The State of Affairs in Russia

[Berkut]

I think WW2 was a fucking long time ago, and neither Germany or Japan should worry about that one tiny little bit anymore.

Disagree, considering there is a party in Germany that pulls 10+% in federal elections and significantly higher in various state elections, where leading members
- consider the Third Reich "a negligible bit of bird poop" in Germany's history
- were outraged because Germany is the only country that would put "a monument of shame" in their capital (referring to the holocaust memorial)
- called for a 180° turn in the national memorial culture in that context

If you made that same demand of every country that can point to 10% of their electorate being a bunch of ssemi-fascist assholes, there would be no countries left of import to do anything.

[DGuller]

I think WW2 was a fucking long time ago, and neither Germany or Japan should worry about that one tiny little bit anymore.

Personally.

Japan is a bit more problematic then Germany, but in both cases there are neighbors of both that have shown themselves to be radically more of a concern as threats to world peace then either of those countries as they exist today.

I think Japan should worry about it quite a bit more than Germany.  I think Germany made a clean break with its warlike past, so you can make an argument that at some point they shouldn't be tied down with it.  I'm far less sold on the idea that Japan truly changed its mentality in ways that would persist after they're not held down by outside forces.

[Berkut]

I think WW2 was a fucking long time ago, and neither Germany or Japan should worry about that one tiny little bit anymore.

Personally.

Japan is a bit more problematic then Germany, but in both cases there are neighbors of both that have shown themselves to be radically more of a concern as threats to world peace then either of those countries as they exist today.

I think Japan should worry about it quite a bit more than Germany.  I think Germany made a clean break with its warlike past, so you can make an argument that at some point they shouldn't be tied down with it.  I'm far less sold on the idea that Japan truly changed its mentality in ways that would persist after they're not held down by outside forces.

Don't disagree with any of that, but would note that

A) In my list of countries to worry about *today* when it comes to nationalistic, proto-fascist warmongers, China and North Korea are far more worrisome then Japan, and
B) They have in fact made an incrediblly important change to their mentality - they are now a functioning democratic nation with an answerable political class.

Sure, they have not made the cultural admissions and self reflection we might like, but their history of action 80+ years ago carries very little weight today compared to what other countries are doing right now. I don't think there is any real credible threat of Japan re-committing the sins of the Empire in the future.

That doesn't mean they should not acknowledge what actually happened, but not because they need to convince anyone they are not a threat to repeat.

[Sheilbh]

I think WW2 was a fucking long time ago, and neither Germany or Japan should worry about that one tiny little bit anymore.

I don't even think it's relevant. I think Germany's approach to its history is incredibly admirable and should be a model - especially for Britain and empire.

However my criticism of German policy would be that even in the immediate post-war I think West German leaders were aware of the choices, costs and consequences of foreign policy and were a vital part of the western alliance. The leadership or foreign policy I think is absent was present under Kohl, Schmidt - even Brandt () during ostpolitik. I think my crticism would be that I think Schroeder and Merkel, I think to an extent, shied away from that.

[Zanza]

As a hypothetical, imagine Germany announcing that it will take care of conventional defense for Europe. And not just go for the 2% GDP NATO spending, but 4% and also increase army size to the maximum allowed under the 2+4 Treaty - about twice its current size. Some Europeans might already get doubts then.
As the new leader of European defense, Germany would then not commit a battalion of troops to Baltic states like now, but station a full panzer division there with 30k soldiers and heavy equipment. The Bundeswehr logo goes back to the Teutonic Knights after all. I somehow doubt that a policy like this would be welcomed in e.g. Poland... despite being in line with the notional goals of a Western alliance. 

You cannot separate the atonement for our past crimes from the restraint in our foreign policy, especially when it comes to hard power.

[Admiral Yi]

As a hypothetical, imagine Germany announcing that it will take care of conventional defense for Europe. And not just go for the 2% GDP NATO spending, but 4% and also increase army size to the maximum allowed under the 2+4 Treaty - about twice its current size. Some Europeans might already get doubts then.
As the new leader of European defense, Germany would then not commit a battalion of troops to Baltic states like now, but station a full panzer division there with 30k soldiers and heavy equipment. The Bundeswehr logo goes back to the Teutonic Knights after all. I somehow doubt that a policy like this would be welcomed in e.g. Poland... despite being in line with the notional goals of a Western alliance. 

You cannot separate the atonement for our past crimes from the restraint in our foreign policy, especially when it comes to hard power.

I'm sympathetic to Germany's sincere pacifism and unwillingness to offend neighbors who suffered during WWII, on the other hand Germany's enthusiasm for contributing to NATO seems to have diminished significantly with the transference of the Iron Curtain further east. 

When Germany was a front line state they were serious about defense.  Now they seem happy to free ride off Poland and the US, much like the Belgium and Italy did when Germany was a front line sate.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah - I thought this piece was interesting. The German government's moved a lot in its public statements in the last couple of weeks and committing more to the NATO mission in Lithuania, so I think the criticism is overblown but I think this crisis (with Nordstream II, sending 5,000 helments to Kyiv, blocking Estonia sending artillery) has hurt Germany's reputation. I think whether its Eastern Europe or DC, I think it will take some time to rebuild trust. And I know I keep going on about the American pivot to Asia but I really think it's essential that Europe works on this because I think we're probably one or two administrations (of either party) away from the US being totally disengaged from Europe and focused on the Pacific (Josh Hawley has already made that case).

Olaf Scholz Is Coming to America on a Salvage Mission
The German chancellor has no choice but to focus on restoring his country's damaged credibility.
By Thorsten Benner, a co-founder and the director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.
February 4, 2022, 6:49 AM

Standing next to then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel last June, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared: "I think it's fair to say that the United States has no better partner, no better friend in the world than Germany." When Merkel's successor Olaf Scholz meets U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington on Monday, these words will sound like a memory from a distant past.

In recent months, Germany's reputation has declined precipitously given what many decry as Berlin's wobbly stance vis-à-vis both the Kremlin and Beijing. Last week, Emily Haber, Germany's ambassador to the United States, sent a cable to Berlin warning that many in the United States see Germany as an "unreliable partner." Republicans in Congress, Haber telegraphed, see Germany as "in bed with Putin" warning of "immense" damage to Germany's reputation. Many in the Biden administration share misgivings about Berlin's stance, although they put on a brave face publicly. Germany's Eastern European partners are more direct. Last week, Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks called Germany's stance on Russia and China "immoral and hypocritical."

Scholz's central mission for his Washington visit has to be restoring German credibility. As a trans-Atlantic-minded centrist, he is well placed to do so with a clear message on Russia sanctions, contributing more to NATO defense capabilities, and a joint agenda on China.

This is not how Scholz had envisaged his first U.S. trip as chancellor. When he was in Washington last October as finance minister, he celebrated the agreement on a global corporate minimum tax he helped to broker with his U.S. counterpart Janet Yellen. It's these sorts of issues that are unrelated to hard security that Scholz is most passionate about. He would have preferred to focus his Washington trip on his priorities for Germany's G-7 presidency under the slogan "progress toward an equitable world," including a "climate club" of pioneering states. This is the global flip side of Scholz's domestic agenda for a modernization decade that he thinks Germany badly needs after too much stasis under Merkel. Scholz's closest advisors see him as "Angela Merkel with a plan." Unlike Merkel, who contented herself with diligently dealing with the many crises coming her way, Scholz came to office determined to pursue a long-term agenda of an equitable digital and post-carbon transformation not just of Germany's industry but also of politics and society in a stronger Europe.

But international security was never near the top of his agenda. That explains why Scholz took a hands-off approach when the crisis with Russia hit right during the first weeks of his chancellorship. He failed to communicate a clear course vis-à-vis Russia's threats against Ukraine. For a long time it was unclear what actions Germany was willing to support to deter the Kremlin from staging another major invasion. Scholz did talk about the "high price" Russian leader Vladimir Putin would pay but sowed doubts about his determination by continuing to label the highly contested Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany a private business project. The fact that German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht tried to take Nord Stream2 sanctions off the table the same day the Biden administration asked U.S. senators to vote to waive sanctions against Germany over this very pipeline added to the fury in Washington. Scholz also failed to reign in the motley crew of pro-Kremlin voices from within his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the opposition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, including Bavarian Prime Minister Markus Söder, a former chancellor hopeful who cautioned against "ever new threats and ever tougher sanctions" against Russia. That Germany cautioned against using the SWIFT financial communications network as part of the sanctions package and refused to send weapons to Ukraine or even authorize the transfer of German-made weapons from Estonia only added to the impression of an unreliable ally.

It was only in mid-January that Scholz committed to the formula of "all options being on the table" in terms of sanctions. But the fact that, apart from weapons deliveries, Germany has fully signed on to the U.S.-led deterrence-through-sanctions agenda while investing in diplomatic channels for crisis management has mostly not registered with Germany's allies. Scholz and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock use the slogan "dialogue and toughness" for their Russia policy. But the impression is, as Russia expert Julia Friedrich has put it, that Berlin "mostly relies on the toughness of others while it sees itself as the bridge for dialogue."

That is why as a first order of business in Washington Scholz needs to loudly and clearly reiterate the message that, in terms of sanctions on Russia, all options are on the table—including Nord Stream 2. That will help to correct the perception that Germany is unwilling to support any sanctions that mean significant economic costs for Germany. If Scholz is clear on this, he can also more forcefully make the case that he wants the burden of sanctions vis-à-vis Russia to be shared fairly among allies (and remind the United States that it is one of the biggest importers of Russian crude). Scholz should also use the Washington visit to distance himself clearly from former SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder whose work on the payroll of the Russian energy firms Gazprom and Rosneft and whose pro-Kremlin advocacy (most recently waffling about Ukrainian "saber-rattling") have become an increasingly heavy reputational millstone around Scholz's, and by extension Germany's, neck.

Even more importantly, Scholz needs to signal that while Germany will not supply weapons to Ukraine, it will contribute additional resources to the defense of NATO allies that feel threatened by Russia. The chancellor should make it crystal clear during his trip to the United States that he sees deterrence by NATO of an aggressive Russia as a task to which Germany is willing to make additional contributions. This is a recognition of the fact that the current crisis with Russia is about a lot more than Ukraine. It is about the key elements of European security order, as the Kremlin's demands in the draft treaty language make it clear.

Scholz can make the case for additional investments in defense and deterrence as part of his call for a new European Ostpolitik together with Germany's key European partners. Scholz's appeal echoes the policy of detente pursued by the first SPD chancellor and Nobel Prize winner Willy Brandt in the late 1960s. Scholz can build on an aspect of Brandt's approach that has largely gone forgotten: that detente was built on a firm commitment to deterrence. In 1973, Brandt argued that "the freedom to work on detente does not come for free." He stressed the need to preserve "presence and combat strength" of the German armed forces and called the defense budget "not just a necessity" but also a "serving our work for peace." As a consequence, under Brandt's leadership from 1969-1974 the German defense budget saw the largest increases to date. It's this legacy of Ostpolitik that Scholz can invoke to justify Germany investing more in European defense.

Investing more resources in defense and deterrence is not popular domestically in Germany, so Scholz will have to spend political capital to convince his own party and the German public. The current level of aggression displayed by the Kremlin is a good window of opportunity to make the case to the German public that does not quite see the need for investing in deterrence in order to negotiate with Moscow on arms control from a position of strength. While Scholz would very much prefer to spend his political capital on other domestic issues, he has no choice but to also invest more in terms of defense if his key goal of a stronger Europe is to have a fighting chance. If key European partners feel insecure and left alone by Berlin, projecting European political unity on the global stage will remain a pipe dream. Berlin can no longer rely on Washington to take care of increased needs for investing in European security. That Biden this week decided to bolster the U.S. presence in Europe by 2,000 troops should not blind Germans to the fact that the United States wants and needs to decrease its presence in Europe in the medium term to focus on countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Scholz knows that even if Trumpism does not stage a comeback in 2024, we will likely never see another U.S. administration with as much goodwill toward Europe and as much willingness to invest in a European crisis. That is why Scholz should make it clear Germany will go ahead with this enhanced contribution even if we get lucky and Putin decides to not pursue another invasion of Ukraine for now.

In his meeting with Biden, Scholz should also present a substantive agenda on possible areas for cooperation on China policy. In his state of the union speech outlining his governing program last December, Scholz talked about the need to adjust German and European policy "to the China we find in the real world," signaling an end to a policy that fed on the illusion of a Beijing continuing to open up its system. The chancellor called on Germany and Europe to "invest in our own political, economic, and technological strength" and to use the strength of the European common market to "fight for fair competition for our companies and to compete globally" with China. Strikingly, he added: "Our most important partner in this is the United States." That is a stronger commitment to trans-Atlantic cooperation on China than you ever heard from Angela Merkel.

Scholz can now fill this idea with life by proposing concrete cooperation in areas such as semiconductors, rare earths, global infrastructure (building on the European Union's recent Global Gateway initiative), and green technology. Scholz should seek cooperation with the United States on countering China's economic coercion (most recently attacking key principles of the European common market by going after Lithuania and German companies producing there). In doing so, he can remind his U.S. counterparts that Washington needs to stop using sanctions against its democratic allies if it wants cooperation on this front. At the same time, Scholz should clearly signal that Berlin is committed to defending the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Germany can make an important contribution on the political, economic, and technological front to nonmilitary deterrence of Beijing moving on Taiwan, the one hot spot that could trigger a great-power war with catastrophic consequences not just for global stability but also for German and European prosperity.

The trip to Washington needs to be Olaf Scholz's overdue coming out on international security. Only if the chancellor invests forcefully in managing international crises and restores Germany as a credible partner with key allies will he have the breathing space to pursue his ambitious and much needed domestic modernization agenda.

Thorsten Benner is a co-founder and the director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.

[Valmy]

Russians lost every battle of consequence during the war

I wouldn't call Balaclava a loss for Russia.

It was a draw, but virtually every other battle the Russians lost rather badly...at least against the allies, they beat up on the Ottomans in some places.

[DGuller]

My recollection is that the Russians view the Crimean War as a humiliating drubbing, and a catalyst for radical changes to how Russian society worked, in order to be able to resist the Western power in future conflicts.  I understand that the victors of this war didn't feel like they won a whole lot, but Russians definitely felt like they lost a lot.

[Valmy]

My recollection is that the Russians view the Crimean War as a humiliating drubbing, and a catalyst for radical changes to how Russian society worked, in order to be able to resist the Western power in future conflicts.  I understand that the victors of this war didn't feel like they won a whole lot, but Russians definitely felt like they lost a lot.

Well the main winner was France and then...well...it didn't end well for their bid to be the dominant power in Europe. The Russian bear was chased back to its den for awhile allowing for NAPOLEONIC GLORY!!!111

[Admiral Yi]

It was a draw, but virtually every other battle the Russians lost rather badly...at least against the allies, they beat up on the Ottomans in some places.

I wouldn't say the Russians lost Inkerman badly.  Nip and tuck for the British, had to be bailed out by the French one more time.

[Berkut]

This is interesting.

A retired Russian general, speaking on internal Russian politics and the threatened war with the Ukraine.

I guess he is a ignorant moron as well, since he is parroting exactly what I've said - that the claimed "threat" is not just bullshit, even those making the threat know it is bullshit.

https://twitter.com/Lucian_Kim/status/1490313041447116806?s=20&t=upB9SgJidSivmSf2Yo5Shw&fbclid=IwAR2hZugn3ih4iPoPy2IeCj6t4ITG9e5_PdzYFy5UrvpODI5qfAZRfXg3mi0

As for external threats, they are certainly present. But, according to our expert assessment, they are not at the moment critical, directly threatening the existence of Russian statehood, its vital interests. In general, strategic stability persists, nuclear weapons are under reliable control, NATO force groups are not increasing, there is no threatening activity.

Therefore, the situation escalated around Ukraine is, first of all, artificial, selfish in nature for some internal forces, including the Russian Federation. As a result of the collapse of the USSR, in which Russia (Yeltsin) took a decisive part, Ukraine became an independent state, a member of the UN, and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter has the right to individual and collective defense.

[viper37]

I guess he is a ignorant moron as well,

more like a dead man walking.

[DGuller]

I guess he is a ignorant moron as well,

more like a dead man walking.

I think he'll be doing more jumping than walking going forward.

[Jacob]

Seeing reports (by reputable independent investigative journalist organization Proekt) that Putin has built a private railroad connecting his residences in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Sochii.

I guess he's worried that if a Polish president could die in a plane accident, so could a Russian one.