US vs China War?

[Threviel]

Taiwanese economy is very entangled into the mainland economy. There's gonna be serious disruptions if it comes to war.

Secondarily there might be sanctions from other powers, don't know about that one since the Americans are so unpredictable.

[Valmy]

I have no idea. It kind of feels like we are closer to war in Iran right now.

But who knows? Nothing makes sense anymore.

[viper37]

I have no idea. It kind of feels like we are closer to war in Iran right now.

But who knows? Nothing makes sense anymore.

Why not both?

Didn't the last week has proven you that this administration think it can win a war with the world?

[Valmy]

I get the logic that American First Trump wouldn't fight for Taiwan so maybe we are farther away from war than we were under more conventional Presidents. But is that actually true? We might actually be closer to war with China with us basically enacting an embargo with them.

I have no idea.

Meanwhile tons of US military gear is being transferred to the Middle East as Trump and his cronies sit there and plot with Netanyahu.

[grumbler]

While I agree that Trump is less likely than sane presidents to get into a war to preserve US interests, I also think that he is so stupid and narcissistic that he could easily stumble into a war he does not want. Xi is also narcissistic, though to a lesser degree, but also motivated by a desire to be the Great Leader talked about for generations. He's not likely to back down from Trump's bellicose bullshit, and we could easily see an escalating war of words become a war of guns as each side is sure the other will back down if pushed hard enough.

[Jacob]

My take about China is that:

• They don't feel ready for a war yet, but expect a war to be coming and are going about readying themselves as much as possible. As such, there's a preference to not trigger a war just yet.
• China has limits they will not back down beyond. One such limit would be a hard drive in practical terms towards rejecting unification from Taiwan (rather than proceeding at frog boiling pace). Another is some sort of attack they feel they'll need to respond to preserve face.
• As well, there's a high chance that China would opportunistically attack Taiwan if they were confident the US could or would not respond effectively. This might trigger a war.
• There's absolutely a constituency within China that wants to avoid war at all costs, but this constituency is not in the drivers seat.

On the balance I think the likelihood of war before 2028 is lower than the likelihood of no war between the US and China, but it's still a distinct possibility (say 10-20% chance). There's a similar chance, I think, that China will attack Taiwan and not draw the US in.

[Neil]

Are we sure that China doesn't believe that they're strong enough?  It seems to me that there's a certain amount of self-propagandization amoungst the Chinese, and with Xi having purged anyone who tells him anything he doesn't want to hear, it's quite possible that he's living in a Putin-world where the only information he receives is that which his subordinates believe will fit his preconceived notions.  Xi is like Trump, only even more isolated and narcissistic. 

[Threviel]

Sounds reasonable Jacob.

Trump always folds also, there'll be no war with the US involved if he can avoid it.

And XI is far cleverer and more competent than Trump, a low bar to be sure.

[Baron von Schtinkenbutt]

Are we sure that China doesn't believe that they're strong enough?  It seems to me that there's a certain amount of self-propagandization amoungst the Chinese, and with Xi having purged anyone who tells him anything he doesn't want to hear, it's quite possible that he's living in a Putin-world where the only information he receives is that which his subordinates believe will fit his preconceived notions.  Xi is like Trump, only even more isolated and narcissistic. 

Sheilbh mentioned indications that XI and the other high-level officials are starting to take the actual level of readiness of the PLA more seriously.  I think they have seen how the pre-2022 assessments of the Russian military turned out to be a joke, and Xi specifically wants to avoid being in the situation Putin found himself in.  There are plenty of similarities between Trump, Putin, and Xi, but I think Xi is by far the most realistic and rational of the three.

[Jacob]

Are we sure that China doesn't believe that they're strong enough?  It seems to me that there's a certain amount of self-propagandization amoungst the Chinese, and with Xi having purged anyone who tells him anything he doesn't want to hear, it's quite possible that he's living in a Putin-world where the only information he receives is that which his subordinates believe will fit his preconceived notions.  Xi is like Trump, only even more isolated and narcissistic. 

I'm not sure, but my impression is that for all its faults the Chinese senior leadership still value expertise and analysis. I don't rate Xi intellectually on an individual level (from afar), but I don't think he is inherently anti-intellectual, anti-knowledge, anti-institution, and capriciously destructive the same way Trump and his oligarchs are. He definitely has ego and sensitivities, but he doesn't need to destroy or ignore the institutional capacities of China because they already serve him and cater to his sensitivities.

As on the main point - I have no doubt that there's a strong jingoistic sentiment in China, and there's confidence (and perhaps over-confidence) in China's ability to innovate, produce, and compete. Still, even in that context I think they're aware that any superiority they may have is untested. On top of that I think they judge the overall trends to be going in their direction - so if (say) they feel they have a 60% chance of winning now but are trending towards 70% or 90% (in their analysis), why not wait? But at the same time, I think they have enough confidence that if they're pushed too far (in their view), there's a solid chance they'll respond.

[Jacob]

Sheilbh mentioned indications that XI and the other high-level officials are starting to take the actual level of readiness of the PLA more seriously.  I think they have seen how the pre-2022 assessments of the Russian military turned out to be a joke, and Xi specifically wants to avoid being in the situation Putin found himself in.  There are plenty of similarities between Trump, Putin, and Xi, but I think Xi is by far the most realistic and rational of the three.

I think - and I guess this may be a pointless nuance - that it's not that Xi is the most realistic and rational of the three on an individual level but that the inputs from his institutions are more realistic and rational and listened to better.

Trump is lost to ideological and personality driven delusion, while Putin it seems is still compelled to play power and loyalty games to secure his position which colours his perspective. Xi, I think, is more secure in his position than Putin and much less of a loon than Trump (and the people Xi has to manage are much less inclined to tear down the institutions around them that Trump's coterie are).

[Neil]

but he doesn't need to destroy or ignore the institutional capacities of China because they already serve him and cater to his sensitivities.

And I suppose that's what I'm talking about.  He doesn't need to attack the institutions themselves because he did it earlier, and he continues to purge the ranks of his underlings, just to maintain the culture of fear and recrimination.  But in terms of how the institutions interact with him and each other, he's already created his bespoke dictatorial system. 

I'm  thinking of Li Shangfu saying that a war against the US would be a disaster, and within a few months he goes from Minister of Defence with the solid backing of the PLA top brass to being run out of the party and disappeared.  This is the sort of thing that Trump and Putin would both do, although Trump would stop at firing him whereas Putin would certainly have him killed. 

[Neil]

Are we sure that China doesn't believe that they're strong enough?  It seems to me that there's a certain amount of self-propagandization amoungst the Chinese, and with Xi having purged anyone who tells him anything he doesn't want to hear, it's quite possible that he's living in a Putin-world where the only information he receives is that which his subordinates believe will fit his preconceived notions.  Xi is like Trump, only even more isolated and narcissistic. 

Sheilbh mentioned indications that XI and the other high-level officials are starting to take the actual level of readiness of the PLA more seriously.  I think they have seen how the pre-2022 assessments of the Russian military turned out to be a joke, and Xi specifically wants to avoid being in the situation Putin found himself in.  There are plenty of similarities between Trump, Putin, and Xi, but I think Xi is by far the most realistic and rational of the three.

And I'm not sure that you can be assured that Xi is taking real military readiness more seriously based on his purging patterns.  He's been purging at a steady rate for years, and while to an outsider it might look like he's trimming the fat off the military brass, his history is such that as soon as his 'readiness clique' tells him anything he doesn't already agree with, they'll likely be purged irrespective of what their loss will do to military coordination and cohesion.  The first and most important target of the PLA is always the Chinese people, and especially the Chinese Communist Party. 

[Sheilbh]

Sheilbh mentioned indications that XI and the other high-level officials are starting to take the actual level of readiness of the PLA more seriously.  I think they have seen how the pre-2022 assessments of the Russian military turned out to be a joke, and Xi specifically wants to avoid being in the situation Putin found himself in.  There are plenty of similarities between Trump, Putin, and Xi, but I think Xi is by far the most realistic and rational of the three.

I agree - I think China will have paid very, very close attention to the surprising deficiencies of the Russian military. As you say compared to pre-war assessments - Russian, Chinese and Western - Russia's military was in a far worse state and Shoigu's reforms were Potemkin. I think a lesson here may be chips where once the US did the CHIPS Act it was discovered that Chinese companies were less advanced than the leadership had understood.

I also think the current purges don't appear to be politically motivated (unless, which is entirely possible, there's something else going on we don't know - and indicates far more fractured control over the military than we understood) - but directed at actual corruption/flaws in the PLA. There's a lot of rhetoric from senior Chinese leaders on the need for readiness, on the threat of graft etc. I don't get the sense there's complacency - though it may obviously be the case that their military is a lot less ready than expected.

On Xi - I don't know. I think Jake's point on the institutions/structures is fair. My read on the personalities is a bit different. But I think Xi's leading the more effective state and seems to be the more effective leader.

The question I always have is whether Xi matters. I think Trump and Putin are, in the worst sense, great men - I do not think their countries would be doing what they're doing with a different leader. I'm not sure that's true of Xi. I think after 2008 there is a shift in the Chinese leadership's view in several ways - I think they think China succeeded in managing the financial crisis, vindicating their system while the West flailed (at best), that it's time for China's power to be reflected in the world order and that corruption is an existential threat to the party's rule. That doesn't necessarily produce Xi - but I think it produces a leader not a million miles from Xi and also a set of political tracks broadly where we are (especially as I think at least a few of those points have been reinforced in the last several years).

[Jacob]

And I suppose that's what I'm talking about.  He doesn't need to attack the institutions themselves because he did it earlier, and he continues to purge the ranks of his underlings, just to maintain the culture of fear and recrimination.  But in terms of how the institutions interact with him and each other, he's already created his bespoke dictatorial system. 

I'm  thinking of Li Shangfu saying that a war against the US would be a disaster, and within a few months he goes from Minister of Defence with the solid backing of the PLA top brass to being run out of the party and disappeared.  This is the sort of thing that Trump and Putin would both do, although Trump would stop at firing him whereas Putin would certainly have him killed. 

Oh yeah for sure. Xi has already conducted most of the necessary purges.

I think that public debate is very much a no-no, especially if it goes against "Xi Jinping thought". I do believe that the internal debate is more vigorous and that the risk assessment is more realistic. But I don't actually know, it's just an impression.

And even if I'm right, it's no guarantee it'll continue to be true. It's an easy trap to fall into if you're not vigorous about it, even at the level of a medium enterprise - never mind at the state level.