Korea Thread: Liberal Moon Jae In Elected

[Sheilbh]

I thought this piece was interesting and a bit sobering:

The Next Korean War
Conflict With North Korea Could Go Nuclear -- But Washington Can Reduce the Risk
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
April 1, 2013

As North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un issues increasingly over-the-top threats -- including intimations that he might launch nuclear strikes against the United States -- officials in Washington have sought to reassure the public and U.S. allies. North Korea, they say, may initiate cyberattacks or other limited provocations, but the leaders in Pyongyang wish to survive, so they are highly unlikely to do anything as foolhardy as using nuclear weapons.

Despite those assurances, however, the risk of nuclear war with North Korea is far from remote. Although Pyongyang's tired threats are probably bluster, the current crisis has substantially increased the risk of a conventional conflict -- and any conventional war with North Korea is likely to go nuclear. Washington should continue its efforts to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula. But equally important, it must rapidly take steps -- including re-evaluating U.S. war plans -- to dampen the risks of nuclear escalation if conventional war erupts.

Ironically, the risk of North Korean nuclear war stems not from weakness on the part of the United States and South Korea but from their strength. If war erupted, the North Korean army, short on training and armed with decrepit equipment, would prove no match for the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command. Make no mistake, Seoul would suffer some damage, but a conventional war would be a rout, and CFC forces would quickly cross the border and head north.

At that point, North Korea's inner circle would face a grave decision: how to avoid the terrible fates of such defeated leaders as Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi. Kim, his family, and his cronies could try to escape to China and plead for a comfortable, lifelong sanctuary there -- an increasingly dim prospect given Beijing's growing frustration with Kim's regime. Pyongyang's only other option would be to try to force a cease-fire by playing its only trump card: nuclear escalation.

It's impossible to know how exactly Kim might employ his nuclear arsenal to stop the CFC from marching to Pyongyang. But the effectiveness of his strategy would not depend on what North Korea initially destroyed, such as a South Korean port or a U.S. airbase in Japan. The key to coercion is the hostage that is still alive: half a dozen South Korean or Japanese cities, which Kim could threaten to attack unless the CFC accepted a cease-fire.

This strategy, planning to use nuclear escalation to stalemate a militarily superior foe, is not far-fetched. In fact, it was NATO's strategy for most of the Cold War. Back then, when the alliance felt outgunned by the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, NATO planned to use nuclear weapons coercively to thwart a major conventional attack. Today, both Pakistan and Russia rely on that same strategy to deal with the overwhelming conventional threats that they face. Experts too easily dismiss the notion that North Korea's rulers might deliberately escalate a conventional conflict, but if their choice is between escalation and a noose, it is unclear why they would be less ruthless than those who once devised plans to defend NATO.

Even if the United States and South Korea anticipated the danger of marching to Pyongyang and adopted limited objectives in a war, nuclear escalation would still be likely. That's because the style of conventional war that the United States has mastered over the past two decades is highly escalatory.

The core of U.S. conventional military strategy, refined during recent wars, is to incapacitate the enemy by disabling its central nervous system -- its ability to understand what is happening on the battlefield, make decisions, and control its forces. Against Serbia, Libya, and Iraq (twice), the key targets in the first days of conflict were not enemy tanks, ships, or planes but leadership bunkers, military command sites, and means of communication. This new American way of war has been enormously effective. But if directed against a nuclear-armed opponent, it would pressure the enemy to escalate a conflict.

Preventing escalation in the midst of a war would require convincing North Korea's leaders that they would survive, and so attacks designed to isolate and blind the regime would be counterproductive. Once airstrikes began pummeling leadership bunkers and severing communication links, the Kim regime would have no way of discerning how minimalist or maximalist the CFC's objectives were. It would face powerful incentives to make the CFC attacks stop immediately -- a job for which nuclear weapons are well suited.

The sliver of good news is that North Korea may not yet have the capabilities to carry out this strategy. It may not be able to tip its ballistic missiles with a nuclear payload, and its other means of delivering nuclear weapons remain limited. Given the rate of progress, however, if the regime does not have these capabilities today, it will soon.

What can be done? First, Washington and Seoul must make every effort to avoid war in the current crisis. The United States is undoubtedly (and appropriately) quietly reinforcing U.S. forces in the region, and the CFC is understandably considering what red lines might trigger a pre-emptive conventional strike. But the fact that war with North Korea probably means nuclear war should temper any consideration of limited pre-emptive strikes. Pre-emption means war, and war means nuclear.

Second, U.S. and South Korean planners need to develop truly limited conventional military options for the Peninsula -- limited not merely in their objectives but also in terms of the military operations they unleash. Perhaps the greatest danger of all is if the U.S. president and the South Korean president incorrectly believe that they have limited military options available; they and their senior advisers may not fully appreciate that those supposedly limited options in fact entail hundreds of airstrikes against high-value targets, such as leadership, command-and-control systems, and perhaps even against nuclear-weapons sites.

Third, American and South Korean leaders should urge China to develop "golden parachute" plans for the North Korean leadership and their families. Leaders in Pyongyang will keep their nuclear weapons holstered during a war only if they believe that they and their families have a safe and secure future somewhere. In the past, China has been understandably reluctant to hold official talks with the United States about facilitating the demise of its ally. But the prospect of nuclear war next door could induce Beijing to take more direct steps, including preparing an escape plan now and revealing it to Kim as soon as a first shot is fired.

More broadly, the strategic dilemma Washington faces today extends beyond the current standoff with North Korea: how to run a network of global alliances when nuclear weapons allow enemies to nullify the United States' superior military might. American officials used to extol the ability of nuclear weapons to stalemate powerful enemies. Now the shoe is on the other foot. There is every reason to believe that North Korea has adopted NATO's old strategy. As the current standoff is making frighteningly clear, deterring escalation, especially during conventional wars, is not last century's concern; it may be the single toughest strategic problem confronting the United States for decades to come.

[CountDeMoney]

News reporter ratings:

Kyung Lah CNN: I'd cum in her chinky eyes. 4 boners out of 5.

Can't touch Melissa Lee on CNBC though.

I think Cramer is nailin' her.

That is an incredibly disgusting image.
Probably uses sound effects.

[Ed Anger]

News reporter ratings:

Kyung Lah CNN: I'd cum in her chinky eyes. 4 boners out of 5.

Can't touch Melissa Lee on CNBC though.

I think Cramer is nailin' her.

That is an incredibly disgusting image.
Probably uses sound effects.

BOOYAH! BOOYAH BOOYAH BOOYAH ARE YOU READY SKEEDADDY?!

[derspiess]

I thought this piece was interesting and a bit sobering:

The Next Korean War
Conflict With North Korea Could Go Nuclear -- But Washington Can Reduce the Risk
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
April 1, 2013

Kinda has the same wimpish tone as the opinion piece I posted the other day.  Thanks for the advice, but we've taken the pussy route and backed down and it has gotten us nowhere.  Nothing's gonna happen, but we should be ready to stomp Kim's nuts if he fucks with us again.

[CountDeMoney]

Considering the latest test and the guesstimates of how much of their estimated stockpile of fissionable material they used up to pop it off, they may not even have enough for a workable weapon at this time.

Ergo, the time to stomp nuts is now.

[Sheilbh]

Kinda has the same wimpish tone as the opinion piece I posted the other day.  Thanks for the advice, but we've taken the pussy route and backed down and it has gotten us nowhere.  Nothing's gonna happen, but we should be ready to stomp Kim's nuts if he fucks with us again.

I think him fucking with you is less likely. It's Japan and South Korea who'd get fucked.

It's not about backing down. I mean the article's quite clear that there's a possibility of a conventional war, but there needs to be a different strategy than with Saddam or Milosevic because, in the last resort, Kim has nukes.

So you probably should encourage the Chinese to build him a comfortable water-ski in Beijing, just in case. Similarly if conventional US strategy could make the situation seem far worse to the regime and make it more difficult for them to climb down, then it should probably be changed. It would be worthwhile developing limited conventional target lists so there can be an adaptable response. And finally be careful, the last thing that's needed is for big talk from politicians - they should be calm, deliberate and very measured in what they say, again so they can be adaptable.

I also think that the Telegraph chief foreign correspondent made a good point on this:

My question is: after all this belligerence, could he still pull back and call off the crisis without a devastating loss of credibility? Put bluntly, if he does nothing now, would Kim lose face irretrievably?

His answer might be to stage a controlled incident, such as the shelling of the South Korean island by the North's artillery that claimed four lives in 2010. On that occasion, the South showed heroic restraint and chose not to hit back. In present circumstances, however, South Korea might well retaliate. If so, would Kim then have to retaliate for the retaliation? And then how would the South respond? It's not hard to see how a cycle of escalation might begin.

Despite everything, the real danger is not that Kim will consciously decide to launch a general war. Instead, the real peril is that he might try to get away with another incident like the bombardment of the island – and end up provoking a conflict by mistake.

Obviously it depends on what information leaders are getting but I think it's possible they could stage an heroic attack somewhere, but then pull back to avoid humiliation/claim victory. If there's indications that's going on that should be an important factor in deciding whether or not to escalate. However difficult it is for the South Koreans.

But then who knows? For some reason I keep on thinking of Father Ted 'careful now' I still think this is all linked to internal power plays we don't know about or understand. Or there's the worrying possibility that it isn't just a rogue regime but a mental one.

[Razgovory]

Considering the latest test and the guesstimates of how much of their estimated stockpile of fissionable material they used up to pop it off, they may not even have enough for a workable weapon at this time.

Ergo, the time to stomp nuts is now.

South Korean and the US released a joint statement that will not tolerate a Nuclear North Korea.  I wonder if they are coming to the same conclusion.

[Ed Anger]

KILL

[katmai]

KILL

Just tell us when REDRUM BONER LEVEL 1 mkay?

[Ed Anger]

KILL

Just tell us when REDRUM BONER LEVEL 1 mkay?

We are at 3. The bombers have been flushed.

[mongers]

N.Korea's rhetoric reminds me of a 1984 protagonist, it's largely for internal consumption; though I'm not at all sure they appreciate the risks involved in doing a Duke of York and marching their troops up that hill.

On the issue of their nuclear weapons, they can only use them or lose them. In all but the most modest conventional confrontation, I cannot see the US not attacking all nuclear facilities, in part because I they'd be relatively easy to destroy, which I think the N.Koreans must guess, hence the pressure to use them whilst they still have them.   

[CountDeMoney]

What's worrisome about the NK reaction during these escalations is that, for the last 30 years, every provocation on their part has been planned and orchestrated accordingly;  now that the ROK and the US have shown a willingness to push back instead of ignore it, the Norkies are in uncharted waters now, and don't know which way to go but up.

[Ed Anger]

I miss the old WHERE ARE THE CARRIERS page at strategypage during times like this.

[derspiess]

I think him fucking with you is less likely. It's Japan and South Korea who'd get fucked.

We have a commitment to defend South Korea.  He fucks with them and he's fucking with us.  And his dad & grandpa fucked with us directly on multiple occasions.  I don't want war, but if it happens it'd be nice to settle some accounts.

It's not about backing down. I mean the article's quite clear that there's a possibility of a conventional war, but there needs to be a different strategy than with Saddam or Milosevic because, in the last resort, Kim has nukes.

There may be a different strategy, who knows.  But I don't buy that a conventional war is that sure of a thing to turn nuclear. 

So you probably should encourage the Chinese to build him a comfortable water-ski in Beijing, just in case. Similarly if conventional US strategy could make the situation seem far worse to the regime and make it more difficult for them to climb down, then it should probably be changed.

I'd love for the Chinese to help out.  Thing is, I'm not sure they're grown up enough to do anything to assist in NK regime change, even if doing so means less fighting on the peninsula.

It would be worthwhile developing limited conventional target lists so there can be an adaptable response. And finally be careful, the last thing that's needed is for big talk from politicians - they should be calm, deliberate and very measured in what they say, again so they can be adaptable.

Politicans on our side should avoid bluster-- but they should be very clear and firm in what they say, and be ready to back it up.  I'm tired of the chicken shit rhetoric of the past.

I also think that the Telegraph chief foreign correspondent made a good point on this:

My question is: after all this belligerence, could he still pull back and call off the crisis without a devastating loss of credibility? Put bluntly, if he does nothing now, would Kim lose face irretrievably?

His answer might be to stage a controlled incident, such as the shelling of the South Korean island by the North's artillery that claimed four lives in 2010. On that occasion, the South showed heroic restraint and chose not to hit back. In present circumstances, however, South Korea might well retaliate. If so, would Kim then have to retaliate for the retaliation? And then how would the South respond? It's not hard to see how a cycle of escalation might begin.

Despite everything, the real danger is not that Kim will consciously decide to launch a general war. Instead, the real peril is that he might try to get away with another incident like the bombardment of the island – and end up provoking a conflict by mistake.

So the implication is that we should just continue to be blubbering vaginas and let him do his act of aggression without responding?  No thanks.

Obviously it depends on what information leaders are getting but I think it's possible they could stage an heroic attack somewhere, but then pull back to avoid humiliation/claim victory. If there's indications that's going on that should be an important factor in deciding whether or not to escalate. However difficult it is for the South Koreans.

But then who knows? For some reason I keep on thinking of Father Ted 'careful now' I still think this is all linked to internal power plays we don't know about or understand. Or there's the worrying possibility that it isn't just a rogue regime but a mental one.

My gut tells me Kim won't do anything.  He & his generals see us (or certainly ought to) preparing for a stronger response than we've offered in the past.  I'd wager that he'll try to pull his internal propaganda coup this time without shooting at us or the South Koreans. 

[Ed Anger]

I miss the old WHERE ARE THE CARRIERS page at strategypage during times like this.

*cough*


http://www.gonavy.jp/CVLocation.html