US - Greenland Crisis Thread

[Legbiter]

Civil preparedness planning is in full swing in Greenland, they're taking various measures, may recommend households stockpile food for at least 5 days. A lot of men are brushing up at the rifle range.

[viper37]

We all know Trump appointees, still in their positions, aren't going to point out how crazy it all is.

Well, Bessent's son is making a killing on these tariffs.  He sells tariff insurance to companies.

[viper37]

withdrawing the US security umbrella (e.g. withdrawals from Europe).

Hegseth already told Europeans to go fuck themselves.  US priorities have shifted, they're toward Asia.  At the same time, they told Taiwan in no uncertain terms they won't intervene in their defense against China.  Except with tariffs.

[Grey Fox]

Man, we need nukes, ASAP.

[Duque de Bragança]

Malheureusement, les bombinettes en question, il faut plutôt des années pour en développer.

[The Minsky Moment]

I think that is a misreading of the European position and views on this

It's a misreading of Bessent to think he cares about the European position and views. He has a constituency of one.

With Bessent, Vance, Rubio, we are dealing with people in a powerful co-dependent relationship with a highly disturbed, abusive and dangerous person.  Their overwhelming motivation is to placate Trump.  And as Tamas astutely observed, it is common for people in that position to feel genuine anger and irritation at outsiders, who though objectively are acting rationally, are perceived as being "difficult" because they aren't cooperating with the essential agenda of pleasing the abuser.

The other powerful dynamic at work is that all three are maneuvering for the rapidly approaching (?) post-Trump GOP landscape. As dominant as Trump is now, a third term is probably beyond his reach.  Bessent, Vance, Rubio are all extremely ambitious people with little to no fixed principles, and Vance and Rubio happen to be the two leading candidates for the GOP nomination in 2028.  But  their prospects depend on keeping their current position and good graces with Trump.  If the cost of securing that means blowing up NATO for no reason, they will gladly set the charges.

[Zanza]

Also I think you need to see Bessent at the weekend:

WELKER: Is Greenland or NATO more essential to US national security?

BESSENT: That's obviously a false choice

WELKER: Not from the perspective of European leaders

BESSENT: European leaders will come around and understand they need to be under the US security umbrella. What would happen in Ukraine if the US pulled its support out? The whole thing would collapse.

I think that is a misreading of the European position and views on this - but implicit in what Bessent is saying is after tariffs, the coercion moves to security. The US suspends weapon sales for Ukraine again and halts intel sharing again, or withdrawing the US security umbrella (e.g. withdrawals from Europe).

There is no US security umbrella anymore as Trump already said that he does not value NATO. So that's an empty threat at this point.

[The Minsky Moment]

Europe is under the US security umbrella, but the umbrella is folded up and the pointy part is jabbing at them.

[Sheilbh]

Hegseth already told Europeans to go fuck themselves.  US priorities have shifted, they're toward Asia.  At the same time, they told Taiwan in no uncertain terms they won't intervene in their defense against China.  Except with tariffs.

There is no US security umbrella anymore as Trump already said that he does not value NATO. So that's an empty threat at this point.

Sure on these points but there is a difference between Hegseth and Vance saying things and the US re-deploying from Europe. That is the message that the US is sending to Europe and the reality is that there are still thousands of American service personnel in Europe, on NATO bases.

There is a level of rhetoric that is happening where what you're saying is right. But at the material and operational level there are about seventy thousand US troops in Europe embedded in NATO infrastructure and with our militaries.

I think there is a significant difference betwen the rhetoric happening with tens of thousands of US troops deployed in Europe and the rhetoric happening with tens of thousands of US troops being re-deployed out of Europe.

It's a misreading of Bessent to think he cares about the European position and views. He has a constituency of one.

With Bessent, Vance, Rubio, we are dealing with people in a powerful co-dependent relationship with a highly disturbed, abusive and dangerous person.  Their overwhelming motivation is to placate Trump.  And as Tamas astutely observed, it is common for people in that position to feel genuine anger and irritation at outsiders, who though objectively are acting rationally, are perceived as being "difficult" because they aren't cooperating with the essential agenda of pleasing the abuser.

Sure I think that's probably right.

Misreading is perhaps the wrong word - in that I don't think it's about caring what Europeans think. But I think the administration does think that they hold the cards to escalate to the point where Europe folds - and I'm not sure that's true. I think territorial integrity of a European state and ally is not something the US will be able to pressure its way to via tariffs, or withdrawing troops, or blocking the supply of US weapons to Ukraine, or energy (which I think is the biggest vulnerablity).

The other powerful dynamic at work is that all three are maneuvering for the rapidly approaching (?) post-Trump GOP landscape. As dominant as Trump is now, a third term is probably beyond his reach.  Bessent, Vance, Rubio are all extremely ambitious people with little to no fixed principles, and Vance and Rubio happen to be the two leading candidates for the GOP nomination in 2028.  But  their prospects depend on keeping their current position and good graces with Trump.  If the cost of securing that means blowing up NATO for no reason, they will gladly set the charges.

I agree and I think everyone going in to the Trump administration knew the cost would be that you go along with whatever he says. The lesson the right took from the first term was that personnel is politics and you can't have internal saboteurs or people trying to "manage" Trump. Project 2025 and the America First Policy Institute were designed primarily to recruit willing cadres of spineless apparatchiks (the latter having far more sway, in my view, precisely because it didn't claim to have a policy agenda).

I think that's true for Vance and Rubio as everyone else in an appointed position in the administration. Having said while I don't think any of those people have "principles" in the "here, I stand" kind of way, I think they do have world views - which they are still trying to push into the whims of what Trump wants to do. But I don't think Trump really has that type of world view. I think the only guiding world views that Trump has are basically those of a mob boss and a reality TV producer.

[Jacob]

Listening to a podcast on arctic warfare (in Danish). They've got a security analyst with about 20 years focus on the Arctic (and his own naval service in Greenland) talking about practicalities of an American attack.

Some of the take aways are:

The US' arctic capabilities - the Arctic Angels - are only 2 years old as a unit (indicating the desire to become active in the Arctic). They've been primarily trained by Scandinavians (Swedish, Norwegian, and Finish) who may in fact have larger capabilities - so if the Nordics support Denmark in defending Greenland, it may in fact be a tough fight for the US in the long run.

Another point - most of the US navy is not rated for arctic conditions, and the waters around Greenland are treacherous (lots of hard to spot black ice, for example). Additionally there's a significant lack of nautical charts - many of the waters are only safely navigable by those who have direct experience in sailing in those waters (which is primarily the Danish navy). Arctic storms are very harsh and not infrequent and - apparently - aircraft carriers are essentially useless while they happen.

Similarly, airports are often closed down due to fog and other weather conditions for weeks at a time.

In short, sustaining an invasion and fight in Greenland is potentially going to strain the US military in spite of its overwhelming power globally. Conversely the Danish military, while obviously small, has a long history of being able to operate across all of Greenland - on land, on the sea, and in the air. The US has not yet demonstrated such capabilities (and an aside, when Italy or Hungary or whoever rule out sending troops to defend Greenland it means nothing, because they don't have any troops that could do so. Finland, Sweden, and Norway are another matter altogether - as is Canada, I expect, but I don't think anyone expects Canada to send troops to fight the US in Greenland).

Still, it is likely that the US can project enough force to take the settlements in Greenland; but Greenland is big, about the size of the UK + Germany + France put together. Given the local conditions it may end up being very costly (and potentially impossible) to hold if Europe (and primarily the Nordics with possibly the UK) continue to contest Greenland after an invasion.

[My thought here: unless, of course, the US prevails on Europe to give up and accept a fait accompli or recede under threat of attacks on European assets outside of the Arctic]

Another key takeaway is that we - in Western Europe - need more submarines (both to counter American aircraft carriers in Northern waters, and to counter the Russian Project Nautilus once development finishes).

[Jacob]

On Hegseth and Bessent and the messaging...

I've always resisted the whole "I'm going to diagnose Trump psychologically, he's a narcissist" thing, but the narcissism model does explain some parts of Trumps behaviour in a way that I think may have utility.

This is from - I believe - Vlad Vexler (I got it via Anders Puck Nielsen). Essentially the model goes that a narcissist like Trump divides people into two groups.

• People he admire and whose respect and admiration he craves. He gets his "narcissist supply" from their respect. These are people he consider strong - so Putin, Kim, and others like them.
• People he considers weak, so victims or future victims. Trump (and thus his regime) gets his "narcissist supply" from being cruel to them, because they cannot do anything back to him.

Europe's problem - vis a vis Trump - is that he puts them in the second category: as weaklings to be bullied. Attempting to compromise or find common ground or talk things out only compounds the problem.

Anders Puch Nielsen suggests that Europe's best approach with Trump is to demonstrate strength. His proposal is to decisively beat Russia in Ukraine (without American support, presumably), which I think is a good idea.

[Sheilbh]

Another key takeaway is that we - in Western Europe - need more submarines (both to counter American aircraft carriers in Northern waters, and to counter the Russian Project Nautilus once development finishes).

Slightly relevant on this but there was a speech in December by the First Sea Lord which touched on this. This was at an event attended by chiefs of navy from Denmark and Norway. He repeated it more pointedly in an interview with the FT. It does not refer to the US but purely Russia and I think is alarming (and I think despite the reference to the Secretary of State is clearly a plea for more spending):

Just look at Russia. Despite the millions of lives and the cost of their egregious illegal invasion of Ukraine, they continue to invest billions in their maritime capabilities, particularly in their Northern Fleet, a 30% increase in Russian incursion in our waters just in the last two years.

It's most visibly seen in the presence of their spy ships like the Yantar.

But I can tell you today, the Yantar is only the visible bit you see in the public and it's not the bit that worries me the most. It's what's going on under the waves that most concerns me.

I can also tell you today that the advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War is at risk. We are holding on, but not by much. There is no room for complacency. Our would be opponents are investing billions. We have to step up, or we will lose that advantage.

We cannot let that happen, as the Secretary of State for Defence said recently in his message direct to Putin, we see you and we know what you are doing.

He was doing a launch of a few things but one is directly to address the submarine threat. I understand it involves autonomous drones to identify and track subs, new high tech (I know nothing about miltiary things!) mines and other stuff. I think the Norwegians have also offered to participate.

(And under this is my complaint: it needs more money and more focus.)

Europe's problem - vis a vis Trump - is that he puts them in the second category: as weaklings to be bullied. Attempting to compromise or find common ground or talk things out only compounds the problem.

Anders Puch Nielsen suggests that Europe's best approach with Trump is to demonstrate strength. His proposal is to decisively beat Russia in Ukraine (without American support, presumably), which I think is a good idea.

On the pscyhological thing - I agree on the narcissism. But with the weakness and Europe I am, characteristically, a little more pessimistic. I always think of the Martin Amis line on Trump (from reading about his business career but also takeover of the GOP):

Perhaps that's the defining asset: a crocodilian nose for inert and preferably moribund prey.

Trump can sense when an entity is no longer strong enough or lithe enough to evade predation. He did it with that white elephant, the Grand Old Party, whose salaried employers never saw him coming, even when he was there, and whose ruins he now bestrides. The question is, Can he do it with American democracy?

But I agee with this guy's points here. I am not sure Europe is in a position to do it right now. And this is basically my core view on all of this that every statement made by a European leader that is not announcing money or contracts or whatever to rebuild our industry and rearm is just wasting another day when we need to be rebuilding and rearming rapidly.

[Jacob]

Slightly relevant on this but there was a speech in December by the First Sea Lord which touched on this. This was at an event attended by chiefs of navy from Denmark and Norway. He repeated it more pointedly in an interview with the FT. It does not refer to the US but purely Russia and I think is alarming (and I think despite the reference to the Secretary of State is clearly a plea for more spending)

This was in fact covered in the podcast, and I agree. "The West" is in the process of losing its supremacy in the GIUK gap.

I expect Denmark will be getting subs in the not too distant future.

Perhaps that's the defining asset: a crocodilian nose for inert and preferably moribund prey.

Trump can sense when an entity is no longer strong enough or lithe enough to evade predation.

I hadn't heard this before, but it agrees 100% with my assessment of Trump and his key skill.

I am not sure Europe is in a position to do it right now. And this is basically my core view on all of this that every statement made by a European leader that is not announcing money or contracts or whatever to rebuild our industry and rearm is just wasting another day when we need to be rebuilding and rearming rapidly.

Yes I agree that Europe must rearm, and quickly. I think where you and I disagree is that I still think that Europe can.

[Zanza]

Sure on these points but there is a difference between Hegseth and Vance saying things and the US re-deploying from Europe. That is the message that the US is sending to Europe and the reality is that there are still thousands of American service personnel in Europe, on NATO bases.

There is a level of rhetoric that is happening where what you're saying is right. But at the material and operational level there are about seventy thousand US troops in Europe embedded in NATO infrastructure and with our militaries.
I think there is a significant difference betwen the rhetoric happening with tens of thousands of US troops deployed in Europe and the rhetoric happening with tens of thousands of US troops being re-deployed out of Europe.

That American troops are here is a fact. But are they friend, neutral or foe these days? Are we still getting mutual benefits (security umbrella) or is it only for US benefit (forward bases)? Not clear anymore based on recent statements of president and war minister.

If the US attacks Denmark (or Canada), there is no rationale for American bases here anymore.

[Sheilbh]

Yes I agree that Europe must rearm, and quickly. I think where you and I disagree is that I still think that Europe can.

I think we're less further apart than that then

I also think Europe can. But I don't think it is yet in any meaningful way (with Poland as an honourable exception). And I think basically anything that isn't contributing to rearmament is just noises off and, at this point, just further highlights the gap between what we're saying and what we aspire to and what we're actually doing.