Iran War?

[OttoVonBismarck]

My suspicion is more talk will shift to the drones (than is already there) in the coming days--ISW reports Iran has lost about 75% of its missile launchers. Most likely in the coming days Iran will be close to having none left--I imagine they will keep some hidden to avoid losing any / all launch capacity, but will probably not use them for daily launches (which exposes them obviously), but rather save them for a more strategic or performative use a little down the road.

I think the story more and more will be the drone warfare's effects on the Gulf nations, which continue to get hit.

I also wonder how long the Gulf nations can maintain their own legitimacy by refusing to fight back. It's one thing to ignore attempts on U.S. bases, but we're seeing oil production and refining assets, civilian residential assets etc being hit, I don't know that the Gulf states can just indefinitely act like this isn't their war.

I'm not sure the significance of any of them fighting back--none are as capable as the U.S. or Israel, KSA and UAE have decently sized air forces for the region though.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Also the Gulf States perhaps waiting for Trump to decide the war isn't a good idea, and take the pressure off of them--probably are misreading the level of stupidity inside Trump's mind.

[Sheilbh]

Although I think it's also wider than America - or American politics is the local expression of a global phenomenon. It wasn't just government contracts but a general cultural and economic shift to "leaner" industry, combating inefficiencies (including stock, process and labour costs), increasing competitiveness in a global marketplace (and leaning on that global marketplace to deliver efficiency) etc. (And obviously in the context of the 70s with Vietnam, the oil shock, stagflation - the criticism/crises that drove that swing were real.)

Having said that I think France is an interesting counter-example on your last point because I think the very things that are now helping France were, for the last 40 years, great examples in the Anglo-media (but I also think elsewhere) of a form of soft corruption. The French state stepping in to protect uncompetitive national champions, the closeness/incestuousness of French political and business elites (also cited as an important part of France's response to covid).

[OttoVonBismarck]

This quote from the daily ISW update is interesting for a few reasons:

The combined force is reportedly considering deploying special forces at a later time in the war to move Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile out of the country. Four sources with knowledge of the matter told Axios on March 8 that the US administration has discussed a potential future operation to move Iran's HEU out of Iran or dilute it in Iran.[53] The sources added that the combined force would only conduct such an operation if Iran could no longer seriously threaten US or Israeli troops.[54] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said during a congressional briefing on March 3 that "people are going to have to go and get it" in response to a question about whether Iran's HEU would be secured.[55] Iran's HEU is buried underneath rubble at the Esfahan, Fordow, and Natanz nuclear sites, which the United States and Israel struck during the 12-day war.[56] US and Israeli officials told Axios that most of Iran's HEU stockpile is located in the underground tunnels of the nuclear facility in Esfahan, while the rest is split between Fordow and Natanz.[57] An Israeli analyst, citing March 2 satellite imagery, reported that the combined force struck Natanz and severely damaged at least three buildings.[58]

For one, my response would be: good fucking luck with that. Special forces raids in Iran? Sure, that's possible. But moving  a stockpile of uranium? That would take a pretty big logistical presence.

The end of that note reveals IMO a core weakness in Trump's mindset--this is an option "he would only consider if there's no risk to U.S. troops."

Now, I'm of a mind this entire war is foolish and misguided, but the reality is whatever the wisdom of a war, one can assess if there's the right mindset to win. I can assure you Iran isn't making decisions out of fear of troop losses, the fact Trump truly believes he can impose his will on Iran without any significant risk to U.S. troops is both arrogant and also reveals Trump doesn't nearly have the will that IMO would be required for a victory of any sort in a strategic sense. (I'm not opposed to the idea Trump's current strategy could result in a "mutual loss" in which everyone loses, but that isn't the kind of thing Trump has been trying to sell people on.)

[The Minsky Moment]

On the one hand - If Trump's people wanted to preserve the option of sending in teams to secure and transport highly enriched uranium from three different sites located in the heart of the country - maybe they shouldn't have first bombed the exterior of the sites to generate massive amounts of rubble?

On the other hand - it's a bit of a ray of light that perhaps one Trumpian act of stupidity may forestall an even bigger one.  Perhaps God really does protect the terminally stupid, by having one idiotic act cancel out another?  Is it too much to hope?

[Tonitrus]

I guess it is not hard for a simple brain to move from "take the oil" to "take the uranium".

[Tonitrus]

There's a sort of end of history decadence to it all - we don't need to worry about where things come from or are made or anything so grubby as the material world, the market will provide.

I don't think we (the collective West) are going to move substantially towards fixing the problem until we get our own nose/face smashed in a bit.  Then we can only hope we'll have the chance to turn things around.   

[grumbler]

Just a complete layman here, but I wonder if the countering the drone swarm is a matter of going back to WW2-era AA systems, with updated computers.  In modern warfare AA has evolved to shoot down fast high-flying missiles, but it seems like with drones we're back to saturating by quantity strategy.  I wonder if with modern technology you can even get high hit rates with non-exploding AA ammo, just by calculating where to aim.

Gun-based interception is possible and very successful when the AA operator knows that the drone is going to enter the gun's range (e.g. protecting a point target like a single building or single radar antenna). The number of gun systems needed to defend something larger, like an airfield, gets quickly out of hand, and missile-based systems become the only option.

Plus, of course, the issue of gun system saturation by large-scale drone attacks where "they can get some of us, but not all of us."

[Maladict]

Also the Gulf States perhaps waiting for Trump to decide the war isn't a good idea, and take the pressure off of them--probably are misreading the level of stupidity inside Trump's mind.

Even without Trump, they know the US eventually will get bored and leave. Yet they will still have to coexist with their neighbor.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Perhaps--but when Iran is blowing up stuff like desalination facilities there's going to be some upper limit of what they can tolerate before questions get pretty loud as to why they aren't doing anything about it. Questions from their own people.

[OttoVonBismarck]

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/03/iran-strategy-victory-disease/686275/?gift=otEsSHbRYKNfFYMngVFweA-lpG91FW0XPeaUsz-ryEc&utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share

Operational Excellence, Strategic Incompetence
The president and his advisers are in the grip of "victory disease."

By Tom Nichols

March 6, 2026

The war in Iran has reaffirmed two truths. One is that the United States is blessed with the most professional and effective military in the world. The men and women of the American armed forces can conduct missions of almost any size with formidable competence, from special operations to seize a rogue-state president to a large-scale war. The other truth is that the Trump administration, when it comes to strategy, is incompetent.

Strategy is about matching the instruments of national power—and especially military force—to the goals of national policy. The president and his team, however, have not enunciated an overarching goal for this war—or, more accurately, they have presented multiple goals and chosen among them almost randomly, depending on the day or the hour. This means that highly effective military operations are taking place in a strategic vacuum.

Worse, Donald Trump is now pointing to these missions as if the excellence with which they have been conducted somehow constitutes a strategy in itself. He appears so enthralled by the execution of these missions that he has enlarged the goals of this war to include the complete destruction of the Iranian regime, after which he will "Make Iran Great Again."

This kind of thinking is an old problem, and it has a name: "victory disease," meaning that victory in battle encourages leaders to seek out more battles, and then to believe that winning those battles means that they are winning the larger war or achieving some grand strategic aim—right up until the moment they realize that they have overreached and find themselves facing a military disaster or even total defeat. It is a condition that has afflicted many kinds of regimes over the course of history, one so common that my colleagues and I lectured military officers about it when I was a professor at the Naval War College. The issue is especially important for Americans, because when national leaders have exceptionally capable military forces at their disposal—as the United States does—they are even more likely to be seized by victory disease.

The Persian emperor Xerxes had it; that's how he found himself eventually suffering a historic defeat in Greece at the Battle of Salamis. Napoleon had it; that's how he ended up freezing in the Russian snow after years of brilliant victories over other European states. The French in 1870 had it; that's how they confidently marched to catastrophes against a superior Prussian army. The Axis had it; that's how Germany and Japan convinced themselves that their early successes meant that they could quickly defeat the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively.

The Americans caught the same bug in the Korean War, when they chased the North Koreans to the Yalu River, a drive that ended in disaster when Communist Chinese troops streamed across the border and joined the conflict. The U.S. fell prey to this syndrome again in Vietnam, when it poured men and materiel into the war for years yet remained unable to turn many battlefield triumphs into a strategic victory.

American policy in the Gulf War in 1991 is an honorable exception; George H. W. Bush avoided victory disease, calling an end to Operation Desert Storm rather than marching on Baghdad after achieving his stated aim of rescuing Kuwait. But his son, George W. Bush, chose to fight two wars at the same time. Once again, the men and women of the U.S. military managed to achieve remarkable operational successes, but it took years to stabilize Iraq, and Afghanistan today is back in the hands of the Taliban.

And now Trump seems to have contracted a whopping case of victory disease. He is clearly convinced that previous operations in Venezuela, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and, of course, Iran are all evidence that a total victory over the regime in Tehran will be relatively quick. But he has provided no conception of what "victory" would look like. As of yesterday, his goals have expanded to include a demand for "unconditional surrender."

Admiring the performance of the U.S. military is understandable. But it is not the same thing as using that military power to achieve some national purpose. Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth so far seem to be enjoying the fireworks. But the efficient and rapid destruction of buildings and machines, and the killing of some enemy leaders, is not the same thing as a strategy.

Today, the U.S. and Israeli militaries have achieved almost full control of the skies over Iran and the waters around it. They appear able to destroy any targets they choose with near impunity. The Iranians still have the ability to strike back by launching missiles and drones at various targets, and they managed to kill six American service members with an attack against a makeshift installation in Kuwait. Nevertheless, Iran has been bested at the operational level of war, and its air and naval forces cannot offer meaningful resistance.

American operations have not been flawless. Last week, a U.S. strike on an Iranian naval base may have destroyed an Iranian school and killed dozens of children. Every major military engagement is fraught with risks of targeting errors, friendly fire, and other accidents, and preliminary evidence indicates that the school bombing was a tragic American error, one that was made more likely by the U.S. and Israeli decision to attack during the day (when children would be in the building). Even so, American military operations have for the most part been astonishingly well executed. Years of training, study, and planning, along with careful use of intelligence, have all contributed to the rapid elimination of much of Iran's capacity to project power, and almost all of its ability to resist allied attacks.

Operational competence, however, cannot answer the question of national purpose. What is the war about, and when will America know it's done? Trump, when pressed, dodges the issue of war aims by pointing to the excellence of the military. "I hope you are impressed," Trump said on Thursday to ABC's Jonathan Karl. "How do you like the performance? I mean, Venezuela is obvious. This might be even better." Trump then repeated, "How do you like the performance?" Karl noted that no one is questioning the success of military operations, and he asked the president what happens next. "Forget about 'next,'" Trump answered. "They are decimated for a 10-year period before they could build it back."

Likewise, the next day, CNN's Dana Bash asked the president how he thought the war was going. Trump rated the war, Bash said, a 12 or 15 out of 10, and then said, "We're doing very well militarily—better than anybody could have even dreamed."

Each time Trump or one of his lieutenants speaks this way, they generate more questions than answers. Yes, military operations are proceeding impressively, with very few casualties among the U.S. and Israeli operators. But what would have constituted a "10" that we can now say that America is at a "15"? Now that Trump, at least for the time being, has issued a call for "unconditional surrender," perhaps vaporizing every piece of military hardware with an Iranian flag on it is enough. Comments on Thursday by Hegseth and Admiral Brad Cooper of Central Command suggest that this seems to be the plan.

But "unconditional surrender" is unlikely to last. To effect such a total defeat, Iran would have to be occupied and administered by the victors. This kind of language is at odds with the reluctance of some in the Trump administration and other Republicans, including Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, to even call Operation Epic Fury a "war." (I will exercise my prerogative here as someone who has studied and taught national security and international relations and confirm that when you bomb a nation, kill its leaders, and call for its people to rise up, you're engaged in war, and if you call for "unconditional surrender," you are definitely at war.)

Trump will likely find himself backpedaling from the demand for unconditional surrender. He might also redefine unconditional to denote more easily achieved aims. (Indeed, hours after Trump's post, the White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt was already offering an interpretation of unconditional that was far more limited than absolute capitulation.) Soon, the Americans could find themselves retreating to the strategic incoherence that has characterized the administration's approach since the first hours of the war. Military operations and national purpose will become more and more distanced from each other, because military prowess cannot clarify America's war aims. As the old saying warns: If you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there.

My colleagues Marie-Rose Sheinerman and Isabel Ruehl have pointed out the severity of this problem by noting that Trump and his aides have offered at least 10 rationales for war over the course of only six days. Rationale No. 1 was "an imminent threat" from Iran, Rationale No. 2 was nuclear weapons, Rationale No. 5 was election interference, Rationale No. 6 was "world peace" writ large, Rationale No. 10 was that America had been dragged into the war by Israel. Some of these reasons might constitute a casus belli—others, such as Rationale No. 9 ("fulfill God's purpose"), less so—but Trump's team has thrown them all at the wall to see what sticks, perhaps in part because the war is still unpopular with the American public and Trump has so far seen no "rally 'round the flag" benefit from launching it.

But each of these rationales demands a different strategy; eliminating an imminent threat involves a different set of operations than establishing peace in the region (or the world). Instead, the Americans are choosing an "all of the above" approach, employing immense power across Iran. Entranced by the show, Trump, Hegseth, and others assume that because these operations are going well, something good will come of them. This kind of poor strategy, ironically, is an option only because of the excellence of the American and Israeli militaries: If Trump had to make decisions under greater material or military constraints, such as shortages of money, weapons, or talent, he would have to choose an actual war aim and stay with it.

If the goal is regime change and "unconditional surrender," do current U.S. operations support that goal? Again, military prowess and victory disease may be encouraging the White House to avoid thinking about some hard realities. Regimes are not changed by bombing; they are put in place by men and women wearing boots and carrying guns. (These need not be American boots, but they have to be somebody's boots.) Trump has called for the Iranians to surrender, but to whom? A U.S. occupation force? Or is an internal group of rebels assembling in Iran? In any case, a new regime will have to gain support by rebuilding infrastructure that's being destroyed. Are the target sets being adjusted accordingly over time? No one can answer these questions, because the civilian leadership of the United States does not seem to have thought them through.

Victory disease divorces military excellence from political wisdom and strategic discipline. It convinces leaders that whatever they're doing must be working and that they should keep doing it, blinding them to the possibility that military operations may have become counterproductive or detached from achievable aims. The American military is given tasks—clear the skies, suppress air defenses, sink the enemy navy—and then it breaks those instructions down into discrete and granular missions against particular targets. The pilots and planners can execute those missions with courage and professionalism, but they cannot force them to make strategic sense.

Meanwhile, despite the successes of the military overseas, Trump now admits that a regime that was supposed to be eliminated quickly could reach the United States with terrorist attacks. He told Time this week that "we expect some things. Like I said, some people will die. When you go to war, some people will die." The American people might be willing to tolerate such risks if they knew what their sons and and daughters were fighting for and how long they would be at war. Trump has retreated behind the skill of the U.S. military rather than answer such questions.

Perhaps the greatest danger of the current epidemic of victory disease is that it seems to be making Donald Trump think he's a brilliant strategist: He is already talking about overthrowing the government of Cuba, even as American forces are still fighting in the Middle East, and the threat of terror may well be growing at home now that the United States is at war. At this point, all Americans can do is admire the fortitude and excellence of the U.S. military while hoping for victory—whatever that is, and whenever it comes.

[Tonitrus]

In a bit of masochism, I watched Hegseth's interview with 60 Minutes...maybe I am not good at reading people, but even though he was saying all the confident things one would expect (including the expected Trump fluffing), I thought he seemed nervous/anxious as heck.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Hegseth exhibits the "Peter Principle" to a degree the late Professor Laurence Peter would have scarce imagined possible in a position as important as SecDef.

Well--at least so soon. I believe Peter was ultimately pessimistic in his book, since he speculates if humanity collectively will eventually become so technologically advanced that civilizational survival is put at risk due to collective incompetence to handle technology too advanced for our level of biological evolution.

ETA: I just now realized this is even more apt because Hegseth himself is a Peter.

[Tonitrus]

At risk of giving Russia too much credit, I think one of the smarter things they did was to replace their Minister of Defense with a technocrat/economist.

The President is the one that makes policy, and the service chiefs can handle the military crap, so the idea that putting in a "military man" is a necessary move seems silly.

My impression of the Austin was kinda meh...he had enough staff experience to be sufficiently competent.  Mattis was also ok, but sort of like a Hegseth but with competence and legitimacy.  I actually had the impression that Esper was a rather good fit for the role...some military experience, but then a lot of follow-on industrialist experience. 

[Sheilbh]

At risk of giving Russia too much credit, I think one of the smarter things they did was to replace their Minister of Defense with a technocrat/economist.

The President is the one that makes policy, and the service chiefs can handle the military crap, so the idea that putting in a "military man" is a necessary move seems silly.

My impression of the Austin was kinda meh...he had enough staff experience to be sufficiently competent.  Mattis was also ok, but sort of like a Hegseth but with competence and legitimacy.  I actually had the impression that Esper was a rather good fit for the role...some military experience, but then a lot of follow-on industrialist experience.

Hegseth has made for TV star good looks and an Ivy League education - which are absolute catnip for Trump.

But I think you're right - I would consider splitting the role and I'd possibly broaden it too. I think of the way Churchill had his war cabinet where you had a Minister of Defence (him) which was a strategic war-fighting role. But separate to that there was a very powerful Minister of Supply which continued as a cabinet position until 1960 - initially Lord Beaverbrock and then a man who'd been on the board of directors of chemical and steel industries whose entire focus was supply chains for the war effort. We're not fighting a world war and while defence procurement in the UK is a particular shitshow but all government procurement has pretty horrendous record and we perhaps need to think a bit more strategically about what a secure supply chain is. From a UK perspective I think there'd be a case of a Minister of Supply covering all government procurement because I think it is an area that needs its own expertise and focus in the modern state. Effective procurement basically enables almost every operational/policy department in government - but it's rarely the focus of any senior civil servant or politician in any of those departments which I think is an issue.

I don't think we (the collective West) are going to move substantially towards fixing the problem until we get our own nose/face smashed in a bit.  Then we can only hope we'll have the chance to turn things around.

I hope you're wrong - or I keep hoping covid, or Ukraine, or this will be the moment it dawns on us.

There was a really interesting NYT article on the success Japan has had in building entire supply chains for rare earths that does not touch China because they recognised the vulnerability. But it was a fifteen policy by government and industry in close cooperation. Not saying that's impossible in the rest of the West but...