Europa Universalis V confirmed

[Syt]

Not to mention many folks crying about low control in locations and that there "need" to be more ways to project it basically from day 1 of a campaign. "Second capitals", "provincial centers" etc., and while not completely invalid it's also increasing the chance to make the mechanic meaningless.

[Tamas]

Not to mention many folks crying about low control in locations and that there "need" to be more ways to project it basically from day 1 of a campaign. "Second capitals", "provincial centers" etc., and while not completely invalid it's also increasing the chance to make the mechanic meaningless.

Yeah Johan will need to stand fast on core design elements. But, come to think of it, he is the guy who was patching EU2  based on what needed nerfing to avoid losing their MP game. 

[Richard Hakluyt]

The period, at a bird's eye level, has centralised states triumphing over decentralised states. There is also an arms race where countries gain huge but temporary leads, the UK with very powerful finance, or France with conscription. There seem to be different viable ways to get that strong control, from the UK's parliamentary system to Russian autocracy.

The way to "balance" the game imo is to make a decision to decentralise good in the short term, interest groups are placated for example, be they old fashioned methods of commercial organisation, regional peculiarites or class privileges. But long term, for this period, the "meta" is that centralised states have the edge over the decentralised ones.

[Tamas]

As I am arguing with a couple of kids over at Paradox, one thing the "OMG DECENTRALISATION IMBALANCE" people ignore is that that one slider doesn't live in isolation.

Multiple times I made decisions in the game to forego significant bonuses because the law/option giving them meant raising decentralisation.

[Syt]

And a lot of them seem to look at it from the perspective of the first 10, 20 years of a 500 years campaign instead of taking a higher level view.

[Tamas]

And a lot of them seem to look at it from the perspective of the first 10, 20 years of a 500 years campaign instead of taking a higher level view.

Yes, frustrating.

[Sheilbh]

The period, at a bird's eye level, has centralised states triumphing over decentralised states. There is also an arms race where countries gain huge but temporary leads, the UK with very powerful finance, or France with conscription. There seem to be different viable ways to get that strong control, from the UK's parliamentary system to Russian autocracy.

The way to "balance" the game imo is to make a decision to decentralise good in the short term, interest groups are placated for example, be they old fashioned methods of commercial organisation, regional peculiarites or class privileges. But long term, for this period, the "meta" is that centralised states have the edge over the decentralised ones.

I suppose that sort of goes to what type of game EU is - and I think the start date is relevant here.

I listened to a podcast a while ago with a Ukrainian academic talking about Medieval Kyiv as this different alternative model of state building that was decentralised regularly splitting and surprisingly successful. But it was slightly challenged by the host that while there was a vibrant culture and economy the same system also made the state vulnerable contributing its colapse.

As I say I think this ties into the start date, because it starts in late Medieval period you kind of need to have that type of decentralised state as a plausible alternative. If it's a bit later and more clearly Early Modern then I think you can frame it more around centralisation, state control etc.

[Sheilbh]

Not to mention many folks crying about low control in locations and that there "need" to be more ways to project it basically from day 1 of a campaign. "Second capitals", "provincial centers" etc., and while not completely invalid it's also increasing the chance to make the mechanic meaningless.

Yeah. I think I'd maybe tie it to estate satisfaction.

Less things you build and more "are the local grandees satisfied"? Thinking of either formal local offices like justices of the peace or the parlements, or more abstractly whether "the estates" are satisfied with and broadly enforcing the centre's law locally.

It might make balancing the estates more important/different too eg if you're town heavy etc.

[Richard Hakluyt]

Yes, I think that is the story. There is nothing wrong with decentralisation per se, but it is easy to become prey for centralising predators. In our own time the EU is one of the best places to live in the world, with prosperity and great culture, but it is militarily and politically impotent when faced with an aggressive shithole like present day Russia.

Similarly, the French got to stomp around the HRE causing havoc for about 200 years (1618-1815). The HRE was fine as a culture and civilisation, but it took the rise of Prussia to stop the great powers using it as their sandpit.

[Tamas]

1.0.7 is out which aimed to undo 1.0.5's breaking of the regular-levy troops balance of 1.0.4 not by reverting the change but by further convoluting the process by which these troops behave and improve over time. I linked Johan's post about it that was immediately torn apart by people.

So apparently now you can get results like this:
https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/threads/1-0-7-bodies-in-unit-calculations-make-regular-troops-useless-before-age-iv.1877431/

Where a handful of regulars still massacre 15k levies but because of the new... jumble of calculations they still lose the battle because their morale runs out.

[Syt]

 

[The Minsky Moment]

The midpoint of the EU campaign in 1587.  From that standpoint I don't think it was obvious that centralizing was a superior state building strategy. The two western European countries with a centralizing drive - England and France - seemed trapped in endless cycles where they would thrive under strong monarchs, only to collapse back into confusion and civil strife during the reigns of weak monarchs or long regencies. And of course that pattern would continue into the mid-1600s.   On the flip side, city states like Venice or city leagues like the Hanse seemed a viable alternative model.  The HRE and the Habsburg agglomeration had all sorts of problems but managed to project resilience and exert power pretty consistently.  The Ottomans were at their height despite granting significant degrees of regional autonomy horizontally and within regions through the millet system.

The proposed changes to centralization do not appear to me to take centralization less preferable. As I understand, the centralization bonuses for crown power and proximity cost remain, and those remain two of the best bonuses in the game.  Decentralization is going to be boosted by basically making it harder to maintain subject loyalty without it.  That doesn't really change the balance in the sense that going centralized will help you project control so that you don't need to rely on subjects as much for expansion and can just control directly.  What it does do is: (1) open the possibility of drifting decentralized early game until other sources of control and prox reduction make a centralized strategy more effective, (2) making decentralization more useful for AI countries that get stuck with it.

[The Minsky Moment]

Also seems to me making subjects harder to control nerfs France game start which will probably boost England's chances of performing as historically in the 100 YW.  At the same time, it will make it harder for England to hold on to large areas of France, especially away from the coasts.  And that seems right too.

[Richard Hakluyt]

Yeah, in the game I'm playing France won the 100 years war in 20 years and seemed to have iron control of their vassals. They became the hegemonic power in Europe by about 1360, which is disappointing.

In the real world a united France was a huge threat to just about every other European state (I'm thinking of Louis XIV here), but getting there so incredibly early (hundreds of years early) is very bad for the game.

[Sheilbh]

Yes, I think that is the story. There is nothing wrong with decentralisation per se, but it is easy to become prey for centralising predators. In our own time the EU is one of the best places to live in the world, with prosperity and great culture, but it is militarily and politically impotent when faced with an aggressive shithole like present day Russia.

I can't remember his name now but that comparison reminds me of the neo-Medieval theory in international relations. I think it's from the English school.

But basically it argues that basically states exist within an international society and that we might be heading back into an era where individuals actually feel more loyalty to localities (cities, sub-national units) or to transnational forms (the EU, "liberal order" etc) with the state as a less central role. A bit like the Medieval era when you had very strong local and transnational forms and identities (cities, Christendom, republic of letters etc) and the state/national level was relatively weak.

Similarly, the French got to stomp around the HRE causing havoc for about 200 years (1618-1815). The HRE was fine as a culture and civilisation, but it took the rise of Prussia to stop the great powers using it as their sandpit.

I'm rather more sympathetic to the French on that one, but I am very anti-Habsburg

The midpoint of the EU campaign in 1587.  From that standpoint I don't think it was obvious that centralizing was a superior state building strategy. The two western European countries with a centralizing drive - England and France - seemed trapped in endless cycles where they would thrive under strong monarchs, only to collapse back into confusion and civil strife during the reigns of weak monarchs or long regencies. And of course that pattern would continue into the mid-1600s.   On the flip side, city states like Venice or city leagues like the Hanse seemed a viable alternative model.  The HRE and the Habsburg agglomeration had all sorts of problems but managed to project resilience and exert power pretty consistently.  The Ottomans were at their height despite granting significant degrees of regional autonomy horizontally and within regions through the millet system.

Maybe. In terms of 1587 - you've got Elizabeth and Henri IV at around that time who are both monarchs who subsequently provide very important role models/patterns for English and French leaders. So in some sense you're right that there are still cycles of violence to go - and perhaps because of that these are proto-golden ages looked back to nostalgically by subsequent generations.

I think I'd argue that the forces that were in play by the late 15th century were pointing in the direction of forms of centralising modernisation. In particular the forces that emergent modern states were able bring in the Italian Wars against condottieri is absolutely devastating. I'm not sure Italy ever really recovers from that point and becomes an increasing object of other great powers' politics/unable to assert any agency (like the rest of the HRE and RH says). But also I think the particular style of the Portuguese monarchy has sponsored the expeditions to the Indies which is transformative - to the extent that the Venetians are paying anyone for information on what the Portuguese are up to and putting their arsenal to work for the Mamluks to build an Indian Ocean fleet for them to kick the Portuguese out. I think in both cases the writing is on the wall for "traditional" Medieval more decentralised Europe (and, with Europe's discovery of the Americas and with colonisation basically acquiring the depth of effectively another Europe, also for the rest of Eurasia - though that's not clear then).