The American Civil War

[CountDeMoney]

The higher ranks were certainly disproportionately Southern for that reason. The lower officer ranks were more representative of the nation at large.

In the South, you had two options:  go into the family business of running the farm or plantation, or go into the military.
Military service for Southerns in the 19th century was what going into the priesthood in the middle ages was.  It was the only real alternative to your family's station.

[Sheilbh]

I think someone on here once posted that the officer corps of the prewar army was disproportionately southern. West Point had a lot of northern entrants, but they didn't stick with military careers as often since they had more economic opportunities at home.

I've read that.  But my understanding is that the military theory at the time was a sort-of Jominian war of manoeuvre and yet the West Point educated, theoretical generals of the South seem far less trapped by that than the Northern generals?

Is part of it possibly that the nature of the war is different for each side at the start?  That the North is fighting to preserve and reinstate the union - the union as it was - while the South are always fighting for survival?  Basically the North doesn't start fighting a total war, the South always is.

[Razgovory]

I'd argue the opposite actually.  Both sides stayed fairly true to military precepts of the day at least in the beginning.  I would say that it was the Union commanders in the West that were the most creative.

One of the main problems with the Army of the Potomac was that it had horrible intelligence.  McClellan labored under the strange notion that he was always outnumbered.

[grumbler]

I've read that.  But my understanding is that the military theory at the time was a sort-of Jominian war of manoeuvre and yet the West Point educated, theoretical generals of the South seem far less trapped by that than the Northern generals?

Southern generals had more experiencing commanding larger bodies of troops, since they had, on average, more years' experience in the Army.  Plus, southern troops tended to be more rural, self-sufficient, and firearms-savvy than their northern counterparts, and earlier in the war this gave the Confederate generals more options in terms of maneuver.  Norhtern troops from the cities had to be pampered more early in their military service.

Is part of it possibly that the nature of the war is different for each side at the start?  That the North is fighting to preserve and reinstate the union - the union as it was - while the South are always fighting for survival?  Basically the North doesn't start fighting a total war, the South always is.

The war was different for the two sides at the start for both the reasons you mention and the ones I mention.  The Southern leadership knew from the start that business as usual wasn't going to cut it for them.

[Eddie Teach]

One of the main problems with the Army of the Potomac was that it had horrible intelligence.  McClellan labored under the strange notion that he was always outnumbered.

Considering he appears to be the only one who believed that, I wouldn't pawn it off on the intelligence network.

[Drakken]

Considering he appears to be the only one who believed that, I wouldn't pawn it off on the intelligence network.

I would blamely squarely on MacLellan, who had this silly notion that any number of soldiers the ANV was reported to field had to be multiplied by three. Whether he truly believed it out of paranoia, or he wanted to keep his force as an army-in-being, or aimed to be as much a pain in the ass to Lincoln as possible, is another matter.

[Drakken]

I've read that.  But my understanding is that the military theory at the time was a sort-of Jominian war of manoeuvre and yet the West Point educated, theoretical generals of the South seem far less trapped by that than the Northern generals?

Southern generals had more experiencing commanding larger bodies of troops, since they had, on average, more years' experience in the Army.  Plus, southern troops tended to be more rural, self-sufficient, and firearms-savvy than their northern counterparts, and earlier in the war this gave the Confederate generals more options in terms of maneuver.  Norhtern troops from the cities had to be pampered more early in their military service.

Is part of it possibly that the nature of the war is different for each side at the start?  That the North is fighting to preserve and reinstate the union - the union as it was - while the South are always fighting for survival?  Basically the North doesn't start fighting a total war, the South always is.

The war was different for the two sides at the start for both the reasons you mention and the ones I mention.  The Southern leadership knew from the start that business as usual wasn't going to cut it for them.

Now I take a seat and cook my popcorn in the oven, in expectation for Berkut to magically appear and flak that argument in favour of "The Southern Leadership" down.

This promises to be fun. 

[Sheilbh]

Southern generals had more experiencing commanding larger bodies of troops, since they had, on average, more years' experience in the Army.  Plus, southern troops tended to be more rural, self-sufficient, and firearms-savvy than their northern counterparts, and earlier in the war this gave the Confederate generals more options in terms of maneuver.  Norhtern troops from the cities had to be pampered more early in their military service.

Two thoughts.  Isn't the real distinction not necessarily North vs South but North-East vs the rest?  I mean surely the North-West was as rural and self-sufficient as the South, which would perhaps explain, along with superior generalship, the relative success of the Union there.

Is that fair?  I mean they're fighting a different kind of war but it strike me that the Army of the Potomac takes a pounding repeatedly and yet time and again morale is rebuilt remarkably quickly.  I don't know if that fits into a pampered urban army.

I'd argue the opposite actually.  Both sides stayed fairly true to military precepts of the day at least in the beginning.  I would say that it was the Union commanders in the West that were the most creative.

No doubt the Western commanders are a far better bunch and very creative. 

[grumbler]

I would blamely squarely on MacLellan, who had this silly notion that any number of soldiers the ANV was reported to field had to be multiplied by three. Whether he truly believed it out of paranoia, or he wanted to keep his force as an army-in-being, or aimed to be as much a pain in the ass to Lincoln as possible, is another matter.

Do some research - the story is even better than "McClellan was some kind of moron who believed he was outnumbered for reasons no one can fathom."  Allen Pinkerton was McClellan's spymaster, and distorted the numbers because he was rewarded by McClellan when he reported larger Confederate force levels.  McClellan had "evidence" his feelings of being outnumbered all the time were justified.

[Drakken]

No doubt the Western commanders are a far better bunch and very creative.

And wider, rougher terrain, less infrastructure, and more rivers.

[Drakken]

Do some research - the story is even better than "McClellan was some kind of moron who believed he was outnumbered for reasons no one can fathom."  Allen Pinkerton was McClellan's spymaster, and distorted the numbers because he was rewarded by McClellan when he reported larger Confederate force levels.  McClellan had "evidence" his feelings of being outnumbered all the time were justified.

But why McLellan rewarded Pinkerton reporting larger forces? Is it because it confirmed what he always suspected, deep down, or because he had an hidden agenda fueling his prevarication.

[grumbler]

Two thoughts.  Isn't the real distinction not necessarily North vs South but North-East vs the rest?  I mean surely the North-West was as rural and self-sufficient as the South, which would perhaps explain, along with superior generalship, the relative success of the Union there.

Exactly.

Is that fair?  I mean they're fighting a different kind of war but it strike me that the Army of the Potomac takes a pounding repeatedly and yet time and again morale is rebuilt remarkably quickly.  I don't know if that fits into a pampered urban army.

An army that has to be pampered relative to another doesn't have to be low-morale.  Morale and the self-sufficiency are independent variables.

No doubt the Western commanders are a far better bunch and very creative.

I'd argue that Phil Kearny* was as good and creative a general as the war saw, and he didn't serve in the West during the ACW.  I think Western generals looked better because they had smaller forces, more maneuvering room, and fewer foes at the start, and so faced a less daunting learning curve.


*Incidentally, a man well worth researching.  He invented the first divisional patch, the "Big Red One," and uniquely (as far as I know) had not one, but two forts named after him; Fort Kearney, and Fort Phil Kearney.

[grumbler]

But why McLellan rewarded Pinkerton reporting larger forces? Is it because it confirmed what he always suspected, deep down, or because he had an hidden agenda fueling his prevarication.

Which is more heroic?  Defeating a larger enemy, or a smaller one?  Which is more admirable?  Staving off defeat by a larger enemy, or failing to defeat a smaller one?

Mac needed to feel the hero, and needed to explain to himself his failures.  It was ingrained into him that he was destined for greatness. 

[Viking]

McClellan was happy to hear high numbers since that allowed McClellan to delay and prepare. He realized that frontal assaults were suicidal and he was proven right again and again during the war. Consequently his (and Halleck's) Jomian view of warfare where maneuver forces the enemy to surrender. He seems to believe that the war could only be won by showing the south it could not win and getting it to surrender without too much bloodshed to reunite the country with the least amount of acrimony.

I can't really help thinking that my wargaming attitude is closest to McClellan of all the civil war generals as I prepare meticulously.

I don't think that Union Generals were less capable than Confederate ones. The great incompetents of the Union (Burnside, Hooker, McDowell, Buell, Pope and Halleck) were matched by an almost equal number of Confederate ones (Polk, Hood, Magruder, Floyd, Pillow and Beauregard). The South had the good luck of having incompetent generals facing incompetent union ones on ground that benefited the confederate. However, if you want to list the best generals of the ACW, out of the top six, four are union generals (Grant, Lee, Sherman, Jackson, Sheridan and Thomas). 

I think the best example of the my of Union incompetence is Burnside. Out of Burnside's five campaigns (North Carolina, Antietam, Fredricksburg, Knoxville and Petersburg) two were unqualified successes and the other two are exemplified by exceptional early quality and failure coming with orders imposed from above (the last, Antietam, was merely competent).

[11B4V]

I'd argue that Phil Kearny* was as good and creative a general as the war saw, and he didn't serve in the West during the ACW.  I think Western generals looked better because they had smaller forces, more maneuvering room, and fewer foes at the start, and so faced a less daunting learning curve.


*Incidentally, a man well worth researching.  He invented the first divisional patch, the "Big Red One," and uniquely (as far as I know) had not one, but two forts named after him; Fort Kearney, and Fort Phil Kearney.

That's the dude that served over in France too. Some think he would have been a better choice the Little Mac.