Pirate bay fruits get year in jail

[garbon]

I don't know where to start...really...good luck with this one, Beeb...

[The Minsky Moment]

The point re: Capital v. Naxos was that productive commercial activity can occur in the absence of an enforceable IP right, and can be more productive than the commercial activity that occurs in their presence.

Not disputed.  Nonetheless the justification for the right is that the existence of a general rule that applies that right is more generative of productive activity than its absence.

This is a pretty trivial point I think -- there is no distinction here between other kinds of rights as well.  There are plenty of situations where Person A could put Person B's property to more productive use - regardless of whether that property is tangible or intangible.  In most cases, the presence of such a situation is insufficient in itself to defeat the right.

Are or should be, yes.

I think that leaves you with some very tough questions to answer.  What it is about putting a newspaper in a vendor box that makes the property right diminish?  Why does a power plant previously operating at demand have its property right in its product dimish once it starts reliably producing above demand? 

[The Minsky Moment]

More like a practical approach to determining how to enforce within a particular cultural context.

From a descriptive rather than a prescriptive approach, a right that almost no one feels obligated to honor a) isn't much of one and b) perhaps shouldn't exist at all.

Only if you want to start bringing your own towels whenever you travel.   

[garbon]

I think that leaves you with some very tough questions to answer.  What it is about putting a newspaper in a vendor box that makes the property right diminish?  Why does a power plant previously operating at demand have its property right in its product dimish once it starts reliably producing above demand? 

We should punish success!

[Pat]

I don't know where to start...really...good luck with this one, Beeb...

[ulmont]

Well, to be honest I have no strong feelings one way or the other about droit morale. Why are you disgusted by it?

I find the ability to exclude others from making use of one's work in further creations to be repugnant.

Taking older works and expanding on them or riffing on them should not be blockable.

The right of attribution doesn't bother me, though.

[ulmont]

Not disputed.  Nonetheless the justification for the right is that the existence of a general rule that applies that right is more generative of productive activity than its absence.

This justification is asserted, but is pretty obviously false.  See the dissents in Eldred v. Ashcroft.

I think that leaves you with some very tough questions to answer.  What it is about putting a newspaper in a vendor box that makes the property right diminish?  Why does a power plant previously operating at demand have its property right in its product dimish once it starts reliably producing above demand?

Eh, I think it simply shows that there are cases where what might be a technical theft results in no real harm.

[szmik]

I'm with ulmont and vinnie on this. You can have almost infinite amount of intelectual "property" and limited amount of physical objects. Historically people are used to pay for things they cannot easily get by other means.
The problem with IP is that everyone can have it at almost no cost, thus easily.
Besides, when supply of something is infinite in number its market price is very close to 0. Why would someone have to pay for it the monopolistic fees?

What IP holders are trying to achieve, is just to cut the supply to raise the real market price, which is hopeless task, unless you cut everyone from the internet, but even then I don't think they would be in better position.

[The Minsky Moment]

Szmik has made an argument about why property rights should disappear when marginal costs are near zero.

Once again, the rationale is not explained and applies to property beyond IP rights,

[The Minsky Moment]

Not disputed.  Nonetheless the justification for the right is that the existence of a general rule that applies that right is more generative of productive activity than its absence.

This justification is asserted, but is pretty obviously false.  See the dissents in Eldred v. Ashcroft.

its pretty obviously correct - otherwise no propery right would be safe.

Eldred is certainly not to the contrary - it was a facial constitutional challenge to an entire statute, not a particular application of a statute to a particular case.  the question in Eldred was whether the extension of copyright term was within the constitutional power of the federal government.  7 of 9 justices said yes.  The dissenting justices disagreed, but they did not base their argument on the fact that in individual cases the existence of the copyright might achieve a commercially undesirable result.  To the contrary, their argument (which I happen to agree with) was that the extension applied as a general rule in the aggregate was undesirable (and hence did not fit within the limiting clause)

Eh, I think it simply shows that there are cases where what might be a technical theft results in no real harm.

I get that - what I don't get is :
(a) why the integrity of the property right is contingent on the objective harm caused by a single violation
(b) why in evaluating harm for the purpose of this exercise, one unrealistically confines oneself to the impact of single violation when what is at issue is the existence of the right in its entirety.

[Ed Anger]

My production possibilities curve is huge.

[Barrister]

I get that - what I don't get is :
(a) why the integrity of the property right is contingent on the objective harm caused by a single violation
(b) why in evaluating harm for the purpose of this exercise, one unrealistically confines oneself to the impact of single violation when what is at issue is the existence of the right in its entirety.

For whatever its worth, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that the "harm principle" is not a part of the criminal law.
The government need not show that anyone is harmed in order to make something illegal.

http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2000/2000bcca335/2000bcca335.html

[ulmont]

its pretty obviously correct - otherwise no propery right would be safe.

I disagree.  We have limited data on the IP front, of course, but those "pirate nations" where IP is not respected, including the US in its earlier days, have managed substantial economic production sans IP protections.

The dissenting justices disagreed, but they did not base their argument on the fact that in individual cases the existence of the copyright might achieve a commercially undesirable result.  To the contrary, their argument (which I happen to agree with) was that the extension applied as a general rule in the aggregate was undesirable (and hence did not fit within the limiting clause)

And those justices pointed out that the existence of the property right, or at least its extension thereof, would not produce more economic activity...

...and studies have shown that the patent system is a negative-sum game for all non-biotech industries.

http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03/the-costs-and-b.html
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/dopatentswork/

I get that - what I don't get is :
(a) why the integrity of the property right is contingent on the objective harm caused by a single violation
(b) why in evaluating harm for the purpose of this exercise, one unrealistically confines oneself to the impact of single violation when what is at issue is the existence of the right in its entirety.

I think now you're backtracking.  I said real property and personal property were fundamentally different from IP based off of the typical consumption pattern.  You gave examples of the consumption of real and personal property that were much closer to the IP pattern, but which were also rather tangential.

To the issue of the existence of the right in its entirety:  I do not believe that inventors would stop inventing or artists would stop creating if there were no IP protections.  I believe that the existence of those protections is actually hindering inventors and artists now.

[ulmont]

For whatever its worth, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that the "harm principle" is not a part of the criminal law.
The government need not show that anyone is harmed in order to make something illegal.

http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2000/2000bcca335/2000bcca335.html

I conclude that on the basis of all of these sources – common law, Law Reform Commissions, the federalism cases, Charter litigation – that the "harm principle" is indeed a principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7. It is a legal principle and it is concise. Moreover, there is a consensus among reasonable people that it is vital to our system of justice. Indeed, I think that it is common sense that you don't go to jail unless there is a potential that your activities will cause harm to others.

What did I misread in that opinion?

[The Minsky Moment]

I disagree.  We have limited data on the IP front, of course, but those "pirate nations" where IP is not respected, including the US in its earlier days, have managed substantial economic production sans IP protections.

That's an empirical claim.  Your original claim was not that IP does not deserve status as property because as an empirical matter, one can show that the benefits are outweighed by the drawbacks - your claim was that IP is inherently a different kind of property right regardless of its policy justification.  OTOH my argument the whole time has been that every form of property involves a policy rationale (an explicit or implicit social quid quo pro) balancing benefits of protections vs. no or less protection.  So I would agree that if as an empirical matter IP rights do more harm then good, they should be limited.  Then again, the same is true of any other form of property right. 

And those justices pointed out that the existence of the property right, or at least its extension thereof, would not produce more economic activity...

...and studies have shown that the patent system is a negative-sum game for all non-biotech industries.

Again, this is an empirical argument.  If it turns out you are wrong, and that protecting IP rights is actually more economically aggregative than protecting other forms of property rights, then the opposite of your conclusions would hold.  We could certainly trade studies and empirical data all day long without ever coming to a satisfactory resolution.

I think now you're backtracking.  I said real property and personal property were fundamentally different from IP based off of the typical consumption pattern.  You gave examples of the consumption of real and personal property that were much closer to the IP pattern, but which were also rather tangential. 

I think it is you that are backtracking here.  You concede that your argument is based off consumption patterns, and further concede that my examples track the same consumption pattern.  Yet you want to discard them as "tangential".  If consumption pattern is the key distinction, then these examples are not tangential.

In response you appear to have switched to a harm-based argument that contends that where a single violation of the property right results in de minimus harm, the property right should be attenuated.  But that doesn't seem to be a justifiable distinction either.