director, Kash Patel, has repeatedly called for the prosecution of Trump's rivals. In 2023, Patel even published a book featuring an "enemies list" of public officials to be targeted.
Because the Trump administration will not control the courts, most targets of selective prosecution will not end up in prison. But the government need not jail its critics to inflict harm on them. Targets of investigation will be forced to devote considerable time, energy, and resources to defending themselves; they will spend their savings on lawyers, their lives will be disrupted, their professional careers will be sidetracked, and their reputations will be damaged. At a minimum, they and their families will suffer months or years of anxiety and sleepless nights.
Trump's efforts to use government agencies to harass his perceived adversaries will not be limited to the Justice Department and the FBI. A variety of other departments and agencies can be deployed against critics. Autocratic governments, for example, routinely use tax authorities to target opponents for politically motivated investigations. In Turkey, the Erdogan government gutted the Dogan Yayin media group, whose newspapers and TV networks were reporting on government corruption, by charging it with tax evasion and imposing a crippling $2.5 billion fine that forced the Dogan family to sell its media empire to government cronies. Erdogan also used tax audits to pressure the Koc Group, Turkey's largest industrial conglomerate, to abandon its support for opposition parties.
The Trump administration could similarly deploy the tax authorities against critics. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations all politicized the IRS before the 1970s Watergate scandal led to reforms. An influx of political appointees would weaken those safeguards, potentially leaving Democratic donors in the cross hairs. Because all individual campaign donations are publicly disclosed, it would be easy for the Trump administration to identify and target those donors; indeed, fear of such targeting could deter individuals from contributing to opposition politicians in the first place.
Tax-exempt status may also be politicized. As president, Richard Nixon worked to deny or delay tax-exempt status for organizations and think tanks he viewed as politically hostile. Under Trump, such efforts could be facilitated by antiterrorism legislation passed in November 2024 by the House of Representatives that empowers the Treasury Department to withdraw tax-exempt status from any organization it suspects of supporting terrorism without having to disclose evidence to justify such an act. Because "support for terrorism" can be defined very broadly, Trump could, in the words of Democratic Representative Lloyd Doggett, "use it as a sword against those he views as his political enemies."
The Trump administration will almost certainly deploy the Department of Education against universities, which as centers of opposition activism are frequent targets of competitive authoritarian governments' ire. The Department of Education hands out billions of dollars in federal funding for universities, oversees the agencies responsible for college accreditation, and enforces compliance with Title VI and Title IX, laws that prohibit educational institutions from discriminating based on race, color, national origin, or sex. These capacities have rarely been politicized in the past, but Republican leaders have called for their deployment against elite schools.
Elected autocrats also routinely use defamation suits and other forms of legal action to silence their critics in the media. In Ecuador in 2011, for example, President Rafael Correa won a $40 million lawsuit against a columnist and three executives at a leading newspaper for publishing an editorial calling him a "dictator." Although public figures rarely win such suits in the United States, Trump has made ample use of a variety of legal actions to wear down media outlets, targeting ABC News, CBS News, The Des Moines Register, and Simon & Schuster. His strategy has already borne fruit. In December 2024, ABC made the shocking decision to settle a defamation suit brought by Trump, paying him $15 million to avoid a trial in which it probably would have prevailed. The owners of CBS are also reportedly considering settling a lawsuit by Trump, showing how spurious legal actions can prove politically effective.
The administration need not directly target all its critics to silence most dissent. Launching a few high-profile attacks may serve as an effective deterrent. A legal action against Cheney would be closely watched by other politicians; a suit against The New York Times or Harvard would have a chilling effect on dozens of other media outlets or universities.
HONEY TRAP
A weaponized state is not merely a tool to punish opponents. It can also be used to build support. Governments in competitive authoritarian regimes routinely use economic policy and regulatory decisions to reward politically friendly individuals, firms, and organizations. Business leaders, media companies, universities, and other organizations have as much to gain as they have to lose from government antitrust decisions, the issuing of permits and licenses, the awarding of government contracts and concessions, the waiving of regulations or tariffs, and the conferral of tax-exempt status. If they believe that these decisions are made on political rather than technical grounds, they have a strong incentive to align themselves with incumbents.
The potential for co-optation is clearest in the business sector. Major American companies have much at stake in the U.S. government's antitrust, tariff, and regulatory decisions and in the awarding of government contracts. (In 2023, the federal government spent more than $750 billion, or nearly three percent of the United States' GDP, on awarding contracts.) For aspiring autocrats, policy and regulatory decisions can serve as powerful carrots and sticks to attract business support. This kind of patrimonial logic helped autocrats in Hungary, Russia, and Turkey secure private-sector cooperation. If Trump sends credible signals that he will behave in a similar manner, the political consequences will be far-reaching. If business leaders become convinced that it is more profitable to avoid financing opposition candidates or investing in independent media, they will change their behavior.
Indeed, their behavior has already begun to change. In what the New York Times columnist Michelle Goldberg termed "the Great Capitulation," powerful CEOs who had once criticized Trump's authoritarian behavior are now rushing to meet with him, praise him, and give him money. Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Toyota each gave $1 million to fund Trump's inauguration, more than double their previous inaugural donations. In early January, Meta announced it was abandoning its fact-checking operations—a move that Trump bragged "probably" resulted from his threats to take legal action against Meta's owner, Mark Zuckerberg. Trump himself has recognized that in his first term, "everyone was fighting me," but now "everybody wants to be my friend."
A similar pattern is emerging in the media sector. Nearly all major U.S. media outlets—ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, The Washington Post—are owned and operated by larger parent corporations. Although Trump cannot carry out his threat to withhold licenses from national television networks because they are not licensed nationally, he can pressure media outlets by pressuring their corporate owners. The Washington Post, for instance, is controlled by Jeff Bezos, whose largest company, Amazon, competes for major federal contracts. Likewise, the owner of The Los Angeles Times, Patrick Soon-Shiong, sells medical products subject to review by the Food and Drug Administration. Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, both men overruled their papers' planned endorsements of Kamala Harris.
PROTECTION RACKET
Finally, a weaponized state can serve as a legal shield to protect government officials or allies who engage in antidemocratic behavior. A loyalist Justice Department, for example, could turn a blind eye to acts of pro-Trump political violence, such as attacks on or threats against journalists, election officials, protesters, or opposition politicians and activists. It could also decline to investigate Trump supporters for efforts to intimidate voters or even manipulate the results of elections.
This has happened before in the United States. During and after Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other armed white supremacist groups with ties to the Democratic Party waged violent terror campaigns across the South, assassinating Black and Republican politicians, burning Black homes, businesses, and churches, committing election fraud, and threatening, beating, and killing Black citizens who attempted to vote. This wave of terror, which helped establish nearly a century of single-party rule across the South, was made possible by the collusion of state and local law enforcement authorities, who routinely turned a blind eye to the violence and systematically failed to hold its perpetrators accountable.
The United States experienced a marked rise in far-right violence during the first Trump administration. Threats against members of Congress increased more than tenfold. These threats had consequences: according to Republican Senator Mitt Romney, fear of Trump supporters' violence dissuaded some Republican senators from voting for Trump's impeachment after the January 6, 2021, attack.
By most measures, political violence subsided after January 2021, in part because hundreds of participants in the January 6 attack were convicted and imprisoned. But Trump's pardon of nearly all the January 6 insurrectionists on returning to office has sent a message that violent or antidemocratic actors will be protected under his administration. Such signals encourage violent extremism, which means that during Trump's second term, critics of the government and independent journalists will almost certainly face more frequent threats and even outright attacks.
None of this would be entirely new for the United States. Presidents have weaponized government agencies before. The FBI director J. Edgar Hoover deployed the agency as a political weapon for the six presidents he served. The Nixon administration wielded the Justice Department and other agencies against perceived enemies. But the contemporary period differs in important ways. For one, global democratic standards have risen considerably. By any contemporary measure, the United States was considerably less democratic in the 1950s than it is today. A return to mid-twentieth-century practices would, by itself, constitute significant democratic backsliding.
More important, the coming weaponization of government will likely go well beyond mid-twentieth-century practices. Fifty years ago, both major U.S. parties were internally heterogeneous, relatively moderate, and broadly committed to democratic rules of the game. Today, these parties are far more polarized, and a radicalized Republican Party has abandoned its long-standing commitment to basic democratic rules, including accepting electoral defeat and unambiguously rejecting violence.
Moreover, much of the Republican Party now embraces the idea that America's institutions—from the federal bureaucracy and public schools to the media and private universities—have been corrupted by left-wing ideologies. Authoritarian movements commonly embrace the notion that their country's institutions have been subverted by enemies; autocratic leaders including Erdogan, Orban, and Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro routinely push such claims. Such a worldview tends to justify—even motivate—the kind of purging and packing that Trump promises. Whereas Nixon worked surreptitiously to weaponize the state and faced Republican opposition when that behavior came to light, today's GOP now openly encourages such abuses. Weaponization of the state has become Republican strategy. The party that once embraced President Ronald Reagan's campaign dictum that the government was the problem now enthusiastically embraces the government as a political weapon.
Using executive power in this way is what Republicans learned from Orban. Orban taught a generation of conservatives that the state should not be dismantled but rather wielded in pursuit of right-wing causes and against opponents. This is why tiny Hungary has become a model for so many Trump supporters. Weaponizing the state is not some new feature of conservative philosophy—it is an age-old feature of authoritarianism.
NATURAL IMMUNITY?
The Trump administration may derail democracy, but it is unlikely to consolidate authoritarian rule. The United States possesses several potential sources of resilience. For one, American institutions are stronger than those in Hungary, Turkey, and other countries with competitive authoritarian regimes. An independent judiciary, federalism, bicameralism, and midterm elections—all absent in Hungary, for instance—will likely limit the scope of Trump's authoritarianism.
Trump is also weaker politically than many successful elected autocrats. Authoritarian leaders do the most damage when they enjoy broad public support: Bukele, Chávez, Fujimori, and Russia's Vladimir Putin all boasted approval ratings above 80 percent when they launched authoritarian power grabs. Such overwhelming public support helps leaders secure the legislative supermajorities or landslide plebiscite victories needed to impose reforms that entrench autocratic rule. It also helps deter challenges from intraparty rivals, judges, and even much of the opposition.
Less popular leaders, by contrast, face greater resistance from legislatures, courts, civil society, and even their own allies. Their power grabs are thus more likely to fail. Peruvian President Pedro Castillo and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol each had approval ratings below 30 percent when they attempted to seize extraconstitutional power, and both failed. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's approval rating was well below 50 percent when he tried to orchestrate a coup to overturn his country's 2022 presidential election. He, too, was defeated and forced out of office.
Trump's approval rating never surpassed 50 percent during his first term, and a combination of incompetence, overreach, unpopular policies, and partisan polarization will likely limit his support during his second. An elected autocrat with a 45 percent approval rating is dangerous, but less dangerous than one with 80 percent support.
Civil society is another potential source of democratic resilience. One major reason that rich democracies are more stable is that capitalist development disperses human, financial, and organizational resources away from the state, generating countervailing power in society. Wealth cannot wholly inoculate the private sector from the pressures imposed by a weaponized state. But the larger and richer a private sector is, the harder it is to fully capture or bully into submission. In addition, wealthier citizens have more time, skills, and resources to join or create civic or opposition organizations, and because they depend less on the state for their livelihoods than poor citizens do, they are in a better position to protest or vote against the government. Compared with those in other competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition forces in the United States are well-organized, well-financed, and electorally viable, which makes them harder to co-opt, repress, and defeat at the polls. American opposition will therefore be harder to sideline than it was in countries such as El Salvador, Hungary, and Turkey.
CHINKS IN THE ARMOR
But even a modest tilting of the playing field could cripple American democracy. Democracies require robust opposition, and robust oppositions must be able to draw on a large and replenishable pool of politicians, activists, lawyers, experts, donors, and journalists.
A weaponized state imperils such opposition. Although Trump's critics won't be jailed, exiled, or banned from politics, the heightened cost of public opposition will lead many of them to retreat to the political sidelines. In the face of FBI investigations, tax audits, congressional hearings, lawsuits, online harassment, or the prospect of losing business opportunities, many people who would normally oppose the government may conclude that it simply is not worth the risk or effort.
This process of self-sidelining may not attract much public attention, but it can be highly consequential. Facing looming investigations, promising politicians—Republicans and Democrats alike—leave public life. CEOs seeking government contracts, tariff waivers, or favorable antitrust rulings stop contributing to Democratic candidates, funding civil rights or democracy initiatives, and investing in independent media. News outlets whose owners worry about lawsuits or government harassment rein in their investigative teams and their most aggressive reporters. Editors engage in self-censorship, softening headlines and opting not to run stories critical of the government. And university leaders fearing government investigations, funding cuts, or punitive endowment taxes crack down on campus protest, remove or demote outspoken professors, and remain silent in the face of growing authoritarianism.
Weaponized states create a difficult collective action problem for establishment elites who, in theory, would prefer democracy to competitive authoritarianism. The politicians, CEOs, media owners, and university presidents who modify their behavior in the face of authoritarian threats are acting rationally, doing what they deem best for their organizations by protecting shareholders or avoiding debilitating lawsuits, tariffs, or taxes. But such acts of self-preservation have a collective cost. As individual actors retreat to the sidelines or censor themselves, societal opposition weakens. The media environment grows less critical. And pressure on the authoritarian government diminishes.
The depletion of societal opposition may be worse than it appears. We can observe when key players sideline themselves—when politicians retire, university presidents resign, or media outlets change their programming and personnel. But it is harder to see the opposition that might have materialized in a less threatening environment but never did—the young lawyers who decide not to run for office; the aspiring young writers who decide not to become journalists; the potential whistleblowers who decide not to speak out; the countless citizens who decide not to join a protest or volunteer for a campaign.
HOLD THE LINE
America is on the cusp of competitive authoritarianism. The Trump administration has already begun to weaponize state institutions and deploy them against opponents. The Constitution alone cannot save U.S. democracy. Even the best-designed constitutions have ambiguities and gaps that can be exploited for antidemocratic ends. After all, the same constitutional order that undergirds America's contemporary liberal democracy permitted nearly a century of authoritarianism in the Jim Crow South, the mass internment of Japanese Americans, and McCarthyism. In 2025, the United States is governed nationally by a party with greater will and power to exploit constitutional and legal ambiguities for authoritarian ends than at any time in the past two centuries.
Trump will be vulnerable. The administration's limited public support and inevitable mistakes will create opportunities for democratic forces—in Congress, in courtrooms, and at the ballot box.
But the opposition can win only if it stays in the game. Opposition under competitive authoritarianism can be grueling. Worn down by harassment and threats, many of Trump's critics will be tempted to retreat to the sidelines. Such a retreat would be perilous. When fear, exhaustion, or resignation crowds out citizens' commitment to democracy, emergent authoritarianism begins to take root.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 18, 2025, 02:27:43 PMAs an aside - I do wonder how long that alliance will last - on the other hand perhaps that's 21st century fusionism with anti-Woke serving as the solvent that anti-Communism was in the 20th?
I don't have answers, but it will be interesting to see.
Think back to 2008 and everyone was amazed by the Obama voting coalition, plus the idea of the "emerging democratic majority". Basically that Democrats, by relying on black and brown voters, would dominate politics for a good long while.
In the end of course Obama's coalition lasted only as long as Obama did.
"Anti-woke" really has a tail because the term has become poisonous - no one on the left uses it any longer. Which is why even now they focus on "anti-DEI". Sooner or later it has to tilt to either anti-minority (which is rather evergreen in its appeal), or to something else entirely.
Quote from: Barrister on February 18, 2025, 03:27:41 PMIn the end of course Obama's coalition lasted only as long as Obama did.
Not even that long. 2010 was the end. The state governments were captured by Republicans who initiated voter suppressing policies that will require big Democrat majorities to overcome.
Obama managed to get himself re-elected but beyond that it went disastrously almost immediately.
Thanks for the article CC. That does seem one of the higher probability scenarios.
I take no credit, that was Crazy Ivan - a cadet branch of the Crazy Canuck clan.
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 18, 2025, 04:47:00 PMI take no credit, that was Crazy Ivan - a cadet branch of the Crazy Canuck clan.
Awkward :Embarrass:
Thank you Crazy_Ivan80
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 18, 2025, 04:47:00 PMI take no credit, that was Crazy Ivan - a cadet branch of the Crazy Canuck clan.
OT but I always appreciated how obscure that reference is.
(https://tse4.mm.bing.net/th?id=OIP.iWmqpVzqVCPtgyeus0p4qwHaFG&pid=Api)
A PC game from 1984.
Ha, I thought it was from Red October.
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 18, 2025, 04:55:33 PMHa, I thought it was from Red October.
you think correctly. :)
Don't know that game, was a toddler that year.
----
anyways. 't was my pleasure.
Whoops. And here I thought Crazy Ivan was a connoisseur of classic 1980s PC gaming all these years.
Quote from: Valmy on February 18, 2025, 05:05:46 PMWhoops. And here I thought Crazy Ivan was a connoisseur of classic 1980s PC gaming all these years.
only started pc gaming around '93. consoles and the old nintendo handhelds before that.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 18, 2025, 02:27:43 PMBut on the TechBro side especially I'm not sure there is a plan or a thing they're aiming for. I think in part it's a different mindset - I think they have projects they're interested in. There are some inchoate ideas with many sources and off-shoots in the ideological mulch. I think what they are aiming for is disruption. To an extent I think the means is the end. I don't think they have an end goal or ideological idea they're working towards any more than capital in general does.
I think disruption for disruption's sake is the goal. The creative destruction etc.
All the while with tensions growing between the Broligarchy and the Christian nationalists wanting a king.
Quote from: Valmy on February 18, 2025, 04:50:11 PMA PC game from 1984.
The Ancient Art of War, from Brøderbund. I loved that game.
Quote from: Oexmelin on February 18, 2025, 06:11:46 PMQuote from: Valmy on February 18, 2025, 04:50:11 PMA PC game from 1984.
The Ancient Art of War, from Brøderbund. I loved that game.
First computer game I ever played. And then I was hooked.
Go fast and break stuff is the tech bro way. Ask forgiveness rather than permission.
I also wager there's a lot of gambling that the system moves so slow and clunky when it comes to legal challenges that it will no longer by viable by the time they come about. Just like trumps legal issues.
The big worry I have with tech bros dominating is they often have this idea that tech is the solution to everything. It's we have this tech, now we need to find a problem for it to solve so we can sell it. Completely backwards thinking.
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 18, 2025, 06:46:43 PMQuote from: Oexmelin on February 18, 2025, 06:11:46 PMQuote from: Valmy on February 18, 2025, 04:50:11 PMA PC game from 1984.
The Ancient Art of War, from Brøderbund. I loved that game.
First computer game I ever played. And then I was hooked.
(https://www.myabandonware.com/media/screenshots/t/the-ancient-art-of-war-at-sea-3gy/the-ancient-art-of-war-at-sea_5.gif)
I started with AAOW at Sea before the original.
Thus, Thor Foote was my first love.
(I forget which one of those was grumbler :P )
Quote from: Norgy on February 18, 2025, 05:44:36 PMI think disruption for disruption's sake is the goal. The creative destruction etc.
All the while with tensions growing between the Broligarchy and the Christian nationalists wanting a king.
I think making money is the goal.
I've noticed repeatedly the idea of using state governments as a bastion against Trumpism, but can that truly be effective? The federal government proved itself adept in securing compliance from the states during the Civil Rights era, and this is exactly the same thing.
I do wonder if the 'war on woke' will be enough to sustain the unity in the right, as the libertarians proceed to destroy family and social bonds even more surely than the so-called 'woke mob' would have.
Another big question is "whither the EU?"
Over in the Ukraine war thread a bunch of our (European) posters are talking about the need for EU to get its shit together in response to Trump aligning with Russia on Ukraine.
Personally, I think plenty of EU leaders are aware of the seriousness of the situation, and are inclined to act. There are a handful of serious obstacles here.
The individual countries their own democratic mandates to manage, and there's the ever present threat of the Russia and Thiel/Musk inspired (and funded) reactionary populists taking over power in any given country.
At the same time there's the EU level challenge of Hungary and Slovakia acting for Russia inside EU institutions.
The wake up call has been received, but are European institutions able to respond? I have much less insight into how Europe functions than the US, but I figure there are a few potential scenarios:
1) A core of European countries and institutions comes together, firms up a European centre of power and pushes European values. In my view this means continuing the pressure on Russia, resisting the political influence of American billionaires and Putin, and supporting Ukraine. My main questions here are - how is that going to pass, and how does it handle the Putin-sympathizers?
2) Mostly words and little practical action. The countries that do resist Russia are isolated, and individually countries are pushed to align with either Russian or American direction as unequal partners or client states.
Quote from: Neil on February 19, 2025, 11:32:08 AMI do wonder if the 'war on woke' will be enough to sustain the unity in the right, as the libertarians proceed to destroy family and social bonds even more surely than the so-called 'woke mob' would have.
These bonds have been hollowed out. People don't realize how much yet.
It rather feels like the US is no longer Europe's ally. Politico article on the topic here (https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-america-vladimir-putin-ally-war/), but I don't think it's just Politico.
Yes, let's ally with a crumbling husk of an Empire like Russia. Though I guess that is our peers these days.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 02:22:37 PMAnother big question is "whither the EU?"
Over in the Ukraine war thread a bunch of our (European) posters are talking about the need for EU to get its shit together in response to Trump aligning with Russia on Ukraine.
Personally, I think plenty of EU leaders are aware of the seriousness of the situation, and are inclined to act. There are a handful of serious obstacles here.
The individual countries their own democratic mandates to manage, and there's the ever present threat of the Russia and Thiel/Musk inspired (and funded) reactionary populists taking over power in any given country.
At the same time there's the EU level challenge of Hungary and Slovakia acting for Russia inside EU institutions.
The wake up call has been received, but are European institutions able to respond? I have much less insight into how Europe functions than the US, but I figure there are a few potential scenarios:
1) A core of European countries and institutions comes together, firms up a European centre of power and pushes European values. In my view this means continuing the pressure on Russia, resisting the political influence of American billionaires and Putin, and supporting Ukraine. My main questions here are - how is that going to pass, and how does it handle the Putin-sympathizers?
2) Mostly words and little practical action. The countries that do resist Russia are isolated, and individually countries are pushed to align with either Russian or American direction as unequal partners or client states.
On the EU I think there are a few big challenges and I don't know the answer of how it'll play out. And I think Europe's in a nightmare state.
We are dependent on the US for defence - another example France deployed forces to Romania as part of the NATO forward presence but those deployments depended on American logistical support (as did France's intervention in the Sahel) because France, like every other European country, doesn't have the capacity.
Right now there's a Russian invasion (and the US backing annexation), with Europe's largest economy entering its second year of a shrinking economy and it basically being unclear if European states have the will or capacity to back up Article 5 in respect of, say, the Baltics (and assuming the US won't). And ultimately geo-politics matters - we're a resource poor continent. The idea that we can simultaneously push against Russia, give up on America, shun the Turks and the Middle East and continue to have high-minded attitudes to China is for the birds. With what? How? The world does not owe Europe power and respect (I've seen a couple of commentators saying they think we're in the early years of a European "century of humiliation").
The best I've seen from a European Commissioner is by more, tougher, stronger regulatory enforcement. The world that was capable of creating a regulatory superpower has gone. Frankly I think any talk that is focused on the using the Digital Services Act more robustly against Musk or Google or Facebook or whatever is Europe in its comfort zone engaging in displacement activities.
What's needed, as Donald Tusk has pointed out, is significant spending on defence - industrial, military, state capacity. As Tusk has said "if we, Europeans, fail to spend big on defence now, we will be forced to spend 10 times more if we don't prevent a wider war." Adding, "as the Polish PM I'm entitled to say it loud and clear, since Poland already spends almost 5% of its GDP on defence. And we will continue to do so." On both points he's right. So I think anything from an European leader that isn't talking about increasing defence spending by magnitudes is unreal.
The biggest way to do that would be by leveraging it at a European level - but defence and foreign policy is not a European competence and it doesn't have that type of budgeting power. The European limits are at their limits legally (though never underestimate EU lawyers for creative interpretation of the treaties). Which is a problem because are the third rails of European politics - common debt and bailouts was a huge factor in the rise of, say, the AfD or in a "debtor" country the rise of anti-politics parties in Italy, some European countries have constitutional neutrality which will be difficult. This is also where Hungary and Slovakia matter - in the institutions they don't, Slovakia's Commissioner is Maros Sefcovic who is in the same party as Fico but not really aligned and is very impressive, Hungary has the Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare. But currently under the treaties common foreign and security policy broadly speaking still operates on the basis of unanimity (because it's not a European competence) which makes common European activity very difficult.
I also think it'll probably require some fairly uncomfortable choices. If Europe can't rely on the US there is no-one else who can step in so it's on Europe - and, if Trump got what he asked for, a Europe that is spending 5% on defence does not need to rely on the US for its defence. Absent the US who will it work with? We can probably rule out Russia, I think Turkey (especially as if Russia and the US are working together the Turks will need friends too) and the Middle East are going to be key and building far closer relationship with China. Any of these decisions is going to involve really difficult, uncomfortable compromises for Europe. The only real alternative I can see is probably doing a bargain with the Russians.
I think fundamentally at a European and national level Europe needs imaginative, flexible (including morally) and savvy leaders. But I think any proposal from any European leader that does not also have a context of significant increase in defence spending is not serious.
I'm not hopeful yet - I don't see anyone on the horizon (with the possible exception of Tusk and Poland as I keep on banging on about). But I'm also not sure there's the will - public opinion is overwhelmingly to back Ukraine and maybe even Euro-army curious. I mentioned it before but I often think about Macron's line about grand narratives and the need for political heroism - and I'm not sure we can do it.
But then I see opinion polling like this (from earlier this week) which I'd say was previously and think maybe there's hope:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GkAIBzCWEAAFpne?format=jpg&name=900x900)
(on the other hand polling also shows opposition to tax rises or spending cuts to fund more defence spending - and relatively high confidence that European defence will be fine without the US...)
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 19, 2025, 07:19:37 PMWe are dependent on the US for defence - another example France deployed forces to Romania as part of the NATO forward presence but those deployments depended on American logistical support (as did France's intervention in the Sahel) because France, like every other European country, doesn't have the capacity.
WHAT THE FUCK IS WRONG WITH EUROPE? Trump served in office from 2017 - 2021 threatening constantly to cut Europe off and they just ignored it? Europe just thought after the Cold War ended that the US was just going to take the responsibly for European defense for ever and ever amen? They never thought that maybe that was not sustainable?
I swear to God all of your politicians should be shot for criminal incompetence and dereliction of national responsibility. Europe can't fucking move troops around INSIDE Europe without the United States doing it for you? Can't you put shit on a train and move it around that way?
It boggles the mind.
How much stuff does a small French force in Romania need anyway? I presume it wasn't 1 million soldiers.
When the Black Watch parades in Edinburgh do they need the United States to provide transport for their fucking bagpipes? Come on.
I totally agree - what I'd say is worse is that for most of the last 4 years (including all of the war in Ukraine) from everything I've read, the default assumption among European policymakers has been that Trump would win in 2024. And yet all strategic thinking and policy was basically based on a best-case scenario. I don't think that's just a failure of the last 4 or even 9 years - I think it's a failure of at least the last 25 if not more.
And there is an idealistic side to it.
Edit: And the other side of this to be clear is that Europe was serious about defence just 35 years ago. We are rich - 5% of GDP would be a slightly larger defence budget than the US. We have (some) industrial capacity and successful arms manufacturers (and exporters). So this isn't saying none of this is possible - but it will take trade offs, political will and imagination.
I think the continuing dependence of the European financial sector on the US makes any kind of concrete action to disentangle from America difficult. The EU isn't equipped to deal with US sanctions (which would be the likely result of attempts to restrict the spread of disinformation via social media). The EU is also hamstrung by fifth columnists like Orban.
The EU isn't equipped to be a meaningful counterweight to a hostile United States. It was designed to operate in an American world. If Europe wants to try and build something, it'll have to be something new.
Defending the eastern border independently will not generate an actively hostile US.
Quote from: Valmy on February 19, 2025, 08:27:40 PMDefending the eastern border independently will not generate an actively hostile US.
The US will be actively hostile no matter what. Not necessarily militarily hostile, but the United States can never again be regarded as a friend to any other country.
All the British papers have a version of this from the Guardian which I think gives the realistic assessment of what Europe can do right now:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/19/britain-and-france-working-on-plans-for-reassurance-force-to-protect-ukraine
A "reassurance force", but one which won't operate in the East of Ukraine and requiring a US "backstop" and NATO's (for which read the US') air support. Good they're thinking but this is something most European countries back as essential to their security and that has huge public support - but this is broadly what we're able to offer right now.
Basically I totally get wanting to dump the Americans - but this is what Europe can currently do to defend itself. Whatever we do needs to start from that reality and not engage in any more fantasy politics as we have for the last 25 years - which is why I think it's sadly right and necessary for Starmer and Macron to be flying out to DC to lobby Trump.
Does France or Britain have hundreds of billions in rare earths to offer? What are they going to give Trump?
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 19, 2025, 07:19:37 PMOn the EU I think there are a few big challenges and I don't know the answer of how it'll play out. And I think Europe's in a nightmare state.
...
I agree Europe is in a real shitty situation, and I agree significantly increased spending is necessary now. I believe Denmark has just announced increased, and I think the Nordics in general is going down that road.
On defense and the EU, I think what I'd go after is a smaller subset of European Nations - led by France, most likely - building a tight European alliance. Other more reluctant nations can then choose to fall in line or not.
It'd be great if the UK wanted to join, but right now it feels like you're more into waffling and trying to preserve the Atlantic alliance and "special relationship." Maybe some of the royal razzle dazzle can get Trump on board, but if not I think you're just chasing dreams there.
In terms of moral purity, I think that's out the window at least internationally. Turkey has interests in containing Russia, so they can be worked with (maybe on arms). China while a dictatorship is not actively at war with Europe (unlike Russia) and is at least consistent (unlike the US), so they're another likely partner.
I think Taiwan's goose is basically cooked. I don't think Trump will help much, and Europe is going to have a lot less room to throw Chinese relations out.
On resources, Canada has lots and is looking for partners. Of course, there's the issue of potentially being annexed by the US. In the short term that's probably off the table, but who knows in the long term.
Quote from: Neil on February 19, 2025, 08:19:15 PMI think the continuing dependence of the European financial sector on the US makes any kind of concrete action to disentangle from America difficult. The EU isn't equipped to deal with US sanctions (which would be the likely result of attempts to restrict the spread of disinformation via social media). The EU is also hamstrung by fifth columnists like Orban.
The EU isn't equipped to be a meaningful counterweight to a hostile United States. It was designed to operate in an American world. If Europe wants to try and build something, it'll have to be something new.
Yeah I think you're right. Europe's not in a good position now, at all. Basically Putin is about to achieve his win conditions.
I don't think we should despair amidst this onrush of bullshit from Trump and his cronies.
It should be remembered, that the large majority or Russian mobile units are engaged in and effectively pinned within Ukraine, so what forces are left with which Putin can attack with or cause trouble in NATO countries?
Baring a sudden collapse of the Ukrainian Army, Putin's military will remain in a quagmire for as long as the Ukrainians keep fighting. Russia's navy is no real threat and their air force have failed to achieve air superiority in the war.
I think NATOs current forces in the East and the earmarked reinforcements are enough to halt a Russian assault against a Baltic sate, excluding the use of nuclear weapons.
What can't be planned for is just how far Trump is ready to 'sell out' Eastern European countries to Putin?
By which I mean the US actively support Russian operations with intel, disruption to NATO logistics, with holding all ammunition and actively sabotaging joint or US weapons programmes in Europe
There lies Putin's only real hope for re-establishing a 'Soviet' empire.
So I think the physical threat (to Europe beyond Russia) is not tomorrow. It's about the forces he can build up within the next five years, especially if sanctions are removed and he's receiving support from the US.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 09:03:29 PMSo I think the physical threat (to Europe beyond Russia) is not tomorrow. It's about the forces he can build up within the next five years, especially if sanctions are removed and he's receiving support from the US.
Yes, but that's predicated on Ukraine being knocked out soon, for better or worse for them, if they're still fighting Putin in 3-4 years time, Putin can't rebuild much of his army.
But as you say there's real additional danger for Putin being able to freely buy anything he wants and getting US military technology transfers.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 08:57:44 PMI agree Europe is in a real shitty situation, and I agree significantly increased spending is necessary now. I believe Denmark has just announced increased, and I think the Nordics in general is going down that road.
On defense and the EU, I think what I'd go after is a smaller subset of European Nations - led by France, most likely - building a tight European alliance. Other more reluctant nations can then choose to fall in line or not.
It'd be great if the UK wanted to join, but right now it feels like you're more into waffling and trying to preserve the Atlantic alliance and "special relationship." Maybe some of the royal razzle dazzle can get Trump on board, but if not I think you're just chasing dreams there.
On France - I think anything has to take into account the very real possibility of a Le Pen presidency in two years.
With the UK I don't think there's an inch of difference between the UK and the rest of Europe on this. Starmer's going to DC next week to lobby Trump for support, Macron's going the week after - that's coordinated. One hosted Trump as guest of honour on Bastille Day, the other might get the King to give a state dinner in a castle.
I've said before I really admire Tusk and Poland over the last three years as a European country that I think has appreciated the risk and changed their policies (and spending) to meet it. It's striking that they are currently taking the most pro-American line - absolutely rejecting attempting to create a "European NATO" or any alternative to the Atlantic Alliance.
Because the reality is what we can offer now, with US support of some sort, is a 30-50,000 "reassurance force" distant from the front line. What we can offer without US support is nothing. So the real question is whether we try to do something, which will require Trump's support, or nothing.
In the long run it's about increasing spending, building the military and industry to support it. Those two tracks of trying to work with the US and trying to build up European capacity aren't contradictory, they need to run in parallel. For example even giving him the win of saying you're massively increasing defence spending to x% because of Trump does both.
QuoteIn terms of moral purity, I think that's out the window at least internationally. Turkey has interests in containing Russia, so they can be worked with (maybe on arms). China while a dictatorship is not actively at war with Europe (unlike Russia) and is at least consistent (unlike the US), so they're another likely partner.
I think Taiwan's goose is basically cooked. I don't think Trump will help much, and Europe is going to have a lot less room to throw Chinese relations out.
On resources, Canada has lots and is looking for partners. Of course, there's the issue of potentially being annexed by the US. In the short term that's probably off the table, but who knows in the long term.
Yeah. I've no idea on the long-run but I think you're right that Taiwan feels far less secure.
Quote from: Tonitrus on February 18, 2025, 08:30:45 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on February 18, 2025, 06:46:43 PMQuote from: Oexmelin on February 18, 2025, 06:11:46 PMQuote from: Valmy on February 18, 2025, 04:50:11 PMA PC game from 1984.
The Ancient Art of War, from Brøderbund. I loved that game.
First computer game I ever played. And then I was hooked.
(https://www.myabandonware.com/media/screenshots/t/the-ancient-art-of-war-at-sea-3gy/the-ancient-art-of-war-at-sea_5.gif)
I started with AAOW at Sea before the original.
Thus, Thor Foote was my first love.
(I forget which one of those was grumbler :P )
:cheers:
I saw a claim that Teump is giving the EU three weeks to agree to his Ukraine deal or he withdraws troops from Europe.
Of course, others have said there are no intention to withdraw.
Exciting times, that's for sure.
Realistically we ought to be able to mobilise weapons production in a few months to be able to supply Ukraine independently of the US. It would cost huge amounts of money, but it is possible. If we could do it in WWI we can do it now even better.
Of course, that would take political will.
Quote from: Threviel on February 20, 2025, 02:34:57 AMRealistically we ought to be able to mobilise weapons production in a few months to be able to supply Ukraine independently of the US. It would cost huge amounts of money, but it is possible. If we could do it in WWI we can do it now even better.
Of course, that would take political will.
Heh, the complexity of building modern weapon systems is several magnitudes above what it took in WWI.
Yes, for fighter jets and missiles. But Ukraine uses artillery, both western and Soviet, and ammunition for that is not hysterically more advanced. It would be expensive.
Likewise drones, infantry equipment, logistical vehicles and so on.
Lots of equipment could be produced and with huge investments even the more advanced equipment could be produced in a year or two.
I'm not saying it would be easy, but with a wartime expenditure of resources we could supply Ukraine enough to hold until production lines of serious equipment can go brrrr.
Funny how just a couple years ago we were talking about the best way to let Putin walk away with his pride intact, and now, basically how much Ukraine is gonna get fucked.
Quote from: Josephus on February 20, 2025, 07:41:41 AMFunny how just a couple years ago we were talking about the best way to let Putin walk away with his pride intact, and now, basically how much Ukraine is gonna get fucked.
Macron infamously did:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/04/russia-must-not-be-humiliated-ukraine-emmanuel-macron (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/04/russia-must-not-be-humiliated-ukraine-emmanuel-macron)
To be fair, almost three years ago.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 20, 2025, 08:22:04 AMQuote from: Josephus on February 20, 2025, 07:41:41 AMFunny how just a couple years ago we were talking about the best way to let Putin walk away with his pride intact, and now, basically how much Ukraine is gonna get fucked.
Macron infamously did:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/04/russia-must-not-be-humiliated-ukraine-emmanuel-macron (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/04/russia-must-not-be-humiliated-ukraine-emmanuel-macron)
To be fair, almost three years ago.
I think that was a decent position once it became clear that Ukraine wasn't going to be quickly defeated. Maybe give Putin an out and we can all pretend this never happened.
But we are obviously way past that.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 10:15:30 PMI saw a claim that Teump is giving the EU three weeks to agree to his Ukraine deal or he withdraws troops from Europe.
Of course, others have said there are no intention to withdraw.
Exciting times, that's for sure.
US troops being withdrawn voluntarily seems great. We don't need fifth columnists in the coming war.
It's better to have no friend than a friend who is a traitor. It's better to have no lifeboat than a broken lifeboat.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 10:15:30 PMI saw a claim that Teump is giving the EU three weeks to agree to his Ukraine deal or he withdraws troops from Europe.
Of course, others have said there are no intention to withdraw.
Exciting times, that's for sure.
This is as if your partner threatens you that they're going to leave you if you don't do X.
Now look - if X is something you know you should be doing anyways, that might be something.
But if it's "We're going for vacation in Mexico or I'm leaving" the relationship is over. They will continue to pull that threat over and over until it's a demand you can no longer tolerate.
Quote from: The Brain on February 20, 2025, 10:25:44 AMUS troops being withdrawn voluntarily seems great. We don't need fifth columnists in the coming war.
It's better to have no friend than a friend who is a traitor. It's better to have no lifeboat than a broken lifeboat.
And having the Slovaks and Hungarians around is bad enough.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 10:15:30 PMI saw a claim that Teump is giving the EU three weeks to agree to his Ukraine deal or he withdraws troops from Europe.
Of course, others have said there are no intention to withdraw.
Exciting times, that's for sure.
Bye.
Quote from: Zanza on February 20, 2025, 02:02:53 PMBye.
Yeah I don't see Europe conceding on this.
It'll be interesting to see if this is a real ultimatum and whether there'll be follow through, whether it was a trial balloon, or whether it's full on misinformation.
Is there even any deal under discussion?
I only read news about Americans surrendering to Russia. Very bad, but what can the EU contribute to this American sell out?
Quote from: Zanza on February 20, 2025, 02:41:38 PMIs there even any deal under discussion?
I only read news about Americans surrendering to Russia. Very bad, but what can the EU contribute to this American sell out?
Euro leaders are visiting HRH Trump in the near future; I imagine there will be a lot of curtsies and kowtowing.
Quote from: Jacob on February 19, 2025, 10:15:30 PMI saw a claim that Teump is giving the EU three weeks to agree to his Ukraine deal or he withdraws troops from Europe.
Of course, others have said there are no intention to withdraw.
Exciting times, that's for sure.
What deal is this that they are supposed to accept? I smell an overly-dramatic MEP.
Quote from: Josephus on February 20, 2025, 03:18:23 PMEuro leaders are visiting HRH Trump in the near future; I imagine there will be a lot of curtsies and kowtowing.
Duda is first going tonight I believe, Starmer next week, Macron the week after. I imagine very coordinated (with lots of consultation) at the European level. It certainly doesn't seem like an accident that the three leaders going are all from countries that meet the current NATO target and can be said to take defence reasonably seriously.
Then obviously St Patrick's Day so the Taoiseach and Tanaiste will be at the White House.
"Hail the king, please don't be a massive dick, your majesty!". :secret:
I've been thinking for a while about what's happened and why and this is my stream of consciousness attempt at finding some kind of explanation.
History goes in cycles as we all know, after some time there's often a reaction taking society in a different direction. The strength of the reaction is often based on how far back it needs to react. French absolutism leads to French revolution leads to absolutism leads to constitutional monarchy, extreme example, but can be seen as something a sinus curve mellowing out. Trudeau for a long time in Canada leads to unpopularity leads to not-Trudeau and so on. There are lots of examples and probably lots of counter-examples.
Back in the day Keynes noticed this behaviour in economics and the answer is that we mellow out the tops of the economic sinus wave, we have "filters" making the extremes of economics mellow out and as a thanks for that we haven't had a new depression like 30's one. These sinus waves could probably best be seen as overtones on a general upwards curve.
Society is obviously very complex and cannot be easily described as a sinus curve, but rather as untold amounts of curves acting as overtones on each-other. But one can perhaps se societal development as an aggregate of a lot of curves coalescing into some kind of curve.
The political parties in their views acted as some kind of overtone on the general developmental curve. If you asked a conservative French politician in 1949 whether he wanted women to vote he might say no, but unlike conservative 1820's politician he would not want a return of serfdom. If you asked him in 1989 he would not be against women voting. The general curve had moved, but the different parties still acted as some kind of wave around it.
Look at the 18th and 19th century, middle classes were growing and the populations were more and more demanding political representation. In France it led to the revolution, in the UK progressive reforms mellowed out the excesses in the developmental curve and we all know what happened.
But why was there a revolution in France? It seems that the democratic consensus moved in a different direction from the ruling elite. The consensus wanted political representation and the ruling elite did not want that to happen. In the end the sides were too far apart and a compromise could not be reached and bam, revolution.
But why not in the UK? The consensus moved in the exact same direction as in France, but the ruling elite moved with the curve, compromising just enough to not break the trust too much and fizzle, no revolution.
This development continued into the 21st century. The curve seems to have followed some kind of democratic consensus. Most everyone agreed that, yes, women should vote, we should be democratic, we should have a market economy, we should have state sponsored education and something of a welfare state and so on.
But then something happened. Immigration is a good example. Consensus, as far as I have been able to gather data, seems to always have been that we don't want immigration. Take your poor, tired masses yearning to breathe free and please stay away and so on. For decades the political elite has had a radically different view from the democratic consensus. In itself the issue has not been important enough to warrant the main curve to move very much. Until it became too much.
It really remains to be seen how much the consensus has moved from the political establishment. I don't really think it has moved much enough to warrant fear of violent revolution, the size of the extreme parties on the right seem to flatten out at around 20, perhaps up to 30 per cent. It's really up to the political systems to see if they can adjust to the new reality. In the US the system has obviously failed, but that's the only place where that's happened. Meloni is not making a fool of herself for example.
There's probably lots of other development aside from immigration with the same pattern, woeness, gay rights or whatever, but I don't know the issues enough to say anything about them.
But the political elite needs to get back on the consensus wave, the problems of immigration need to be handled of we don't want the adjustment to be too hard, because where the will of the people want to go it will go.
I don't know if this incoherent babbler makes any sense what so ever, just an attempt to crystallise my thoughts.
The russians are currently attacking with men on crutches and literal donkeys for resupply. They're sending chinese golf carts into minefields. The idea that Europe can't do anything about the russians without the US is utterly fanciful.
The frontlines have not moved significantly in 2 years. They have 5 times the population of Ukraine and still can't advance. The world has consistently underrated Ukrainians' brilliance and willingness to sacrifice.
If the EU can get some artillery and mortar ammunition factories going, the russians will never advance again. If sanctions are kept on by the US, russian lines WILL collapse within 2 years. Then we're back to 2013 borders (and probable civil war in russia but not our problem).
Quote from: Zoupa on February 23, 2025, 02:20:29 PMThe russians are currently attacking with men on crutches and literal donkeys for resupply. They're sending chinese golf carts into minefields. The idea that Europe can't do anything about the russians without the US is utterly fanciful.
The frontlines have not moved significantly in 2 years. They have 5 times the population of Ukraine and still can't advance. The world has consistently underrated Ukrainians' brilliance and willingness to sacrifice.
If the EU can get some artillery and mortar ammunition factories going, the russians will never advance again. If sanctions are kept on by the US, russian lines WILL collapse within 2 years. Then we're back to 2013 borders (and probable civil war in russia but not our problem).
:yes:
Just because Trump is a Class 1A wanker, doesn't mean European need to despair.
Quote from: Zoupa on February 23, 2025, 02:20:29 PMIf the EU can get some artillery and mortar ammunition factories going, the russians will never advance again.
Unfortunately, it's too late. Those things take time to set up, even if you had the money.
QuoteIf sanctions are kept on by the US,
And that's the other problem. They won't.
Quote from: Neil on February 23, 2025, 08:10:07 PMUnfortunately, it's too late. Those things take time to set up, even if you had the money.
Won't be too late for next time if you set it up today.
Quote from: Neil on February 23, 2025, 08:10:07 PMQuote from: Zoupa on February 23, 2025, 02:20:29 PMIf the EU can get some artillery and mortar ammunition factories going, the russians will never advance again.
Unfortunately, it's too late. Those things take time to set up, even if you had the money.
QuoteIf sanctions are kept on by the US,
And that's the other problem. They won't.
I know more about mortar rounds than artillery. UK, France, Spain and Norway all have the facilities set up. France and Norway have set up 24 hour shifts. Not sure about the UK, Spain has done fuck-all. It doesn't take THAT much time to set up.
And the money exist too, it's a matter of reallocation.
Belgium for example divvies up 66 billion euros in subsidies, flemish regional another 18. Surely something can be done there
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 02:22:42 AMAnd the money exist too, it's a matter of reallocation.
Belgium for example divvies up 66 billion euros in subsidies, flemish regional another 18. Surely something can be done there
If you want your farmers to protest and fill your streets with manure.
Quote from: HVC on February 24, 2025, 03:35:47 AMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 02:22:42 AMAnd the money exist too, it's a matter of reallocation.
Belgium for example divvies up 66 billion euros in subsidies, flemish regional another 18. Surely something can be done there
If you want your farmers to protest and fill your streets with manure.
Most subsidies don't go to farmers, we're not france
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 03:37:01 AMQuote from: HVC on February 24, 2025, 03:35:47 AMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 02:22:42 AMAnd the money exist too, it's a matter of reallocation.
Belgium for example divvies up 66 billion euros in subsidies, flemish regional another 18. Surely something can be done there
If you want your farmers to protest and fill your streets with manure.
Most subsidies don't go to farmers, we're not france
Fair enough :D
That's not to say Europe shouldn't do more. They should. Probably won't, but should.
Not disagreeing with that. Europe has the money, it just needs to allocate it properly. Don't even need to raise taxes.
Quote from: Threviel on February 23, 2025, 10:36:27 AMI've been thinking for a while about what's happened and why and this is my stream of consciousness attempt at finding some kind of explanation.
History goes in cycles as we all know, after some time there's often a reaction taking society in a different direction. The strength of the reaction is often based on how far back it needs to react. French absolutism leads to French revolution leads to absolutism leads to constitutional monarchy, extreme example, but can be seen as something a sinus curve mellowing out. Trudeau for a long time in Canada leads to unpopularity leads to not-Trudeau and so on. There are lots of examples and probably lots of counter-examples.
Back in the day Keynes noticed this behaviour in economics and the answer is that we mellow out the tops of the economic sinus wave, we have "filters" making the extremes of economics mellow out and as a thanks for that we haven't had a new depression like 30's one. These sinus waves could probably best be seen as overtones on a general upwards curve.
Society is obviously very complex and cannot be easily described as a sinus curve, but rather as untold amounts of curves acting as overtones on each-other. But one can perhaps se societal development as an aggregate of a lot of curves coalescing into some kind of curve.
The political parties in their views acted as some kind of overtone on the general developmental curve. If you asked a conservative French politician in 1949 whether he wanted women to vote he might say no, but unlike conservative 1820's politician he would not want a return of serfdom. If you asked him in 1989 he would not be against women voting. The general curve had moved, but the different parties still acted as some kind of wave around it.
Look at the 18th and 19th century, middle classes were growing and the populations were more and more demanding political representation. In France it led to the revolution, in the UK progressive reforms mellowed out the excesses in the developmental curve and we all know what happened.
But why was there a revolution in France? It seems that the democratic consensus moved in a different direction from the ruling elite. The consensus wanted political representation and the ruling elite did not want that to happen. In the end the sides were too far apart and a compromise could not be reached and bam, revolution.
But why not in the UK? The consensus moved in the exact same direction as in France, but the ruling elite moved with the curve, compromising just enough to not break the trust too much and fizzle, no revolution.
This development continued into the 21st century. The curve seems to have followed some kind of democratic consensus. Most everyone agreed that, yes, women should vote, we should be democratic, we should have a market economy, we should have state sponsored education and something of a welfare state and so on.
But then something happened. Immigration is a good example. Consensus, as far as I have been able to gather data, seems to always have been that we don't want immigration. Take your poor, tired masses yearning to breathe free and please stay away and so on. For decades the political elite has had a radically different view from the democratic consensus. In itself the issue has not been important enough to warrant the main curve to move very much. Until it became too much.
It really remains to be seen how much the consensus has moved from the political establishment. I don't really think it has moved much enough to warrant fear of violent revolution, the size of the extreme parties on the right seem to flatten out at around 20, perhaps up to 30 per cent. It's really up to the political systems to see if they can adjust to the new reality. In the US the system has obviously failed, but that's the only place where that's happened. Meloni is not making a fool of herself for example.
There's probably lots of other development aside from immigration with the same pattern, woeness, gay rights or whatever, but I don't know the issues enough to say anything about them.
But the political elite needs to get back on the consensus wave, the problems of immigration need to be handled of we don't want the adjustment to be too hard, because where the will of the people want to go it will go.
I don't know if this incoherent babbler makes any sense what so ever, just an attempt to crystallise my thoughts.
I recall once talking with an self-admitted far right supporter who used this excuse that "Its not actually that far right" and "Its just the world is really far left so it looks it".
To which...wut? We live in a super right wing world. We've had 50 years of a basic continuous lurch to the right.
Improvements in rights for minorities sure. But in the actual stuff that impacts your average straight cis white guy's every day life its just been rightwards ho.
Now looked on the grand scope of human history, then sure. We are considerably more left wing today than 200 years ago. Maybe there's some psychohistory deep genetic memory stuff going on there. But I don't think its how people look at things.
On immigration too.... Again I have to say this is a strange idea that gets repeated a lot. That the establishment doesn't want us to talk about immigration. They're really for it whilst the silent majority of normal people naturally hate it, obviously....
But in the UK at least we've had 30 years of non-stop talk about immigration with certain parts of the establishment really keen to make it an issue when most people...just don't care.
I googled it and even today only 51% of people think its an issue- not a top issue, an issue at all. Go back some years and you get even lower numbers. Look for yougov polling on important issues and its generally a small minority worried about that.
With immigration the key problem for most I believe is not the immigrants themselves. Its that they're being blamed for all our other problems. Why build more housing or invest in the health service when you can just say the reason they suck is immigrants.
I've said before but I do think much of this comes down to system 1 and system 2 thinking.
The issues we have in developed western countries are wicked problems. There's no simple answer for what needs to be done and the obvious stuff that would make up any solution- its hard to actually do.
Enter immigration. A simple answer to a complex problem that puts a scary face on the issue.
The right's would-be good faith answers to our problems clearly don't work... so they're embracing the simple non-answers.
Quote from: Josquius on February 24, 2025, 06:30:11 AMThe issues we have in developed western countries are wicked problems. There's no simple answer for what needs to be done and the obvious stuff that would make up any solution- its hard to actually do.
Enter immigration. A simple answer to a complex problem that puts a scary face on the issue.
The right's would-be good faith answers to our problems clearly don't work... so they're embracing the simple non-answers.
What is the obvious but hard to do solution for indigenous blue collar workers feeling their livelihoods are threatened by immigration?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on February 24, 2025, 09:58:23 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 24, 2025, 06:30:11 AMThe issues we have in developed western countries are wicked problems. There's no simple answer for what needs to be done and the obvious stuff that would make up any solution- its hard to actually do.
Enter immigration. A simple answer to a complex problem that puts a scary face on the issue.
The right's would-be good faith answers to our problems clearly don't work... so they're embracing the simple non-answers.
What is the obvious but hard to do solution for indigenous blue collar workers feeling their livelihoods are threatened by immigration?
Basic Universal Income.
Quote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 10:37:17 AMBasic Universal Income.
Presumably set high enough to compensate for any perceived reduction in wages caused by immigrant competition?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on February 24, 2025, 10:54:35 AMQuote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 10:37:17 AMBasic Universal Income.
Presumably set high enough to compensate for any perceived reduction in wages caused by immigrant competition?
If one's needs and creature comforts are adequately satisfied, then would their be any perceptions of reduced wages? I thought the latter was more of a rationalization/bugbear of noting feeling satiated.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on February 24, 2025, 10:54:35 AMQuote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 10:37:17 AMBasic Universal Income.
Presumably set high enough to compensate for any perceived reduction in wages caused by immigrant competition?
The details are what makes it hard.
Quote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 11:47:14 AMQuote from: Admiral Yi on February 24, 2025, 10:54:35 AMQuote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 10:37:17 AMBasic Universal Income.
Presumably set high enough to compensate for any perceived reduction in wages caused by immigrant competition?
The details are what makes it hard.
I think Yi's point is more about how Yi thinks about the world than how a poor person thinks about the world. If a poor person receives a basic income to cover their living expenses, that person is not going to care that someone else who is working, and paying taxes to support their basic income, makes more money than them.
Raising the minimum wage in that respect would be better. It's not like unemployment is that high anywhere in much of the West to be of a concern that doing so would cause layoffs because of it. Would also increase tax receipts as well.
Quote from: PJL on February 24, 2025, 12:01:28 PMRaising the minimum wage in that respect would be better. It's not like unemployment is that high anywhere in much of the West to be of a concern that doing so would cause layoffs because of it. Would also increase tax receipts as well.
It is important to remember that the unemployment rate is based on people looking for work, meaning it does not include those who have given up looking. I would argue that poverty rates are the more important thing to look at, and especially when we are talking about segments of the population becoming radicalized.
And there is an added benefit that the Universal basic income also acts as a unofficial minimum wage requirement, because it is going to be hard to get someone to work for equal to or less than that number. Which, as an aside, another reason why Yi's proposition is wrong.
Cultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
I agree completely, I was addressing the economic argument Yi raised.
Quote from: crazy canuck on February 24, 2025, 12:28:01 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
I agree completely, I was addressing the economic argument Yi raised.
I know, but I also have the feeling this part gets overlooked more often than not ( whether on purpose or not I can't say, but I've got suspicions.)
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Sure but everyone becomes a lot more patient with our differences if everyone has shelter & food.
Quote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 01:10:26 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Sure but everyone becomes a lot more patient with our differences if everyone has shelter & food.
Depends on the differences and wether or not they involve stabbing, running over or exploding people
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 01:14:13 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 01:10:26 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Sure but everyone becomes a lot more patient with our differences if everyone has shelter & food.
Depends on the differences and wether or not they involve stabbing, running over or exploding people
Patience.
Quote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 01:10:26 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Sure but everyone becomes a lot more patient with our differences if everyone has shelter & food.
Not really. There's a reason that political extremism is rife in affluent students. If all their needs are met, people just find something else to be angry about.
Quote from: Neil on February 24, 2025, 01:48:53 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 01:10:26 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Sure but everyone becomes a lot more patient with our differences if everyone has shelter & food.
Not really. There's a reason that political extremism is rife in affluent students. If all their needs are met, people just find something else to be angry about.
Sure, but those people are small in number. They may become the leaders of a movement, but more likely they are the first ones up against a wall.
Quote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 01:39:45 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 01:14:13 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on February 24, 2025, 01:10:26 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on February 24, 2025, 12:19:53 PMCultural differences matter with mass migration. Humans are more than consumers and workers.
Sure but everyone becomes a lot more patient with our differences if everyone has shelter & food.
Depends on the differences and wether or not they involve stabbing, running over or exploding people
Patience.
In that sense patience only works if you shut the door behind immigrants. Having a consistent flow of new immigrants means that the extremism never ends. If you're looking at it as an aspect of extremely differing cultures merging. Volume also matters there.
Where Canada has been lucky in the past with integration, as a general rule, is that it was usually people of some means and education coming. Much easier to integrate, and usually more closely aligned view points to begin with. That wasn't always the case, of course, 60 and 70s had a lot of influx of poorer peoples, but we need construction workers :D.
Of course, the student visa loop hole and the influx in the last decade or so kind of broke that educated middle class immigration stream, and we've had the backlash that accompanies such a change.
Quote from: Josquius on February 24, 2025, 06:30:11 AMQuote from: Threviel on February 23, 2025, 10:36:27 AMI've been thinking for a while about what's happened and why and this is my stream of consciousness attempt at finding some kind of explanation.
History goes in cycles as we all know, after some time there's often a reaction taking society in a different direction. The strength of the reaction is often based on how far back it needs to react. French absolutism leads to French revolution leads to absolutism leads to constitutional monarchy, extreme example, but can be seen as something a sinus curve mellowing out. Trudeau for a long time in Canada leads to unpopularity leads to not-Trudeau and so on. There are lots of examples and probably lots of counter-examples.
Back in the day Keynes noticed this behaviour in economics and the answer is that we mellow out the tops of the economic sinus wave, we have "filters" making the extremes of economics mellow out and as a thanks for that we haven't had a new depression like 30's one. These sinus waves could probably best be seen as overtones on a general upwards curve.
Society is obviously very complex and cannot be easily described as a sinus curve, but rather as untold amounts of curves acting as overtones on each-other. But one can perhaps se societal development as an aggregate of a lot of curves coalescing into some kind of curve.
The political parties in their views acted as some kind of overtone on the general developmental curve. If you asked a conservative French politician in 1949 whether he wanted women to vote he might say no, but unlike conservative 1820's politician he would not want a return of serfdom. If you asked him in 1989 he would not be against women voting. The general curve had moved, but the different parties still acted as some kind of wave around it.
Look at the 18th and 19th century, middle classes were growing and the populations were more and more demanding political representation. In France it led to the revolution, in the UK progressive reforms mellowed out the excesses in the developmental curve and we all know what happened.
But why was there a revolution in France? It seems that the democratic consensus moved in a different direction from the ruling elite. The consensus wanted political representation and the ruling elite did not want that to happen. In the end the sides were too far apart and a compromise could not be reached and bam, revolution.
But why not in the UK? The consensus moved in the exact same direction as in France, but the ruling elite moved with the curve, compromising just enough to not break the trust too much and fizzle, no revolution.
This development continued into the 21st century. The curve seems to have followed some kind of democratic consensus. Most everyone agreed that, yes, women should vote, we should be democratic, we should have a market economy, we should have state sponsored education and something of a welfare state and so on.
But then something happened. Immigration is a good example. Consensus, as far as I have been able to gather data, seems to always have been that we don't want immigration. Take your poor, tired masses yearning to breathe free and please stay away and so on. For decades the political elite has had a radically different view from the democratic consensus. In itself the issue has not been important enough to warrant the main curve to move very much. Until it became too much.
It really remains to be seen how much the consensus has moved from the political establishment. I don't really think it has moved much enough to warrant fear of violent revolution, the size of the extreme parties on the right seem to flatten out at around 20, perhaps up to 30 per cent. It's really up to the political systems to see if they can adjust to the new reality. In the US the system has obviously failed, but that's the only place where that's happened. Meloni is not making a fool of herself for example.
There's probably lots of other development aside from immigration with the same pattern, woeness, gay rights or whatever, but I don't know the issues enough to say anything about them.
But the political elite needs to get back on the consensus wave, the problems of immigration need to be handled of we don't want the adjustment to be too hard, because where the will of the people want to go it will go.
I don't know if this incoherent babbler makes any sense what so ever, just an attempt to crystallise my thoughts.
I recall once talking with an self-admitted far right supporter who used this excuse that "Its not actually that far right" and "Its just the world is really far left so it looks it".
To which...wut? We live in a super right wing world. We've had 50 years of a basic continuous lurch to the right.
Improvements in rights for minorities sure. But in the actual stuff that impacts your average straight cis white guy's every day life its just been rightwards ho.
Now looked on the grand scope of human history, then sure. We are considerably more left wing today than 200 years ago. Maybe there's some psychohistory deep genetic memory stuff going on there. But I don't think its how people look at things.
On immigration too.... Again I have to say this is a strange idea that gets repeated a lot. That the establishment doesn't want us to talk about immigration. They're really for it whilst the silent majority of normal people naturally hate it, obviously....
But in the UK at least we've had 30 years of non-stop talk about immigration with certain parts of the establishment really keen to make it an issue when most people...just don't care.
I googled it and even today only 51% of people think its an issue- not a top issue, an issue at all. Go back some years and you get even lower numbers. Look for yougov polling on important issues and its generally a small minority worried about that.
With immigration the key problem for most I believe is not the immigrants themselves. Its that they're being blamed for all our other problems. Why build more housing or invest in the health service when you can just say the reason they suck is immigrants.
I've said before but I do think much of this comes down to system 1 and system 2 thinking.
The issues we have in developed western countries are wicked problems. There's no simple answer for what needs to be done and the obvious stuff that would make up any solution- its hard to actually do.
Enter immigration. A simple answer to a complex problem that puts a scary face on the issue.
The right's would-be good faith answers to our problems clearly don't work... so they're embracing the simple non-answers.
Good response. From what data I have seen people haven't cared much and immigration has not been important. But the voters have consistently been against it. That the anti-immigration parties seem to level at around 20% support is sn indication that it's not a super-important question.
Trans issues is, I guess, another similar thing. No-one cares at all, but if an opinion has to be given I would guess that a clear majority would find the whole thing weird and unnatural. And then it became part of the silly culture wars and bam, another absurd talking point for fascist forces.
There are unavoidable demographic realities that impact now on all developed countries. In Europe, the effect is particularly strong, as birth rates are now very low and have been far below replacement for a while now. For the rhetoric about automation and AI, it isn't feasible to substitute capital for labor fast enough to handle that transition without serious economic fallout. Modern developed economies are overwhelming service based and with a rapidly aging society, the demand for care workers and all kinds of domestic labor will only increase. And of course, the demographic profile flows into worsening dependency ratios, with potentially catastrophic consequences for public pension schemes.
Therefore, there appears to be a stark policy choice - either accept - indeed encourage - immigration, or face chronic labor shortages, inflationary pressures, and possibly collapse of retirement schemes.
In Europe, that choice has created difficulties because the most obvious source of immigration is from predominantly Muslim countries, resulting in tensions with the secularized post-Christian culture of the "natives". And yet that cultural tension is not a full explanation of the atavistic resistance to immigration. Anti-immigrant agitation has flared in the US, even though the bulk of migrants are Christians from predominantly Spanish speaking countries that have an established record of integrating reasonably well into American society. The fact that extreme voices on the xenophobic nationalist right include names like Enrico Tarrio and Nick Fuentes indicates that the issue in the US is not simple anti-Hispanic prejudice. It is a political and cultural clash over status.
That describes our present, but the demographic shift already well underway in the most developed countries is also spreading and deepening into Latin America and much of the Muslim world. It won't be too long before the issue of immigration flows from those countries will be academic as there won't be any surplus labor left to migrate. At that point, the developed world will be left to confront the full implications of demographic decline.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on February 24, 2025, 05:20:27 PMThat describes our present, but the demographic shift already well underway in the most developed countries is also spreading and deepening into Latin America and much of the Muslim world. It won't be too long before the issue of immigration flows from those countries will be academic as there won't be any surplus labor left to migrate. At that point, the developed world will be left to confront the full implications of demographic decline.
Yep. Immigration will not be a viable strategy for long. The future will need another plan. Elon Musk will have to repopulate the world single handedly.
Yeah I'm really trying to wrap my head around the depopulation scenario(s).
Some things I think are fairly clear (I think) - the tension between the growing need for further retirement and old-age care services and shrinking work forces is pretty clear, and how to structure an economy in those conditions.
Most likely, I assume, it'll result in deflationary pressure on the local economy.
I wonder if it'll drive up the value of human labour, echoing the aftermath of the Black Death?
The immigration piece (in the Western World) is interesting. Anti-immigration sentiment is growing, I think, so the "import youth from elsewhere" strategy seems to be off the table.
Internationally, I wonder if (and how) the change in population percentages is going to work out - India will be much more populous than China, for example; and the African population will become comparatively bigger.
Why do you think it will be deflationary? Whenever there is a labour force decrease prices tend to go up because of the cost of labour goes up.
My assumption is that population shrinkage will result in less aggregate demand and therefore shrink the economy, but I am far from certain :)
Quote from: Jacob on February 24, 2025, 06:59:26 PMInternationally, I wonder if (and how) the change in population percentages is going to work out - India will be much more populous than China, for example; and the African population will become comparatively bigger.
India's fertility rate is 2.0, below replacement level. Granted giant compared to China, so I guess that checks out.
The African fertility rate is falling rapidly but still huge. The continent right now is 4.0 which is...hard for my western mind to get around. But it was 5 twenty years ago.
Quote from: Jacob on February 24, 2025, 09:29:41 PMMy assumption is that population shrinkage will result in less aggregate demand and therefore shrink the economy, but I am far from certain :)
the shrinkage is in the young age group, the olds will increase. Demand goes up but the workers needed to meet the demand goes down.
I wonder if there will come a point where evolution will step in and correct for demographic implosion, either at individual level or at societal level; selecting for individuals directly or indirectly more driven to reproduce, or selecting for societies which discourage childlessness. Surely in the long run humanity can't survive indefinitely with below replacement level fertility. Then again, no species is guaranteed survival, plenty of them go extinct all the time because they couldn't adapt to new environment...
Quote from: Valmy on February 24, 2025, 09:40:36 PMIndia's fertility rate is 2.0, below replacement level. Granted giant compared to China, so I guess that checks out.
Yeah, I was skimming some reports earlier - before I made the post - and what I saw as something saying that China was set to decline from 1.2 billion, maybe all the way down to 800 million; while India was set to peak at 1.4 billion (also starting from 1.2 billion) before starting to decline.
So basically China is deeper in the hole than India.
QuoteThe African fertility rate is falling rapidly but still huge. The continent right now is 4.0 which is...hard for my western mind to get around. But it was 5 twenty years ago.
Yeah, it's something. Though by current projections it seems likely (though projected) that Africa will eventually decline to below 2.1 as well - though it's further in the future. Who knows what will actually happen?
Quote from: DGuller on February 24, 2025, 10:37:40 PMI wonder if there will come a point where evolution will step in and correct for demographic implosion, either at individual level or at societal level; selecting for individuals directly or indirectly more driven to reproduce, or selecting for societies which discourage childlessness. Surely in the long run humanity can't survive indefinitely with below replacement level fertility. Then again, no species is guaranteed survival, plenty of them go extinct all the time because they couldn't adapt to new environment...
Yeah... fertile ground for new types of sci-fi: 1) Descendants of decline empires, not because of apocalypse but just lack of replacement; 2) The descendants of social media billionaires in their AI & robot doomsday bunkers, contrasted with whatever happened outside... and probably more.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on February 24, 2025, 05:20:27 PMThere are unavoidable demographic realities that impact now on all developed countries. In Europe, the effect is particularly strong, as birth rates are now very low and have been far below replacement for a while now. For the rhetoric about automation and AI, it isn't feasible to substitute capital for labor fast enough to handle that transition without serious economic fallout. Modern developed economies are overwhelming service based and with a rapidly aging society, the demand for care workers and all kinds of domestic labor will only increase. And of course, the demographic profile flows into worsening dependency ratios, with potentially catastrophic consequences for public pension schemes.
It is strong in Europe but Europe also has immigration at releatively high levels (historically). There are several European countries with a larger immigrant share of the population than the US including the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands etc.
The really interesting countries to watch I think are in Asia where the immigration rate is lower - particularly South Korea and Japan. I think South Korea last year had more 81 year olds than 1 year olds. I don't know what that society looks like.
One thing I slightly wonder is even just social attitudes around age.
I have no idea on the demographic point both how societies will change but also globally how the world will change as the population centre of gravity moves from Asia to Africa (why I think development is such an important question here). I think it's the biggest challenge/policy issue because I just don't know what that social change will look like.
Quote from: Jacob on February 25, 2025, 12:53:12 AMQuote from: DGuller on February 24, 2025, 10:37:40 PMI wonder if there will come a point where evolution will step in and correct for demographic implosion, either at individual level or at societal level; selecting for individuals directly or indirectly more driven to reproduce, or selecting for societies which discourage childlessness. Surely in the long run humanity can't survive indefinitely with below replacement level fertility. Then again, no species is guaranteed survival, plenty of them go extinct all the time because they couldn't adapt to new environment...
Yeah... fertile ground for new types of sci-fi: 1) Descendants of decline empires, not because of apocalypse but just lack of replacement; 2) The descendants of social media billionaires in their AI & robot doomsday bunkers, contrasted with whatever happened outside... and probably more.
You might like Paradise, on Disney
We're definitely going to need a change away from the current pension ponzi scheme. Even if immigration lets us kick the can down the road further, or governments manage to make it affordable and desirable for people to have kids, we can't just keep growing forever.
A bit of population decline would actually be a good thing in itself- its just the economic mess that results from this that is a problem, and of course caring for all those old people.
Another place where it seems Japan isn't actually weird, its just ahead of the curve. Though there- lets stop repeating the myth Japan doesn't want immigrants. It really really does. Its just not many foreigners learn Japanese and salaries in Japan aren't brilliant.
Their official data masks a tonne of foreigners resident in the country. Short term residents like Chinese "interns" for instance and those with a Japanese passport.
One thing I find interesting on Japan's decline is how unequal it is. Tokyo, Osaka, and other big cities are doing fine. You have vast swathes of the country becoming ghost towns however. Predictions for many European countries have similar, France for instance, though the UK is rather different with our different cultural attitudes to the city and country.
On Africa- there its just a few countries which are breaking things. Nigeria is a key one where they've this big cultural thing about having huge families. Lots of places like Kenya already have population growth under control.
On Japan less than 3% of the population are foreign nationals - that is millions of people. But in terms of the debate in Europe and North America that means Japans has fewer immigrants than Victor Orban's Hungary. So I'm not sure we can say Japan really really wants immigration unless we're just applying a different frame than we do for Europe.
With immigration and pensions it slightly depends. For example a lot of European immigration is primarily refugees/asylum seekers and family unification visas - so they're not economically focused migrants (I think this is one of the challenges with integration that some European countries have). I'm not sure the extent to which they help pay for pensions especially because in continental Europe there is a persistent earnings gap with second and third generations too.
The UK is a bit different - immigration looks more North American here. It is more heavily based on economic/work visas (plus students and family unification) and second and third generations tend to earn above the national average. So I think the argument on helping pay for pensions is stronger here. Having said that I think current rates of around 750,000 to 1 million net migration per year is not sustainable for more than a few years (especially in a country with the vaulting ambition of building 1.5 million new homes over five years).
With Africa no country is breaking things really. Most of Africa has the birth rate you would expect based on income and female literacy rates - the big exceptions are South Africa which is lower than you'd expect and the Sahel which is higher than you'd expect. But broadly fertility rates in Africa are exactly where you'd predict them to be based on fertility rates in the rest of the world.
S. Korea has 2.5 million foreigners working here. Out of a total 51.7 million. That's close to 5%.
My neighborhood and church has a ton of folk from Liberia and Nigeria.
I'm not sure what you guys are on about France. I've never seen a ghost town, and my family lives in the countryside. There's a zillion villages, and they're always building new houses.
EDIT: Google tells me France has the highest fertility rate in Europe, at 1.79. Add immigration and it seems fine to me.
QuoteOn Japan less than 3% of the population are foreign nationals - that is millions of people. But in terms of the debate in Europe and North America that means Japans has fewer immigrants than Victor Orban's Hungary.
As I say Japanese data is misleading however. Their census doesn't differentiate between 'native' Japanese and naturalised immigrants, lots of short term residents, which are most foreign workers, aren't counted, and so on.
They still have nothing on the UK of course, but they're not so immigrant free as is popularly believed.
QuoteSo I'm not sure we can say Japan really really wants immigration unless we're just applying a different frame than we do for Europe.
I want to be a millionaire. Doesn't mean I am. ;)
The Japanese government for years has been making efforts to try and encourage more immigration. They have problems doing this however.
QuoteWith Africa no country is breaking things really. Most of Africa has the birth rate you would expect based on income and female literacy rates - the big exceptions are South Africa which is lower than you'd expect and the Sahel which is higher than you'd expect. But broadly fertility rates in Africa are exactly where you'd predict them to be based on fertility rates in the rest of the world.
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Checking up my data might be out of date on Nigeria. Seems their birth rate has fell by a whole 1 in the last 5 years.
I do recall reading a piece a while ago how a handful of countries, them included, were the 'issue' in terms of African population growth however.
Quote from: Zoupa on February 27, 2025, 01:25:23 AMI'm not sure what you guys are on about France. I've never seen a ghost town, and my family lives in the countryside. There's a zillion villages, and they're always building new houses.
EDIT: Google tells me France has the highest fertility rate in Europe, at 1.79. Add immigration and it seems fine to me.
Its looking at the future rather than today.
I mention France less about it having especially poor population growth, and more without immigration Paris remains a pretty lone notable spot of growth in Europe.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2025/feb/18/europes-population-crisis-see-how-your-country-compares-visualised
France also does seem to have similar cultural vibes to Japan with the vibes that everything that is worth anything comes from the metropole.