Jutland campaign AAR

[grumbler]

Trying to look up the actual causes of loss in this case, as I know the Luftwaffe was supplying air cover. I don't suppose you have the figures to hand?

First-person accounts in The Narrow Sea have all the craft lost to AA.

As for the Bismarck's AA, eyewitnesses are said to have reported that the Bismarck's AA seemed to be consistently bursting ahead of the attacking Swordfishes. I agree it is only a theory, but it does fit the observable facts in the case of the Bismarck.

Source?

[Agelastus]

Interesting.

Despite the detailed account I have just read listing FW190s diving on the Swordfish during their torpedo runs, the implication I get from the language used for each shootdown is that German AA got them. Although I do believe the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were carrying a much heavier outfit of light (20mm & 37mm AA) in 1942 than Bismarck was on her last voyage.

[Warspite]

Who cares WE WON THE DAMN WAR

[Ed Anger]

Who cares WE WON THE DAMN WAR

[grumbler]

Interesting.

Despite the detailed account I have just read listing FW190s diving on the Swordfish during their torpedo runs, the implication I get from the language used for each shootdown is that German AA got them. Although I do believe the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were carrying a much heavier outfit of light (20mm & 37mm AA) in 1942 than Bismarck was on her last voyage.

The Swordfish had a fighter escort, which drew off the covering CAP.  All six Swordfish made it inside the outer AA defenses, after which it would be unusual 9and very dangerous0 for CAP to try to intervene.

Both had 16x 37mm in twin mounts.  Bismarck had 18x 20mm, Scharnhorst 24x 20mm (at that time).  I wouldn't call that a "much heavier" outfit (though Prinz Eugen apparently got really beefed up with 20mm in this period, having lots of excess buoyancy).

None of this supports the concept that

The American Naval Aviators couldn't hit a barn from the inside in May -41. Now the torpedoe planes they had in May -41 would have been shot up by the flak quite badly. Now before you say that the Swordfish was worse, consider that the Swordfish had to take a direct hit to the engine or pilot to stop flying, quite hard with flak, while the TBD Devastators, slow and wallowing pigs, that the US Nave toted around in May -41 was easy to hit with flak

[Agelastus]

None of this supports the concept that

The American Naval Aviators couldn't hit a barn from the inside in May -41. Now the torpedoe planes they had in May -41 would have been shot up by the flak quite badly. Now before you say that the Swordfish was worse, consider that the Swordfish had to take a direct hit to the engine or pilot to stop flying, quite hard with flak, while the TBD Devastators, slow and wallowing pigs, that the US Nave toted around in May -41 was easy to hit with flak

Not my quote...however, data on whether Swordfish or Devastators were more likely to survive battle damage would be interesting (the original poster appears to be arguing two different things in his post.)

As for the FW190s. the account I have just read lists them as attacking after the CAP had been engaged by ME109s. However, as you say, the account then goes on to list all the shootdowns as being by the flak. It just surprised me, that's all, as a swordfish low and slow on a torpedo run must be one of the easiest things in the world for a high performance fighter to hit.

[Ape]

Quick count says 8 hits out of 44 launches.  As I noted above, the attack against Shokaku was launched from an extremely disadvantageous position (astern) because wing tactics broke down.

My accounts say that Thornhill's torpedo was the first torpdeo to hit Shoho destroying the rudders making her unable to maneuver.  So she wasn't exactly fully maneuverable when the rest of the torpedoes ripped her apart was she? It also states that Shoho was at that point steaming into the wind to launch fighters, so she wasn't actually maneuvering.

  Dixon's Scouting Two missed completely, and Scouting Two had ten planes, not five.  Shoho's maneuvers ended when Torpedo Two (not Bombing Two) knocked out the steering gear.

Alright I'll concede the point on Dixon, 'Ship Strike Pacific' p.29 by Bruning states  that the Sq. made an across beam attack that missed. The part about Dixons Sq being only a 5-plane Sq was my mistake 'Carrier war: aircraft carriers in World War II' p.47 by McGowen had written it so it appeared as if Dixon's Sq was only a 5-plane Sd. Since that was also the source that stated Dixon hit Shoho, I'll disregard as unreliable for the discussion.

The fifteen planes of Bombing Two got two hits.  The twelve planes of Torpedo Two got five hits.  When the tactics were executed, they obviously worked well.

Yes, 'when' Why couldn't the Devastators launch anyting but an aft attack on Shokaku the next day? Surely they could just fly around? Right? 

In fact, none of my sources mention this.    Care to cite a source?  Is it the same source that had Scouting Two having only five planes and getting three hits?  Might not be the best source (but then The First Team could have it all wrong).  I await your source to decide.

'Black Cat Raiders' p.53 by Knott states that 18% of the Mk13 had 'unsatisfactory depth performance' and that only 31 % out 105 tested ran without defects. That does not include the problems with the detonators.

[grumbler]

My accounts say that Thornhill's torpedo was the first torpdeo to hit Shoho destroying the rudders making her unable to maneuver.  So she wasn't exactly fully maneuverable when the rest of the torpedoes ripped her apart was she? It also states that Shoho was at that point steaming into the wind to launch fighters, so she wasn't actually maneuvering.

All of the torpedoes that hit were in the water by the time the first one hit.  I dunno about "your accounts" but The First Team (which covers this attack very extensively, in over eight pages) describes the Shoho as maneuvering to starboard to try to avoid the torpedo attack, which was of no avail because Torpedo Two had split to launch an "anvil attack" on either bow.

And it is rather amusing that you claim somehow that Shoho "wasn't exactly fully maneuverable" when "the torpedoes ripped her apart," given that it was the torpedoes that made her not "exactly fully maneuverable!" 

Alright I'll concede the point on Dixon, 'Ship Strike Pacific' p.29 by Bruning states  that the Sq. made an across beam attack that missed. The part about Dixons Sq being only a 5-plane Sq was my mistake 'Carrier war: aircraft carriers in World War II' p.47 by McGowen had written it so it appeared as if Dixon's Sq was only a 5-plane Sd. Since that was also the source that stated Dixon hit Shoho, I'll disregard as unreliable for the discussion.

So you concede that your "accounts" are not reliable, and (tacitly) that mine are, and yet you don't concede the point that, as Ludstrom notes on page 200 of The First team, "Torpedo Two's strike, the foirst for an American squadron against an enemy carrier, was a masterpiece"?  You are going to continue to assert that the Devastator was easily shot down by AA (none lost in this battle to AA)?  Don't rely on the Ballantine potted history books.   Like the Osprey books, they aren't written by first-water historians because the publishers wouldn't pay the rates a real historian would charge.

Yes, 'when' Why couldn't the Devastators launch anyting but an aft attack on Shokaku the next day? Surely they could just fly around? Right? 

Have you not been reading my posts?  The TBDs had to attack with the bombers - that was the tactic.  When the dive bombers attacked Shokaku, the TBDs had to launch, even under unfavorable conditions.  They couldn't just "fly around" because this was war, and just "flying around" isn't part of naval tactics.

'Black Cat Raiders' p.53 by Knott states that 18% of the Mk13 had 'unsatisfactory depth performance' and that only 31 % out 105 tested ran without defects. That does not include the problems with the detonators.

I was asking for a source for your claim about "the Mk.13's tendancy [sic] to run to deep."  An 18% rate of "poor depth control" (which included many cases of the torpedo running shallow and, in fact, exploding when hitting debris in the water) isn't a "tendency to run deep."  I rather suspect that you confused the Mk 13 and the Mk 14 (the sub torpedo which did have a tendency to run deep" and think it hilarious that you added the  when it was you ass getting reddened. That the Mk 13 was a crappy torpedo is beyond doubt.  That doesn't impact my statement that the American TBD aircrews were well-trained and their tactics sound., and history shows that your assertion that "The American Naval Aviators couldn't hit a barn from the inside in May -41" is false, and that "the torpedoe [sic] planes they had in May -41 would have been shot up by the flak quite badly" is unsupported by anything like real information.

[CountDeMoney]

Since all you navaltards trashed this thread, I'm repeating my question:

How is the year old 1916 campaign feature, Tamas?  Totally flexible, or what?

[Drakken]

Since all you navaltards trashed this thread, I'm repeating my question:

How is the year old 1916 campaign feature, Tamas?  Totally flexible, or what?

Me too wanna know. Me love topic long time.

[Drakken]

OMG naval-geek rush on my thread! 

Stop whining and fill us with Jutland boom-boom goodness! 

[Ape]

All of the torpedoes that hit were in the water by the time the first one hit.  I dunno about "your accounts" but The First Team (which covers this attack very extensively, in over eight pages) describes the Shoho as maneuvering to starboard to try to avoid the torpedo attack, which was of no avail because Torpedo Two had split to launch an "anvil attack" on either bow.

  where does it say that the Shoho was maneuvering to starboard?

As the Shoho headed Southeasterly into the wind, Brett's TBDs drew up near her stern. The 1st Division crossed her stern in a wide arc around her port side, while Hurst's six planes swung to her starboard. Above them, Bombing Two pressed its devastating attack. At 1119, Brett released his torpedo from off the Shoho's port quarter. Fanning out, the remaining TBD pilots curved toward the target, launched their fish, and sheered off to avoid anti-aircraft fire. As each torpedo cut into the water, it threw out a huge splash before (hopefully) righting itself at the proper depth and heading for the target.

Torpedo Two's strike, the first for an American squadron against an enemy carrier, was a masterpiece. Lieut. (jg) Thornhill's fish was the first to slam home. His torpedo struck the Shoho's starboard quarter. The blast half hidden by smoke alreay raised by VB-2's bomb hits. The explosion wrecked both electrical and back-up manual steering systems, forcing the ship to hold to a steady south-easterly heading.

In fact it actually supports what I already have said. 1) Shoho was not maneuvering at the time of the coordinated attack, she was heading into the wind, my sources claim it was to launch planes, yours give no reason. 2) The first torpedo hit made it impossible for her to even try and evade the rest.
My question was:

...and how many torpedo hits did the US naval aviators score within the first six months they were involved in against ships fully maneuverable?

Your answer:

Quick count says 8 hits out of 44 launches.

Is then not the correct answer to my question. Care to recount? Or shall I? And since June 7th is six months from December 7th. How many hits were scored at Midway by torpedoes? How many Devastators managed to launch their torpedoes?

So you concede that your "accounts" are not reliable, and (tacitly) that mine are, and yet you don't concede the point that, 

I conceded that one of my sources was overruled by one of yours, yes because another source verified yours. I do not concede that all of the sources I have used are overruled.

as Ludstrom notes on page 200 of The First team, "Torpedo Two's strike, the foirst for an American squadron against an enemy carrier, was a masterpiece"? 

That's an opinion of the author, and shouldn't really be included in the book as it weakens it. He gives no exampels of what exactly is the difference between a masterpiece and a 'merely' successfull torpedo attack. Another real problem with Lundstrom's book, is that he gives no information about what the Japanese side knew and were doing during the Shoho attack, everything he write is about what the Americans knew and were doing.

You are going to continue to assert that the Devastator was easily shot down by AA (none lost in this battle to AA)? 

Where did I say 'easily shoot down'?

How many made it so far as to even get a chance to be shot down by Flak?

How many planes were damaged due to flak ? How many were written off?

And with sources please.

Don't rely on the Ballantine potted history books.   Like the Osprey books, they aren't written by first-water historians because the publishers wouldn't pay the rates a real historian would charge.

Like First Team? Written in 1984? A book that gives the authors opinions and hardly any insight into the Japanese side, particulary during the Shoho attack?

Have you not been reading my posts?  The TBDs had to attack with the bombers - that was the tactic.  When the dive bombers attacked Shokaku, the TBDs had to launch, even under unfavorable conditions.  They couldn't just "fly around" because this was war, and just "flying around" isn't part of naval tactics.

Why were they not in a favourable position then? Oh that's right, they were to Slow and unable to get into a favourable position, because the Shokaku was actually trying to avoid them, instead of steaming straight ahead.

I was asking for a source for your claim about "the Mk.13's tendancy [sic] to run to deep."  An 18% rate of "poor depth control" (which included many cases of the torpedo running shallow and, in fact, exploding when hitting debris in the water) isn't a "tendency to run deep."  I rather suspect that you confused the Mk 13 and the Mk 14 (the sub torpedo which did have a tendency to run deep" and think it hilarious that you added the  when it was you ass getting reddened. That the Mk 13 was a crappy torpedo is beyond doubt. 

Actually, this is what Dept of Ordnace analysis said about the Mk 13.
36% didn't even start
20% sank
20 % veered to the right or left,
18 % gave unsatisfactory depth performance
2 % ran on the surface 
31% gave a satisfactory run
reason for the numbers to be above 100%: Some had more then one defect.
So in effect 19 out of 67 or 28% had 'unsatisfactory depth performance' ie going deep, I'd call that a tendancy (maybe the word has a different meaning in English ).

 
ten⋅den⋅cy
/ˈtɛndənsi/  [ten-duhn-see]
–noun, plural -cies.
1.    a natural or prevailing disposition to move, proceed, or act in some direction or toward some point, end, or result: the tendency of falling bodies toward the earth.
2.    an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something: a tendency to talk too much.
3.    a special and definite purpose in a novel or other literary work.

I'll concede that the word tendancy was the wrong one and that your English is better then mine. The wording got lost in translation, perhaps the word slight in  before 'tendancy' should have accuratly portraited what I tried to say.

An 18% rate of "poor depth control" (which included many cases of the torpedo running shallow and, in fact, exploding when hitting debris in the water)

Sources please? Last part sounds more like the problems with the detonators.

That doesn't impact my statement that the American TBD aircrews were well-trained and their tactics sound., and history shows that your assertion that "The American Naval Aviators couldn't hit a barn from the inside in May -41" is false, and that "the torpedoe [sic] planes they had in May -41 would have been shot up by the flak quite badly" is unsupported by anything like real information.

I'll concede as far as that they could hit a ship steaming straight ahead and not actually trying to avoid torpedo attacks, and that their tactics was sound while performing the above attack. You have not yet shown that they could hit a ship  that did try to avoid torpedo attacks, or that their tactics was sound for that.

[Tamas]

Since all you navaltards trashed this thread, I'm repeating my question:

How is the year old 1916 campaign feature, Tamas?  Totally flexible, or what?

Define flexible. You can create your own task forces and move ships around in it, so is with the default historical task forces of course. Reinforcements are historical. There is mine laying and shore bombardment and merchant shipping (I wish it was abstracted). There are submarine and zeppelin TFs but they do not participate in tactical battles

I will continue this game tonight btw and give you an update. Plan is:
-escape the british fleet
-repair my remaining ships
-finish off the rest of the Britihs BCs and thus force the AI to divide the Grand Fleet

[CountDeMoney]

Define flexible. You can create your own task forces and move ships around in it, so is with the default historical task forces of course. Reinforcements are historical. There is mine laying and shore bombardment and merchant shipping (I wish it was abstracted). There are submarine and zeppelin TFs but they do not participate in tactical battles

That's what I want to know: so, we can pretty much do what we want with the Task Forces and sorties throughout the year?

[Tamas]

Define flexible. You can create your own task forces and move ships around in it, so is with the default historical task forces of course. Reinforcements are historical. There is mine laying and shore bombardment and merchant shipping (I wish it was abstracted). There are submarine and zeppelin TFs but they do not participate in tactical battles

That's what I want to know: so, we can pretty much do what we want with the Task Forces and sorties throughout the year?

Yes. A reviewer said that no GC plays the same way twice because the AI mixes its play as well, but I haven't been able to confirm that.