Jutland campaign AAR

[grumbler]

  where does it say that the Shoho was maneuvering to starboard?

What difference does it make which way she turned?

In fact it actually supports what I already have said. 1) Shoho was not maneuvering at the time of the coordinated attack, she was heading into the wind, my sources claim it was to launch planes, yours give no reason. 2) The first torpedo hit made it impossible for her to even try and evade the rest.

This quote does not say that Shoho was headed into the wind at the time of the torpedo attack, and in fact supports my position completely.  You rather dishonestly omit the sentence at the top of page 200 which says exactly what you say is untrue:

Izawa saw the TBDs closing from his starboard quarter, but other than order a turn to starboard, he could do nothing.

What are "your sources," BTW?  You keep claiming to have these sources, but when compared to The First Team they always seem to come out as wrong.  You then conceded the point, and make up some other whiopper, which in turn gets smacked down.

Your source appears to be your ass.

Is then not the correct answer to my question. Care to recount? Or shall I? And since June 7th is six months from December 7th. How many hits were scored at Midway by torpedoes? How many Devastators managed to launch their torpedoes?

How many hits were scored by Swordfish against fully maneuverable targets in the first six months of World War Two?  Aagin, what difference does this make?  My point has been made, and yours refuted.  US Naval Aviators could, indeed, hit "a barn from the inside" in 1941/42.

I conceded that one of my sources was overruled by one of yours, yes because another source verified yours. I do not concede that all of the sources I have used are overruled.

Again, what are those sources?

That's an opinion of the author, and shouldn't really be included in the book as it weakens it. He gives no exampels of what exactly is the difference between a masterpiece and a 'merely' successfull torpedo attack. Another real problem with Lundstrom's book, is that he gives no information about what the Japanese side knew and were doing during the Shoho attack, everything he write is about what the Americans knew and were doing.

Yes, this is called "writing the book you are writing."  Since you were just quote-mining it from Google Books, you don't understand it.  But that's okay.  It still gives the best account of the attack on the Shoho I have seen, and the purpose of the book is moot to this discussion.

Where did I say 'easily shoot down'?

So you are going to try to weasel out of " the TBD Devastators, slow and wallowing pigs, that the US Nave toted around in May -41 was easy to hit with flak" and say that you didn't mean that they were easy to shoot down?  Okay.  Whatever.  It doesn't help your argument.

How many made it so far as to even get a chance to be shot down by Flak?

At Coral Sea, all of them.

How many planes were damaged due to flak ? How many were written off?

In the strike against the Shoho, none of 24.  Against Shokaku, one damaged out of 20.

And with sources please.

Nope.  I am not playing this game.  You give sources, or don't ask for them.

Like First Team? Written in 1984? A book that gives the authors opinions and hardly any insight into the Japanese side, particulary during the Shoho attack?

No, not like real history books like The First team, which covers its subject (even if it doesn't include unrelated material you think it should).  I dunno what the publication date (not the "written in" date, which I suspect was over several years) has to do with the validity of The First Team.  Something bad happen to you in 1984 that scarred you emotionally?

Why were they not in a favourable position then? Oh that's right, they were to Slow and unable to get into a favourable position, because the Shokaku was actually trying to avoid them, instead of steaming straight ahead.

Yes, of course they were slow, and of course they couldn't get into favorable positions without cooperation from the dive bombers.  The debate here isn't whether they were fast, but whether they could "hit a barn from the inside."  Clearly, the Shoho attack showed that their tactics were sound, and the Shokaku attack showed how fragile those tactics were.

Actually, this is what Dept of Ordnace analysis said about the Mk 13.
36% didn't even start
20% sank
20 % veered to the right or left,
18 % gave unsatisfactory depth performance
2 % ran on the surface 
31% gave a satisfactory run
reason for the numbers to be above 100%: Some had more then one defect.
So in effect 19 out of 67 or 28% had 'unsatisfactory depth performance' ie going deep, I'd call that a tendancy (maybe the word has a different meaning in English ).

In English, "unsatisfactory depth performance" means running shallower or deeper than the set depth (or both, at various times in the run).  You claim that you have information that shows that the Mk 13 had a tendency to run deep, and you haven't produced it (the BuOrd  - not "Dept of Ordnance," which reference alone makes me doubt whatever your source is - report does not do this).  In English, we call trying to pretend data says what we want it to say rather than what it says "intellectually dishonest."  And when one does so using insulting emoticons and is exposed, we call that in English "getting your fanny reddened."

Sources please? Last part sounds more like the problems with the detonators.

Nope.  No more sources from me until you start naming some sources (like the one claiming Shoho was not maneuvering under Torpedo Two's attack at the Battle of the Coral Sea).

I'll concede as far as that they could hit a ship steaming straight ahead and not actually trying to avoid torpedo attacks, and that their tactics was sound while performing the above attack. You have not yet shown that they could hit a ship  that did try to avoid torpedo attacks, or that their tactics was sound for that.

Since the Lundstrom book describes exactly that, and you have utterly failed to provide any evidence that Shoho was "not actually trying to avoid torpedo attacks," I would say your statement here is pretty much a complete concession.  In fact, given that you cannot explain why Shoho wouldn't want to maneuver when attacked by torpedo bombers, I would say you are conceding that your argument is both wrong and counter-intuitive.

[Cecil]

Interesting as your drivel back and forth is how does a battle half a year into the war prove how they were able to do things 6 months before the war even started?

[Drakken]

Since all you navaltards trashed this thread, I'm repeating my question:

How is the year old 1916 campaign feature, Tamas?  Totally flexible, or what?

Define flexible. You can create your own task forces and move ships around in it, so is with the default historical task forces of course. Reinforcements are historical. There is mine laying and shore bombardment and merchant shipping (I wish it was abstracted). There are submarine and zeppelin TFs but they do not participate in tactical battles

I will continue this game tonight btw and give you an update. Plan is:
-escape the british fleet
-repair my remaining ships
-finish off the rest of the Britihs BCs and thus force the AI to divide the Grand Fleet

What targets can you attack, beside RN ships? Which objectives can you set?

Perhaps I am wrong, but the German High Sea Fleet is barely more than an oversized fleet-in-being. What can you do if the British refuses the fight, attack British sea coast cities and British merchants in the North Sea?

[Ape]

This quote does not say that Shoho was headed into the wind at the time of the torpedo attack, and in fact supports my position completely.  You rather dishonestly omit the sentence at the top of page 200 which says exactly what you say is untrue:

Izawa saw the TBDs closing from his starboard quarter, but other than order a turn to starboard, he could do nothing.

my bolded part is more interesting.

Now using your source: p.199f
11.17 Shoho launches three fighters and turns sharply to port (since this means she is pointing in the wind direction to launch fighters it means south east, or do you dispute this as well?)
11.18 Shoho has completed her circle (as in 360 degrees and is again pointing in the wind direction or do you dispute this as well?) Lundstrom does not give any information after this if Shoho did turn.
11.19  The torpedo squadron launches their torpedoes at Shoho. It does not say at what range, or when the first torpedo detonated. When it did strike, your source says Shoho was locked on a south eastern heading. (or do you dispute this)

As for dishonestly omitting:

Izawa saw the TBDs closing from his starboard quarter, but other than order a turn to starboard, he could do nothing. The lead torpedo planes had already released their fish.

So how long does it take for a torpedo to reach it's mark? It took 51 seconds for the one that doomed Bismarck, at range of about 750 meters.
Since according to your source it 'only' took the Shoho a minute to make a 360 degree turn, why was the Shoho still on a SE heading after she was struck by the first torpedo? Or don't belive me do the math yourself, 1 kn= 1,852km/h=0,51m/s
So a 40kn torpedo would make just over 20m/s.
So  I ask at what range did the american aviators at coral sea launch their torpedoes at the Shoho and when in relation to this did Izawa order that starboard turn? And was it executed? Because from your source Shoho can't have made that turn that Izawa ordered as it was steaming in the same direction after the attack as before the attack.

What are "your sources," BTW?  You keep claiming to have these sources, but when compared to The First Team they always seem to come out as wrong.  You then conceded the point, and make up some other whiopper, which in turn gets smacked down.

I have given you my sources, but sure I can quote it:

At this point the Shoho's skipper, captain Ishonosuke Izawa, made a critical error. With the SBDs of scouting Two now finished with their dive-bombing runs, a slight lull developed. Doctrine demanded that the bombing and torpedo squadrons go in together after the scouting squadron had supressed the enemy task force. Hamilton's VB-2 had been forced to wait for Torpedo Two's ponderously slow Devastators, which were closing on the Shoho from the southwest.
Thinking he had enough time to launch more fighters form his deck, Izawa ordered the Shoho into the wind. Just as she steadied on a southeasterly course. Torpedo Two's TBDs began streaming around the Shoho's escorting cruisers. They penetrated the screen with ease and then split up to launch an anvil attack. Half of the squadron would strike from the port bow, half from the starboard. Prewar tests had shown this to be the most effective way of striking a moving ship.

I'm not making anything up. When disproven you change your point of view, the above is in no way contradicted by what Lundstrom wrote that was cited above. Infact they support each other quite well since Lundstrom is not concerned of what the Japanese were doing or why.

Your source appears to be your ass.

And you cannot read

How many hits were scored by Swordfish against fully maneuverable targets in the first six months of World War Two?  Aagin, what difference does this make?  My point has been made, and yours refuted.  US Naval Aviators could, indeed, hit "a barn from the inside" in 1941/42.

So you continue to attack a moot point? I have conceded that they could hit a straight moving target five months after the war began. Since the original question to my hyperbole was what would have happend if you switch an american carrier for the Ark Royal on May 26th -41. I said they wouldn't hit it, you said yes they would look at Shoho. To which even your sources say was running straight at the moment of the torpedo attack.

Again, what are those sources?

Right now I'm using yours, and even they support what I am saying.

Yes, this is called "writing the book you are writing."  Since you were just quote-mining it from Google Books, you don't understand it.  But that's okay.  It still gives the best account of the attack on the Shoho I have seen, and the purpose of the book is moot to this discussion.

No it's called opinion-based history writing. Had Lundstrom wrote 'a text-book example of a well co-ordinated strike' with a citation or quote from example the contemporary training manual I would have been okey with. As it is me as a reader will have to take it at face-value that this strike was a 'masterpiece'. And what differantiates this particular example from other torpedo strikes that were 'merely' succesfull? Can I as a reader know that, just by reading this book ?

For the record, I went down to the local library and borrowed 'First strike'. But what differance would it make where I get the book from? The book says the same thing.

So you are going to try to weasel out of " the TBD Devastators, slow and wallowing pigs, that the US Nave toted around in May -41 was easy to hit with flak" and say that you didn't mean that they were easy to shoot down?  Okay.  Whatever.  It doesn't help your argument.

No I stick with it, I never said that the Devastators were easy to shoot down, only that due to their speed and lack of maneuverability that they were easy to hit. The rest are your assumptions of what I said.

How many made it so far as to even get a chance to be shot down by Flak?

At Coral Sea, all of them.

So 44 at Coral Sea? And at Midway?

No, not like real history books like The First team, which covers its subject (even if it doesn't include unrelated material you think it should).  I dunno what the publication date (not the "written in" date, which I suspect was over several years) has to do with the validity of The First Team.  Something bad happen to you in 1984 that scarred you emotionally?

So it is not important to know what the Japanese were doing? Or knowing? Was the torpedo attack obscured by smoke or fires from the dive bombing?
What is important about the date of publishing? Well it says a lot of things actually. Middle of cold war. Quite a few pilots left alive, sorry American pilots. I could never guess what possible explanation there could be for not asking questions and taking 'facts' at face value, facts like the first American torpedo strike in the Pacific war was a 'masterpiece'.

Yes, of course they were slow, and of course they couldn't get into favorable positions without cooperation from the dive bombers.  The debate here isn't whether they were fast, but whether they could "hit a barn from the inside."  Clearly, the Shoho attack showed that their tactics were sound, and the Shokaku attack showed how fragile those tactics were.

Thank you for conceding that the Devastators were slow. In fact they were so slow that they couldn't keep up with the turning radius of Shokaku. Thus my 'slow and wallowing pig' comment.

In English, "unsatisfactory depth performance" means running shallower or deeper than the set depth (or both, at various times in the run).  You claim that you have information that shows that the Mk 13 had a tendency to run deep, and you haven't produced it (the BuOrd  - not "Dept of Ordnance," which reference alone makes me doubt whatever your source is - report does not do this). 

I have given you the source for this, and if it is the 'Bureau' instead of 'Department' then that was my mistake in not re-checking what I am writing, particulary since the translation of Bureau is not used when talking about government agencies in Swedish. Still I have given a source regarding the reliability of the Mk.13, it was orignially taken from "U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II" by Lt. Cmdr. Buford Rowland, USNR, and Lt. William B. Boyd, USNR, no page number given.

And if "unsatisfactory depth performance" could mean that it is  running shallower, what does the 2 % ran on the surface mean? Is the surface to shallow and has to get a classifiction of their own? Or has my English failed me again

shal⋅low
  /ˈʃæloʊ/ [shal-oh]
–adjective
1.    of little depth; not deep: shallow water.
2.    lacking depth; superficial: a mind that is not narrow but shallow.
3.    taking in a relatively small amount of air in each inhalation: shallow breathing.
4.    Baseball. relatively close to home plate: The shortstop caught the pop fly in shallow left field.

In English, we call trying to pretend data says what we want it to say rather than what it says "intellectually dishonest." 

and when you ignore the other sides arguments, sources and still refuse to listen to them we call it beeing an ass.

And when one does so using insulting emoticons and is exposed, we call that in English "getting your fanny reddened."

now what is it you say in English about turnabout?

Nope.  No more sources from me until you start naming some sources (like the one claiming Shoho was not maneuvering under Torpedo Two's attack at the Battle of the Coral Sea).

Did and done so above. From your source nontheless.

Since the Lundstrom book describes exactly that, and you have utterly failed to provide any evidence that Shoho was "not actually trying to avoid torpedo attacks," I would say your statement here is pretty much a complete concession.  In fact, given that you cannot explain why Shoho wouldn't want to maneuver when attacked by torpedo bombers, I would say you are conceding that your argument is both wrong and counter-intuitive.

Since Lundstrom does not say this, why should concede? If you actually read what he writes rather then skimm it you might (well maybe not you but any other reasonable human beeing would) see the point that I am trying to make.I have given an explantion and a source as to why Shoho did not maneuver, and I had done so previously.

Can you actually provide any sources that claim that Shoho was doing avoidance maneuvering during the torpedo attack that hit her steering mechanisms? Since Lundstrom clearly doesn't.

It is quite obvious that you are debating dishonstly and only read what you think you read. Furthermore you seem only interested in your own opinion in regards to american infallibility during the pacific war. Either that or you're trolling. Now unless you actually cough up any sources that support your claims, I am done. Good day to you, or what is left of it anyway.

[Tamas]

Since all you navaltards trashed this thread, I'm repeating my question:

How is the year old 1916 campaign feature, Tamas?  Totally flexible, or what?

Define flexible. You can create your own task forces and move ships around in it, so is with the default historical task forces of course. Reinforcements are historical. There is mine laying and shore bombardment and merchant shipping (I wish it was abstracted). There are submarine and zeppelin TFs but they do not participate in tactical battles

I will continue this game tonight btw and give you an update. Plan is:
-escape the british fleet
-repair my remaining ships
-finish off the rest of the Britihs BCs and thus force the AI to divide the Grand Fleet

What targets can you attack, beside RN ships? Which objectives can you set?

Perhaps I am wrong, but the German High Sea Fleet is barely more than an oversized fleet-in-being. What can you do if the British refuses the fight, attack British sea coast cities and British merchants in the North Sea?

Yep I can bombard cities and scavenge around secondary or tertiary british shipping lines (you can highlight these on the map, along with german ones) with my ships or subs. Primary too of course but they are rare and near dangerous waters. The Brits also have a bunch of commerce raiders normally operating west of norway.

I was ahead in VPs before this battle and it has not changed so I think Neil's earlier analysis of this not being such a big defeat holds true.
As a matter of fact, the day when I first posted the royal navy out in numbers (the start of this AAR), was maybe the second day when the victory status line said "germany+++" following a streak of sunk british merchants and torpedo boats with no british reply. I really hope that this was what triggered the British sortie because it would be realistic, by simulating political pressure.

[grumbler]

Now using your source: p.199f
11.17 Shoho launches three fighters and turns sharply to port (since this means she is pointing in the wind direction to launch fighters it means south east, or do you dispute this as well?)

Immediately after the Scouting Two attack, the Japanese launched three fighters, or do you dispute this as well?

11.18 Shoho has completed her circle (as in 360 degrees and is again pointing in the wind direction or do you dispute this as well?) Lundstrom does not give any information after this if Shoho did turn.

At 1117 the Shoho turned sharply to port (away from the wind), and then Izawa sighted the torpedo planes and ordered a starboard turn, or do you dispute this as well?

11.19  The torpedo squadron launches their torpedoes at Shoho. It does not say at what range, or when the first torpedo detonated. When it did strike, your source says Shoho was locked on a south eastern heading. (or do you dispute this)

At 1119, after the starboard turn had been ordered, the first torpedo was launched.  Lunstrom does NOT say that " Shoho was locked on a south eastern heading."  Those are your words, not his.  He doesn't give a heading for the ship after either the sharp turn to port at 1117 nor the one to starboard a minute or so later.

As for dishonestly omitting:

Izawa saw the TBDs closing from his starboard quarter, but other than order a turn to starboard, he could do nothing. The lead torpedo planes had already released their fish.

So how long does it take for a torpedo to reach it's mark? It took 51 seconds for the one that doomed Bismarck, at range of about 750 meters.
Since according to your source it 'only' took the Shoho a minute to make a 360 degree turn, why was the Shoho still on a SE heading after she was struck by the first torpedo?

Where are you getting the idea that Lundstrum says that "it 'only' took the Shoho a minute to make a 360 degree turn"?  Not only are you putting words in his mouth, you are putting silly ones in.  There is no way a carrier could do a 360 degree turn in a minute.  Hell, a destroyer couldn't do that!

Lundgren has the Shoho completing two circles in 11 minutes.  That is much more reasonable than the numbers you are making up and dishonestly attributing to Lundstrum.

I have given you my sources, but sure I can quote it:

At this point the Shoho's skipper, captain Ishonosuke Izawa, made a critical error. With the SBDs of scouting Two now finished with their dive-bombing runs, a slight lull developed. Doctrine demanded that the bombing and torpedo squadrons go in together after the scouting squadron had supressed the enemy task force. Hamilton's VB-2 had been forced to wait for Torpedo Two's ponderously slow Devastators, which were closing on the Shoho from the southwest.
Thinking he had enough time to launch more fighters form his deck, Izawa ordered the Shoho into the wind. Just as she steadied on a southeasterly course. Torpedo Two's TBDs began streaming around the Shoho's escorting cruisers. They penetrated the screen with ease and then split up to launch an anvil attack. Half of the squadron would strike from the port bow, half from the starboard. Prewar tests had shown this to be the most effective way of striking a moving ship.

I'm not making anything up. When disproven you change your point of view, the above is in no way contradicted by what Lundstrom wrote that was cited above. Infact they support each other quite well since Lundstrom is not concerned of what the Japanese were doing or why.

Actually, while Bruning does not contradict Lundstrum, he provides much less detail and does not mention that Izawa had already launched his fighters and turned sharply to port (and had completed another circle) by the time Torpedo Two and Bombing Two began their attacks.  While Izawa may have been launching fighters between the attacks, he was not doing so during the combined attack, as Lundstrum makes clear ("The SBDs started pushing over as the Shoho completed her second circle and momentarily lay in the wind axis...).  Bruning may have mistaken the launch of the three fighters as a sign that Izawa had "ordered the Shoho into the wind" but I very much doubt that his interpretation is correct - what carrier skipper would, under attack, stop maneuvering?  Further, Bruning's assertion that the Shoho was headed southeast and the TBDs were coming up from the southwest flies in the face of the fact that the torpedo bombers approached Shoho from her starboard quarter.  Shoho must have had an easterly heading at that point (consistent with Lundstrum's description but not Bruning's) until she came right after Izawa spotted the planes approaching.  Of course, Bruning talks only about what Shoho was doing as the "TBDs began streaming around the Shoho's escorting cruisers" and not what she was doing when the TBDs attacked, so maybe he is simply guilty of a bit of omission.  Neither source says what you claim they both say, and Lundstrum says the opposite. 

And you cannot read

I can read perfectly well, and can see, for instance, that Lundstrum describes the Shoho completing two complete circles between 1107 and 1118, not one in one minute and one in 10 minutes! 

So you continue to attack a moot point? I have conceded that they could hit a straight moving target five months after the war began. Since the original question to my hyperbole was what would have happend if you switch an american carrier for the Ark Royal on May 26th -41. I said they wouldn't hit it, you said yes they would look at Shoho. To which even your sources say was running straight at the moment of the torpedo attack.

Again, Lundstum does not say that Shoho was on a steady course when the torpedo bombers attacked, so I don't know why you repeat the lie.  Lundstrum clearly states that Izawa ordered a turn to starboard..

Right now I'm using yours, and even they support what I am saying.

Nope.  It says the opposite.  You can find no quote from Lundstrum that says that Shoho was on a steady course when Torpedo Two attacked.

No I stick with it, I never said that the Devastators were easy to shoot down, only that due to their speed and lack of maneuverability that they were easy to hit.

This is called a weasel.  "I only said they were easy to hit, not to shoot down" is a pointless distinction given that you had addressed the TBD in contrast to the Swordfish which you explicitly discuessed in terms of staying in the air.  Whatever.  You were wrong either way; its just that i would have hped you would man up to your mistake instead of weaseling.

So 44 at Coral Sea?

Correct.

And at Midway?

Do your own research, dude!

So it is not important to know what the Japanese were doing? Or knowing? Was the torpedo attack obscured by smoke or fires from the dive bombing?

Not for the purposes of the book, no.  And given that the torpedo attack started before the first bombs hit, any cover provided by smoke and fires would, of course, be part of the doctrine.  The whole idea behind the coordinated attack (one that you thought the US incapable of executing since you claimed they "couldn't hit a barn from the inside") is to present the enemy with these difficulties, and you are trying to make it into a bad thing! 

What is important about the date of publishing? Well it says a lot of things actually. Middle of cold war.

Quite a few pilots left alive, sorry American pilots.

I could never guess what possible explanation there could be for not asking questions and taking 'facts' at face value, facts like the first American torpedo strike in the Pacific war was a 'masterpiece'.

Thank you for conceding that the Devastators were slow. In fact they were so slow that they couldn't keep up with the turning radius of Shokaku. Thus my 'slow and wallowing pig' comment.

Thank you for conceding that the Devastators were slow, and thus my comment that they needed wing tactics to be properly executed in order to be effective.

I have given you the source for this, and if it is the 'Bureau' instead of 'Department' then that was my mistake in not re-checking what I am writing, particulary since the translation of Bureau is not used when talking about government agencies in Swedish. Still I have given a source regarding the reliability of the Mk.13, it was orignially taken from "U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II" by Lt. Cmdr. Buford Rowland, USNR, and Lt. William B. Boyd, USNR, no page number given.

So you are giving sources and inaccurate transcriptions, and then changing the meaning to match what you want the results to be, and you expect to have any cred at all?

And if "unsatisfactory depth performance" could mean that it is  running shallower, what does the 2 % ran on the surface mean? Is the surface to shallow and has to get a classifiction of their own? Or has my English failed me again

Running on the surface is a completly different problem than running shallower than expected, or deeper.  No source of which i am aware backs your assertion that I

forgot to mention the Mk.13's tendancy to run to deep 

and when you ignore the other sides arguments, sources and still refuse to listen to them we call it beeing an ass.

That is precisely correct.  And I think it is pretty clear who is ignoring the other side's arguments and inserting "facts" which the sources do not support.

now what is it you say in English about turnabout?

What we say is "whipping that fanny is fun, but don't ask the guys to turnaround."

Did and done so above. From your source nontheless.

Nope.  Neither source claims this, and Lundstrum directly refutes it.

Since Lundstrom does not say this, why should concede?

Lundstum describes the starboard turns the Shoho took in the minutes leading up to the attack, and the starboard turn ordered just as the attack commenced.  Dunno why you refuse to admit this; it is in as plain an English as you could hope for.

If you actually read what he writes rather then skimm it you might (well maybe not you but any other reasonable human beeing would) see the point that I am trying to make.I have given an explantion and a source as to why Shoho did not maneuver, and I had done so previously.

You have failed to provide any explanation for the Shoho's supposed unwillingness to maneuver, despite Lundstrum's descriptions of those maneuvers, and the best you have is a claim that Izawa turned into the wind as the torpedo planes crossed the escort line, despite the fact that this description is completely inconsistent with the facts that:
(1) had Shoho been headed southeast, the approaching TBDs would have been off her starboard bow (or at worst her starboard beam) and not her quarter;
(2) had the TBDs been off her bow or beam, the second half of the anvil would surely have passed ahead of Shoho to get into position off her port bow, rather than flying all the way around her stern and then try to fly up her port side to take a position off her port bow; and
(3) the TBDs did, indeed, pass astern of the Shoho, which means they were off her starboard quarter (exactly as the Japanese and Americans reported), which means that
(4) Shoho was not headed southeast when the TBDs started their attack, but rather easterly. 
This is precisely consistent with Lundstrum's account.

It is quite obvious that you are debating dishonstly and only read what you think you read. Furthermore you seem only interested in your own opinion in regards to american infallibility during the pacific war. Either that or you're trolling. Now unless you actually cough up any sources that support your claims, I am done. Good day to you, or what is left of it anyway.

  So, your fanny is getting whipped, you have engaged in wholesale deliberate misreadings of the evidence you have presented in a manner that is ignorant at best, dishonest at worst, and this is all somehow my fault?

I love the strawman stuff about my "opinion in regards to american infallibility during the pacific war"(sic)!    That was the last bit needed to completely discredit your arguments here, and makes one wonder if you were ever arguing here with the honest intention of ferreting out the truth.

[Syt]

Tamas, how about you start an AAR thread?

[Cecil]

Yeah these two morons just about ruined this thread.

[Ed Anger]

Tamas, how about you start an AAR thread?

The action so far:

Ape and Grumbler have both torpedoed each other and their rudders are jammed. Both are steaming in a circle.

[Tamas]

ALLRIGHT FOR FUCK'S SAKE LET ME GET BACK TO MY AAR OKAY?!!!!


After that huge night battle, the Brits did not give up the pursuit. Soon after it, the two battlecruiser fleets bumped into each other in the dark, which resulted in the near total destruction of my BC fleet's escort ships, altough at least I sank more enemy small ships than I lost, but it means the escort numbers for the Scout Fleet will have to be replaced from the local defense forces.

The cruisers of the British BC fleet kept getting into visual contact with my ships but I kept losing them.

Then on the morning of 24th, with my High Seas Fleet paddling east, with the Scout Fleet somewhat to the NE of it, I saw 3 British BCs going flank speed, leaving their escorts behind. A sort of bidding game started: I made my last 3 BBs turn back to stay and shoot at the bastards, but it quickly turned out 4 other BCs were on their way as well, so I sent an other bunch of BBs back. Then my gunmen sucked at aiming so I sent all the BBs back, seeing the chance to finish the British BC fleet off.

Needless to say, the British Grand Fleet arrived as well, and altough I did manage to break contact, I had to get into close quarter fighting between some of my BBs and the BCs.

Summa summarum: I have lost 3 other BBs, but as far as I know, Great Britain has lost all her Battlecruisers!
(I really hope the AI just simply did not want to give up catching me with its BBs because the last couple of BCs did really not have to die)

Location: 183 Kilometers west northwest of Emden
Battle Start: 10:29 A.M., January 24th, 1916
Battle Duration: 5 hours, 30 minutes
Final environment: -3 degrees celsius, precip 0%, wind 4 knots, Sky: cloudy, fog 0%, visibility 11452m.

Sunk German BBs: Hessen, Hannover, Schleswig-Holstein
Sunk British BCs:  Indefatigable, New Zealand, Australia, Invincible,  Indomitable, Inflexible
plus the British destroyer Marne managed to get sunk somehow

[Warspite]

Tamas, how about you start an AAR thread?

The action so far:

Ape and Grumbler have both torpedoed each other and their rudders are jammed. Both are steaming in a circle.

That sounds... hot

[Agelastus]

Yeah these two morons just about ruined this thread.

Who the fuck are you?

[Ape]

ALLRIGHT FOR FUCK'S SAKE LET ME GET BACK TO MY AAR OKAY?!!!!

Sorry Tamas, I'll keep any further posting of mine in this thread to your AAR, ok?

[Neil]

Sunk German BBs: Hessen, Hannover, Schleswig-Holstein
Sunk British BCs:  Indefatigable, New Zealand, Australia, Invincible,  Indomitable, Inflexible
plus the British destroyer Marne managed to get sunk somehow

You weakened the British fleet and made your own stronger at the same time.  Those predreadnoughts are terrible.

[grumbler]

ALLRIGHT FOR FUCK'S SAKE LET ME GET BACK TO MY AAR OKAY?!!!!

If debating to kill time while waiting for your AAR has actually sped up your AAR, that is win-win in classic languish fashion!