Syria is disintegrating

[Sheilbh]

The question is not "Why wouldn't the Hague do something", it's "Why would it?"  I seriously doubt the UN would create a tribunal unless Assad is already out of power.  And has the ICC indicted anyone who wasn't in Africa?

The ICC hasn't.  They're investigating outside Africa though.  They need to be asked to investigate - they're not allowed to roam around the world looking for war crimes - which means for Syria that the UNSC would need to ask them to investigate.  Unless the Syrian National Council are recognised.  Then they could ask.  But if Russia and China decide to abandon Assad - without approving intervention - then I think they'll give this.

Or a special tribunal could be set up like the one for Lebanon.

I agree that Syria has been weakened by this, but I don't think it'll fall.  I think the Alawite and the Druze will ultimately stay loyal.  A new government may very well butcher them and they know it.  The rebels can't resist the military and the crowds can't protest forever.  The fractious nature of the opposition means that the government can buy off portions in a divide and conquer strategy.

They've not managed to buy any bit of the opposition off yet.  Because it's so fractious I think, in part.  There's no clear leaders and even if the regime bought them off there's no indication that the uprising would follow.

But I think your impression of the Syrian government's strength is wrong.  They still haven't managed to take Homs - the city is still being shelled and fought over.  The government announced that they'd taken Idlib during the weak, they've withdrawn today using civilians as human shields due attacks by 'rebels' of some sort.  The loyal, trusted bits of the Syrian military (Alawite regiments) and the secret service haven't yet managed to re-assert control in any city in Syria yet they occassionally manage to get a neighbourhood or the centre but they've always been driven back.  If they lose Damascus or Aleppo then I think it's over because they wouldn't have even that.

The reports from Damascus are of growing opposition though.  There's apparently been bomb attacks on government and military institutions, there's hit and run attacks on government employees and occasional brief protests that then disperse or are dispersed very quickly.  It's still totally in government control but there are more reports of those types of incident than before either because the regime's weakening, the opposition's getting bolder or undecided Damascenes are turning against the regime.

[Razgovory]

Homs has all but fallen.  The rebels only hold a small fraction of the city now.  They'll lose that very soon.  And you are completely wrong about the Syrian government not asserting authority over areas.  There have been several successful operations mounted by the Government.   Where did you read that Syrian forces retreated from Idlib?  I've read they've withdrawn to go fight elsewhere and the city is firmly under the control of the government.  Idlib is just one of many cities and towns crushed by the government.

I think you are wrong Assad not buying off the opposition yet.  He's offered many concessions and some of these have been taken.  The new Constitutions is an example of this.  There is also talk of restoring the political rights of Kurd.  Kurds seem respective this idea.

I think the escalation of violence is actually the last stages of the rebellion.  The government has secured enough support domestically and internationally that it can now destroy any of those rebels who remain.

[Sheilbh]

So this is surprising:

Cautious hope for Syria
Posted By Marc Lynch   Friday, April 13, 2012 - 12:40 PM 

Few diplomatic initiatives have faced more skepticism than Kofi Annan's plan for Syria, and for good reason. Annan's six point plan may have been the only game in town, but its limited mandate reflected by necessity the demands of a divided Security Council and seemed to many far too accommodating to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Assad certainly gave little reason to believe its promises, as his forces spent the days leading up to the ceasefire date unleashing ever escalating violence. Syrian opposition and activist views ranged from skeptical to hostile, while those who loudly yearn for a Western military intervention dismissed it as an irritating obstacle to action.

But on Thursday, the ceasefire took effect. Violence did not end, but it dramatically dropped.  That set the stage for today's critical test: would peaceful protestors return to the streets after the brutal onslaught of the last couple of weeks? And how would regime forces respond if they did? Up until now, the answers offer the first, frail glimmers of hope for Syria in a long, long time. I've been watching dozens of videos of Syrians pouring out into the streets today to demonstrate across the country. And while there have again been scattered reports of attacks and efforts to block demonstrations in some cities, there has not been a systematic military response. Today's exhilerating outpouring of popular, peaceful protest does not guarantee anything.  But it does prove that Assad's effort to kill his way to victory has failed.

The wave of peaceful protests today offers a tantalizing window into the possibility, however slim, that Annan's plan could halt Syria's seemingly relentless slide to civil war. Assad's failure to break the spirit of opposition despite his brutal onslaught over the last couple of weeks is genuinely significant. The wave of protest and the much-strengthened international consensus showed that Assad's brutal offensive, and dangerous escalation along the Turkish border, failed to destroy the opposition and helped to unite the international community. The willingness of Syrians to go into the streets today, and for the opposition to generally adhere to peaceful protest for the day, is a vital sign that such a political strategy remains possible and that a mobilized non-violent opposition might take advantage of a ceasefire to recapture political momentum.

Given his lost legitimacy and the economic collapse, I don't believe that Assad can survive at this point without using force. He seems to have believed that he could crush the opposition before his international window closed, but he did not. If Syrians continue to take to the streets and the regime is restrained by international pressure from responding violently, a snowball could begin to roll, especially if those still sitting on the fence or backing the regime out of fear come to see that opposition as peaceful and inclusive rather than as a potentially life-threatening armed force. It would be remarkable to see a non-violent, mass protest movement emerge from the wreckage of civil war like a Phoenix. It may in fact be too much to expect, given the evolution of the status and role of the armed groups within the opposition and the horrors which the regime has inflicted upon the population. But it's something to encourage and to protect.

It's obviously only a beginning, and one which could be reversed over the weekend. Assad has not even come close to complying with the terms of the Annan plan, which includes far more than a ceasefire. But it's notable that there is now a robust and largely unified international consensus demanding that he comply with the plan -- even from Russia and China, which have a stake in a plan they helped craft. The plan, as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton noted, is not a menu of options from which to choose.  And more demands should be forthcoming. The Security Council is reportedly close to approving a plan for a small observer mission to enter Syria, which would at least initially be a symbolic step to capitalize on the momentum. I suspect that the recent rumblings from Annan about humanitarian corridors, from Turkey about safe zones and invoking NATO Article, and from the Security Council resolution drafters about considering "other means" if the ceasefire fails are meant primarily to pressure Assad to stick to the plan. And I'm very pleased by the growing talk of pushing for an ICC referral at the Security Council should the Annan plan fail, and by the agreement at the recent Friends of Syria conference to create a "Syria Accountability Clearing House" to prepare the ground for future international or transitional justice regardless of the political outcome.

Nobody believes that this is going to be easy or fast or fully satisfying, least of all Annan.  Everything could easily go wrong if and when regime forces launch a major attack on protestors, or if there's an opposition attack against those forces. I don't believe that Assad will intentionally negotiate his own downfall, or trust his intentions for a minute.  The contours of a political transition haven't even begun to be discussed publicly. Syrian opposition activists are highlighting ongoing violations and warning furiously that Assad should not be trusted. And a lot of external supporters of the Syrian opposition don't want a political process to succeed since it would block the path towards the military intervention they advocate, and are already agitating to declare the Annan plan dead.

But that would be a mistake at this point. The fetish for military intervention among so many in the Syria policy debate has been counter-productive. The Obama administration and most of the key governments involved in the Syria crisis clearly believe that military intervention and arming the opposition are bad ideas -- not viable solutions which they are avoiding for political reasons, but potential fiascos which they are avoiding out of prudence. I expect that the U.S. and the United Nations will try to keep this process alive while pushing Assad and the opposition for self-restraint and for a political roadmap. They should, even through the likely setbacks, stumbles, and reversals to come. This may be the last chance to avoid a catastrophic descent into years of protracted insurgency and proxy warfare. I hope it survives the weekend and takes root, even if most everyone recognizes that it likely will not.   

[The Brain]

Is that from Vogue?

[Sheilbh]

And it ended.  The government's back to shelling Homs.  I suspect they were spooked by the fact that at least tens of thousands of people turned out on the first day they could do so without being killed.