Quo Vadis, Democrats?

[The Minsky Moment]

Or alternatively, the affluent professionals that make up a good portion of the population justify their wealth by voting left as a sort of Noblesse Oblige.  It wasn't he very poor who voted for Mamdani, it was the affluent professionals.  Perhaps envy played a part, but by the middle and the upper middle envying the very top.

The numbers don't support that.

Mamdani's core based of support was the middle class, earning 50K-150K.  These are not affluent professionals, not in NYC.  They are teachers, police, fire, small shop owners, uber drivers, gig economy workers, etc. People who are being squeezed by rising rents and food costs.  Mamdani had a big lead in people who rent their housing; he led among whites, Hispanics, and Asians.

Cuomo did win a lot of the less affluent, primarily African-American neighborhoods.  But he also won the very richest districts in the city - the Upper East and Upper West sides. There is a very high concentration of affluent professionals in those neighborhoods.

[The Minsky Moment]

Another thing to consider Joan, is if your model of inequality distress is true, then it becomes a local issue, not a national one.

It's not really my model, I have no idea what the real causal linkage is.  That would require proper study and analysis.

My point is that whenever someone posits causation based on correlation, you should ask yourselves whether the reverse causation is also possible, or whether it is possible some third factor is at play.  That way you avoid big mistakes like concluding that Tylenol causes autism.

[crazy canuck]

Yeah, I don't think we have a benchmark to be honest. Has a proper Western democracy fallen to authoritarianism due to internal politics (as opposed to invasion)?

If there are any history nerds on this forum I'd be interested in hearing their takes. Obviously there are a whole bunch of no-true-Scotsman fallacy potential here, but even so I think it'd be instructive to compare the similarities and points of distinction.  I'd also be interested in looking at any democracies that slid into authoritarianism more or less on their own, and then turned back into liberal democracies.

Japan in the 1930s. Chile in 1973. I'd argue Weimar Germany was not yet a proper Western Democracy wen Hitler overthrew it.

I am not sure Chile is a good example of internal politics. But for the US involvement it would likely not have occurred.

Japan 1930 might be the best historical example

[Jacob]

Japan in the 1930s. Chile in 1973. I'd argue Weimar Germany was not yet a proper Western Democracy wen Hitler overthrew it.

Japan (and Weimar Germany if we allow it) are discouraging examples - that trajectory requires losing a world war (to democracies) to return to democracy.

Chile is interesting. I'm no expert, but it seems like the dictatorship basically ran out of steam while facilitating a gradual transition to democracy (in the vein of Taiwan and South Korea's transitions to democracy). Do you (or anyone else) have any insight into the conditions that prompted this transition?

Another example occurs to me is the Portuguese transition via the Carnation Revolution. Here the solution seems to be a significant part of the military - officer cadre included - that is invested in democratic principles and willing to carry out a coup. Turkey, I suppose, is a similar case. Early republican France may be instructive as well?

My tentative conclusion is that if a democracy does slide into a dictatorship, the best chance for a return to democracy is a pro-democracy military coup at some point. I don't know how likely a scenario it would be in the US, though, given the military's culture of following civilian instruction.

[crazy canuck]

Japan in the 1930s. Chile in 1973. I'd argue Weimar Germany was not yet a proper Western Democracy wen Hitler overthrew it.

Japan (and Weimar Germany if we allow it) are discouraging examples - that trajectory requires losing a world war (to democracies) to return to democracy.

Chile is interesting. I'm no expert, but it seems like the dictatorship basically ran out of steam while facilitating a gradual transition to democracy (in the vein of Taiwan and South Korea's transitions to democracy). Do you (or anyone else) have any insight into the conditions that prompted this transition?

Another example occurs to me is the Portuguese transition via the Carnation Revolution. Here the solution seems to be a significant part of the military - officer cadre included - that is invested in democratic principles and willing to carry out a coup. Turkey, I suppose, is a similar case. Early republican France may be instructive as well?

My tentative conclusion is that if a democracy does slide into a dictatorship, the best chance for a return to democracy is a pro-democracy military coup at some point. I don't know how likely a scenario it would be in the US, though, given the military's culture of following civilian instruction.

On Chile, I think you have your dates mixed up. 73 is when the military coup took place and ended the popular democratically elected government.

[HVC]

My understanding is quite lacking, but I believe a large  part of the reason for the military turning on the government was the disastrous colonial wars. So while not a war against a democratic enemy it still involved war.

*edit* in the carnation revolution that is.

[The Minsky Moment]

Do the wealthy and the poor go to the same schools in New York?  In small Jefferson city they do.  There was only one public high school, so the wealthiest and the poorest all went to the same school (there was a much smaller Catholic Highschool, but that was mostly for Catholics).  I don't think Congressional District Jefferson City was in was sorted by class.  The entire town was just one district.  The City I live in now, Columbia has two districts, but that is dilute the voting power of a University town, not to separate the people based on class.  The people inside Columbia and the people living in the rural area outside of Columbia don't differ that much in wealth.

I think that this is exactly the point I'm making.  I presume Jefferson City doesn't have a lot of billionaires and centi-millionaires.  That entire super-rich strata is missing which pulls down the Gini. 

We have similar kinds of places in the northeast.  Trenton is a former minor industrial center and now the state capital of New Jersey.  On the Axios map, it votes Democrat still but Gini is below the average.  Albany is another state capital that isn't a major city (by New York standards) - I couldn't find NY-20 on the map, but it leans Democratic and I assume it could be found in one of the big clusters near the line.

I wonder if the reason that of greater inequality in these areas is because the affluent people in these cities just don't pay their servants very well.

Every place is different, but I'm not sure how familiar you are with how young affluent professionals live in these megacities.  Yes the megarich have their servants, but a typical professional in finance, advertising, law etc. in NYC lives in something like a 2BR 1000 square foot apartment.  I know because I lived in one and most my colleagues did too.  We didn't have a "staff" or bevies of servants. 

What affluent professionals do is ride the subway and take hire cars and send kids to schools and order takeout.  They don't personally set the prices and remuneration terms for those services, but the reality is that the wages for those workers are not enough to live reasonably in the city.  And the same goes for other city workers. And yes it is absolutely true that some (and certaintly not all) affluent professionals find that situation concerning and aren't super impressed by Andrew Cuomo's plan of sticking to business as usual in city government.

[grumbler]

I am not sure Chile is a good example of internal politics. But for the US involvement it would likely not have occurred.

Japan 1930 might be the best historical example

I think that the US role in the coup in Chile has been overstated, not east because some of the CIA types involved wrote books that were designed to show how important they were. We have to remember that Allende was elected after winning only a third of the votes in a highly polarizing election. I think that it is probable that a coup would have occurred regardless of US involvement. However, US involvement definitively increased the opposition to Allende and damaged his legitimacy, so definitely improved the chances of a coup.  We will never know for sure.

I agree that parliamentary Japan is a better example.

[Oexmelin]

My tentative conclusion is that if a democracy does slide into a dictatorship, the best chance for a return to democracy is a pro-democracy military coup at some point. I don't know how likely a scenario it would be in the US, though, given the military's culture of following civilian instruction.

Bear in mind that a lot of these events took place in a time when the dominant power of the West, the United States, expressed at least nominal concern for democracy - even if only as a tool against the Soviet bloc, it served to nurture hope and fuel principled opposition.

In a world where democracy is discredited (as was the case in Europe in the 1930s), finding inspiration is going to be harder. 

[The Minsky Moment]

I'd argue Weimar Germany was not yet a proper Western Democracy wen Hitler overthrew it.

It's debatable, but I think that claim arguably veers towards a True Scotsman fallacy.

Weimar had a pretty decent run, under very trying circumstances that even more established democracies would struggle to weather.

The two key flaws that undid Weimar also have real cautionary lessons for the present: (1) too many voters ceased to believe in democracy and backed anti-democratic parties, and (2) excessive and easily abused executive emergency powers.

[The Minsky Moment]

a pro-democracy military coup

Screwing for virginity rarely achieves the purportedly intended goal.

[HVC]

The two key flaws that undid Weimar also have real cautionary lessons for the present: (1) too many voters ceased to believe in democracy and backed anti-democratic parties, and (2) excessive and easily abused executive emergency powers.

Well shit.

[Duque de Bragança]

My understanding is quite lacking, but I believe a large  part of the reason for the military turning on the government was the disastrous colonial wars. So while not a war against a democratic enemy it still involved war.

*edit* in the carnation revolution that is.

That plus Caetano made the mistake of firing Spinola, a demand of the old-guard, since he was deemed too liberal, and a decree to get more captains or commissioned officers by speeding up the career of conscript commissioned officers antagonised the career commissioned officers.
The deteriorating situation in Guinea made the rest.

[Sheilbh]

I actually think one of the key points of US involvement is possibly around the assassination of General Schneider who was a staunch constitutionalist general and a very important force against the politicisation of the military. I understand there's some evidence of CIA involvement in the various assassination attempts, including the ultimate successful one against him all of which happened in the period between Allende's election and taking office. He was rightly seen by the coup backers and, I believe, the CIA as a major obstacle to anything as he was absolutely saturated in Chile's traditions of democratic politics and a non-politicised military.

Kissinger and Nixon also talked very loosely about their role in Chile (on the Nixon tapes, for example). There is also an important international far-right set of ideas in the Spanish speaking world at that time which overlaps with elements of the US state, but isn't necessarily caused by it. I think also international anti-communism with involvement from the US but sometimes with hub-and-spoke models (and I think South America in the 70s and 80s is the peak of this). It's described in The Jakarta Method - which is written by a leftist with an angle but fascinating, for example of graffiti in rich Santiago neighbourhoods saying "Jakarta is coming" so these were links being made at the time.

I would probably agree that the US role has been overstated, but I think that's more a reflection of the level of hyperbole. I think it's significant and very important.

Another example occurs to me is the Portuguese transition via the Carnation Revolution. Here the solution seems to be a significant part of the military - officer cadre included - that is invested in democratic principles and willing to carry out a coup. Turkey, I suppose, is a similar case. Early republican France may be instructive as well?

Sorry I'd got the question wrong and thought you were wondering about the move from democracy (which is a relatively novel, relatively limited form of government) to authoritarianism, not the other way round.

Portugal's colonial conflicts are really important context for the Carnation Revolution.

On Turkey I read a really interesting piece (to me) on something Turkish I'll post in the OTT thread. I would argue though that the Turkish military are not invested in democratic principles at all. Democracy is disposable. Their interest was in a specific form of state, society and something like authoritarian, modernising liberalism. I think France is varied - First and Second Republics from revolution, Third Republic from the Franco-Prussian War and crushing of the Commune, Fourth Republic from WW2 and the Fifth was arguably founded in a democratic coup (and I think part of the challenges France has is that it's constitutional order is designed to fit the gargantuan historic proportions of de Gaulle and every subsequent President, with a slight exception for Mitterrand, cannot comfortably wear that role).

The other side of this - to the "end of history" point is that I do still think we are in an end of the end of history moment rather than on the other side. In that one of Fukuyama's points was that there was no systemic challenger to liberal market democracy - even authoritarian regimes (excluding the Communist remnants) aspired to the forms of liberal democratic states. It is the legitimating tool of even authoritarian regimes to have an election (and win 99% of the vote) - which is odd, but it is because that concept of legitimacy from the people has been so embedded. I think that is still true - I'd argued before that I think Putinism was possibly a systemic rival (though I'm less sure on that now) - and I think in many states those forms of liberal democracy can still provide a point of opposition.

I think that this is exactly the point I'm making.  I presume Jefferson City doesn't have a lot of billionaires and centi-millionaires.  That entire super-rich strata is missing which pulls down the Gini. 

I think you're right generally - but I'd just flag that those maps and charts posted by Syt are Gini measuring income inequality, not wealth inequality. So it probably is more reflecting affluent professionals rather than the super-rich. I'm not sure a wealth inequality map of the US would be significantly different though.

[Sheilbh]

It's debatable, but I think that claim arguably veers towards a True Scotsman fallacy.

Weimar had a pretty decent run, under very trying circumstances that even more established democracies would struggle to weather.

The two key flaws that undid Weimar also have real cautionary lessons for the present: (1) too many voters ceased to believe in democracy and backed anti-democratic parties, and (2) excessive and easily abused executive emergency powers.

I think there was also a broader lack of legitimacy which was crucial.

Ultimately only the SPD and (occasionally) the Centre Party really believed in the Weimar state. At a party political level whether it was fascists, or monarchists yearning for the Wilhelmine order or Communists - there was a profound crisis of legitimacy more or less all the way through. But I think that also applied to the judiciary, the military, the police, the civil service. I think that culture at the elite level was absolutely essential in structuring the politics and form of state - which shaped with the choices voters were presented with, for example.