Coup in Niger

[Jacob]

Here's what I've read:

A military junta put the democratically elected president Mohamed Bazoum under house arrest last week, and took over running the country.

As I understand it Niger is of strategic importance due to its uranium production, is relevant to the Islamicist political contest, and is a key stop in important migration routes to North Africa and the Mediterranean region.

The union of West African countries - ECOWAS - has attempted to put pressure on the coup-makers to reinstall Bazoum, but the junta refused to meet a Nigerian delegation. Niger's airspace is closed, electricity form Nigeria (which provides ~70%) has been cut off, and ECOWAS has put a deadline in place for the reinstallation of Bazoum and have said they'll militarily intervene if it is not met. That deadline is about to expire in the next 24 hours.

France and the US are supportive of democracy and ECOWAS' efforts - and both countries have troops stationed in Niger (after withdrawing them from Mali). Senegal, Nigeria, and Cote D'Ivoire are supporting the reinstatement of Bazoum, but Burkina Faso and Mali have said that a military intervention against the new military junta will be taken as a declaration of war (both of those countries are governed by military regimes).

Meanwhile, the coup-makers have apparently appealed to the Wagner group for support.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah.  From what I've no idea what will happen and I think there's lots of moving parts.

I think this is very tie to the unravelling of France's war on terror - it has been more than just French troops being stationed in the region. They've had troops, with some European allies, and some logistical support from the US, UK etc (without putting boots on the ground) in the Sahel for 10 years on active operations to suppress jihadis in the region. At it's peak I think France had about 6,000 troops deployed (for context that's almost twice the deployment of UK troops for the occupation of Iraq, but less than Afghanistan) across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania. The French tried regularly to "Europeanise" this operation but had basically very little interest from most EU partners of, from France's perspective, "sharing the burden".

That operation has now ended and fundamentally, it's failed. French-led forces didn't really manage to suppress the jihadi groups in the region. Their presence and their operations was causing increasing instability as well as incidents that are reminiscent of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq - accidentally bombing or raiding civilians, collateral damage etc.

That is, I think, an important part of the context behind the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and possibly Niger - it's also part of why they've called in Wagner. Although my understanding is they're not Islamist coups, that part of the reason they've called in Wagner is for even more violent suppression of jihadis. I believe Mali and Burkina Faso have also both bought Bayraktars from Turkey. And there is an argument there. One of the sides of French policy in the Sahel was it had the close security relationship with these countries (and the military bases to strengthen them) - they've had ten years of operating across these countries in theory to restore order/improve security and they have failed. To an extent it is understandable that the militaries are looking for other states/forces who can provide them with the "tools" they want to suppress the jihadis - the US has zero interest in getting involved (but would back France a bit), no-one else in Europe is interested, it's a bit more dynamic than UN peacekeeping. Who is left?

There is also, I think an anti-colonial, element. Francafrique has meant France has been far more actively involved in its former African colonies than most post-imperial powers. Mali, Niger and Burkino Faso are all part of the West African CFA Franc (and there are benefits to this, but it is also, arguably a tool of control for France) - so there's a fixed exchange rate with the Euro and a French guarantee of free conversion of the CFA Franc into Euros. Most controversially all members and the central bank are required to have an "operating account" with the French Treasury. At independence this was 100% of their foreign reserves, I believe it's now at 50% - Macron is reducing the requirement. Historically stability of the currency zones have taken priority over democracy and France has not hesitated in backing coups to install friendly leaders. There is an argument - some would say it's a neo-colonial tool that has also encouraged massive looting and capital outflows (often spent in France) and that about 2/3s of the member states are among the least developed countries. The counter-argument is that it provides a stable, credible, easily convertible currency zone with French backing (I'm very, very dubious about saying France is "supportive of democracy" in any meaningful sense in Francafrique for that reason - not sure I'd give the US that benefit of the doubt in Africa either, or indeed, any European/Western power).

But there's been increasing movements among elites against this - it's also, interestingly, been picked up in Europe, Meloni has a riff basically saying French "neo-colonialism" is keeping West Africa poor and increasing migration to Europe and that France should give back Africa's gold so they can develop and don't need to migrate. From what I've read across the region, but also in other states in Francafrique, like Senegal there's been increasing anti-French sentiment since the end of the Cold War and French corporations (who obviously benefit from a fixed and easily convertible currency) are regular targets during unrest - in both democratic and non-democratic states.

In that context it is striking that Mali has removed French as an official language (though it's still a working language) and instead making several indigenous languages official languages of the state. As well as ordering the removal of French troops and advisors they've also banned French NGOs.

I thtink the emergence of the ECOWAS view is really interesting. Not least because one of the options for a post CFA Franc currency, at least for West Africa, was an African run and led currency with ECOWAS that would have none of the pillars of the CFA France. But also because, especially Nigeria, is a bit of a sleeping giant so it's interesting to see it take a leadership role. It would also be intereseting to see what that would look like and a more assertive Nigeria or ECOWAS - there's lots of calls, understandably, for African solutions to African problems, which I think is right. But, I wonder if the EU, US, Russia or China are particularly ready for what that might look like?

I could be wrong (and in a way I hope I am), but my guess is that militaries plus Wagner and Bayraktar are probably going to be no more able to suppress the jihadis than French forces and local militaries were able to; but they will have (maybe fatally) weakened the state - so I wouldn't be surprised if the result is even more instability, possibly disintegration and the implications that has, for example, for Nigeria which could be quite severe and again my lead to a more active role for ECOWAS. I suspect it could also have a knock on effect on migration to Europe, Europe's migration politics - especially in France where I imagine most would want to go - and Europe's deals with Libya and Tunisia.

And I look at the French presence across the Sahel and think it's a bit: European military presence in Africa, the solution to and cause of all its problems. Again my instinct is there is no justification for any European (or US or Chinese) bases in Africa, including Wagnerites, so maybe one way or the other at some point ECOWAS (or other regional powers and groups) doing more would be a good thing?

[Tonitrus]

I think this is very tie to the unravelling of France's war on terror - it has been more than just French troops being stationed in the region. They've had troops, with some European allies, and some logistical support from the US, UK etc (without putting boots on the ground) in the Sahel for 10 years on active operations to suppress jihadis in the region. At it's peak I think France had about 6,000 troops deployed (for context that's almost twice the deployment of UK troops for the occupation of Iraq, but less than Afghanistan) across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania. The French tried regularly to "Europeanise" this operation but had basically very little interest from most EU partners of, from France's perspective, "sharing the burden".

One of the slightly interesting/touchy aspects to the politics of this coup is that there ARE about 1,000 US troops in Niger right now as part of the force working against terrorism.

[Sheilbh]

One of the slightly interesting/touchy aspects to the politics of this coup is that there IS about 1,000 US troops in Niger right now as part of the force working against terrorism.

Oh interesting - I didn't know. Is that part of the French operations or supporting them in some way, or separate US mission?

[Tonitrus]

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/which-western-countries-have-foreign-forces-niger-2023-07-28/

It looks like the US forces are mostly there providing drone support to the French and training for the local forces.

[Jacob]

Thanks for that write-up Sheilbh - very informative.

[DGuller]

What role does Wagner play in Africa?  Are they just mercenaries for hire that would do whatever you ask them to do, or are they essentially Russian colonizers entrenching themselves with local African governments?

[Tonitrus]

Plausibly (but not really, unless you're a dope) deniable tools of Russian foreign policy.   

[Jacob]

I think both?

They're your first call if you need extra muscle to do shifty things, especially if that muscle is to do things the West doesn't approve of.

Making money while pulling actors away from Western norms and influence is a two-for-one for Russian foreign policy.

Not that I'm an expert but that's my read.

[Sheilbh]

Plausibly (but not really, unless you're a dope) deniable tools of Russian foreign policy. 

Also same purpose as any other outsourcing - it's off the books for Russia. So they have a tool of foreign policy that they are not having to pay for because often Wagner get paid through mining contracts etc. From my understanding the "elite" Wagner forces operate abroad and have never been involved in Ukraine, it was just dregs and prisoners put into that meat grinder.

I've heard Mark Galeotti on this flag that Wagner is part of the wider Concord group. Some of the PMCs are just mercernaries for hire but Concord provide what he called wider "authoritarian support services". So there's a bit that does political and PR consulting, they've got troll farms for your social media, they can help astro-turf supportive crowds etc - they also have people (as you'd expect from an economy like Russia) that can help with resource extraction (and, I imagine, subsequently extracting the cash out of country and into some safe assets).

Although on that astro-turfing I've heard African reporters slightly query Wagner's role - or at least they've noted that Wagner are very good at making sure they are prominently involved. So Wagner very obviously flew someone in in the first day or two of this coup, they made sure there were lots of Russian (and Wagner) flags for the crowd etc - and the journalist slightly questioned how much Wagner is involved and how much is just spin that helps them and the local forces they're working with.

They're your first call if you need extra muscle to do shifty things, especially if that muscle is to do things the West doesn't approve of.

Making money while pulling actors away from Western norms and influence is a two-for-one for Russian foreign policy.

Yes - although I think there's maybe less of a contrast between West and Russia here. There's French and British mercenary forces in Africa (who have participated in civil wars, similarly largely paid for by extraction) and post-Iraq, I think Blackwater started working in the DRC, which obviously is hugely mineral rich. In terms of "private security" more broadly, as well as the French, British and Americans there's Germans in Sudan, Libya, Mauritania and Egypt, South Africans also in Mozambique (also against jihadi groups) and, before the war, there were Ukrainians. I imagine that like Wagner those forces maybe also provide other services like lobbying in Western capitals for your force.

And one of the reasons isn't necessarily even that you want to do shifty things - from what I've heard part of it is just that these mercenary tend to be better motivated than poorly paid not particularly ideologically motivated conscript forces. Some of it's definitely shady but I think part of it is as simple as if you need to take a position held by jihadis who have some defences conscripts might struggle.

I think like Wagner those companies won't get involved if it oppose their home state's interests and will sometimes support it directly (like in Syria). I think the difference is Russia is more likely to "adopt" Wagner operation - so they have a role in state propaganda and also probably help form connections so Mali and Burkina Faso military leaders were at the recent Navy Day parade in Russia.

The Western mercernaries are more of an embarrassment - although obviously Erik Prince of Blackwater is Betsy DeVos' brother so...

[Sheilbh]

Separately thought this was interesting from a Georgetown professor of African Studies:
https://kenopalo.substack.com/p/putting-the-recent-coups-in-the-sahel

[Sheilbh]

Nigerian senators have rejected Tinubu's request to deploy forces - "Senators opposed to military action pointed out that our military is highly ill-equipped and not prepared to fight any war.They said that we have fragile peace in Nigeria and that Niger is the highest arms market in Africa."

Seems like a fair point - apparently they also asked the government to focus on beating Boko Haram before they want to use the military for potentially destabilising deployments in a neighbouring country. Which, again, seems very sensible. They're apparently commending the ECOWAS stance generally though and would support other measures.

Feels like a sad dead end for countries in the Sahel though because I very much doubt the coup is going to deliver what people want.

[Sheilbh]

And on the point of security forces taking control and bringing in Wagner to fight jihadi groups, those groups have announced that they're blocking all routes into Timbuktu. As I say, not sure these coup regimes, are going to be any better at suppressing jihadi activity which is their justification and I'm not sure where that'll leave things.

[The Minsky Moment]

Wagner's not there to fight jihadis, they are there to facilitate the transmission of graft money into overseas accounts (while taking their cut) and liquidate any pain-in-the-ass civilians bold enough to complain about it.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Indeed, because more jihadis means more refugees for Europe (where they're not wanted) and thus more problems