Languish.org

It's been 25 years since Francis Fukuyama's essay was published.
In terms of the ratio of level of critical comment to people who have actually read the thing, it ranks very high.

The core of the argument:

QuoteWhat we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in. the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.

The End of History thesis has been subject to broad-based criticism from all across he political spectrum, but it seems to me looking back after 25 years, the thesis has held up pretty well.  Communism did utterly cease to exist as a viable ideological alternative.  And liberal democracy, despite its difficulties, remains unchallenged in the ideological sphere.  There are of course illiberal regimes and political currents, and they may even be growing.  But none of these has developed into a viable ideological alternative.  The Chinese "model" as such does not exist - China itself has made little effort to export its system as an ideological or practical alternative, and no other country has had success trying to imitate it.  Russia has stood apart as well but from the perspective of cultural influence, political soft power and economic development, Putinism has been a dismal failure.  Others have followed this "democratic authoritarian" model, but other than Turkey, none has really gotten any traction.  The only real success story in that tradition was one that existed back in 1989 - Singapore. It seemed like an exceptional case then, and still seems so now.

Clearly there are competing systems but is there a viable competing ideological ideal in Fukuyama's sense?  If there is I don't see it.  I think the thesis is still looking pretty good.

Thoughts?

You don't consider militant Islamism a viable competing ideological ideal?

Putinism anf Jihadism may be "failures", but they are increasing in influence.

Why should the "end of history", in Fukuyama terms, date to 25 years ago? Facism and Communism were never viable alternatives to liberal democracy, any more than Putinism or Jihadism are now.

Quote from: Jacob on August 21, 2014, 03:49:34 PM
You don't consider militant Islamism a viable competing ideological ideal?

I think the notion is that it isn't serious. In that, it can cause serious trouble, but not pose any sort of real threat to change the direction of world civilization (other than to retard it). 

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:50:59 PM
Facism and Communism were never viable alternatives to liberal democracy, any more than Putinism or Jihadism are now.

Plenty of people considered Communism a completely viable alternative.  The end of that illusion is pretty much the crux of Franky's thesis, as a I understand it.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2014, 04:01:12 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:50:59 PM
Facism and Communism were never viable alternatives to liberal democracy, any more than Putinism or Jihadism are now.

Plenty of people considered Communism a completely viable alternative.  The end of that illusion is pretty much the crux of Franky's thesis, as a I understand it.

Sure. And pleny of people, apparently, consider Putin a master statesman, with a superior vision of society. And plenty of people, seemingly, think political Islam is the answer.

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:52:45 PMI think the notion is that it isn't serious. In that, it can cause serious trouble, but not pose any sort of real threat to change the direction of world civilization (other than to retard it).

If that's true, I don't know if I buy it.

Personally I don't believe we are immune to descents into barbarism, I don't think we are immune to massive upheaval caused by issues in our economic system, and I don't think we are immune to significant environmental issues on the scale that would cause significant changes in the direction of world civilization.

I mean, it's possibly not going to happen in the immediate future, but I reckon that at best we're in a bit of a lull; and I'm not quite ready to relegate militant religious fundamentalism or the range of kleptocracies (from the pseudo liberal democracies, to the pseudo totalitarian ones) to the pile of "irrelevant dinosaurs". Maybe those systems won't directly challenge and supplant liberal democratic ideals in the West (but history is not just about the West anyhow), but they may well be part of crises and conflicts that alter how the West itself sees and applies liberal democratic ideals.

Even if we rule out future revolutions, and I don't, there's still evolution.

Quote from: Jacob on August 21, 2014, 04:07:01 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:52:45 PMI think the notion is that it isn't serious. In that, it can cause serious trouble, but not pose any sort of real threat to change the direction of world civilization (other than to retard it).

If that's true, I don't know if I buy it.

Personally I don't believe we are immune to descents into barbarism, I don't think we are immune to massive upheaval caused by issues in our economic system, and I don't think we are immune to significant environmental issues on the scale that would cause significant changes in the direction of world civilization.

I mean, it's possibly not going to happen in the immediate future, but I reckon that at best we're in a bit of a lull; and I'm not quite ready to relegate militant religious fundamentalism or the range of kleptocracies (from the pseudo liberal democracies, to the pseudo totalitarian ones) to the pile of "irrelevant dinosaurs". Maybe those systems won't directly challenge and supplant liberal democratic ideals in the West (but history is not just about the West anyhow), but they may well be part of crises and conflicts that alter how the West itself sees and applies liberal democratic ideals.

Even if we rule out future revolutions, and I don't, there's still evolution.

Hey, I'm not sure I buy it either.  ;)

I think the idea being put forth is that there is a certain current in world civilization that divides the 'haves' from the 'have-nots'; that is, as it were, the mainstream of human civilization. This may falter, or destroy itself, or fall to barbarians, but until it does, it is going to drive human society forward. There will be places that don't adopt this mainstream, but they will, by and large, be backwaters.

My objection to the "end of history" idea is that communism was ever really likely to 'be the mainstream' and relegate liberal democracies to the 'backwater'. Certainly some academics thought this to be true, but it was never, IMO, in any way likely.

Quote from: Jacob on August 21, 2014, 03:49:34 PM
You don't consider militant Islamism a viable competing ideological ideal?

I don't think it qualifies as a coherent political ideology in the Hegelian sense that Fukuyama was talking about.  And radicalized political Islam simply hasn't gotten much traction as an actual form of governance (as opposed to an animating principle of a political movement outside the state).  No one seems to be jumping to the Saudi model; the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt at governance was a fiasco; the Iranians have recruited militias abroad but no one seems much interested in replicating their model either.

Actually listening to Origins of Political Order right now. 

I could possibly buy the idea that Western liberal democracy is the bestest form of government that man will ever reach. Whether it will dominate or even survive in the future I don't know. A huge chunk of mankind hates hates hates freedom.

I think Putinism is a challenge.

I don't think Islamism is.

But more later. Maybe.

Putinism is ad-hoc, ghetto Pobedonostsev and nothing more. 

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 04:03:41 PM
Sure. And pleny of people, apparently, consider Putin a master statesman, with a superior vision of society. And plenty of people, seemingly, think political Islam is the answer.

As late as the 1970s and early 80s, it certainly looked like Communism was viable political model - the post-Stalinist USSR recorded very impressive macroeconomic numbers, had impressive technological achievements in high profile areas like rocketry, and had a high profile culturally, from sport to music to film.  Meanwhile the capitalist countries were experiencing stagflation and culture wars.  There had been two decades of former colonies breaking away and adopting various forms of "democratic socialism" in imitation of the Soviet or Yugoslav models.

Putinism doesn't present anything like the ideological challenge that Communism did.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 21, 2014, 04:50:18 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 04:03:41 PM
Sure. And pleny of people, apparently, consider Putin a master statesman, with a superior vision of society. And plenty of people, seemingly, think political Islam is the answer.

As late as the 1970s and early 80s, it certainly looked like Communism was viable political model - the post-Stalinist USSR recorded very impressive macroeconomic numbers, had impressive technological achievements in high profile areas like rocketry, and had a high profile culturally, from sport to music to film.  Meanwhile the capitalist countries were experiencing stagflation and culture wars.  There had been two decades of former colonies breaking away and adopting various forms of "democratic socialism" in imitation of the Soviet or Yugoslav models.

Putinism doesn't present anything like the ideological challenge that Communism did.

And in the last ten years the "democratic authoritarian" model displayed by China has also shown impressive growth, with a number of people around the world do appear to consider it a viable model, even if as you say the Chinese don't go around trying to export it.  Similarly political islam continues to be very attractive, with an islamist government in Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza.

Just because those models aren't getting much traction in "the west" doesn't mean they aren't attractive in other parts of the world.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 21, 2014, 04:50:18 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 04:03:41 PM
Sure. And pleny of people, apparently, consider Putin a master statesman, with a superior vision of society. And plenty of people, seemingly, think political Islam is the answer.

As late as the 1970s and early 80s, it certainly looked like Communism was viable political model - the post-Stalinist USSR recorded very impressive macroeconomic numbers, had impressive technological achievements in high profile areas like rocketry, and had a high profile culturally, from sport to music to film.  Meanwhile the capitalist countries were experiencing stagflation and culture wars.  There had been two decades of former colonies breaking away and adopting various forms of "democratic socialism" in imitation of the Soviet or Yugoslav models.

Putinism doesn't present anything like the ideological challenge that Communism did.

My impression in the early 80s was that the second world was widely regarded as a dreary shit-hole. Sure, it financed third world former colonies (as did the CIA) with arms - but such places were, by and large, even more dreary shit-holes.

People in the West feared the USSR, but mostly because they feared a nuke exchange. They did not fear that it represented "the future". Outside of some ivory tower academics and lunatic-fringers, no-one much believed it had 'ideological attractions'. Mostly, people were impressed by learing about the Communist horrors of the 70s that was comming into popular understanding - the "cultural revolution" and Pol Pot's lunacy.

Quote from: Barrister on August 21, 2014, 05:04:19 PMAnd in the last ten years the "democratic authoritarian" model displayed by China has also shown impressive growth, with a number of people around the world do appear to consider it a viable model, even if as you say the Chinese don't go around trying to export it.  Similarly political islam continues to be very attractive, with an islamist government in Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza.

I don't think the Chinese model is exportable except to other Communist countries. I can't see how you can achieve that without starting from an even higher level of state control.

Similarly I agree with Joan on Islamism. I don't think there's a state model yet. Iran and Saudi are sui generis. The Brothers failed in a failing transitional democracy. Hamas is maybe the only one there that is arguably exportable.

Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

And, on Malthus, last point I kind of do worry that it's a future. I don't think we're invulnerable to it.

Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2014, 05:16:05 PM

Quote from: Barrister on August 21, 2014, 05:04:19 PMAnd in the last ten years the "democratic authoritarian" model displayed by China has also shown impressive growth, with a number of people around the world do appear to consider it a viable model, even if as you say the Chinese don't go around trying to export it.  Similarly political islam continues to be very attractive, with an islamist government in Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza.

I don't think the Chinese model is exportable except to other Communist countries. I can't see how you can achieve that without starting from an even higher level of state control.

Similarly I agree with Joan on Islamism. I don't think there's a state model yet. Iran and Saudi are sui generis. The Brothers failed in a failing transitional democracy. Hamas is maybe the only one there that is arguably exportable.

Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

And, on Malthus, last point I kind of do worry that it's a future. I don't think we're invulnerable to it.

I think the point is that it isn't a future that people find attractive or appealing in the West. It has the look of a backwater in the making. Sure, it is appealing to local elites who want to capitalize on it and know-nothings. Same with political Islam.

My point is that the same was true of Communism pre-fall of the USSR. Most people saw it as unattractive (though they may not have put it like that). It appealed to know-nothings and local elites who wanted to capitalize on it. The only difference is that it also appealed to some ivory-tower intellectuals. Not sure if this difference is enough to justify a grandiloquent 'end of history' moniker.   

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 21, 2014, 04:42:14 PM
I don't think it qualifies as a coherent political ideology in the Hegelian sense that Fukuyama was talking about.  And radicalized political Islam simply hasn't gotten much traction as an actual form of governance (as opposed to an animating principle of a political movement outside the state).  No one seems to be jumping to the Saudi model; the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt at governance was a fiasco; the Iranians have recruited militias abroad but no one seems much interested in replicating their model either.

I think that ultimately my issue with the "end of history" thesis is that I don't think history is a Hegelian dialectic process that ultimately ends, but rather "one damn thing after another" a la Hubbard and Toynbee.

Even if we are looking at it in a Hegelian sense, wouldn't it make more sense to conclude that we're in a period of transition from synthesis to thesis (liberalism has adapted the better parts of socialism, and this liberal democracy is what seems the unassailable ideal), and that another point of antithesis will arise eventually (whether it be from the bosoms of corruptocrats, religious radicals, environmental and resource constraints, or some other source of disagreement with the liberal democratic ideal)?

Or have I misunderstood something?

I think Shelf has a point.  Illiberal democracy isn't attractive to us, but we aren't the ones who are going to be choosing it for our selves.  It's what seems viable to up-and-coming third world states.  I do agree that these these ideas aren't as coherent as liberal democracy or Marxist communism.  They seem to take a variety of forms for each locality but there are many things in common such as traditional values.  Putin's patronage of the Orthodox church, Singapore's "Asian values", Erdogan's political Islam.  I also wouldn't discount Islamist theocracy.  It hasn't spread very far party because it first came to Islam.  But recall it took a while before liberal democracy spread or and for 20 years there were only two Marxist states in the world.

Throughout recored history if someone had made this statement, they'd have been 'wrong'*, so why in the last few years has this ceased to be the case?


* in terms of triumph of current day western liberalism.

Quote from: Jacob on August 21, 2014, 05:25:02 PM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 21, 2014, 04:42:14 PM
I don't think it qualifies as a coherent political ideology in the Hegelian sense that Fukuyama was talking about.  And radicalized political Islam simply hasn't gotten much traction as an actual form of governance (as opposed to an animating principle of a political movement outside the state).  No one seems to be jumping to the Saudi model; the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt at governance was a fiasco; the Iranians have recruited militias abroad but no one seems much interested in replicating their model either.

I think that ultimately my issue with the "end of history" thesis is that I don't think history is a Hegelian dialectic process that ultimately ends, but rather "one damn thing after another" a la Hubbard and Toynbee.

Even if we are looking at it in a Hegelian sense, wouldn't it make more sense to conclude that we're in a period of transition from synthesis to thesis (liberalism has adapted the better parts of socialism, and this liberal democracy is what seems the unassailable ideal), and that another point of antithesis will arise eventually (whether it be from the bosoms of corruptocrats, religious radicals, environmental and resource constraints, or some other source of disagreement with the liberal democratic ideal)?

Or have I misunderstood something?

Never did completely grasp German Idealism.

Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2014, 05:16:05 PM
I don't think the Chinese model is exportable except to other Communist countries. I can't see how you can achieve that without starting from an even higher level of state control.

I think most attempts at implementing the Chinese model will turn into something similar to what Putin is doing.

QuoteSimilarly I agree with Joan on Islamism. I don't think there's a state model yet. Iran and Saudi are sui generis. The Brothers failed in a failing transitional democracy. Hamas is maybe the only one there that is arguably exportable.

I'm not sure that we can rightly confine our analysis of ideologies and history to states, especially since there are a number of failed states and near failed states out there. Also, not state actors and ideologies have frequently initiated significant change in history and the actions of states.

Radical Islamism may not provide a successful model for setting up states competing with liberal democratic states. But it may turn states into basically failed states a la Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan etc, acting directly counter to the supposed trend towards the spread of liberal democracy. It may cause liberal states to turn more reactionary in response to external threats, and it may serve as a justification for states to embrace reactionary corruption in democratic clothes as an alternative to actual liberal democracy.

As such, even if history is only measured by the professed ideologies of states, radical islamism seems pretty significant (and other fundamentalist religious values, I don't think islamism is the only expression of this tendency).

QuoteWhere I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

And, on Malthus, last point I kind of do worry that it's a future. I don't think we're invulnerable to it.

Isn't that one of the classical critiques of democracy?

Quote from: Jacob on August 21, 2014, 05:25:02 PM
Even if we are looking at it in a Hegelian sense, wouldn't it make more sense to conclude that we're in a period of transition from synthesis to thesis (liberalism has adapted the better parts of socialism, and this liberal democracy is what seems the unassailable ideal), and that another point of antithesis will arise eventually (whether it be from the bosoms of corruptocrats, religious radicals, environmental and resource constraints, or some other source of disagreement with the liberal democratic ideal)

It might make sense to say that "something else" may come, it just doesn't appear that is has come.

Even before socialism was ever adopted as a governing form, it presented a clear and rather compelling ideological alternative.  It presented competing ideals of egalitarianism and the elimination of poverty, it could lay claim to superiority in material provision by remedying the seemingly intractable cyclical crises of capitalism.  It exposed real "contradictions" of the emerging classical liberal order in the claim that formal equality of dignity was meaningless in the presence of dire poverty, and unrealized because the liberal order was grafted on to the aristocratic order it succeeded, thus preserving the very class distinctions in fact that it denied in theory.

As you say, it was compelling enough ultimately to dissolve the classical liberal order in synthesis.

I don't see anything out there compelling enough to drive such a fundamental programmatic adjustment.  Religious fundamentalists are this sense a regression, an echo of a superseded order - political luddism.  Kleptocracy is not an ideology, in any sense.  Environmental zero growthism hit its peak into the 1970s and has been in eclipse ever sense.  I don't think it will return in that form.

The one true ideological challenge that could I see emerge is a movement for effective global governance, as many of the most severe problems we face from global warming to depletion of fisheries or water resources or other commons, to spreads of infectious diseases, to disruptive migratory flows to the struggles of states to control transnational capital, stem from the limitations of the national state form.  But we are so far away from any viable expression of such an ideology - on the contrary the trend to be towards a strengthening of nationalism.

Quote from: Sheilbh on August 21, 2014, 05:16:05 PM
Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

The "market test" hasn't been kind to Putin.  If you look at the old Warsaw Pact states plus the states of the old Soviet Union the draw of the European Union, despite all of its problems, has been very powerful.  In contrast, the Russian led customs union counts two other members, the Russian led economic community four members, and the Russian led treaty organization five members.   The same names crop up: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan - basically weak, landlocked countries, often with significant Russian ethnic presence.  I.e. countries that don't have a lot of other viable options.

Erdogan isn't following Putin, he is just Islamizing Kemalism, even if the some of the end results look similar.  In so doing he has split that society down the middle and generated dissension in his own party, while cementing a permanent majority by keeping the Kurdish minority on his side.

As for Modi, I agree he is personally inclined in that direction but I very much doubt he will be able to run roughshod over all the powerful regional governments and localized interests and herd all those cats to the end.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 21, 2014, 06:21:22 PM
It might make sense to say that "something else" may come, it just doesn't appear that is has come.

That's fair enough. I expect that it will.

QuoteEven before socialism was ever adopted as a governing form, it presented a clear and rather compelling ideological alternative.  It presented competing ideals of egalitarianism and the elimination of poverty, it could lay claim to superiority in material provision by remedying the seemingly intractable cyclical crises of capitalism.  It exposed real "contradictions" of the emerging classical liberal order in the claim that formal equality of dignity was meaningless in the presence of dire poverty, and unrealized because the liberal order was grafted on to the aristocratic order it succeeded, thus preserving the very class distinctions in fact that it denied in theory.

As you say, it was compelling enough ultimately to dissolve the classical liberal order in synthesis.

I don't see anything out there compelling enough to drive such a fundamental programmatic adjustment.

Yeah, I don't think there's a coherent competitive alternative out there at this point, but I don't think things are quiet enough that they won't be sought out and/ or evolve, nor that the seeds of the next alternative isn't already sprouting somewhere. It seems to me that in many cases, identifying a particular dialectic is easier in retrospective.

I mean, sure, Capitalism vs Communism was particularly stark and obvious at the time, but I think earlier ideological conflicts were less so; I don't think that the lack of such start contrast necessarily implies a lack of conflict.

QuoteReligious fundamentalists are this sense a regression, an echo of a superseded order - political luddism.  Kleptocracy is not an ideology, in any sense. 

Fundementalism and kleptocracies - and the potential marriage of the two - may not be particularly intellectually robust, but I don't think intellectual robustness is as important as popularity.

QuoteEnvironmental zero growthism hit its peak into the 1970s and has been in eclipse ever sense.  I don't think it will return in that form.

The one true ideological challenge that could I see emerge is a movement for effective global governance, as many of the most severe problems we face from global warming to depletion of fisheries or water resources or other commons, to spreads of infectious diseases, to disruptive migratory flows to the struggles of states to control transnational capital, stem from the limitations of the national state form.  But we are so far away from any viable expression of such an ideology - on the contrary the trend to be towards a strengthening of nationalism.

That's more along the lines of what I meant. I don't think environmentalists are going to band together and create an ideology that will provide a credible alternative to liberal democracy. I'm more considering the possibility of some sort of environmentally triggered shit hitting the fan and causing a significant shift in how we - or at least some people - approach governance. Well, that and causing significant cultural shifts and conflicts - that's history to me too.

If, say, resource scarcity causes the displacement of tens or hundreds of millions of people, with attendant cultural upheaval and wars and death, I'd consider that history even if there isn't an underlying ideological dialectic going on other than "we want to live" vs "we don't want you downgrading our quality of life".

Was reading a book review, maybe in the NYT, about life at the end of the Soviet Union.  Author said the worst thing about Communism was there was absolutely nothing to do.  You worked, you ate, and you slept.

Friend of mine who visited East Germany had a similar observation: what Communists really needed was video games.

He also told me that the parts of East Germany that recieved West German TV had much lower rates of defection.

Even the western democracies have strong illiberal undercurrents. It's foolish to think any ideology has "won".

Quote from: Admiral Yi on August 21, 2014, 07:03:34 PM
Was reading a book review, maybe in the NYT, about life at the end of the Soviet Union.  Author said the worst thing about Communism was there was absolutely nothing to do.  You worked, you ate, and you slept.

You left out...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-Ecy9KUN2s

There is only one prevailing and consistent social order throughout History: the 'Have' rule - the 'Have Not' are being ruled.  What changes are the modalities which enable one to be a member of the former group rather than to be confined to the latter one.  Everything else is merely window dressing - no matter what ideologues may prattle about it at any given time.



G.

Chavezism is the real threat!  :lol:

http://time.com/3156299/venezuelan-president-announces-mandatory-fingerprinting-at-grocery-stores/

QuoteVenezuelan President Announces Mandatory Fingerprinting at Grocery Stores

Eliana Dockterman @edockterman

The measure is meant to end food shortages

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced Wednesday that the country will introduce a mandatory fingerprinting system in supermarkets. He asserted that the plan will keep people from buying too much of any single item. The president did not say when the measure would go into effect, the Associated Press reports.

The Socialist Venezuelan government has struggled with food shortages for over a year. Basic cooking items like oil and flour are scarce. The administration says that the shortages are a result of companies speculating and people smuggling food out of the country.

Critics argue that the new system—which was tried on a voluntary basis in government-run grocery stores this spring—is equivalent to rationing food.

The end of history will be the technological singularity, when humans merge with technology.
It is not about creating strong AIs, but about enhancing humanity.

Post singularity humans will have their memories in the cloud, process information so fast the physical world will seem frozen, and more importantly, all the human individualities will not matter anymore, because they will all look and behave however they really wanted too. If we don't kill ourselves with nano-scale technologies, the future is great.

Quote from: Siege on August 22, 2014, 03:10:24 AM
The end of history will be the technological singularity, when humans merge with technology.
It is not about creating strong AIs, but about enhancing humanity.

Post singularity humans will have their memories in the cloud, process information so fast the physical world will seem frozen, and more importantly, all the human individualities will not matter anymore, because they will all look and behave however they really wanted too. If we don't kill ourselves with nano-scale technologies, the future is great.

You should play Civilization: Beyond Earth. Unfortunately, it does not have Jews in space. :(

Have anybody ever got a full valyrian steel plate armor?
I bet it would completely impervious to castle-forged steel.

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:50:59 PM
Putinism anf Jihadism may be "failures", but they are increasing in influence.

Why should the "end of history", in Fukuyama terms, date to 25 years ago? Facism and Communism were never viable alternatives to liberal democracy, any more than Putinism or Jihadism are now.

The thing is that Fascism and Commnuisms were thought to be viable alternatives. They were not mere reactions to something else. Islamism claims to be a viable alternative - obviously it isn't. Putinism doesn't claim to be a viable alternative, it really claims to be the same thing. The ideology of putinism, if there is such a thing, is "you are doing this too".

Fukuyama is still correct. We have reached the end of history in the hegelian sense. History has no direction to progress in.

A Valyrian dragon lord probably flew around in full plate valyrian steel armor, eh?

Quote from: Viking on August 22, 2014, 03:47:11 AM

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:50:59 PM
Putinism anf Jihadism may be "failures", but they are increasing in influence.

Why should the "end of history", in Fukuyama terms, date to 25 years ago? Facism and Communism were never viable alternatives to liberal democracy, any more than Putinism or Jihadism are now.

The thing is that Fascism and Commnuisms were thought to be viable alternatives. They were not mere reactions to something else. Islamism claims to be a viable alternative - obviously it isn't. Putinism doesn't claim to be a viable alternative, it really claims to be the same thing. The ideology of putinism, if there is such a thing, is "you are doing this too".

Fukuyama is still correct. We have reached the end of history in the hegelian sense. History has no direction to progress in.

I would say "fascism and communism claimed to be viable alternatives - obviously, they weren't". How does that differ from Islamicism or that mix that we could convenietly label Putinism? That some academics, bizzarely, took those claims seriously then, but few do now!

The only "change" here is on the inside of academic heads. Also, in the weakness, in absolute terms, of the present-day challengers at the moment. The West could, if motivated to all out war, crush Putin and the Islamicists like flies, which wasn't true of the fascists and communists in their heyday.   

Quote from: Grallon on August 21, 2014, 07:58:46 PM
There is only one prevailing and consistent social order throughout History: the 'Have' rule - the 'Have Not' are being ruled.  What changes are the modalities which enable one to be a member of the former group rather than to be confined to the latter one.  Everything else is merely window dressing - no matter what ideologues may prattle about it at any given time.

OK so Stalin and Roosevelt, Hitler and Churchill - all the same, the differences are just "window dressing" to prattle about?

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 08:51:40 AM

Quote from: Viking on August 22, 2014, 03:47:11 AM

Quote from: Malthus on August 21, 2014, 03:50:59 PM
Putinism anf Jihadism may be "failures", but they are increasing in influence.

Why should the "end of history", in Fukuyama terms, date to 25 years ago? Facism and Communism were never viable alternatives to liberal democracy, any more than Putinism or Jihadism are now.

The thing is that Fascism and Commnuisms were thought to be viable alternatives. They were not mere reactions to something else. Islamism claims to be a viable alternative - obviously it isn't. Putinism doesn't claim to be a viable alternative, it really claims to be the same thing. The ideology of putinism, if there is such a thing, is "you are doing this too".

Fukuyama is still correct. We have reached the end of history in the hegelian sense. History has no direction to progress in.

I would say "fascism and communism claimed to be viable alternatives - obviously, they weren't". How does that differ from Islamicism or that mix that we could convenietly label Putinism? That some academics, bizzarely, took those claims seriously then, but few do now!

The only "change" here is on the inside of academic heads. Also, in the weakness, in absolute terms, of the present-day challengers at the moment. The West could, if motivated to all out war, crush Putin and the Islamicists like flies, which wasn't true of the fascists and communists in their heyday.

Well the thing is nobody out there is suggesting that "we" should be like putin's russia, while there are lots of people are suggesting "we" should be like the caliphate.

Quote from: Viking on August 22, 2014, 09:32:45 AM
Well the thing is nobody out there is suggesting that "we" should be like putin's russia, while there are lots of people are suggesting "we" should be like the caliphate.

Not true. There are some - ultra-conservatives who think the West is on the road to degeneration. They admire Putin's Russia.

What there aren't, are academics who admire Putin's Russia (or at least, I haven't heard of any). That seems to be the major difference as to why the one set of horrible ruling theories/philosophies was a "serious challenge" and the other set is not.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 08:57:54 AM

OK so Stalin and Roosevelt, Hitler and Churchill - all the same, the differences are just "window dressing" to prattle about?

Those regimes were variations of the same thing - a hierarchical society.  You should read Pierre Clastres' "Society against the State".  He contends that only primitive tribal societies, "structured by a complex set of customs [can] avert, ward off and refuse the rise of despotic power".

Is there a fundamental difference between ranting about the herrenvolk, droning on about the dictatorship of the proletariat or speeches about democracy & capitalism?  In the methods you might say but tell me, weren't all these regimes based on extensive legal structures distributing power and establishing the parameters for the use of legitimate coercion?

It's not because the iron first is (more or less) gloved in velvet in our democracies that it isn't there - see what's happening in Ferguson at the moment.

But perhaps you're after a moral hierarchy?  Now *that* is definitely window dressing.




G.

Quote from: Grallon on August 22, 2014, 09:40:32 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 08:57:54 AM

OK so Stalin and Roosevelt, Hitler and Churchill - all the same, the differences are just "window dressing" to prattle about?

Those regimes were variations of the same thing - a hierarchical society.  You should read Pierre Clastres' "Society against the State".  He contends that only primitive tribal societies, "structured by a complex set of customs [can] avert, ward off and refuse the rise of despotic power".

Is there a fundamental difference between ranting about the herrenvolk, droning on about the dictatorship of the proletariat or speeches about democracy & capitalism?  In the methods you might say but tell me, weren't all these regimes based on extensive legal structures distributing power and establishing the parameters for the use of legitimate coercion?

It's not because the iron first is (more or less) gloved in velvet in our democracies that it isn't there - see what's happening in Ferguson at the moment.

But perhaps you're after a moral hierarchy?  Now *that* is definitely window dressing.




G.

The problem with Clastres is that he assumed as much as he criticized in his notions of stateless and states.  For him, the state was not evolutionary (or perhaps better would be he criticized notions of evolution as progress) but instead the state was a failure.  Both are assumptions, both are slanted and in my opinion incorrect views.

Small scale societies do indeed run as classless and hierarchy-free social units, however this is only true on the smallest scales.  Increases in population and methods of food gathering require institutions and organization that needs leaders and systems of work roles.  While on the (still) small scales these roles are often task-based with little actual authority outside of the situation needed, they do show a movement toward hierarchies in society as the population size increases and social complexity likewise increases.

The reason frameworks like the Sahlins-Service theory still work is that it manages to explain that varying levels of population and social complexity go hand in hand with hierarchies and concentrations of power.  Human social systems of increasing social stratification and concentrations of power seem not to be "failures" of society, but rather methods of change over time to changing demographic and caloric production needs.

In short, to lump all of the 1930s leaders into one camp work only if you are talking on the meta-level - they all were leaders of hierarchical states at that time, however this is facile and really only works as a t-shirt slogan or as a rallying cry to teenagers who do not wish to delve into the complexity of the situation.

So is that what "the end of history" means?

That Western nation states think they have the best system, and that they feel there are no competing models that they are willing to consider. That there are no credible ideological competition from our point of view?

That may be true - at least at the moment - but it seems a bit overwrought to call it the end of history. History also happens in places that are not Western nations, and it happens in the interactions between Western nations and non-Western ones. And the ascendance of liberal democracy globally seems far from certain to me at this point.

I had no idea Grallon was such an anarchist.

Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2014, 10:30:24 AM
I had no idea Grallon was such an anarchist.

He's more of a nihilist, it seems.

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 10:29:28 AM
That may be true - at least at the moment - but it seems a bit overwrought to call it the end of history. History also happens in places that are not Western nations, and it happens in the interactions between Western nations and non-Western ones. And the ascendance of liberal democracy globally seems far from certain to me at this point.

Are you suggesting Fukuyama is not aware of non-Western states?  I find that humorous.

Quote from: Grallon on August 22, 2014, 09:40:32 AM
Is there a fundamental difference between ranting about the herrenvolk, droning on about the dictatorship of the proletariat or speeches about democracy & capitalism? 

Is that your understanding of historical Nazism; merely a lot of pointless speeches, nothing else to see there, nothing to write home about?

I disagree.

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 10:29:28 AM
That may be true - at least at the moment - but it seems a bit overwrought to call it the end of history. History also happens in places that are not Western nations, and it happens in the interactions between Western nations and non-Western ones. And the ascendance of liberal democracy globally seems far from certain to me at this point.

But what is the competing idea?
There are plenty of illiberal states and plenty of undemocratic ones but most at least play lip service to "bourgeois" democracy and human rights.

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 10:29:28 AM
So is that what "the end of history" means?

That Western nation states think they have the best system, and that they feel there are no competing models that they are willing to consider. That there are no credible ideological competition from our point of view?

That may be true - at least at the moment - but it seems a bit overwrought to call it the end of history. History also happens in places that are not Western nations, and it happens in the interactions between Western nations and non-Western ones. And the ascendance of liberal democracy globally seems far from certain to me at this point.

My understanding is that the idea of the "end of history" can be summarized as follows (I'm open to correction as I read his work a long, long time ago):

1. Human society is ever-evolving. There is a hierarchy involved: some societies rank higher than others. This is evidenced by improvements in ethics, politics and economics.

2. Right now, the most "evolved" societies are the Western liberal democracies.

3. The end of history is not the end of events - or even, an inevitable, physical triumph of Western democracies. They could fall, be overwhelmed by barbarians, etc.

4. The 'end of history' means that there are no alternative systems that could challenge some sort of democratic, liberal system for the title of 'most evolved form of society'.

5.For example, it is theoretically possible that the Western demoracies could lose a war with the combined might of Putin's legions and Islamoid fundies. But even if that where to happen, it would not give said Putinite legions or fundies the title of 'more evolved', it would just signal a regression in world civilization. Such societies would not be ethically, politically or economically better than the societies they defeated.

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 10:29:28 AM
So is that what "the end of history" means?

That Western nation states think they have the best system, and that they feel there are no competing models that they are willing to consider. That there are no credible ideological competition from our point of view?

That may be true - at least at the moment - but it seems a bit overwrought to call it the end of history. History also happens in places that are not Western nations, and it happens in the interactions between Western nations and non-Western ones. And the ascendance of liberal democracy globally seems far from certain to me at this point.

This is my take on this as well. We may indeed see the end of ideological struggle in the West - at least for the forseeable future - but that does not mean that the struggle is not happening elsewhere (and "seeping" into the West, perhaps not at the structural level, but at individual level - see, for example, Westerners joining up with the jihad). And, truth be told, end of this internal struggle in the West may not be such a good thing - it breeds complacency, which may prove fatal in the end.

I'm fairly certain, for example, that at the beginning of the Qing dynasty's reign, the Chinese could have happily concluded that this is the end of history - but it turned out to be the end of China instead.

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 10:45:20 AM

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 10:29:28 AM
So is that what "the end of history" means?

That Western nation states think they have the best system, and that they feel there are no competing models that they are willing to consider. That there are no credible ideological competition from our point of view?

That may be true - at least at the moment - but it seems a bit overwrought to call it the end of history. History also happens in places that are not Western nations, and it happens in the interactions between Western nations and non-Western ones. And the ascendance of liberal democracy globally seems far from certain to me at this point.

My understanding is that the idea of the "end of history" can be summarized as follows (I'm open to correction as I read his work a long, long time ago):

1. Human society is ever-evolving. There is a hierarchy involved: some societies rank higher than others. This is evidenced by improvements in ethics, politics and economics.

2. Right now, the most "evolved" societies are the Western liberal democracies.

3. The end of history is not the end of events - or even, an inevitable, physical triumph of Western democracies. They could fall, be overwhelmed by barbarians, etc.

4. The 'end of history' means that there are no alternative systems that could challenge some sort of democratic, liberal system for the title of 'most evolved form of society'.

5.For example, it is theoretically possible that the Western demoracies could lose a war with the combined might of Putin's legions and Islamoid fundies. But even if that where to happen, it would not give said Putinite legions or fundies the title of 'more evolved', it would just signal a regression in world civilization. Such societies would not be ethically, politically or economically better than the societies they defeated.

By that definition, didn't history end with the Enlightenment? I mean, there have been set backs, but overall these have been two solid centuries of liberal democracy gaining more ground.

Quote from: Martinus on August 22, 2014, 10:56:35 AM

By that definition, didn't history end with the Enlightenment? I mean, there have been set backs, but overall these have been two solid centuries of liberal democracy gaining more ground.

That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 10:38:30 AM

Is that your understanding of historical Nazism; merely a lot of pointless speeches, nothing else to see there, nothing to write home about?

I disagree.

No my original point was that all those regimes were complex apparatus of domination and as such were equivalent. 

However as PDH rightly pointed out that was a facile categorization because there was a fundamental difference between Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia on one side and the western democracies on the other: totalitarianism. 



G.

Quote from: Martinus on August 22, 2014, 10:56:35 AM
By that definition, didn't history end with the Enlightenment? I mean, there have been set backs, but overall these have been two solid centuries of liberal democracy gaining more ground.

From the original essay:

QuoteHegel  . .  proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially correct.[2] The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point that the  vanguard of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806 - abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc. - the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.

So the answer is basically "yes" but with the exception that there emerged a competing enlightenment vision - Marxism - whose political manifestation was not definitively defeated until much later.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 08:57:54 AM

Quote from: Grallon on August 21, 2014, 07:58:46 PM
There is only one prevailing and consistent social order throughout History: the 'Have' rule - the 'Have Not' are being ruled.  What changes are the modalities which enable one to be a member of the former group rather than to be confined to the latter one.  Everything else is merely window dressing - no matter what ideologues may prattle about it at any given time.

OK so Stalin and Roosevelt, Hitler and Churchill - all the same, the differences are just "window dressing" to prattle about?

I can't believe that you, of all people, bit on this troll!  :lol:

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 11:03:03 AM
That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

If you look at the 10 concrete measures proposed in the Communist manifesto - most of them were adopted in whole or in part by capitalist regimes: graduated income taxation, taxation of estates, central banks with a monopoly of currency issuance, centralized regulation of transport and communication, common agricultural policies, mechanization of agriculture, free universal education.

Communism was a very powerful ideological force, so powerful that is was to a significant extent co-opted.  And the Cold War was part of that process: progressive taxation, large-scale public transport, the development of the welfare state, expansion of higher education, even the civil rights movement were all influenced by the ideological and physical competition against Communism.

Communism was a viable competitor, but liberal democracy proved more adaptable.

Quote from: grumbler on August 22, 2014, 11:51:50 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 08:57:54 AM

Quote from: Grallon on August 21, 2014, 07:58:46 PM
There is only one prevailing and consistent social order throughout History: the 'Have' rule - the 'Have Not' are being ruled.  What changes are the modalities which enable one to be a member of the former group rather than to be confined to the latter one.  Everything else is merely window dressing - no matter what ideologues may prattle about it at any given time.

OK so Stalin and Roosevelt, Hitler and Churchill - all the same, the differences are just "window dressing" to prattle about?

I can't believe that you, of all people, bit on this troll!  :lol:

Sheer curiosity to see how far he would go.

Quote from: Martinus on August 22, 2014, 10:51:36 AM
I'm fairly certain, for example, that at the beginning of the Qing dynasty's reign, the Chinese could have happily concluded that this is the end of history - but it turned out to be the end of China instead.

The Chinese could have happily concluded they would be ruled by foreigners forever and delighted to be second class citizens in their own empire?  Are you sure this is a good example?

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 11:55:45 AM

Quote from: grumbler on August 22, 2014, 11:51:50 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 08:57:54 AM

Quote from: Grallon on August 21, 2014, 07:58:46 PM
There is only one prevailing and consistent social order throughout History: the 'Have' rule - the 'Have Not' are being ruled.  What changes are the modalities which enable one to be a member of the former group rather than to be confined to the latter one.  Everything else is merely window dressing - no matter what ideologues may prattle about it at any given time.

OK so Stalin and Roosevelt, Hitler and Churchill - all the same, the differences are just "window dressing" to prattle about?

I can't believe that you, of all people, bit on this troll!  :lol:

Sheer curiosity to see how far he would go.

Yeah, I realized after I posted that you probably didn't read the board often enough to know that he was going to go nowhere - I don't think he even realizes that emotion is not intellect.  Well, now you know.  It was a pretty cheap price to pay, I suppose.

Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2014, 11:57:46 AM

Quote from: Martinus on August 22, 2014, 10:51:36 AM
I'm fairly certain, for example, that at the beginning of the Qing dynasty's reign, the Chinese could have happily concluded that this is the end of history - but it turned out to be the end of China instead.

The Chinese could have happily concluded they would be ruled by foreigners forever and delighted to be second class citizens in their own empire?  Are you sure this is a good example?

Marti is also apparently unaware of the fact that Chinese political historiography was completely wrapped up in cyclic theory; the Chinese intelligentsia "knew" that the Qing Dynasty would eventually lose the Mandate of Heaven and be replaced.  It had always happened and, they supposed, always would.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 11:54:32 AM

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 11:03:03 AM
That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

If you look at the 10 concrete measures proposed in the Communist manifesto - most of them were adopted in whole or in part by capitalist regimes: graduated income taxation, taxation of estates, central banks with a monopoly of currency issuance, centralized regulation of transport and communication, common agricultural policies, mechanization of agriculture, free universal education.

Communism was a very powerful ideological force, so powerful that is was to a significant extent co-opted.  And the Cold War was part of that process: progressive taxation, large-scale public transport, the development of the welfare state, expansion of higher education, even the civil rights movement were all influenced by the ideological and physical competition against Communism.

Communism was a viable competitor, but liberal democracy proved more adaptable.

Wouldn't the Heglian triad be a better way to describe this process, rather than one system winning and the other losing?

After all, modern liberal democracy has very little in common with the laissez faire republic that led to the postulation of communism by Marx.

In fact, from a certain perspective you could say that it is socialism, not laissez faire capitalism that won in the West - right now the USA is probably the last stronghold of the latter out of Western democracies, and even it is going to give up eventually.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 10:41:30 AM
But what is the competing idea?
There are plenty of illiberal states and plenty of undemocratic ones but most at least play lip service to "bourgeois" democracy and human rights.

My objection to the "end of history" thesis is not that there is a clear and compelling alternative idea competing with Western liberal democracy.

Rather, it is that the global triumph of Western liberal democracy is currently inhibited by a large incoherent mess of interests and local political factors. There are more places with more people where liberal democracy does not really exist, and where it is not ascendant, in spite of any lip service paid to it.

Now, over time liberal democracy may well triumph but it is far from clear to me that it is inevitable. Personally, I'd put my money on "a new challenger arises" rather than "and that, bar a few bumps in the road, was it."

As an aside - I think the "end of history" bit was a brilliant bit of marketing for Francis Fukuyama. I think it increases the chance of him being referenced centuries hence. If he was right, more or less, he'll seem prophetic. If wrong, he'll be taken as an exemplar of a line of thought and a great starting point for discussion; "the end of history, right or wrong? Discuss."

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 11:54:32 AM

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 11:03:03 AM
That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

If you look at the 10 concrete measures proposed in the Communist manifesto - most of them were adopted in whole or in part by capitalist regimes: graduated income taxation, taxation of estates, central banks with a monopoly of currency issuance, centralized regulation of transport and communication, common agricultural policies, mechanization of agriculture, free universal education.

Communism was a very powerful ideological force, so powerful that is was to a significant extent co-opted.  And the Cold War was part of that process: progressive taxation, large-scale public transport, the development of the welfare state, expansion of higher education, even the civil rights movement were all influenced by the ideological and physical competition against Communism.

Communism was a viable competitor, but liberal democracy proved more adaptable.

I don't think it is provable or disprovable whether some, or all, of these measures would or would not have been adopted by modern Western nations had Communism never existed. Surely some (or all) of them were in the process of being adopted long before the publication of the Communist Mannifesto.

In short, it is perfectly possible to argue that these were indigenous developments within the Western Liberal tradition. I don't think anyone ever said "oh look, those commies have tractors. We better co-opt them and adopt "mechanization of agriculture". Or that without the Communist Manifesto the West would not have tractors (or universal educaction or regulations or central banks or whatever).

The actual practice of communism (as opposed to the Manifesto) proved just another dreary species of totalitarianism. Not really a "viable competitor" at all, other than in the sense of brute force. 

Quote from: grumbler on August 22, 2014, 12:03:37 PM

Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2014, 11:57:46 AM

Quote from: Martinus on August 22, 2014, 10:51:36 AM
I'm fairly certain, for example, that at the beginning of the Qing dynasty's reign, the Chinese could have happily concluded that this is the end of history - but it turned out to be the end of China instead.

The Chinese could have happily concluded they would be ruled by foreigners forever and delighted to be second class citizens in their own empire?  Are you sure this is a good example?

Marti is also apparently unaware of the fact that Chinese political historiography was completely wrapped up in cyclic theory; the Chinese intelligentsia "knew" that the Qing Dynasty would eventually lose the Mandate of Heaven and be replaced.  It had always happened and, they supposed, always would.

Ok, so I was talking out of my ass. Boo fucking hoo. This is Languish. Anyways, I like my idea about Heglian triad more than the failed Chinese analogy. Let's discuss that.

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 12:33:42 PM
My objection to the "end of history" thesis is not that there is a clear and compelling alternative idea competing with Western liberal democracy.

Rather, it is that the global triumph of Western liberal democracy is currently inhibited by a large incoherent mess of interests and local political factors. There are more places with more people where liberal democracy does not really exist, and where it is not ascendant, in spite of any lip service paid to it.

Now, over time liberal democracy may well triumph but it is far from clear to me that it is inevitable. Personally, I'd put my money on "a new challenger arises" rather than "and that, bar a few bumps in the road, was it."

As an aside - I think the "end of history" bit was a brilliant bit of marketing for Francis Fukuyama. I think it increases the chance of him being referenced centuries hence. If he was right, more or less, he'll seem prophetic. If wrong, he'll be taken as an exemplar of a line of thought and a great starting point for discussion; "the end of history, right or wrong? Discuss."

You do a good job of articulating my response to Fukuyama as well:  I think it was an interesting thought experiment, and may prove to be a viable assertion in the broadest sense for our time period, but I don't think that it will prove an accurate prediction of the future.  I'd just add that i don't think that he really believed it himself; that he was proposing a possible truth based on the evidence that he presented (which was the evidence available), rather than promoting his truth as the only possible one, never to be superseded.

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 12:33:42 PM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2014, 10:41:30 AM
But what is the competing idea?
There are plenty of illiberal states and plenty of undemocratic ones but most at least play lip service to "bourgeois" democracy and human rights.

My objection to the "end of history" thesis is not that there is a clear and compelling alternative idea competing with Western liberal democracy.

Rather, it is that the global triumph of Western liberal democracy is currently inhibited by a large incoherent mess of interests and local political factors. There are more places with more people where liberal democracy does not really exist, and where it is not ascendant, in spite of any lip service paid to it.

Now, over time liberal democracy may well triumph but it is far from clear to me that it is inevitable. Personally, I'd put my money on "a new challenger arises" rather than "and that, bar a few bumps in the road, was it."

As an aside - I think the "end of history" bit was a brilliant bit of marketing for Francis Fukuyama. I think it increases the chance of him being referenced centuries hence. If he was right, more or less, he'll seem prophetic. If wrong, he'll be taken as an exemplar of a line of thought and a great starting point for discussion; "the end of history, right or wrong? Discuss."

I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 01:08:35 PM
I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

Quote from: grumbler on August 22, 2014, 01:05:19 PMYou do a good job of articulating my response to Fukuyama as well:  I think it was an interesting thought experiment, and may prove to be a viable assertion in the broadest sense for our time period, but I don't think that it will prove an accurate prediction of the future.  I'd just add that i don't think that he really believed it himself; that he was proposing a possible truth based on the evidence that he presented (which was the evidence available), rather than promoting his truth as the only possible one, never to be superseded.

Yeah, we're getting decent mileage out of discussing it here, right now, for example :)

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 01:25:13 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 01:08:35 PM
I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

Well, if it is true, it is certainly a point worth noting. If on the hand there are multiple ways to be "at the pinnacle of moral and social evolution", that would imply something totally different.

For example, if it is true, then we are justified in encouraging others to adopt our system in preference to what they have now - if it is not, then such actions are really nothing more than a kind of socio-cultural bigotry.

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 01:31:06 PM

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 01:25:13 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 01:08:35 PM
I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

Well, if it is true, it is certainly a point worth noting. If on the hand there are multiple ways to be "at the pinnacle of moral and social evolution", that would imply something totally different.

For example, if it is true, then we are justified in encouraging others to adopt our system in preference to what they have now - if it is not, then such actions are really nothing more than a kind of socio-cultural bigotry.

Wouldn't that depend on the parameters adopted to measure that, though?

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 01:25:13 PM

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 01:08:35 PM
I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

I did not get the impression that was what he was doing.  He was discussing the implications of the failure of Communism as a challenge.  I never got the impression the book was a self-congratulatory one.  And why is it pointless to discuss important events and ideologies and their implications?

Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2014, 02:39:01 PM
I did not get the impression that was what he was doing.  He was discussing the implications of the failure of Communism as a challenge.  I never got the impression the book was a self-congratulatory one.

What impression did you get of his argument, then? My reply was in response to Malthus' impression of the argument; if your impression is different, I'll probably have a different response to you :) 

QuoteAnd why is it pointless to discuss important events and ideologies and their implications?

It isn't.

Saying "we are the best and no one will ever better than us" seems pretty pointless, though... though I suppose it's a pretty powerful argument to support the current power structure (whatever it may be).

But as you say, Fukuyama may have been getting at something else.

Honestly?  Nope.

I think we're looking at some really radically transformation of the Western economic model in the next 50 years.  Industrial automation and the continuing concentration of financial capital have already started taking their toll on the legitimacy of the model.  There's bound to be upheaval. 

Quote from: Queequeg on August 22, 2014, 04:04:23 PM
Honestly?  Nope.

I think we're looking at some really radically transformation of the Western economic model in the next 50 years.  Industrial automation and the continuing concentration of financial capital have already started taking their toll on the legitimacy of the model.  There's bound to be upheaval. 

That seems to augur a descent into barbarism, not a better model.

It's an event horizon.  Can't see past it.

:rolleyes:

I don't think people are grappling with it yet.  Between global warming, the return of great power bickering, the concentration of financial capital and the rapid development of industrial automation we're in phenomenally interesting times and I'm not convinced Liberal Democracy as we currently understand it will change fast enough.  It isn't right now. 

Quote from: Jacob on August 22, 2014, 10:31:02 AM

Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2014, 10:30:24 AM
I had no idea Grallon was such an anarchist.

He's more of a nihilist, it seems.

Those new hillbillists are becoming a problem.

Quote from: Malthus on August 22, 2014, 11:03:03 AM

Quote from: Martinus on August 22, 2014, 10:56:35 AM

By that definition, didn't history end with the Enlightenment? I mean, there have been set backs, but overall these have been two solid centuries of liberal democracy gaining more ground.

That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

I think you are wrong in the evolutionary sense. If fascism or communism had defeated the liberal democracies then it would had selected democracy as a failed system. If anything, I think the 20th century proved that social structures that allow certain level of independence to the individual, to make their own decisions and contribute to society where is more convenient to the individual, are evolutionarily superior to social structures in which the individual is coherced by the state to contribute to society were the state believe his work is needed.

The question is if this trend will continue and at what point it will correct itself and start leaning in the opposite direction.

It should be noted that China seems to be an ecception to this, so far, and I think is because the Chinese central party resemble more the roman senate than anything else, and have a succession rule that forces out whoever is power every 10 years. This 10 years max in power seems to be the stabilizing factor in allowing the different factions in the central party to share power.

I have no idea why anyone would ever use the collapse of a Russian empire as a validation or invalidation of any ideology.  "Look, everybody, the historically dysfunctional state was unable to meet the challenges that faced it when it tried to jump from an agricultural backwater to an industrial-consumer society!"  It's not a surprise.

East Germany didn't make it work either.

The closest you get to it working are the Kibbutzim.  And they didn't work. 

Quote from: Peter Wiggin on August 24, 2014, 03:54:15 PM
East Germany didn't make it work either.

I don't know, they ran a highly successful surveillance state, something the UK and USA are only now fully getting to grips with.

Quote from: Peter Wiggin on August 24, 2014, 03:54:15 PM
East Germany didn't make it work either.

East Germany was a satellite of ______?

Communism will be back.  Technocratic administration from the center is the only sensible arrangement.  The lies of market liberalism and its political creation, liberal democracy, have been largely exposed; a morality based on enlightened collectivism will return, but it'll take time since we've been acculturated in an horrific atomized society.

In any event, I'm not sure the Hegelian dialectic really explains history.  It's more like an ongoing experiment in grafting systems onto human society, but human nature keeps subverting and defeating them.  This happened to old-line communism; it's happening to contemporary capitalism.  In the final analysis, I'm with Siege, as unlikely as that is: human nature will be changed to fit society, and our descendants will be a lot more pleasant and happier than we ever were.

Until then, a retreat from individualism and the birth of the powerful-but-accountable state are together quite attractive.

Quote from: mongersI don't know, they ran a highly successful surveillance state, something the UK and USA are only now fully getting to grips with.

Crybaby.

Quote from: Ideologue on August 24, 2014, 07:36:38 PM
Until then, a retreat from individualism and the birth of the powerful-but-accountable state are together quite attractive.

For whom?

And how is your enlightened despotism going to motivate work Ide? 

Same way capitalism does, but without retarded differentials.

So a burger flipper would make like 15 an hour, and a brain surgeon would make like 20?

He is trolling right?

To whom is the "powerful-but-accountable state" accountable to?

Quote from: Siege on August 24, 2014, 11:14:22 PM
He is trolling right?

To whom is the "powerful-but-accountable state" accountable to?

La gente. Theoretically.

Yi:

No.  The brain surgeon would probably make about what they make now; the hospital administrator would probably be shot.  Not really, but they wouldn't make as much as they do now.  Nor university presidents.  Nor, especially, CEOs and other executives.  Filthy recipients of passive income would have it the worst, since after the nationalization of key industries, their major streams of unearned income would be redirected to the people.

There would also be fewer burger flippers, as the enlightened command economy does not suppose that everyone is needed, and will automate all that it can, while distributing the productivity gains across the whole population.  The first five year plan would probably see U-6 at historical levels, but that would no longer be a meaningful metric.  Instead of hanging on to an old paradigm, as America's awesome and universally-beloved despot I would ease the transition into a laborless future populated by balls of light.

This is the most important thing.  Also pervasive surveillance and information gathering that would end crime and (perhaps) the spread of disease within the first half decade.  Also an incentive-based eugenics/dieback program.  Also solar power satellites and a phased relinquishing of fossil fuels.

I could probably retire after fifteen years.  It'd be ridiculously easy, conceptually, to fix society.  It would simply be investment-heavy, and require poor, confused dissidents to give up long-cherished beliefs, like "market rewards are equivalent to social value," "work is necessary to dignity," "privacy is a human right," and "I need make no reference to moral axioms when deciding whether or not to bring children into an overcrowded world, regardless of their probability of success and happiness."  I.e., impossible--not least because no person could or should be trusted with the power to fix society--and I'm just dreaming of an orderly, great society that, in all likelihood, I would have no more place in than this one.

That said, a slower, more confused, but more popular social democracy that incorporates these ideas is probably on its way.  Nobody has faith in the market anymore.  Surveillance is already kind of a thing, only toothless.  We all realize that robots will make most of us redundant to the economy.  Eugenics will probably not ever make a comeback, but embryo selection exists and there is certainly a demand for genetic engineering, but it could only be morally palatable to most if it is adminstered and paid for by the state.

Quote from: SiegeTo whom is the "powerful-but-accountable state" accountable to?

Discounting the possibility that I personally become dictator, elections probably do still need to be held. :(

All IT departments need to be shot.  Right after they turn off and turn back on their computers.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on August 24, 2014, 11:41:52 PM
All IT departments need to be shot.  Right after they turn off and turn back on their computers.

One day the philistines will die off.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nn2FB1P_Mn8

Quote from: Ideologue on August 24, 2014, 11:23:11 PM
Yi:

No.  The brain surgeon would probably make about what they make now;

He's pulling your leg here Yi.  The brain surgeons will be all shot, on the theory that properly working brains pose a risk to this system.