Social Democrats in the Wilderness

[Sheilbh]

All of those things have been feasible as goals for society to strive for in the not too distant past or in certain places today. Would such societies be better off with no moral goals at all? There will always be a minority who disagrees with or is hurt by the morality I think, yes?

I didn't say any moral purpose is better than none.

However I would say that in most cases that is what is attractive, at the start, in unpleasant regimes.  It was, I think, the attraction of communism and Khomeini both.

Maybe I am missing something about your argument, Sheilbh, but I think it is contradictory. You complain that a "society" based on common moral goals is collapsing/disintegrating, but at the same time you complain that it is replaced by "like-minded, self-segregated communities" - aren't the latter exactly the type of "societies" that you would like to return? The only difference is that your disappearing "society" would be a like-minded self-segregated community based on some arbitrary element such as nationality, ethnicity or simple geographical proximity.

I think you're right, I've contradicted myself so I'll sort of back up a bit.  I think politics based on common moral goals has gone but that society has disintegrated because it lacks the imagination for sympathy. 

We cannot imagine the good in other people's views or their perspectives at all.  Where I find morality worthwhile, such as the useful hypocrisy of the CofE, isn't because it injects a moral purpose into society but a sympathy and a common denominator to some extent.

The examples I've given are broad groups like the metropolitan middle class, the commuter shires, the working class.  I think that there was something in common for all these groups - like a lie in religion, or an engagement with the competing moral visions of our politics - so that even when they seemed motivated by different things there was still a connection.  I think that sympathy's gone and we're left with mutual suspicion and fear.

I do also worry about a wider social disintegration but that's because I dislike modern capitalism

Edit:  And I'd add that I worry our society's lost the ability to deal with morality in any sense.  I think we - and Judt makes this point - seem no longer able to talk about the bit moral issues.  Those words: 'justice', 'fairness' and so on are used by looneys (look at the poor civil libertarians like Liberty), joked about by the rest of us and only possible in distancing quotation marks.  I think, to use Judt's idea, that it's a fault precisely as our society has become more unfair to not be able talk seriously about what we fairness whatsoever.  At best it's part of the bumph that Brown tries to ram into his absurd 'Britishness' and 'British values' stuff.

[Martinus]

I think this is one of these "good old days" nostalgia things, that rarely bother to check the facts before proclaiming that "we no longer feel sympathy".

When was this "golden age" of the British society, when people felt sympathy for each other? The "Oliver Twist" times of child labour or debtors prisons? The Boer wars or the Amritsar massacre? Or perhaps the reign of terror in Ireland? (Not to mention the 1980s under tories).

At these times you had one mainstream moral ideology that had monopoly on power, and the discord that you so bemoan was absent, because all dissidents were defined to be outside of the "community" or "society". Now we have a pluralistic society where different definitions of what is moral and what isn't (or fair or just) can compete - and we try to drop these "big words" not because we no longer believe in them, but because it doesn't help a debate if every side defines its own position as the absolute good and therefore all others as absolute evil.

[The Minsky Moment]

As a historical matter - the rationalist argument can be said to have preceded the moral one - slavery and its cousin serfdom largely died out in much of Europe and the northern parts of the Americas because it was no longer a useful or effective method of social organization.  Only after that trend was well established and slavery became the preserve of a few peculiar societies did the moral argument gather force.

This is hugely contentious - I was at a conference last week again rehashing the debate without coming to any conclusion... Historians are at pains at trying to find the "ineffectiveness" of slavery in the decades preceeding the abolition movement (more slaves entered Saint-Domingue in the last 20 years of the colony than during the century before), and, of course, ineffectiveness compared to what? To the mechanized fields of cane of Australia in the 20th c. or to salaried manpower of the mid 19th c. ? For slaveholders of the 18th c., there was nothing else that was remotely available for his production. Then, there is the issue of consciousness of it. Were the esoteric calculations of cliometricians available to the slave-holders and abolitionists ?

The "gathering force" argument doesn't hold to the scrutiny of the begining years of the abolitionist movement, except if you take such a large time scale as to make it irrelevant and then, again, if you *do* take the larger time-scale (say, the era of christianity), you are left with utility calculations that are unavailable to historical actors, who simply do not reason in such terms. Unless, again, you hold to universal economic laws that hold true regardless of any time period (and then we are left with irreducible disagreement and faced, again, with a hugely contentious issue).

In any case, the point was simply to address the limits of the rationalist argument in trying to present itself as a amoral, yet total way of building the foundation of society. It would not be necessary to underline the point if the utilitarian argument was not used with such a pretetion by its more vocal adherents - and I do think the "amoralist" crowd are participating in a weak form of it, even if they are unaware.

I think we are talking past each other.

Abolitionism could only arise because there were large areas of the planet -- namely western Europe and the northern parts of the Americas -- where slavery or its equivalents had disappeared because of economic and social obselescence.   I am not making an argument about the economic viability of slavery in those places where it still existed in the late 18th and early 19th century.  Rather, the argument is that within the Euro-American sphere, those locations had already became exceptional.  Had slavery still been prevalent in New England in 1800 or serfdom in Western Europe in the same time period, an ideological movement of abolitionism would not have arose in the first place.

[The Minsky Moment]

What was the moral failing?

An orgy of desire fulfilled - as I say I've always blamed 'Main Street' for the Wall Street disaster.  They were a Frankenstein's monster not something entirely divorced from the rest of us.

Seems to me there is two ways this idea can be expressed - the Frankfurt School theory of modern consumers mindlessly filling propaganda-driven (i.e. advertising) "false needs" or a more classical moralist concept of the virtues of simple living.  I assume you are stating the latter case.  If so, I would note that: (a) historically, the persistance of human desire has proven resistant to such appeals, and (b) practically speaking were individuals en masse overhaul their lifestyles in such a virtuous way, the result would be an economic collapse so deep and severe it would make the recent recession look like a mere pothole.  See Mandeville.

[Oexmelin]

Had slavery still been prevalent in New England in 1800 or serfdom in Western Europe in the same time period, an ideological movement of abolitionism would not have arose in the first place.

We are not so much talking past each other as having a profound disagreement. You seem to be a strict historical materialist. I am not.

[Oexmelin]

historically, the persistance of human desire has proven resistant to such appeals

Human desire for what? Material goods ? Mutual recognition ? Social distinction ?
We have now a system built around the very idea of consumption of material goods (to say nothing of the practice of consumptions). Of course it is going to be portrayed as a) natural and b) inescapable

[The Minsky Moment]

Had slavery still been prevalent in New England in 1800 or serfdom in Western Europe in the same time period, an ideological movement of abolitionism would not have arose in the first place.

We are not so much talking past each other as having a profound disagreement. You seem to be a strict historical materialist. I am not.

Now you are just calling me names.   

I do think the fact that a particular form of social organization existed for a long time, but then disappears in light of differing economic and social conditions is suggestive of causal link of obsolescence in response to the changed conditions.  In that sense, I confess guilt to the charge of historical materialism.  I am open to alternative interpretations but I would have to see the argument.

Human desire for what? Material goods ? Mutual recognition ? Social distinction ?
We have now a system built around the very idea of consumption of material goods (to say nothing of the practice of consumptions). Of course it is going to be portrayed as a) natural and b) inescapable

Was the system intentionally and purposely built from scratch or did it evolve over time?  And how much of a break does it represent from the past?  The very same concept of appealing to a more pure less materialistic past itself recycles tropes from classical Rome and Greece - societies that transformed themselves into powerful engines of distribution of consumer goods (mass produced in the Roman case), while at the same time producing literature that romanticized an earlier, more rustic golden age. 

Is such a system inescapable?  No - systemic economic collapse and the resulting mass impoverishment can help "restore" an anti-materialist order that de-emphasizes consumption, but it is difficult to convince me that this is a desirable outcome.

[Oexmelin]

I do think the fact that a particular form of social organization existed for a long time, but then disappears in light of differing economic and social conditions is suggestive of causal link of obsolescence in response to the changed conditions.  In that sense, I confess guilt to the charge of historical materialism.  I am open to alternative interpretations but I would have to see the argument

Herein lies your main problem, and the reason why I chose the slavery argument. Either slavery disappeared out of material causes (i.e. it was no longer profitable enough) or it disappeared out of "different social conditions" - which should be more narroly defined to be meaningful (things always change because of "different social conditions"). Does christianity - which frowned upon slavery - count as a different social condition ?

It if is, then it because more more difficult to ascribe "causal links" (the bête noire of historians who long for causes but can only find plausability) and we are left with a much more complicated, but in the end, much more rewarding IMO, weberian roadmap. And even if it isn't, we are left with trying to explain what, exactly, became materially different for historical actors, and how material causes led to human action.

If christianity isn't, then you are left with historical materialism (i.e., changes of patterns of consumption, travel routes, etc.). Which is why I used the late slavery example, because it provides both a moral conundrum for materialists, and a problem for materialistic interpretations. Slavery had *in fact* been reintroduced in the West. Was it out of material causes that it became reintroduced ? How was it fought ? You simply reexport the analytical problem back in the past (i.e, material causes in the past enabled immaterial causes in the future - but were material causes in the past really  material ?)

Historical materialism is a very useful tool, but can grow so big so as to make history look like predestination (religious bent), preordained (à la Jared Diamond), or programmatic (Marx).

[The Minsky Moment]

Herein lies your main problem, and the reason why I chose the slavery argument. Either slavery disappeared out of material causes (i.e. it was no longer profitable enough) or it disappeared out of "different social conditions" - which should be more narroly defined to be meaningful (things always change because of "different social conditions").

Production and consumption does not occur in a vacuum; they are human activities embedded within human systems of social organization - this is a fundament of Marxian analysis and one of its sounder contributions.  Slavery itself is a system of social organization with material ramifications, so one could legitimately accuse me of tautological argumentation.  My defense is that I am taking a much more modest position than you seem to ascribe to me.  I am not adopting any particular narrative or causal explanation for slavery's pre-18th century disappearance in the West.  I am merely stating the negative position that it did *not* occur as the result of some directed ideological campaign against slavery itself.   To the extent that I have assigned the somewhat loaded term "rationalist" to refer to this development, you have a fair criticism, albeit one that goes to terminology more than substance.  The key point is that abolitionism itself or some similar moral program did not create the conditions under which abolitionism as a movement arose.

Does christianity - which frowned upon slavery - count as a different social condition ?

You have embedded a dubious assumption here - does Christianity frown upon slavery?  Christian abolitionists contended it did; Christian slaveholders claimed it did not, and both had sound cases to make.  "Christianity" definitely does count as a social condition but it is simply far too broad and complex a phenomenon to be subject to this kind of reductive analysis.  Rather than giving an answer to the question of the justice of slavery, Christianity provided one of the frameworks within which the contending principles would frame their thinking and contentions.  The underlying crude material fact driving these articulations is not varying degrees or types of Christian-ness, but the simple reality that slaveholding Christians had an interest to interpret Christian ideas and doctrine in ways that non-slaveholding Christians did not, and vis-a-versa.

If christianity isn't, then you are left with historical materialism (i.e., changes of patterns of consumption, travel routes, etc.). Which is why I used the late slavery example, because it provides both a moral conundrum for materialists, and a problem for materialistic interpretations. Slavery had *in fact* been reintroduced in the West. Was it out of material causes that it became reintroduced ? How was it fought ? You simply reexport the analytical problem back in the past (i.e, material causes in the past enabled immaterial causes in the future - but were material causes in the past really  material ?)

History is not physics - it isn't amenable to giving definitive answers to these kinds of questions.  But it seems like there is solid ground in stating that changing patterns in consumption, production, transportation and distribution contributed to the early 19th century rennaissance of slavery.  Slaves were a very costly investment,  and regardless of their adherence to various theories about race and subordination, slaveholders would not likely to commit to such an investment without giving careful thought to returns.

Historical materialism is a very useful tool, but can grow so big so as to make history look like predestination (religious bent), preordained (à la Jared Diamond), or programmatic (Marx). 

Any system of analysis can be abused or taken too far; that does not invalidate the usefulness of that mode of analysis.

[Martinus]

Isn't this a bit of a chicken and an egg problem?

I mean the first "spark" of a social change is probably moral in nature (albeit of a type of morality that goes against the social mores, so it's not necessarily a point in favor of the society being morally inclined). Once this first spark creates verifiable "economic" cases, it becomes economic and this leads to the cause being adopted by the mainstream populace. Only then, I'd argue, the mores of the society change so it becomes immoral to own slaves.

[Jaron]

Isn't this a bit of a chicken and an egg problem?

I mean the first "spark" of a social change is probably moral in nature (albeit of a type of morality that goes against the social mores, so it's not necessarily a point in favor of the society being morally inclined). Once this first spark creates verifiable "economic" cases, it becomes economic and this leads to the cause being adopted by the mainstream populace. Only then, I'd argue, the mores of the society change so it becomes immoral to own slaves.

Marbas (k)

[Oexmelin]

Production and consumption does not occur in a vacuum; they are human activities embedded within human systems of social organization - this is a fundament of Marxian analysis and one of its sounder contributions.

I do not have a problem with embededness (which is what I meant by weberian framework) - but Marxism puts it in the top spot in the hiearchy of things. Which this...

The underlying crude material fact driving these articulations is not varying degrees or types of Christian-ness, but the simple reality that slaveholding Christians had an interest to interpret Christian ideas and doctrine in ways that non-slaveholding Christians did not, and vis-a-versa.

Seems to do as well. "True motives" are economic interests (or self-interest, economically defined) and the rest is ascribed to mere intellectual window dressing. Whether your point is that abolitionism (or, again, other moral issues) pre-18th c. did not occur out of a moral crusade, or that it did occur out of material condition is slightly different, but it is again brushing aside any ideological contribution as, if not entrirely irrelevant, at lease very secundary. This, again, is a hierarchization of "causes" that make modes of production the main driving force of human history, and the rest arising out of it.

In this case, again, only as an example, is moral issues are not what led the abolitionists of the 17th c., what was the great material shift that happened in the 30-40 years that it took for the debate to arise, convince people, and lead to the interdiciton of the slave trade by the British ?

As for the rest, it is more tangential to the debate, hence why I went rapidly. I will simply state that when I mentionned Christianity, I was not aiming at 18th c. or 19th c. abolitionists, but at medieval christianity, which did, indeed, frown upon christian owning christians. 

[Sheilbh]

I think this is one of these "good old days" nostalgia things, that rarely bother to check the facts before proclaiming that "we no longer feel sympathy".

Well, there aren't many facts to check.  I mean we don't, alas, have a sympathy index.

When was this "golden age" of the British society, when people felt sympathy for each other? The "Oliver Twist" times of child labour or debtors prisons? The Boer wars or the Amritsar massacre? Or perhaps the reign of terror in Ireland? (Not to mention the 1980s under tories).

I don't think there's ever been a golden age and, in reality the imagining of one tells us more about the present. 

You're right there's been an enormous lack of sympathy in society before I think in those times, however, they have pointed to very serious social and economic issues that needed massive reform and change.  The examples you give all indicate that: the 19th century of debtors prison; the obscenity of Empire and so on.

The response to the inequality of the 19th century and Empire was not to celebrate our lack of care or moral sympathy but to marshal a moral crusade against it.  This never happened as much with Empire because we never saw people in Empire as British, not least because of their race.  But I think that represents the problem, if you disqualify from a common feeling then you're obviously more able to attack them.  The post-war consensus represents the triumph, I think, of that argument.

Now we have a pluralistic society where different definitions of what is moral and what isn't (or fair or just) can compete - and we try to drop these "big words" not because we no longer believe in them, but because it doesn't help a debate if every side defines its own position as the absolute good and therefore all others as absolute evil.

I'll take this bit by bit. 

There has always been different moral crusades, or common purposes, within our politics and that is entirely right - it's the nature of democracy that you should have the left arguing 'never again' while the right desire an 'ownership society' and self-responsibility and so on.  I don't want a one party state, nor do I think it would be the inevitable result of a resurgence of social democracy.  In politics I think we've lost the moral purpose - I can't think of a significant way any party wants to shape our society.  I think that reflects a wider social belief that we can't change society, which is in turn why we retreat from the big words and the big ideas.  The reason for that I would argue is a sort of social collapse which I find concerning.

The second thing is that I don't think talking about fairness or justice inevitably leads to your opponents being absolute evil and yourself absolute good.  That is not my reading of British history at least.  I actually think that self-segregated ideologically cohesive communities are more likely to lead to that - as I said earlier I worry we're on the verge of an American style culture war -  because you don't really have to deal with your opponent.

I think immigration is a particular example of this.  I recoil from what I hear, to be honest, working class people saying about it; I find the opinions I hear when I go down to Dorset (ye olde England extraordinaire) incredible, like absolute take-your-breath-away stuff.  I look at this issue and I can to some extent understand how this gulf of opinion has arrived but it's fundamentally like we're confronting different worlds.  The same goes when I hear people talking about welfare or benefits and other issues too.  I feel it also when I hear my middle class citiefied friends talking about those people.  There's no sense of common feeling so much as there is just resentment and alienation for and from swathes of this country and our society and I find that scary.

But if you don't have any core sympathy or common feeling within a society then any moral purpose within its politics will be what you describe; it will be absolutes pitted against each other.  I get this sense when I listen to some American politicians and pundits on the extreme and I really, really dislike it and I worry that it's where we're heading.

I think on the left to some extent old school social democracy - with its 'moral crusade' is a potential tonic.

[Oexmelin]

I actually think that self-segregated ideologically cohesive communities are more likely to lead to that - as I said earlier I worry we're on the verge of an American style culture war -  because you don't really have to deal with your opponent.

Which is why the examples quoted of the internet recreating communities is itself symptomatic: you never quite deal with your neighbors on the internet, and, while you might create solidarities, those are solidarities which I feel are in a vaccuum. There are no constraints, no day-to-day interaction, only an opt-in opt-out situation, which is not quite a true community, where bad things happen and you are forced to deal with having to live together. You create customized, tailored communities. The downside, for example, of living with a few trolls on a board are very slight, whereas having to learn with, and contend with, political opponents that you can meet at church, school, on your doorsteps is what creates sympathy, and empathy .

That being said, perhaps in the future the internet will indeed create true communities. It will remain to be seen how this will cope with the geopolitical and social world.

[The Minsky Moment]

As for the rest, it is more tangential to the debate, hence why I went rapidly. I will simply state that when I mentionned Christianity, I was not aiming at 18th c. or 19th c. abolitionists, but at medieval christianity, which did, indeed, frown upon christian owning christians.

But not on the concept of slavery itself - Christians could enslave Muslims and pagans and did without objection from the Church; medieval theologians accepted Augustinian or Aristotlean views that were not hostile to slavery.  And of course the Church did not express great concern over the institution of serfdom, in which Christians held other Christians in thrall as a form of quasi-property.

"True motives" are economic interests (or self-interest, economically defined) and the rest is ascribed to mere intellectual window dressing.

The quotations are your words not mine.  I simply noted the fact that an economic interest and the fact that ideological expressions often followed the economic interest.  It does not follow that economic interests are the *only* motives or the only "true" motives.  But I would contend that economic interests are motives and that they can be powerful ones.  The coincidence of material interests and the direction of moral theorization is probably not random happenstance.

In this case, again, only as an example, is moral issues are not what led the abolitionists of the 17th c., what was the great material shift that happened in the 30-40 years that it took for the debate to arise, convince people, and lead to the interdiciton of the slave trade by the British ?

Of course moral thinking drove the formation of the abolitionist movement.  But that formation occurred (and only could occur) within a particuliar social-material context in which slavery had already long ceased to exist, and its absence become a fundamental aspect of the social fabric.  Classical society had all of the intellectual tools to develop an abolitionist movement - including the Gospels, Christianity and decent levels of literacy, ample avenues for elite correspondence and cooperation across long distances - but it never developed as such in the context of a society in which slavery was an accepted norm and a basic part of the antique economy.   There are individuals who decry instances of slavery or counsel against holding fellow Christians in bondage, but no general attack on slavery as a social institution.