Aukus

[OttoVonBismarck]

I don't actually think either of them care about that, really.

It is just an excuse to grab some more territory, really.

I don't really know what you mean, much of China and Russia's behavior the last 20 years has specifically been around creating scenarios where they can either acquire territory or bring it under their "dominion." And the idea that "just grabbing territory" is some little thing is insane. That's literally what lead to WWII. You have heard about that, right? The shit about China being mean authoritarians has little to do with the international order, and frankly doesn't matter. Lots of authoritarian countries are part of the accepted world order and play by the post-WWII rules. One has nothing to do with the other. The post-WWII order was not about everyone being a liberal democracy. That may have been the goal of some areas of foreign policy in some contexts, but was not the heart of the system.

[Eddie Teach]

Thanks but I prefer to accept the judgment of a retired Canadian rear admiral who has more knowledge in this particular area than you likely have.

Ah, the appeal to authority fallacy.  Haven't seen that one from you in several days.  It's good that you rotate through your fallacious statements so frequently and thoroughly.  It keeps us amused.

Interesting he chooses a retired sailor over his country's prime minister in determining a diplomatic slight has occurred.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Both countries also have ultra-nationalist governments that use territorial grievances to both stay in power and keep their people in a state of frenzy over territory that doesn't belong to them, that is the core serious area of conflict we could face with Russia or China in the 21st century. The rest of our disputes with them fall into the category of "not that big of a deal."

[OttoVonBismarck]

And maybe I shouldn't leave it unstated--the reason territorial expansionism is so scary is because eventually it might involve territory a great power isn't willing to allow Russia or China to take, to the point of being willing to fight a full scale war over it. The more territorial annexations and encroachments we allow from Russia/China, the more we run the risk of just this scenario happening.

[Sheilbh]

Basically, the success of the post WW2 international rules based order at avoiding violent confict has been pretty much entirely limited to western liberalism. Is that correlation or causation.

Can an authoritarian, populist, ultra-nationalistic nation that thinks genocide is a pretty reasonable tool of statecraft fit into that liberal world order that eschews the use of force to resolve disputes between themselves?

It doesn't feel like it would. I don't think they've evidenced anything that suggests that is something they even contemplate, much less are capable of.

Has it though? Doesn't the international rules based order include Brazil, for example, or Gulf countries or most Latin American countries that have not always had liberal governments, or for that matter Suharto's Indonesia? I think the same goes for many African states - historically both apartheid South Africa was part of that order as was Mobutu's Zaire.

I think it's possible that perhaps it has transformed from when it was a Cold War order and now you need to be a liberal state, but I don't know how true that is and there are some massive edge cases of whether it's a liberal state - such as Modi's India - plus the Gulf (or part of the order).

This is part of the reason why I'm not convinced there is an external sort of politically neutral legalist international rules based order - I think it reflects (as it did in the Cold War) American power and American hard power in particular.

Much of the heart of the order we built after WWII was to dissuade and act against wars of territorial expansionism, since such wars had lead directly to the greatest conflagration in human history. By tacitly rejecting that, both Russia and China are forever outside unless they abandon that.

That's a fair point - although China isn't sending "little green men" to occupy territory of its neighbours.

I suppose the point I'm trying to think about is that as you say there are lots of other very unpleasant authoritarian regimes in the rules based order. There's also lots of behaviour from China that is really bad - espionage, repression, sparring with India over their frontier, sparring with foreign fishing fleets over their maritime frontier - but is stuff that has been tolerated by other states within the international order, and frankly, is stuff big, confident countries do.

So I'm wondering what the red-lines are and why - I think Xinjiang is possibly one, I think your point on territorial claims (basically Taiwan) is another. I think perhaps more important than the claims themsleves is China's military build up that could help realise those claims. Basically what amount is just a challenge of can this order accommodate another large, assertive nation staking a leadership claim and what extent it's specific to this China (and is that PRC, or just Xi I suppose)?

[Berkut]

I don't actually think either of them care about that, really.

It is just an excuse to grab some more territory, really.

I don't really know what you mean, much of China and Russia's behavior the last 20 years has specifically been around creating scenarios where they can either acquire territory or bring it under their "dominion." And the idea that "just grabbing territory" is some little thing is insane. That's literally what lead to WWII. You have heard about that, right? The shit about China being mean authoritarians has little to do with the international order, and frankly doesn't matter. Lots of authoritarian countries are part of the accepted world order and play by the post-WWII rules. One has nothing to do with the other. The post-WWII order was not about everyone being a liberal democracy. That may have been the goal of some areas of foreign policy in some contexts, but was not the heart of the system.

I was referencing your pre-edit post where you mentioned them wanting to think any place there was ever someone Chinese needs to be part of China, and the same with Russia.

I think that is just an excuse - they want to grab territory, and that is just the fig leaf to justify it.

And I think that is a very, very big deal. Like you said, it's what triggered most of the really violent wars.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I don't quite agree w/that either. Putin is a true believer in shit like the glory of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, he genuinely thinks it's a terrible thing the central Asian-stans, and the Eastern European Republics broke away.

China I think is absolutely engaged in some stupid shit around things like small parts of India and the fake islands in the South China sea--I don't think they have any serious ideological investment in those, they just have desires. But Taiwan I think is a genuine nationalist red line for China--largely because China has made it so, they have fed their populace nationalist rhetoric on Taiwan for 70 years and there is no scenario in any kind of near term future where any Chinese leader I can imagine could back down from that. That being said in the grand scheme of things China's direct territorial ambitions are probably more limited than Russia's, but China's capacity to some day use force to achieve them is likely much higher than Russia's. Russia for example likely couldn't absorb any of the large Soviet Republics that broke away via force--they could certainly beat those countries in wars but wars vs occupations are very different things. Russia could easily defeat and subjugate the small Baltic Republics, which is a little scary because that would very likely lead to full scale war between NATO and Russia that likely would not be settled any way other than definitively--fwiw I don't think it'd go nuclear, but it'd be very, very bad. The worst war since WW2, easily.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Also not for nothing but one of my biggest criticisms of Obama was how little he did about annexation of Crimea. I think we should have pushed that to the point of war--not to war itself, but been willing to suggest that we'd go to war over it. Basically Cuban Missile Crisis level of stand down. Why? Because Crimea was a deliberate, actual annexation of territory by Russia, using force. It's a red line that had not really been meaningfully crossed by a country since Saddam in Kuwait, and not standing up for it was in a sense conceding we aren't willing to redline territorial annexations.

I'll note that a lot of the "proxy wars" that have been going on for ages are in a sense a reflection of that power of that world order--proxy wars represent a country not willing to openly violate the order. But when you cross into real annexation you've crossed that final line.

It's not that Crimea is worth war with Russia, it's that it's worth risking war with Russia to signal to Russia we will go to war over territorial aggression. I fear a scenario where Putin seeks to test us in the Baltics, because I think he'd be making the classic WWII mistake the Axis Powers made--they confused earlier concessions with a complete unwillingness to fight, but I genuinely think we would go to full scale war over the NATO member states in the Baltic, basically we would be at war until they were liberated or Russia had defeated our armies, and I think through that scenario and it's not a pretty situation.

I don't think it's all that likely, but like, if I rank various catastrophes like: major asteroid strike, the Yellowstone supervolcano erupting--I could see a general war between us and Russia over the Baltics happening before those scenarios.

[Tamas]

The Guardian has decided to go all Appeasement-like on this alliance. "Global Britain went rogue" and all that kinds of nonesense

[Sheilbh]

The Guardian has decided to go all Appeasement-like on this alliance. "Global Britain went rogue" and all that kinds of nonesense

Of course - it's the Guardian

I'm slightly more worried by the BBC's framing - and I'm not a BBC-basher - which is very much around China's hypothetical response and not provoking China, but has very little context on, for example, non-Chinese Asian states' views which are not uniformally positive.

I don't quite agree w/that either. Putin is a true believer in shit like the glory of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, he genuinely thinks it's a terrible thing the central Asian-stans, and the Eastern European Republics broke away.

China I think is absolutely engaged in some stupid shit around things like small parts of India and the fake islands in the South China sea--I don't think they have any serious ideological investment in those, they just have desires. But Taiwan I think is a genuine nationalist red line for China--largely because China has made it so, they have fed their populace nationalist rhetoric on Taiwan for 70 years and there is no scenario in any kind of near term future where any Chinese leader I can imagine could back down from that. That being said in the grand scheme of things China's direct territorial ambitions are probably more limited than Russia's, but China's capacity to some day use force to achieve them is likely much higher than Russia's. Russia for example likely couldn't absorb any of the large Soviet Republics that broke away via force--they could certainly beat those countries in wars but wars vs occupations are very different things. Russia could easily defeat and subjugate the small Baltic Republics, which is a little scary because that would very likely lead to full scale war between NATO and Russia that likely would not be settled any way other than definitively--fwiw I don't think it'd go nuclear, but it'd be very, very bad. The worst war since WW2, easily.

I think it's probably both genuine idealist belief and opportunism - because I think all politics is probably a combination of both of those.

I agree I don't think China is as bad in terms of revanchism as current Russian leadership is, and I think only Taiwan is truly ideological/central for China. I think the Spratley's and clashes with India in the Himalaya are broadly stuff I'd put in the category of big, assertive, confident, slightly dick swinging country. I don't think that side of things is particularly unique to China or some existential threat to the global order - on a smaller scale a lot of Spratley's/maritime border stuff reminds me of the mess in the Eastern Med between Greece, Turkey, both Cypruses, Lebanon and Israel - it's a similarly congested area with a lot of economic potential.

Edit: And apparently Macron's cancelled a meeting with the Swiss because they've decided to buy American fighter jets. Starting to think that France is a defence industry with a state attched

[OttoVonBismarck]

FWIW a lot of reporting I'm seeing from Asia seems to find AUKUS a rational response to "poor Chinese diplomacy" toward Australia, and several years of Chinese diplomatic malpractice. China literally launched a trade embargo over an Australian request to investigate the origins of covid19, for example.

It didn't get the headlines but Vietnam and Japan actually signed a defense cooperation agreement this week as well. I think countries like Australia, Vietnam, Japan, and India aren't interested in trying to hold China back economically. China is the largest country on earth (at least for a bit longer, probably), it is going to be a major economic power forever and it's not productive or even desirable to resist that.

But that doesn't mean ignoring when China acts badly, and China has been acting badly. As strong and as big as China is, a collection of states like India / Vietnam / Japan / Australia / United States acting in concert to resist the worst of Chinese excesses, is formidable. There's nothing like an alliance or commitment to collective action between those 5 countries as a group, but there's definitely the framework being built out of a lot of significant Asian powers + the United States being interested in pushing back against the worst of Chinese behavior. There will be broader disagreement on pushing back against other areas, for example the United States is probably more upset about things like the treatment of the Uighurs and Chinese intellectual property offenses than is say, India or Vietnam. But when it comes to territorial aggression that seems to be something a good chunk of Asian powers are not really happy with Chinese actions--even if many of them are mostly symbolic for now.

[Sheilbh]

I mentioned it before but it's why I think Rana Mitter's take is particularly interesting - especially the example of the Vietnman-Japan agreement:

The Aukus pact is a sign of a new global order
Rana Mitter
The deal has upset China, but it also binds the US into European security, in a world where Nato may be less relevant
Fri 17 Sep 2021 15.55 BST

France is furious. Theresa May is worried. The announcement of the new Australia-UK-US alliance (Aukus) and the ditching of a previous French-Australian submarine deal has led France's foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, to term the pact "a stab in the back", while the former British prime minister is concerned about Britain being dragged into a war over the future of Taiwan.

Oddly enough, Beijing's reaction has been rather muted. Yes, it has accused the west of a "cold war mentality", and Xi Jinping has warned foreigners not to interfere in the region, but its warning that China would "closely monitor the situation" was close to a "cut and paste" outrage.

Aukus is more significant for what it reveals about the three partners' thinking than the actual content of the pact. Some observers are calling it a "nuclear" deal when it is nothing of the sort; the submarines are not the nuclear weapon-carrying Tridents seen on the BBC drama Vigil, but vessels powered by nuclear energy, giving them longer range. For the west, Aukus shows the real fear that the next president of the US might be either Donald Trump or one of his apostles. Boris Johnson has spoken in firm tones about Aukus lasting for "decades": the unstated implication is, regardless of who the presidents of the US are over that period, Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term.

Less obviously, it is also about binding the US into European security in a world where Nato may be less relevant. This week France has every reason to be angry about losing its Australian alliance and submarine contract. But over the next decade, expect to see a rather different arrangement: the UK and France will both be pillars of a European security order (along with a nascent EU force). And association with Aukus brings the most important stabilising prize – the presence of the US allied firmly to a major European power (albeit a non-EU one).

China's rhetoric about the cold war misses an important point: the structures of that era were binary and rigid. But Aukus suggests that the liberal order can reconstitute itself through "minilateral" deals, in which different constellations of powers act together over different issues. The "Quad" of Japan, Australia, India and the US is the best-known example of this so far, but Aukus may be a sign of more to come. Those deals may anger individual members of that order in the short term (British anger at the US over Afghanistan, French anger at Australia over Aukus), but they actually show that the liberal order is more robust than surface noise suggests. It's not a cold war, but a series of constantly changing adaptations.

Beijing seems to know this, which may be why its response has sounded so half-hearted. China will be less concerned about the specifics of Aukus, as there is plenty of western military hardware in the region already. The real challenge to China is, why do so few of its neighbours back its complaints about the new pact? Singapore, a country that has spent decades balancing between the US and China in the region, expressed hopes that Aukus would "complement the regional architecture", which made it sound more like an elegant Georgian fireplace than a deal over deadly weapons. China's failure over the past two decades has not been its failure to remove the US from the region, but its continuing inability to persuade local countries that American departure would be a good idea.

The achilles heel of Aukus may not be in security, but in a different area: trade. China is the biggest partner for all its neighbours and is outside only one major trading bloc in the region, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. A British Foreign Policy Group report this week, which I co-authored, predicted that a move to join the CPTPP would be part of China's strategy to improve the regional narrative around itself. The day after Aukus was announced, Beijing declared its formal bid to join the partnership.

This is a smart move but also a risky one. The CPTPP demands a range of standards for trade and, crucially, labour, which are certainly weaker than EU rules but still more exacting than those in China itself. Beijing has heft, and may be able to negotiate its own terms more freely than smaller members. But its entry may well include discussions with what seems likely to be the partnership's newest member in 2022 – the UK, which will be, after Japan, the second biggest economy in this grouping. If the UK can work out how to contribute to a process that moves China into higher standards of trade and labour rights, at the same time as keeping Aukus alive, that would be a genuine contribution to the idea of "global Britain".

It was Donald Trump who took the US out of the TPP, the pact's predecessor. China's attempt at entry might just tempt the Americans back in; which would mean that the greatest irony of Aukus could be that the world's two biggest economies become more divided on security, and simultaneously more thoroughly entwined through trade.

    Rana Mitter is professor of the history and politics of modern China, University of Oxford, and co-author (with Sophia Gaston) of the report Resetting UK-China Engagement: 2021 update

[Berkut]

But that doesn't mean ignoring when China acts badly, and China has been acting badly. As strong and as big as China is, a collection of states like India / Vietnam / Japan / Australia / United States acting in concert to resist the worst of Chinese excesses, is formidable. There's nothing like an alliance or commitment to collective action between those 5 countries as a group, but there's definitely the framework being built out of a lot of significant Asian powers + the United States being interested in pushing back against the worst of Chinese behavior. There will be broader disagreement on pushing back against other areas, for example the United States is probably more upset about things like the treatment of the Uighurs and Chinese intellectual property offenses than is say, India or Vietnam. But when it comes to territorial aggression that seems to be something a good chunk of Asian powers are not really happy with Chinese actions--even if many of them are mostly symbolic for now.

I think this is spot on.

It is why Trump was such a cancer as well - the way to deal with China is to present a united, calm, and rational front against their bullshit.

There is no need for belligerence, except in response to Chinese belligerence. China is going to be a world power, that is just simple economics. They can do so with or without being assholes towards their neighbors. The way for the neighbors to make sure they are not assholes, is to simply get together and present a united front on the military side of things, AND on the economic side when it comes to bullshit there as well.

Necessary for that to work is strong alliances with your friends. Trump was incapable of that - he saw every alliance as a sucker deal. Which is why China and Russia loved him so much - they want a system where each neighbour can be dealt with individually.

The other thing we need to figure out is how to oppose China's soft power bullshit as well. The way Hollywood has basically bent over for China when it comes to censoring content as an example. That seems like a harder problem to solve.

[OttoVonBismarck]

It's actually interesting how nationalists often discard the possibility that other countries can have national pride and nationalist sentiment, as well. I think it's that sort of thinking that has China "surprised" that despite the many ways Vietnam's relationship with China is very important, Vietnam has been willing to stand up to China and even act oppositionally to China. The Chinese don't understand that the Vietnamese are a proud people, and there's no level of economic stick and carrot that will make them prostate Vietnam's national honor and rights to that of China just because China makes economic threats.

Xi is old enough that he should remember China's disastrous war with Vietnam in the late 1970s, but he seems to have forgotten the lessons that China's leaders of the time learned from it. Mainly that the Vietnamese are kind of like a badger, you really don't want to fight one in its den, and they generally defend their interests vigorously.

[Zanza]

One in five humans lives in China and an even higher share of the global middle class. The economic rationale for Hollywood to cater to these customers is something you will not be able to fight. It's all about profits.