The End of History

[Martinus]

That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

If you look at the 10 concrete measures proposed in the Communist manifesto - most of them were adopted in whole or in part by capitalist regimes: graduated income taxation, taxation of estates, central banks with a monopoly of currency issuance, centralized regulation of transport and communication, common agricultural policies, mechanization of agriculture, free universal education.

Communism was a very powerful ideological force, so powerful that is was to a significant extent co-opted.  And the Cold War was part of that process: progressive taxation, large-scale public transport, the development of the welfare state, expansion of higher education, even the civil rights movement were all influenced by the ideological and physical competition against Communism.

Communism was a viable competitor, but liberal democracy proved more adaptable.

Wouldn't the Heglian triad be a better way to describe this process, rather than one system winning and the other losing?

After all, modern liberal democracy has very little in common with the laissez faire republic that led to the postulation of communism by Marx.

In fact, from a certain perspective you could say that it is socialism, not laissez faire capitalism that won in the West - right now the USA is probably the last stronghold of the latter out of Western democracies, and even it is going to give up eventually.

[Jacob]

But what is the competing idea?
There are plenty of illiberal states and plenty of undemocratic ones but most at least play lip service to "bourgeois" democracy and human rights.

My objection to the "end of history" thesis is not that there is a clear and compelling alternative idea competing with Western liberal democracy.

Rather, it is that the global triumph of Western liberal democracy is currently inhibited by a large incoherent mess of interests and local political factors. There are more places with more people where liberal democracy does not really exist, and where it is not ascendant, in spite of any lip service paid to it.

Now, over time liberal democracy may well triumph but it is far from clear to me that it is inevitable. Personally, I'd put my money on "a new challenger arises" rather than "and that, bar a few bumps in the road, was it."

As an aside - I think the "end of history" bit was a brilliant bit of marketing for Francis Fukuyama. I think it increases the chance of him being referenced centuries hence. If he was right, more or less, he'll seem prophetic. If wrong, he'll be taken as an exemplar of a line of thought and a great starting point for discussion; "the end of history, right or wrong? Discuss."

[Malthus]

That, in a nutshell, is more or less my critique of his thesis. WTF was so damn special about the end of the Cold War? Why does that represent the "end of history"? The development of liberal democracy has been centuries in the making, and no, I don't think fascism or communism were serious "competitors" in the "evolutionary" sense, any more than Putinism or Islamicism is now - only, the fascist and communist 'barbarians at the gates' were (1) a lot more threatening, and (2) some deluded academic types *thought* they were "competitors". They were dead wrong then, as has been proved now.

If you look at the 10 concrete measures proposed in the Communist manifesto - most of them were adopted in whole or in part by capitalist regimes: graduated income taxation, taxation of estates, central banks with a monopoly of currency issuance, centralized regulation of transport and communication, common agricultural policies, mechanization of agriculture, free universal education.

Communism was a very powerful ideological force, so powerful that is was to a significant extent co-opted.  And the Cold War was part of that process: progressive taxation, large-scale public transport, the development of the welfare state, expansion of higher education, even the civil rights movement were all influenced by the ideological and physical competition against Communism.

Communism was a viable competitor, but liberal democracy proved more adaptable.

I don't think it is provable or disprovable whether some, or all, of these measures would or would not have been adopted by modern Western nations had Communism never existed. Surely some (or all) of them were in the process of being adopted long before the publication of the Communist Mannifesto.

In short, it is perfectly possible to argue that these were indigenous developments within the Western Liberal tradition. I don't think anyone ever said "oh look, those commies have tractors. We better co-opt them and adopt "mechanization of agriculture". Or that without the Communist Manifesto the West would not have tractors (or universal educaction or regulations or central banks or whatever).

The actual practice of communism (as opposed to the Manifesto) proved just another dreary species of totalitarianism. Not really a "viable competitor" at all, other than in the sense of brute force. 

[Martinus]

I'm fairly certain, for example, that at the beginning of the Qing dynasty's reign, the Chinese could have happily concluded that this is the end of history - but it turned out to be the end of China instead.

The Chinese could have happily concluded they would be ruled by foreigners forever and delighted to be second class citizens in their own empire?  Are you sure this is a good example?

Marti is also apparently unaware of the fact that Chinese political historiography was completely wrapped up in cyclic theory; the Chinese intelligentsia "knew" that the Qing Dynasty would eventually lose the Mandate of Heaven and be replaced.  It had always happened and, they supposed, always would.

Ok, so I was talking out of my ass. Boo fucking hoo. This is Languish. Anyways, I like my idea about Heglian triad more than the failed Chinese analogy. Let's discuss that.

[grumbler]

My objection to the "end of history" thesis is not that there is a clear and compelling alternative idea competing with Western liberal democracy.

Rather, it is that the global triumph of Western liberal democracy is currently inhibited by a large incoherent mess of interests and local political factors. There are more places with more people where liberal democracy does not really exist, and where it is not ascendant, in spite of any lip service paid to it.

Now, over time liberal democracy may well triumph but it is far from clear to me that it is inevitable. Personally, I'd put my money on "a new challenger arises" rather than "and that, bar a few bumps in the road, was it."

As an aside - I think the "end of history" bit was a brilliant bit of marketing for Francis Fukuyama. I think it increases the chance of him being referenced centuries hence. If he was right, more or less, he'll seem prophetic. If wrong, he'll be taken as an exemplar of a line of thought and a great starting point for discussion; "the end of history, right or wrong? Discuss."

You do a good job of articulating my response to Fukuyama as well:  I think it was an interesting thought experiment, and may prove to be a viable assertion in the broadest sense for our time period, but I don't think that it will prove an accurate prediction of the future.  I'd just add that i don't think that he really believed it himself; that he was proposing a possible truth based on the evidence that he presented (which was the evidence available), rather than promoting his truth as the only possible one, never to be superseded.

[Malthus]

But what is the competing idea?
There are plenty of illiberal states and plenty of undemocratic ones but most at least play lip service to "bourgeois" democracy and human rights.

My objection to the "end of history" thesis is not that there is a clear and compelling alternative idea competing with Western liberal democracy.

Rather, it is that the global triumph of Western liberal democracy is currently inhibited by a large incoherent mess of interests and local political factors. There are more places with more people where liberal democracy does not really exist, and where it is not ascendant, in spite of any lip service paid to it.

Now, over time liberal democracy may well triumph but it is far from clear to me that it is inevitable. Personally, I'd put my money on "a new challenger arises" rather than "and that, bar a few bumps in the road, was it."

As an aside - I think the "end of history" bit was a brilliant bit of marketing for Francis Fukuyama. I think it increases the chance of him being referenced centuries hence. If he was right, more or less, he'll seem prophetic. If wrong, he'll be taken as an exemplar of a line of thought and a great starting point for discussion; "the end of history, right or wrong? Discuss."

I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

[Jacob]

I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

[Jacob]

You do a good job of articulating my response to Fukuyama as well:  I think it was an interesting thought experiment, and may prove to be a viable assertion in the broadest sense for our time period, but I don't think that it will prove an accurate prediction of the future.  I'd just add that i don't think that he really believed it himself; that he was proposing a possible truth based on the evidence that he presented (which was the evidence available), rather than promoting his truth as the only possible one, never to be superseded.

Yeah, we're getting decent mileage out of discussing it here, right now, for example

[Malthus]

I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

Well, if it is true, it is certainly a point worth noting. If on the hand there are multiple ways to be "at the pinnacle of moral and social evolution", that would imply something totally different.

For example, if it is true, then we are justified in encouraging others to adopt our system in preference to what they have now - if it is not, then such actions are really nothing more than a kind of socio-cultural bigotry.

[Martinus]

I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

Well, if it is true, it is certainly a point worth noting. If on the hand there are multiple ways to be "at the pinnacle of moral and social evolution", that would imply something totally different.

For example, if it is true, then we are justified in encouraging others to adopt our system in preference to what they have now - if it is not, then such actions are really nothing more than a kind of socio-cultural bigotry.

Wouldn't that depend on the parameters adopted to measure that, though?

[Valmy]

I think the claim of the "end of history" isn't that Western Liberalism will (physically) triumph everywhere, but rather that it marks the pinnacle of human social evolution. Though of course, something new can arise.

You may be right.

That strikes me a bit as pointless self-congratulation, though. "We're the pinnacle of moral and social evolution! Yeay us!" So what?

I did not get the impression that was what he was doing.  He was discussing the implications of the failure of Communism as a challenge.  I never got the impression the book was a self-congratulatory one.  And why is it pointless to discuss important events and ideologies and their implications?

[Jacob]

I did not get the impression that was what he was doing.  He was discussing the implications of the failure of Communism as a challenge.  I never got the impression the book was a self-congratulatory one.

What impression did you get of his argument, then? My reply was in response to Malthus' impression of the argument; if your impression is different, I'll probably have a different response to you  

And why is it pointless to discuss important events and ideologies and their implications?

It isn't.

Saying "we are the best and no one will ever better than us" seems pretty pointless, though... though I suppose it's a pretty powerful argument to support the current power structure (whatever it may be).

But as you say, Fukuyama may have been getting at something else.

[Queequeg]

Honestly?  Nope.

I think we're looking at some really radically transformation of the Western economic model in the next 50 years.  Industrial automation and the continuing concentration of financial capital have already started taking their toll on the legitimacy of the model.  There's bound to be upheaval. 

[garbon]

Honestly?  Nope.

I think we're looking at some really radically transformation of the Western economic model in the next 50 years.  Industrial automation and the continuing concentration of financial capital have already started taking their toll on the legitimacy of the model.  There's bound to be upheaval. 

That seems to augur a descent into barbarism, not a better model.

[Queequeg]

It's an event horizon.  Can't see past it.