Some history questions for you learned people

[Alcibiades]

I was reading a book for one of my classes and a passage came up that I was interested in claiming that America's NATO allies hindered us during the Korean war and wouldn't allow us to pursue communist aircraft into China.  I was always curious about our position in regards to China, and always assumed the reason we didn't firebomb the their coastal population cities is because we were afraid to provoke the Soviets.  Is this correct?


Anyone have any more information on this subject?




My second question involves Italy and Germany during World War two, what were there motivations for declaring war on the United States on December 11, 1941?  Was it purely in an attempt to draw Japan in against the Soviets?  In hindsight it seems entirely foolish as the Japanese had apparently zero interest in intervening, was this understood by the rest of the Axis at the time or were they merely hoping their effort would give Japan a push and that America would prove ineffectual in the war effort?

[Razgovory]

I didn't even know NATO was existed at the time.

The second one is one of the great mysteries of history.  It was the act of a madman.  I don't think anyone can really know.

[derspiess]

I didn't even know NATO was existed at the time.

1949.

[Tonitrus]

I didn't even know NATO was existed at the time.

1949.

Either way, I am assuming he meant our NATO allies who were also part of (and probably most of) the UN coalition. 

[Ideologue]

I was reading a book for one of my classes and a passage came up that I was interested in claiming that America's NATO allies hindered us during the Korean war and wouldn't allow us to pursue communist aircraft into China.  I was always curious about our position in regards to China, and always assumed the reason we didn't firebomb the their coastal population cities is because we were afraid to provoke the Soviets.  Is this correct?


Anyone have any more information on this subject?

My understanding of the matter accords with yours.  MacArthur, in a rare moment of lucidity, wanted bombers to at least hit the bridges over the Yalu and for preference wanted nuclear attacks on airfields in Manchuria and if the Chinese proved recalcitrant, I believe he advocated full nuclear combat, at which the PRC would have been at a serious disadvantage.

HST, in a rare moment of ballslessness, thought it would bring the Soviets into the war and possibly lead to war with Europe.  But it makes sense that our NATO allies would be afraid of this too; although I can't say as I've heard that they were, it's hard to believe they wouldn't have been.  In any event, Truman's lack of stomach for an easily winnable world war is, iirc, one of the reasons MacArthur was sacked.

Also, I vaguely recall reading somewhere that the Soviets would not have done anything substantial to intervene in PRChina if we went nuclear--as would be wise, as up until the late 50s we held an unbeatable advantage, especially if we didn't care about Europe--but take that with a grain of salt.

My second question involves Italy and Germany during World War two, what were there motivations for declaring war on the United States on December 11, 1941?  Was it purely in an attempt to draw Japan in against the Soviets?  In hindsight it seems entirely foolish as the Japanese had apparently zero interest in intervening, was this understood by the rest of the Axis at the time or were they merely hoping their effort would give Japan a push and that America would prove ineffectual in the war effort?

Italy was dragged in by Germany.  Germany was basicallly already at war with the United States.  The first US freighter to be sunk was the SS Robin Moor in May, and in April the USS Niblack DD-424 fired the first shots of an undeclared war when they launched depth charges at a u-boat whose number I can't find, if it's even known.  In September, FDR issued an order to attack any u-boats within defined protected zones after the USS Greer DD-145 attacked/was attacked by U-652.  USS Ruben James DD-245 was sunk by U-552 in October, the first American warship to go down in World War II (if unofficially).  A bunch of other incidents occurred too, so that by December DDs and u-boats had been regularly shooting at each other.

Hitler also did hope, in vain, that the Japanese would break the Molotov-Matsuoka Pact--and iirc he was pissed when they didn't, but God knows what anyone believed the Japanese could do, even if they didn't get their asses handed to them by a proper army for the third time (any understanding of the Pacific War and WWII in general is incomplete without remembering, as Hitler may have done, the Soviet-Japanese border war, notably the remarkably inept offensives at Khasan Lake and Khalkin Gol).  Let's assume an initial Japanese victory over Soviet forces--what is the ultimate outcome? Despite being an optimal opening move for Japan in Axis & Allies, rolling up to Chelyabinsk while fighting a war on three other fronts in real life seems pretty unlikely.

But the main issue was that the Second Battle of the Atlantic was already underway.  I recall that Hitler once defended the decision to undertake Barbarossa as the only way to completely isolate and defeat Britain; in that light, war against America at least makes more sense than war against the USSR did at the time.

But what I've often wondered is whether the Japanese would have been better off avoiding attacking the U.S. altogether and making war only on Britain and the Netherlands.  The prospect of LBA in the Philippines closing off the sea lanes between SEAsia and the home islands was too big a threat to bear, I suppose, but would America really have had the political stomach to attack the Japanese on behalf of British and Dutch colonialism?

[Alcibiades]

Thanks for the info



I actually have wondered about the Japanese attack several times as well, I don't think the US would have intervened.  My understanding is that the American public could give two shits about the Asia at the time.  Even if we had intervened it wouldn't have been with such vehement feeling as after Pearl.

[Valmy]

I actually have wondered about the Japanese attack several times as well, I don't think the US would have intervened.  My understanding is that the American public could give two shits about the Asia at the time.  Even if we had intervened it wouldn't have been with such vehement feeling as after Pearl.

Not suprisingly the West Coast cared a bit.  Just like the East Coast was always the place most interested in doing something to stop Germany.

But the whole idea was to starve the Japanese of resources and either force them out of China that way or get them to attack the West....of course when they did attack it was a bit more effective of an attack than we anticipated.

As for Hitler deciding to declare war, yeah it was in the vain hope the Japanese would help him defeat the Soviet Union and it allowed him to more thoroughly wage his UBoat campaign against Britain. 

[dps]

Thanks for the info



I actually have wondered about the Japanese attack several times as well, I don't think the US would have intervened.  My understanding is that the American public could give two shits about the Asia at the time.  Even if we had intervened it wouldn't have been with such vehement feeling as after Pearl.

The Japanese, as best as I can figure, didn't think that they could take the chance.  I think the key is that they didn't really understand US politics.  Getting Congress and the public behind a war against a Japan that had attacked the British and Dutch possessions in the East Indies but left the Philippines and other US territory alone would have been a very hard sell.

As far as Germany's declaration of war on the US, sure, it was a mistake, but sooner or later one of the confrontations between US destroyers and German subs in the North Atlantic would have given President Roosevelt enough to get a declaration of war on Germany.  From Germany's point of view, if they were going to have to fight the US as well as the UK and Soviet Union, it wasn't a bad time to begin doing so openly.  It let the Germans launch unrestricted submarine warfare right in US coastal waters, where shipping wasn't even being convoyed, and coastal blackouts weren't in force.  The U-boots had a field day there for a while.  Had war between Germany and the US come a few months after war had begun between us and Japan, that wouldn't have been the case.

[crazy canuck]

I was reading a book for one of my classes and a passage came up that I was interested in claiming that America's NATO allies hindered us during the Korean war and wouldn't allow us to pursue communist aircraft into China.  I was always curious about our position in regards to China, and always assumed the reason we didn't firebomb the their coastal population cities is because we were afraid to provoke the Soviets.  Is this correct?

What book was that?  I havent heard the claim that NATO allies were the ones responsible for the US decision not to send aircraft into China.  I thought that was a US decision.

Here is something I found after a quick search.

When MacArthur tried to order bombing raids against some bridges near the Manchurian border, Truman and the JCS delayed the bombings out of fear that errant bombs might land in Manchuria. On November 7, a US Congressional Election was held, which, although it preserved the Democratic Party majority, was viewed by many as a referendum criticizing Truman's Korean War policy.  At this point (November 1950), the Korean Conflict became "an entirely new war." The Eighth Army withdrew to fortified positions while MacArthur prepared a new offensive. MacArthur reinitiated the bombing campaign against bridges in the northernmost provinces, but succeeded in destroying only a third of them.

[The Minsky Moment]

The Germans calculated -- basically correctly -- that the US would not be able to exert effective power in Europe until late 43.  By that time Hitler figured he would have knocked the Russians out and be in an impregnable position in Europe. If the Russians weren't knocked out by then, they were going to screwed no matter what.

AS others have pointed out, the declaration allowed a real expansion of the submarine war to American shores which in the short run was very effective and made it more difficult to deliver materials and supplies from the US to Europe in the crucial months leading up to the big campaigns of 1942.

It kind of makes sense when you realize that the Germans were basically doomed in Dec 41 when the Soviets didn't fold - leaving them with the equivalent of a draw to an inside straight.  If they didn't win decisively and hugely on all fronts in 42, it was going to be all over, so why worry what would happen after.

[Alcibiades]

What book was that?  I havent heard the claim that NATO allies were the ones responsible for the US decision not to send aircraft into China.  I thought that was a US decision.

Democracies at War by Dan Reiter, just states that NATO allies were the reason for not chasing communist aircraft back into China, nothing about bombing.

[Alcibiades]

I was wondering about this statement made about Robert McNamara in regards to the Sr-71 Blackbird, apparently it was part of the contract to destroy the tools used to manufacture the Blackbird:

That same year, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the specialized tooling used to manufacture the aircraft destroyed. Though this was part of the original contract, it limited to Blackbird force to the 32 aircraft that had been built.

Why would they want to do this?  Anyone have any insight on it?

[The Brain]

I was wondering about this statement made about Robert McNamara in regards to the Sr-71 Blackbird, apparently it was part of the contract to destroy the tools used to manufacture the Blackbird:

That same year, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the specialized tooling used to manufacture the aircraft destroyed. Though this was part of the original contract, it limited to Blackbird force to the 32 aircraft that had been built.

Why would they want to do this?  Anyone have any insight on it?

Either spite or keeping the Blackbird technology and performance as secret as possible.

[grumbler]

I was wondering about this statement made about Robert McNamara in regards to the Sr-71 Blackbird, apparently it was part of the contract to destroy the tools used to manufacture the Blackbird:

That same year, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the specialized tooling used to manufacture the aircraft destroyed. Though this was part of the original contract, it limited to Blackbird force to the 32 aircraft that had been built.

Why would they want to do this?  Anyone have any insight on it?

Either spite or keeping the Blackbird technology and performance as secret as possible.

Plus, it prevented some congressional committee from redirecting DoD funds from something McNamara wanted into procurement of more Blackbirds.