http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/A-Cutting-Edge-Second-Look-at-the-Battle-of-Gettysburg.html
QuoteNew, computer-generated map of Gettysburg suggests Lee had a poor view of the battlefield
New map may explain Lee's decisions at Gettysburg
By MICHAEL RUBINKAM | Associated Press | Jun 28, 2013 12:21 PM CDT in US
On the second day of fighting at Gettysburg, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee listened to scouting reports, scanned the battlefield and ordered his second-in-command, James Longstreet, to attack the Union Army's left flank.
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It was a fateful decision, one that led to one of the most desperate clashes of the entire Civil War _ the fight for a piece of ground called Little Round Top. The Union's defense of the boulder-strewn promontory helped send Lee to defeat at Gettysburg, and he never again ventured into Northern territory.
Why did the shrewd and canny Lee choose to attack, especially in the face of the Union's superior numbers?
While historians have long wrestled with that question, geographers and cartographers have come up with an explanation, by way of sophisticated mapping software that shows the rolling terrain exactly as it would have appeared to Lee: From his vantage point, he simply couldn't see throngs of Union soldiers amid the hills and valleys.
"Our analysis shows that he had a very poor understanding of how many forces he was up against, which made him bolder," said Middlebury College professor Anne Knowles, whose team produced the most faithful re-creation of the Gettysburg battlefield to date, using software called GIS, or geographic information systems.
Developed for the Smithsonian Institution to mark Gettysburg's 150th anniversary, the panoramic map went live on the Smithsonian website Friday, giving history buffs a new way to look at the Civil War's pivotal battle, which took place July 1-3, 1863.
"Our goal is to help people understand how and why commanders made their decisions at key moments of the battle, and a key element that's been excluded, or just not considered in historical studies before, is sight," Knowles said.
Long before the advent of reconnaissance aircraft and spy satellites, a general's own sense of sight _ his ability to read the terrain and assess the enemy's position and numbers _ was one of his most important tools. Especially at Gettysburg, where Lee was hampered by faulty intelligence.
"We know that Lee had really poor information going into the battle and must have relied to some extent on what he could actually see," Knowles said.
The geographer applied GIS to find out what Lee could see and what he couldn't.
To reconstruct the battlefield as it existed in 1863, researchers used historical maps, texts and photos to note the location of wooden fences, stone walls, orchards, forests, fields, barns and houses, as well as the movement of army units. High-resolution aerial photos of the landscape yielded an accurate elevation model. All of it was fed into a computer program that can map data.
Lee is believed to have surveyed the battlefield from a pair of cupolas, one at a Lutheran seminary and the other at Gettysburg College, both of which yielded generally excellent views.
But a GIS-generated map, with illuminated areas showing what Lee could see and shaded areas denoting what was hidden from his view, indicates the terrain concealed large numbers of Union soldiers.
"What really came through as a new discovery for us in this project was seeing how few federal forces Lee could see, particularly on Day 2, when he decides to send Longstreet," Knowles said.
Historian Allen Guelzo, who wasn't involved in the project, agreed that Lee's view probably misled him. Guelzo, director of Civil War-era studies at Gettysburg College, took a visitor up to the school's cupola and motioned toward the peak of Little Round Top, just visible in the distance.
"You can see a lot from up here, and Robert E. Lee might have thought on July 2 that he had seen everything," said Guelzo, who has written a new book on the Battle of Gettysburg. "But, in fact, the dips and folds of the ground, the foliage as it was on the ground in various groves and woods, all of that concealed what turned out to be the deadly truth."
Conversely, the Union Army occupied higher ground, and used it to great advantage.
Union Gen. Gouverneur Warren spied Longstreet's troops just as they were about to launch their attack on an undefended Little Round Top. Frantic, Warren dispatched an officer to round up reinforcements. They got there just in time, and withstood the Confederates.
In Warren's case, GIS confirmed what historians have long known.
For Knowles, the mapping project and the mysteries it revealed helped Gettysburg come alive.
"Commanders always had to make decisions with really limited information ... committing men's lives to scraps of information or intuition, or what you can see at a certain day or a certain time," she said. "This analysis, for me, is making the battle more human."
nly problem with this theory is that there were, in fact, no Union troops on the hill when Lee ordered the attack.
I don't know why it's always so mystical, but most of Lee's performance at Gettysburg can be explained by the simple fact that he was overly arrogant and aggressive and ignored lessons he should have learned from previous experience in the war--in fact history suggests he did know better, and simply made bad decisions. Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on June 29, 2013, 12:27:01 PM
Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.
Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee.
He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on June 29, 2013, 12:34:18 PM
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on June 29, 2013, 12:27:01 PM
Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.
Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee.
He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.
No doubt.
I do need to finnish reading Pfanz's books on Gettysburg. I read his
Gettysburg--The First Day , it was good mind you. I would say very similar writing style to Glantz.
QuoteWhy did the shrewd and canny Lee choose to attack, especially in the face of the Union's superior numbers?
Probably the same reason he did so at the Seven Days and Chancellorsville? Just this time the Union general did not lose his nerve.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on June 29, 2013, 12:34:18 PM
Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee.
He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.
Lee's strategic decisions seem rather lacking in my eyes, he should have sent forces west to save Pemberton and Bragg in 1863 like many Confederate leaders wanted instead of his invasion of the North which did not distract Grant or Rosecrans at all. His invasion of the North in 1862 was likewise disastrous for the Confederate cause.
It seems odd to celebrate a general as the greatest of all time when his two big strategic initiatives both resulted in failure.
Lee acted like a putz several times during the Seven Days too.
Much like Napoleon, Lee's genius was for the operational, not the grand tactical.
Quote from: Valmy on June 29, 2013, 02:03:06 PM
Quote from: CountDeMoney on June 29, 2013, 12:34:18 PM
Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee.
He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.
Lee's strategic decisions seem rather lacking in my eyes, he should have sent forces west to save Pemberton and Bragg in 1863 like many Confederate leaders wanted instead of his invasion of the North which did not distract Grant or Rosecrans at all. His invasion of the North in 1862 was likewise disastrous for the Confederate cause.
It seems odd to celebrate a general as the greatest of all time when his two big strategic initiatives both resulted in failure.
:yes:
Quote from: grumbler on June 29, 2013, 10:16:03 AM
nly problem with this theory is that there were, in fact, no Union troops on the hill when Lee ordered the attack.
I think it is saying Lee didn't know that there were a lot of Union troops behind and along Seminary Ridge to the right of his position in general. He didn't really order Longstreet to attack LRT in particular, IIRC.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on June 29, 2013, 12:27:01 PM
I don't know why it's always so mystical, but most of Lee's performance at Gettysburg can be explained by the simple fact that he was overly arrogant and aggressive and ignored lessons he should have learned from previous experience in the war--in fact history suggests he did know better, and simply made bad decisions. Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.
To be fair to Lee, one of the lessons he did likely learn earlier in the war is that the Union could not stand up to a concentrated, well prepared assault, and their leadership would generally screw up in some fashion.
Never has this meme been more apt...
...map sucks.
Quote from: Berkut on June 29, 2013, 04:21:00 PM
I think it is saying Lee didn't know that there were a lot of Union troops behind and along Seminary Ridge to the right of his position in general. He didn't really order Longstreet to attack LRT in particular, IIRC.
But this is nothing new. Everything "revealed" by this new map has been known for decades. The idea that Lee would assume that there were no troops he couldn't see ("he had seen everything") is plucked from thin air. The idea that " a key element that's been excluded, or just not considered in historical studies before, is sight" is just bullshit made up by Professor Knowles.
Lee didn't know exactly what he faced, at Gettysburg or any other battle. No general does. Lee decided to attack the Union flanks because the Union army was notoriously vulnerable to such attacks (and had been the day before, in fact).
Why Lee attacked the center the next day is the puzzler. He had to have known that he had already lost the battle.
How could Lee have seen everything of the battlefield, anyway? JEB Stuart was running amok elsewhere with his cavalry regiment, having fun plucking Union supplies around Dover, while the first day of the battle started raging on. Every serious to not-so-serious narrative of the Battle of Gettysburg put the emphasis on Lee's lack of recon capability because JEB Stuart wasn't doing what he was supposed to be doing.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on June 29, 2013, 12:34:18 PM
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on June 29, 2013, 12:27:01 PM
Lee was a great commander and is rightly still studied, and respected, but he had a bad Battle at Gettysburg. Some historians and fans seem to be unable to accept this.
Yeah, it's all part and parcel of the romanticized mystique of Lee.
He's the Dan Marino of the Confederacy: not a single incomplete, turnover or loss was ever his fault.
LACES OUT. MEW.
Why are historians still spending time and money on Gettysburg? All the remaining questions were answered during the Languish Gettysburg Meet.
Lulz, "Little Round Toppings"
Quote from: grumbler on June 30, 2013, 09:07:39 AM
Quote from: Berkut on June 29, 2013, 04:21:00 PM
I think it is saying Lee didn't know that there were a lot of Union troops behind and along Seminary Ridge to the right of his position in general. He didn't really order Longstreet to attack LRT in particular, IIRC.
But this is nothing new. Everything "revealed" by this new map has been known for decades. The idea that Lee would assume that there were no troops he couldn't see ("he had seen everything") is plucked from thin air. The idea that " a key element that's been excluded, or just not considered in historical studies before, is sight" is just bullshit made up by Professor Knowles.
Lee didn't know exactly what he faced, at Gettysburg or any other battle. No general does. Lee decided to attack the Union flanks because the Union army was notoriously vulnerable to such attacks (and had been the day before, in fact).
True enough, I don't disagree with the basic premise of what you are saying, just pointing out that the article wasn't saying Lee couldn't see troops on LRT - I doubt Lee was ever anywhere that he could have seen troops there even if he could see the feature itself.
But more basically, I think the article fails because it presumes that "What my eyeballs can see" was somehow of primary importance to a Civil War general when it came to him deciding where he though the enemy was at.
I think we can assume that Lee knew if he attacked the center of the line, he'd run into someone. Even if he couldn't see them at that very moment. I mean, he was a trained surveyed, so he knew how features could be hidden by terrain.
Quote from: Razgovory on June 30, 2013, 07:13:54 PM
I think we can assume that Lee knew if he attacked the center of the line, he'd run into someone. Even if he couldn't see them at that very moment. I mean, he was a trained surveyed, so he knew how features could be hidden by terrain.
I agree. The issue wasn't that Lee didn't have a map or understanding of terrain (he very well knew that Gettysburg and its surroundings were higher, uneven terrain, and for God's sake the man had passed West Point without a single blemish on his cadet record). Lee's problem was that he didn't correctly assess the number of Union soldiers that had been massed in front of him, partly due to bad recon and a bit of wishful thinking.
Lee knew that Hancock's Corps was in front of him allright, and logically came to the argument that since Meade had reinforced his flanks in the past two days the center
must be weaker, and that he had the right odds with Longstreet's Corps to perform what was basically a fort-taking breakthrough assault. On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.
The problem was that he was Martin Sheen and a pretty piss-poor Lee at Gettysburg.
Quote from: PDH on June 30, 2013, 09:04:49 PM
The problem was that he was Martin Sheen and a pretty piss-poor Lee at Gettysburg.
Sheen wasn't that bad, but Duvall had it, he was the shit. And the dude literally
has Lee in him as one of his direct descendants.
Quote from: Drakken on June 30, 2013, 09:07:22 PM
Sheen wasn't that bad, but Duvall had it, he was the shit.
Bullshit. Sheen was better. Duvall was just shitkicker Duvall, without any of the self-absorbed evangelicalism.
QuoteAnd the dude literally has Lee in him as one of his direct descendants.
All the fanbois say that. B.F.D. Stuart.
Sheen. Duvall was OK.
Quote from: PDH on June 30, 2013, 09:04:49 PM
The problem was that he was Martin Sheen and a pretty piss-poor Lee at Gettysburg.
You have to be kidding me, Sheen was a great Lee. Granted there have not been very many competent Lees in film history.
Quote from: Drakken on June 30, 2013, 09:01:03 PM
On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.
Yeah Meade called it the night before and he was no military genius.
Quote from: Drakken on June 30, 2013, 09:01:03 PM
Lee knew that Hancock's Corps was in front of him allright, and logically came to the argument that since Meade had reinforced his flanks in the past two days the center must be weaker, and that he had the right odds with Longstreet's Corps to perform what was basically a fort-taking breakthrough assault. On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.
Lee knew that the AoP had more soldiers than he did, knew that the AoP had been concentrating on Gettysburg for two days already, and knew that a frontal attack was the riskiest and bloodiest option in the commander's repertoire. There was absolutely no reason for him to attack on the third day; he had already lost the battle. Sure, the Union center or reserve would be weaker after reinforcing the flanks; that doesn't say that it was weak enough to fold in a frontal assault.
It was ego. Lee just couldn't believe he could be beaten, so he grasped at straws, and his men paid for it.
Quote from: grumbler on July 01, 2013, 05:32:11 AM
Quote from: Drakken on June 30, 2013, 09:01:03 PM
Lee knew that Hancock's Corps was in front of him allright, and logically came to the argument that since Meade had reinforced his flanks in the past two days the center must be weaker, and that he had the right odds with Longstreet's Corps to perform what was basically a fort-taking breakthrough assault. On that note he was spectacularly wrong, plus the fact that attacking the Center was the most obvious of moves Lee could pull.
Lee knew that the AoP had more soldiers than he did, knew that the AoP had been concentrating on Gettysburg for two days already, and knew that a frontal attack was the riskiest and bloodiest option in the commander's repertoire. There was absolutely no reason for him to attack on the third day; he had already lost the battle. Sure, the Union center or reserve would be weaker after reinforcing the flanks; that doesn't say that it was weak enough to fold in a frontal assault.
It was ego. Lee just couldn't believe he could be beaten, so he grasped at straws, and his men paid for it.
I don't think that Lee had so much ego that he thought that he couldn't be beaten; it was more that the situation really worked against his strengths. Lee was always best as a counterpuncher, and with Meade sitting on the defensive, Lee didn't have an opportunity to do that. And strategically, since in this case, Lee was invading the North, if he couldn't counterpunch, his options were to either attack or simply go home and admit that the invasion had been a bad idea--and the latter was something his ego probably wouldn't let him do.
Of course, the invasion was a bad idea, but that's a different issue.
Quote from: dps on July 01, 2013, 07:01:27 AM
I don't think that Lee had so much ego that he thought that he couldn't be beaten; it was more that the situation really worked against his strengths. Lee was always best as a counterpuncher, and with Meade sitting on the defensive, Lee didn't have an opportunity to do that. And strategically, since in this case, Lee was invading the North, if he couldn't counterpunch, his options were to either attack or simply go home and admit that the invasion had been a bad idea--and the latter was something his ego probably wouldn't let him do.
Of course, the invasion was a bad idea, but that's a different issue.
The invasion was a gamble. The gamble had failed by nightfall on the 2nd. Lee had no reason to believe that a frontal assault would actually break the Union line, but he had every reason to believe that, win or lose, a frontal assault would be horrendously expensive in terms of his own army's casualties. Forced to choose between retreat or a gamble that at best would give him a Pyrrhic victory, Lee gambled. It was a sucker's gamble, and I can find only ego to explain it.
Quote from: grumbler on July 01, 2013, 09:25:43 AM
It was a sucker's gamble, and I can find only ego to explain it.
That's pretty much it, I think. Victim of his own success & whatnot.
There is another explanation and that is as a matter of grand strategy, the Confederacy was doomed unless the Pennsylvania offensive succeeded. So from Lee POV it was a choice between an attack with a very low chance of success, and a certain chance of eventual total defeat if he withdrew without attacking.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 01, 2013, 11:02:10 AM
There is another explanation and that is as a matter of grand strategy, the Confederacy was doomed unless the Pennsylvania offensive succeeded. So from Lee POV it was a choice between an attack with a very low chance of success, and a certain chance of eventual total defeat if he withdrew without attacking.
But even this would be ego speaking. Lee was the biggest proponent of the "Second Saratoga" strategy, rejecting the more popular (and more feasible) cordon strategy that called for simply wearing the North out by standing on the defensive and forcing the Union armies to come at them. In effect, he sacrificed the chance to make the cordon strategy work in favor of a low-probability-of-success gamble with the troops that perhaps could have made the cordon feasible.
You could argue that Lee's decision to invade the North rather than send troops to relieve Vicksburg had already doomed the South, but Lee couldn't have known that at the time.
Quote from: grumbler on July 01, 2013, 11:34:41 AM
But even this would be ego speaking. Lee was the biggest proponent of the "Second Saratoga" strategy, rejecting the more popular (and more feasible) cordon strategy that called for simply wearing the North out by standing on the defensive and forcing the Union armies to come at them. In effect, he sacrificed the chance to make the cordon strategy work in favor of a low-probability-of-success gamble with the troops that perhaps could have made the cordon feasible.
You could argue that Lee's decision to invade the North rather than send troops to relieve Vicksburg had already doomed the South, but Lee couldn't have known that at the time.
I don't dispute any of that.
However, having made the decision to commit to strategic offensive in the East, it was success or bust. Hence the Hail Mary attack on the third day.
This kind of gets into the inevitably regressive "At what point should they have realized that the entire thing was doomed to begin with" question.
I mean, I am of the opinion that given the basic economic, demographic, and political realities of the situation, the South did much, MUCH better than could reasonable be expected. Their result was about as good as it could possibly get considering how ridiculously stupid the entire war was in any objective sense.
At what point should that have been obvious?
I think plenty of people thought it was obvious before it started...
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 01, 2013, 11:52:02 AM
I don't dispute any of that.
However, having made the decision to commit to strategic offensive in the East, it was success or bust. Hence the Hail Mary attack on the third day.
I understand what you are saying, but if it was, indeed, "success or bust," then why didn't Lee attack on the 4th? Sure, he had no reasonable chance of success on the 4th, but he didn't on the 3rd, either.
Lee's plan failed with the defeat of the flanking attacks on the second. The attack on the 3rd was not the result of reasoned military planning, it was the result of Lee's ego refusing to acknowledge what his reason told him.
Oh btw it is the 150th anniversary of Little Round Top today.
Fix bayonets! Charge!
Would this have worked better? :hmm:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Longstreet#cite_ref-47
QuoteOn the night of July 2, Longstreet did not follow his usual custom of meeting Gen. Lee at his headquarters to discuss the day's battle, claiming that he was too fatigued to make the ride. Instead, he spent part of the night planning for a movement around Big Round Top that would allow him to attack the enemy's flank and rear. (Longstreet, despite his use of scouting parties, was apparently unaware that a considerable body of troops from the Union VI Corps was in position to block this move.) Shortly after issuing orders for the attack, around sunrise, Longstreet was joined at his headquarters by Lee, who was dismayed at this turn of events. The commanding general had intended for Longstreet to attack the Union left early in the morning in a manner similar to the attack of July 2, using Pickett's newly arrived division, in concert with a resumed attack by Ewell on Culp's Hill. What Lee found was that no one had ordered Pickett's division forward from its bivouac in the rear and that Longstreet had been planning an independent operation without consulting with him. Lee wrote with some restraint in his after-battle report that Longstreet's "dispositions were not completed as early as was expected."
It certainly could not have worked any worse.
But no, it would not have "worked" either.
Quote from: Berkut on July 02, 2013, 08:52:43 AM
It certainly could not have worked any worse.
But no, it would not have "worked" either.
The worst outcome I can see (that is, the best outcome from the Confederacy's POV) would have been that Meade would become concerned about the Rebels getting around his flanks, and withdrawn in good order to his pre-selected defensive position at Pipe's Creek (?--doing this from memory, may have the name of the place wrong), and then Lee's army would have been no better off than it had been at Gettysburg.