New fighter jet to bolster Russian air force, and India

[grumbler]

"End of complex life on Earth" is overselling it.  Unless you mean it will be more difficult to go to poetry slams in the post-war environment.

You can go with the studies you have read, and I will go with the ones I have read.  They don't seem to lead to the same place, but since we are talking hypotheticals, that doesn't matter.

[The Minsky Moment]

When?  My understanding is that it was not until 1966 that Hanoi and Haiphong could even be attacked by tactical aircraft, and that Johnson refused to "escalate" by sending B-52s very far north.  Thus, it was not until the closing days of the war, specifically the Linebacker operations, and even more specifically Linebacker II, that Hanoi and Haiphong were attacked by massed B-52 formations.  Which had a great deal of military impact.

However, even then, at no point was terror bombing ever contemplated.  Moreover, there was never a systematic plan designed to destroy North Vietnam's ability and will to support operations in South Vietnam through airpower--only impulsive and desultory raids, beginning with Arc Light anti-tree operations, and which regrettably includes even the otherwise successful Linebacker II.   . . .In any event, you certainly cannot compare the strategic air war over Vietnam to those over German, Japan, or--more relevantly--North Korea.  (Ever seen photos of Pyongyang in 1948?  Looks like Slaughterhouse Five.)

This analysis doesn't make a lot of sense to me.  When Rolling Thunder commenced in early `65, the war was still basically a counter-insurgency campaign, which ARVN was losing.   Bombing the crap out of Hanoi would not fix this problem.  It would not have changed the contours of the insurgency in the South.  It might have made supply and reinforcement from the North more difficult, but not impossible.  And of course it might have prompted stronger intervention from the USSR and/or China, the risks of which was another lesson of Korea.

Seems to me the better argument is that the US shouldn't have gotten into the bombing business in the first place, not that they didn't do enough.  Rolling Thunder was supposedly retaliation for a guerilla attack on a helicopter base.   It is hard to see the military and political logic that escalates from such an incident to a full-scale WW2-style terror bombing campaign.  Another problem was the even the more limited campaign forced a general escalation because the US had to deploy thousands of ground troops to secure the USAF bases.  If Johnson had followed your advice of a massive, unrestricted bombing campaign, the level of commitment would have been even greater, and probably beyond what was politically feasible in 1965 (a busy year domestically).

As for Linebacker II, whatever its "military impact", its strategic effectiveness was dubious.  Linebacker II was a recognition of failure; it was designed to force the North to the table to give Nixon a paper agreement that would save face for him over the US abandoning the South to inevitable total defeat.  It succeeded in that regard, but achieved no actual useful purpose.

[Ideologue]

Well, you said that destructive bombing campaigns were attempted, and had little effect.  I'm only pointing out that a truly destructive bombing campaigns were not attempted, until, and even then only arguably, the very end of the war.  And, as you note, by this point Nixon had already basically resigned himself to ending American involvement, and the SRVN was less of an obstacle to its termination than Thieu.  Fwiw, given the actual goals of Linebacker II, I'm not sure it's entirely justifiable.  However, it does make for a good case of what a serious bombing effort might have eventually accomplished if undertaken with different goals in mind.

This analysis doesn't make a lot of sense to me.  When Rolling Thunder commenced in early `65, the war was still basically a counter-insurgency campaign, which ARVN was losing.   Bombing the crap out of Hanoi would not fix this problem.  It would not have changed the contours of the insurgency in the South.  It might have made supply and reinforcement from the North more difficult, but not impossible.

But the insurgency was overtly supported by the SRVN, and relied on PAVN soldiers and materiel, which in turn relied in some part on foreign assistance.

My point is that in all aspects, we never treated the Vietnam conflict as a total war, when it was--it ended in the extinction of a friendly government.

[The Minsky Moment]

My point is that in all aspects, we never treated the Vietnam conflict as a total war, when it was--it ended in the extinction of a friendly government.

Vietnam was a counter-insurgency effort in a geopolitically peripheral nation.  It would have been utterly insane to treat it as a total war.  Ike - who whatever his faults knew a little something about total wars -- understood that, which was why he didn't back the French and kept US commitment limited in the south.  The argument that still gets made by some that "we could have won" had the US fought a Clausewitzian war of annihilation is flawed in multiple respects: it assumes (falsely) that such an effort would be politically feasible, it assumes (falsely) that the effort would have been worth the cost, and it assumes (fasely) that such a "victory" would be of significant practical value once achieved.

The "friendly government" didn't go extinct because the US failed to back it up by dropping enough ordinance, it went extinct for the same reason most organisms usually go extinct -- it was not properly adapted to its environment.  Blowing up the dodo's predators en masse with grenades might save a few dodos for a little bit of time, but at the end of the day, you are still stuck with a bunch of dodos.

[Razgovory]

"End of complex life on Earth" is overselling it.  Unless you mean it will be more difficult to go to poetry slams in the post-war environment.

You can go with the studies you have read, and I will go with the ones I have read.  They don't seem to lead to the same place, but since we are talking hypotheticals, that doesn't matter.

Are these studies classified?

[Ideologue]

My point is that in all aspects, we never treated the Vietnam conflict as a total war, when it was--it ended in the extinction of a friendly government.

Vietnam was a counter-insurgency effort in a geopolitically peripheral nation.  It would have been utterly insane to treat it as a total war.  Ike - who whatever his faults knew a little something about total wars -- understood that, which was why he didn't back the French and kept US commitment limited in the south.  The argument that still gets made by some that "we could have won" had the US fought a Clausewitzian war of annihilation is flawed in multiple respects: it assumes (falsely) that such an effort would be politically feasible, it assumes (falsely) that the effort would have been worth the cost, and it assumes (fasely) that such a "victory" would be of significant practical value once achieved.

The "friendly government" didn't go extinct because the US failed to back it up by dropping enough ordinance, it went extinct for the same reason most organisms usually go extinct -- it was not properly adapted to its environment.  Blowing up the dodo's predators en masse with grenades might save a few dodos for a little bit of time, but at the end of the day, you are still stuck with a bunch of dodos.

Well, that's an argument for never getting involved to begin with, with which I concur.

[Neil]

Well, that's an argument for never getting involved to begin with, with which I concur.

Do you?  Shouldn't you support the decapitation of North Vietnam and the destruction of their warmaking capability with atomics against their cities?

[Ideologue]

Well, that's an argument for never getting involved to begin with, with which I concur.

Do you?  Shouldn't you support the decapitation of North Vietnam and the destruction of their warmaking capability with atomics against their cities?

I don't support the atomic destruction of every country.  Only those whose causes are irrefutably unjust, and who have no means to retaliate in kind.  In other words, the PRC.  During the Korean War, certainly, but whenever.

[Razgovory]

My point is that in all aspects, we never treated the Vietnam conflict as a total war, when it was--it ended in the extinction of a friendly government.

Vietnam was a counter-insurgency effort in a geopolitically peripheral nation.  It would have been utterly insane to treat it as a total war.  Ike - who whatever his faults knew a little something about total wars -- understood that, which was why he didn't back the French and kept US commitment limited in the south.  The argument that still gets made by some that "we could have won" had the US fought a Clausewitzian war of annihilation is flawed in multiple respects: it assumes (falsely) that such an effort would be politically feasible, it assumes (falsely) that the effort would have been worth the cost, and it assumes (fasely) that such a "victory" would be of significant practical value once achieved.

The "friendly government" didn't go extinct because the US failed to back it up by dropping enough ordinance, it went extinct for the same reason most organisms usually go extinct -- it was not properly adapted to its environment.  Blowing up the dodo's predators en masse with grenades might save a few dodos for a little bit of time, but at the end of the day, you are still stuck with a bunch of dodos.

I thought Ike did back up the French.  I seem to recall reading that the US helped funded the ill fated Dien Bien Phu thingy.  Other then that, I agree with you.  Vietnam turned out not to be particularly important.  The US already had bases in the area and it's economic interests in the country were never that great.  Communism didn't spread across all of South East Asia, and the Communists ended up just fighting each other.  Hell, the North winning the war has actually ended up benefiting the US.  We do lots of trade with them, and it's not inconceivable that we may end up allied to them in the near future.

[jimmy olsen]

My point is that in all aspects, we never treated the Vietnam conflict as a total war, when it was--it ended in the extinction of a friendly government.

Vietnam was a counter-insurgency effort in a geopolitically peripheral nation.  It would have been utterly insane to treat it as a total war.  Ike - who whatever his faults knew a little something about total wars -- understood that, which was why he didn't back the French and kept US commitment limited in the south.  The argument that still gets made by some that "we could have won" had the US fought a Clausewitzian war of annihilation is flawed in multiple respects: it assumes (falsely) that such an effort would be politically feasible, it assumes (falsely) that the effort would have been worth the cost, and it assumes (fasely) that such a "victory" would be of significant practical value once achieved.

South Korea's initial government was a rather incompetent and corrupt dictatorship. If "victory" had assured an independent S. Vietnam I don't see why it's weak government would have prevented it from following S. Korea's path of economic (and likely political) development.  Surely a S. Vietnam even half as developed as S. Korea would be of significant practical value.

[Neil]

South Korea was defensible. South Vietnam's huge border with the enemy made it not so.

[Razgovory]

South Korea's initial government was a rather incompetent and corrupt dictatorship. If "victory" had assured an independent S. Vietnam I don't see why it's weak government would have prevented it from following S. Korea's path of economic (and likely political) development.  Surely a S. Vietnam even half as developed as S. Korea would be of significant practical value.

US forces were already being attacked in South Korea.  South Korea was a more homogenous country then Vietnam, (which had all sorts of mountain tribes).  I think Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia or better comparisons to get an idea of what Southern Vietnam might look like.

[grumbler]

South Korea's initial government was a rather incompetent and corrupt dictatorship. If "victory" had assured an independent S. Vietnam I don't see why it's weak government would have prevented it from following S. Korea's path of economic (and likely political) development.  Surely a S. Vietnam even half as developed as S. Korea would be of significant practical value.

South Vietnam's political leadership was composed of catholic refugees from the North imposing their military rule over a Buddhist nation.  There is no reason why Vietnam, now that that government is gone, cannot, as you say, follow South Korea's path of economic (and likely political) development.  The south dominates Vietnam culturally, and the south's political power is on the rise.  The survival of a Catholic dictatorship in a still-divided country is the only means by which the US and Vietnam could have lost that war.

[Brazen]

Just a couple of points about the original article. Remember that? T-50 is just its prototype name, the aircraft is called the PAK FA. Catchy.

Its demonstration flight at the MAKS airshow was aborted during takeoff after an engine malfunction, with the pilot deploying the brake parachute at 100kph. Eyewitnesses saw a flash of light, so it sounds like it exploded.

India and Russia have a number of defence partnerships, with the number increasing as they're both increasing defence spending while most of the West is implementing massive defence cuts.

Unlike most other airshows, MAKS is mainly Russian companies selling to Russia. Foreign contractors pretty much need to set up a Russia-based subsidiary to get work.

[The Minsky Moment]

South Korea's initial government was a rather incompetent and corrupt dictatorship. If "victory" had assured an independent S. Vietnam I don't see why it's weak government would have prevented it from following S. Korea's path of economic (and likely political) development.  Surely a S. Vietnam even half as developed as S. Korea would be of significant practical value.

The logical comparison is not South Korea but Thailand.  Thailand did experience some development despite corrupt governments, and was a useful ally of the US.  But to put it crassly - it not really essential to US security or geopolitical strategy.  The US strategic interest in east Asia was to underwrite the security of its key allies and trading partners -- Japan, Australia, and the Phillipines, and to secure the free flow of goods through the Pacific.  Later during this period the opportunity to triangulate with China came to the fore.  The precise orientation of governments in the relatively small mainland southeast Asian states just was not of great strategic import.  In fact, the rise of Marxist-oriented regimes in southeast Asia arguably redounded to the strategic interest of the US by stoking Sino-Soviet frictions and competition.