US General asks for more troops

[Berkut]

Ok so your logic is that because there are other failed states around the world that one more shouldnt matter?

No, other terrorist safe havens (not the same thing if you look at the list).  Unless you're suggesting we go into all the others (or at least all other havens in the Middle East and Africa), you're kidding yourself that you're making a difference.

No, the person kidding themselves is the one that thinks that every situation that can possibly be described as a "safe haven" is pretty much the same, so there is not point in doing anything about a state harboring and abetting terrorists.

And you can be sure that if some group manages to pull of a large attack from Somalia, then in fact there will be a response.

[crazy canuck]

No, the person kidding themselves is the one that thinks that every situation that can possibly be described as a "safe haven" is pretty much the same, so there is not point in doing anything about a state harboring and abetting terrorists.

And you can be sure that if some group manages to pull of a large attack from Somalia, then in fact there will be a response.

QFT

[ulmont]

the person kidding themselves is the one that thinks that every situation that can possibly be described as a "safe haven" is pretty much the same

Presumably there are some consistencies, otherwise there's no use in defining the term "safe haven."

[ulmont]

And you can be sure that if some group manages to pull of a large attack from Somalia, then in fact there will be a response.

Like the invasion of Yemen, one of the places on the State Department's list of safe havens, in response to the USS Cole bombing?

[The Minsky Moment]

1) There are a truckload of safe havens left that we aren't doing anything about.  Take a look at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64333.htm

This report it seems to me supports the opposite conclusion - it points to the fact where failed states do exist in whole  or in part at present, there are significant existent (Somali piracy) or emergent (active AQ splinter) threats.

Also there is a difference between a failed state tout court like Afghanistan under Taliban rule and "failed regions" of weak states like the Saharan areas decribed in the report or the wilds of the Pakistan-Afghan border.  Mali for example, while weak, is not a failed state, it just lacks the ability to control and police the entirety of its vast land area.  However, most of that land area is trackless, virtually inhabitable desert posing serious logisitical challenges to even small operations.  The same is true for bin Laden's mountain hideout in the Afghan border region.

[Darth Wagtaros]

Can't we just declare Exterminatus and saturate the place with fusion and virus bombs?

I'd say that the enemy rae worshippers of Khorne.  Your idea has merit.

[KRonn]

Ok so your logic is that because there are other failed states around the world that one more shouldnt matter?

No, other terrorist safe havens (not the same thing if you look at the list).  Unless you're suggesting we go into all the others (or at least all other havens in the Middle East and Africa), you're kidding yourself that you're making a difference.

I think it does make a difference if we address the issues that we can. Not all failed states, terrorist havens, and the like are the same. Each situation differs, and requires a different, or even maybe no response. I think it makes a difference since if radicals are blunted or stopped in one place, it sends a positive signal to populations threatened by such groups. And these guys generally threaten their own people, nations, as well as carry out attacks outside. And losing some of the fights sends a signal to terrorist/radical types that they can't get away with things, and dries up their resources and volunteers. Already we've seen that Al Qaida is a damaged brand over all. If they hadn't been strongly opposed, I'd think they'd have a lot more successes, which would bring in volunteers, donors and assistance.

[viper37]

Whether they are there now, or going to be there shortly is rather irrelevant to Marty's claim that the US has less than 30,000 troops committed. Not that that claim has anything to do with anything anyway.

It is relevent.  The troops are not there.  They are not on the way either, your government is still debating if they really need to send 30 000 more troops in the country, hence the report by the General in command of Afghanistan.

Afaik, the 6000 troops committed by Bush have not arrived yet.

If Generals were to fight with imaginary troops, Germany would have won WWII.

[Berkut]

Whether they are there now, or going to be there shortly is rather irrelevant to Marty's claim that the US has less than 30,000 troops committed. Not that that claim has anything to do with anything anyway.

It is relevent.  The troops are not there.  They are not on the way either, your government is still debating if they really need to send 30 000 more troops in the country, hence the report by the General in command of Afghanistan.

Afaik, the 6000 troops committed by Bush have not arrived yet.

If Generals were to fight with imaginary troops, Germany would have won WWII.

No they wouldn't, we were a lot more imaginative than they were.

[Warspite]

I think it does make a difference if we address the issues that we can. Not all failed states, terrorist havens, and the like are the same. Each situation differs, and requires a different, or even maybe no response.

Precisely.

Afghanistan offered a haven for Al-Qaeda because, while in a terrible state, in the Taliban areas there was at least some kind of authority. And the Pushtunwalli code and Taliban leadership provided AQ with safety. Thus, from there, they were able to marshal resources, train and radicalise recruits, and so on.

Now, why did I mention authority? Because in total anarchy, or unhospitable cultural environments, foreign terrorists actually face a similar set of problems to foreign aid workers. This is the reason Al-Qaeda have never really set up shop in Somalia beyond the odd, short-lived training camp from well before 9/11 (and we know that they have tried). Somalis know instantly who a foreigner is. So the Arab Al-Qaeda terrorist arrives. He will find himself in a country with no infrastructure; like the foreign NGO, he has to pay off the different factions along the way for "protection" if he wants to move anywhere or have anything moved.  He'll have to pay protection money for wherever the camp is. He'll find a thousand potential bounty hunters who, having no kinship relation, will gladly turn him in or shoot him for a $500 reward. The foreign terrorist will also have no real appreciation of the nuanced layers of clan protocol or interaction. There's also another key reason: in truly failed states, there are far fewer repercussions for covert military strikes.

So actually, the best haven for a terrorist is a stable state - at least, stable enough to provide a modicum of security for the terrorist (fairly ironic, no?).

[Zanza]

Zanza, why does it make sense to limit your fight against terrorists that threaten your country?

Priorization of limited resources.

If I was convinced that we could actually defend Germany (or the West) at the Hindukush, I would support it. However, in the last few years, virtually all terrorists in Europe seem to be homegrown. So I would  rather make that my priority.

Maybe the reason we only hear about the domestic terrorists is that fighting them in Afghanistan is actually spectacularly successful? I don't know. That's not the impression I am getting.

So that's how I form my opinion. If I would be convinced that the mission in Afghanistan is actually a big benefit, I would probably change my mind. After all, I used to be convinced of that until say a year or so ago.

[KRonn]

I think it does make a difference if we address the issues that we can. Not all failed states, terrorist havens, and the like are the same. Each situation differs, and requires a different, or even maybe no response.

Precisely.

Afghanistan offered a haven for Al-Qaeda because, while in a terrible state, in the Taliban areas there was at least some kind of authority. And the Pushtunwalli code and Taliban leadership provided AQ with safety. Thus, from there, they were able to marshal resources, train and radicalise recruits, and so on.

Now, why did I mention authority? Because in total anarchy, or unhospitable cultural environments, foreign terrorists actually face a similar set of problems to foreign aid workers. This is the reason Al-Qaeda have never really set up shop in Somalia beyond the odd, short-lived training camp from well before 9/11 (and we know that they have tried). Somalis know instantly who a foreigner is. So the Arab Al-Qaeda terrorist arrives. He will find himself in a country with no infrastructure; like the foreign NGO, he has to pay off the different factions along the way for "protection" if he wants to move anywhere or have anything moved.  He'll have to pay protection money for wherever the camp is. He'll find a thousand potential bounty hunters who, having no kinship relation, will gladly turn him in or shoot him for a $500 reward. The foreign terrorist will also have no real appreciation of the nuanced layers of clan protocol or interaction. There's also another key reason: in truly failed states, there are far fewer repercussions for covert military strikes.

So actually, the best haven for a terrorist is a stable state - at least, stable enough to provide a modicum of security for the terrorist (fairly ironic, no?).

Good summary, and it makes good sense. I hadn't really looked at the issue of Somalia but that makes great sense as to the difficulties of operating there, or a place like it, without the cover and relations needed to get along with the locals.

Afghanistan was a perfect place perhaps. AQ had a compliant, helpful government, so had the cover and relations, and assistance of a national government. And it was a government that was as radical in ideology as AQ. So it just seems to me that Afghanistan is the one place we'd want to try and oppose those types setting up shop. Now especially with all that Pakistan is going through with fighting like minded groups, I'd think that helps efforts in Afghanistan if it affects groups that operate in Afghanistan. That must have some spill over to negatively affect Afghan groups, though that may not be so significant, depending on where the pressure is hitting, as some of the Pakistani efforts are targeting their own in house groups anyway.

[Sheilbh]

And you can be sure that if some group manages to pull of a large attack from Somalia, then in fact there will be a response.

Al-Qaeda's had to pull out of Somalia.  It's too chaotic and violent and doesn't have enough infrastructure for them.  Given that al-Qaeda have previously had bases in Sudan and Afghanistan, while they've failed in Somalia, suggests that they need a degree of stability.

I'm reading through the report right now.  I find it weird that the reporting's been all about the resources - and it does says 'more resources won't win, but too few will lose' - given that the extra troops seems to me to be an adjunct to changing strategy which McCrystal seems to rate far more highly.

[The Minsky Moment]

They don't need stability, they need some form of organized authority that nonetheless does not rise to the level of a proper state.  And they need physical access to the geographies and instrumentalities of civilization, such as the ability to execute and receive wire transfers.