Aukus

[OttoVonBismarck]

Yeah by far the biggest barrier to countries like France and the US, or other EU states, being allies in the Indo-Pacific are France and the EU consistently prioritizing their desires for warm trade relations with China over most other concerns about China. That isn't a foundation to work with the United States. It's also why all of those countries will seem less credible as a bulwark against China from the perspective of countries like India / Japan / South Korea / Australia etc.

It will somewhat be interesting to see how the CPTPP works out--probably one of Trump's worst policy decisions was withdrawing us from the treaty. Also bad was his logic behind it, which can be summed up as "Obama bad." Many of the provisions of the TPP were specifically crafted to address many of the concerns traditional anti-trade forces in the United States frequently have with free trade agreements. Additionally our not being in the treaty disadvantages many of our agricultural exporters in any number of markets,  a group that is also fairly Trumpy in its politics.

[Jacob]

Those are fair points Sheilbh and Otto.

[Sheilbh]

And there's the next stage - the Times reporting that Britain's nuclear subs will be allowed to use Australia as a base with "deep maintenance" facilities to have a more persisitent presence in the region.

Obviously these facilities will also be necessary for Australia's new subs, but I imagine they'll also be used for American subs to have a semi-permanent base in the South Pacific. I could be wrong but I imagine that's the next stage.

[Agelastus]

And there's the next stage - the Times reporting that Britain's nuclear subs will be allowed to use Australia as a base with "deep maintenance" facilities to have a more persisitent presence in the region.

Obviously these facilities will also be necessary for Australia's new subs, but I imagine they'll also be used for American subs to have a semi-permanent base in the South Pacific. I could be wrong but I imagine that's the next stage.

Also makes it more likely that the speculation that the Australian Subs will be Astute variants (with more American systems) is correct.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Those are fair points Sheilbh and Otto.

Something maybe worth pointing out--I don't think it is wrong for France to vigorously maintain "strategic independence", there are pros and cons to that stance for France or for any country and it will always be somewhat subjective where the balance lies. If you hitch to the United States as the United Kingdom / Australia have--and arguably as have countries like Canada albeit they aren't in AUKUS, there are many benefits, but there is also one big systemic risk--you don't control the United States or its activities. Trump highlighted this risk very well; a government could come in power in the United States that simply abandoned those shared strategic commitments. When you've been running your military for 50 years designed to integrate into a larger force structure with the United States at its head, if that head disappears, you're suddenly in a very bad place.

The big con of maintaining strategic independence is for all but the very largest countries the cost of doing it at scale is very, very high. When I was listing out the comparisons earlier between the French Navy and the USN (or a small portion of it), what I didn't mention is our Navy has a $200bn+ annual budget, and about $50-60bn every single year is for procurement. So something like the Australian sub deal it had with France was a $50bn deal that was to be paid out over many years. We basically are disbursing money equal to that every single year on Naval procurement. That adds up over time to a huge amount of resources at our disposal, but it came at a significant cost.

[grumbler]

Also makes it more likely that the speculation that the Australian Subs will be Astute variants (with more American systems) is correct.

That would make sense.  The Virginia class is more than the RAN needs, an an Astute with PWR3 would be quite capable and could be started soonest.

[Sheilbh]

Something maybe worth pointing out--I don't think it is wrong for France to vigorously maintain "strategic independence", there are pros and cons to that stance for France or for any country and it will always be somewhat subjective where the balance lies. If you hitch to the United States as the United Kingdom / Australia have--and arguably as have countries like Canada albeit they aren't in AUKUS, there are many benefits, but there is also one big systemic risk--you don't control the United States or its activities. Trump highlighted this risk very well; a government could come in power in the United States that simply abandoned those shared strategic commitments. When you've been running your military for 50 years designed to integrate into a larger force structure with the United States at its head, if that head disappears, you're suddenly in a very bad place.

I agree there is a decision here - I think the UK one for the last 65 years at least makes sense, even if I'm slightly jealous of the French. But it definitely has consequences.

The big issue I think France has is their idea of European strategic independence always involves a middle course/re-set of the relationship with Russia. That means it won't include the UK or most CEE states who are probably, broadly essential, to European strategic autonomy - because those states don't think there is a plausible middle course with Russia so they would rather stay close to the US. Because of that policy France is sort of left with working with Germany (which isn't that interested) and Italy (with whom they strongly disagree on the Med) which isn't enough for strategic autonomy. I think there's probably a similar factor at play in the Indo-Pacific.

If France really wants strategic autonomy it should invest time and energy in convincing CEE that it shares their risk assessment of Russia and that an independent, French-led European defence arrangement is the best way to address that risk.

[Duque de Bragança]

Macron, as the Atlantis he is, is not really interested with a middle course with Russia. He tried that earlier on (à la Obama reset) but it did not work. The country relying on Russia is Germany, not France (Nordstream Schröder etc.). Even Poland and other CEE countries, with all their very polluting lignite or coal resources, still rely on Russian gas to a great extent.

Macron's Atlantist policy failed though but now he is more interested in the presidential campaign next year.

France still has its nuclear power plants, unlike German, despite Macron closing the odd one (the old one) in an attempt to appease the Greens but then he squandered it by slashing the prices of hunting licenses, for pure electoral motives. Hunting lobby is quite strong in France.

A bit late to the party, some symbolic pro-France EU statements by Josep Borrell and Ursula von der Leyen came eventually about the submarine dispute.
The negotiations between the EU and Australia about a free trade pact won't be be affected for now it seems.

[Sheilbh]

Macron, as the Atlantis he is, is not really interested with a middle course with Russia. He tried that earlier on (à la Obama reset) but it did not work. The country relying on Russia is Germany, not France (Nordstream Schröder etc.). Even Poland and other CEE countries, with all their very polluting lignite or coal resources, still rely on Russian gas to a great extent.

I don't think that's the perception from the CEE - there's been repeated references to resets and diplomatic outreach to Moscow. Even earlier this year Macron and Merkel were proposing regular EU summits. I think Parly has acknowledged that in terms of concrete results from the diplomatic overtures to Russia there aren't any yet and instead we've had the poisoning of Navalny, poisoning of Skripal on the soil of another European country, continued meddling in Ukraine and Russian policy increasingly using Belarus.

It's not that France is dependent or reliant on Russia but that Macron as a matter of policy wants to re-frame European relations with Russia. I think as long as that's the French attitude then a block of countries will prefer working with and trust the Americans over France.

I also think there's something to the comment made by a British or French diplomat that the UK consistently romanticises Turkey and doesn't appreciate the threats Turkey's neighbours feel/is naive about it, and France does the same for Russia.

A bit late to the party, some symbolic pro-France EU statements by Josep Borrell and Ursula von der Leyen came eventually about the submarine dispute.
The negotiations between the EU and Australia about a free trade pact won't be be affected for now it seems.

Yeah and we'll see on the EU-US technology and trade meeting in Pittsburgh next week. Apparently the French government have requested this is delayed/postponed, but there's some resistance from the Commission and other member states.

[Duque de Bragança]

Macron, as the Atlantis he is, is not really interested with a middle course with Russia. He tried that earlier on (à la Obama reset) but it did not work. The country relying on Russia is Germany, not France (Nordstream Schröder etc.). Even Poland and other CEE countries, with all their very polluting lignite or coal resources, still rely on Russian gas to a great extent.

I don't think that's the perception from the CEE - there's been repeated references to resets and diplomatic outreach to Moscow. Even earlier this year Macron and Merkel were proposing regular EU summits. I think Parly has acknowledged that in terms of concrete results from the diplomatic overtures to Russia there aren't any yet and instead we've had the poisoning of Navalny, poisoning of Skripal on the soil of another European country, continued meddling in Ukraine and Russian policy increasingly using Belarus.

It's not that France is dependent or reliant on Russia but that Macron as a matter of policy wants to re-frame European relations with Russia. I think as long as that's the French attitude then a block of countries will prefer working with and trust the Americans over France.

Even CEE vastly differs in perception towards Russia. Case in point: Poland vs Hungary. Countries such as Bulgaria are not specially anti-Putin to say the least without being tempted by a return to the Moscow umbrella.
I was not speaking about perception though. Energy is more about than perception.

One element that could help towards CEE would be the end of unrealistic demands on CEE countries to accept mass immigration of unassimilable illegal migrants under the thing guise of the latter being refugees.
Lukashenko already saw the possible wedge and now sends illegals towards Lithuania or Poland to put pressure on these countries.
I still don't see Jupin willing to be realist and acting accordingly. Some vague theatricals entirely for French internal consumption notwithstanding.
He is now doing is best Trudeau impersonation by apologizing for France, as long as he does not have to apologize for his own behavior.
From colonisation being a "crime against humanity" to now the shameful treatments of harkis (native muslim auxiliary troops during the Algerian war) he has been showing he is quite the opportunist.

I also think there's something to the comment made by a British or French diplomat that the UK consistently romanticises Turkey and doesn't appreciate the threats Turkey's neighbours feel/is naive about it, and France does the same for Russia.

The old Tory tactic of using Turkey to undermine the EU. 
The one country supporting Greece during the squabble with Turkey was France. The one move by Jupin supported by all in France, even Marine. It also had benefits for the French armaments industry.
Germany, with so many Turks, with a sizable portion of them as a potential fifth column for Merdogan has no such margin.

A bit late to the party, some symbolic pro-France EU statements by Josep Borrell and Ursula von der Leyen came eventually about the submarine dispute.
The negotiations between the EU and Australia about a free trade pact won't be be affected for now it seems.

Yeah and we'll see on the EU-US technology and trade meeting in Pittsburgh next week. Apparently the French government have requested this is delayed/postponed, but there's some resistance from the Commission and other member states.

Jupin is also supposed to speak with Biden on the phone these days about this matter.

PS: there are talks/rumours about Naval Group selling nuclear subs to India now though given India's finances and technology transfer considerations it is too early if it will amount to something.

Zemmour now has given his opinion on the whole submarine debacle. More details later. 

[The Minsky Moment]

The big issue I think France has is their idea of European strategic independence always involves a middle course/re-set of the relationship with Russia.

To what end?  It's not like the reset game has never been played before with Putin.  You can reset, re-engage, do the hokey-pokey and turn yourself around.  You'll still end up on the same place. Putin is who he is and he's not changing.  Talking about "resets" with him just signals weakness.  And what is the payoff - what does Russia have to give?  Oil and gas contracts?

[The Brain]

And what is the payoff - what does Russia have to give?  Oil and gas contracts?

That is an offensive lie. It also offers post-political-career sinecures.

[Sheilbh]

To what end?  It's not like the reset game has never been played before with Putin.  You can reset, re-engage, do the hokey-pokey and turn yourself around.  You'll still end up on the same place. Putin is who he is and he's not changing.  Talking about "resets" with him just signals weakness.  And what is the payoff - what does Russia have to give?  Oil and gas contracts?

I agree.

My point is just not only is all of that true but it undermines France's desire for European strategic autonomy (especially within the EU) because it alienates the Baltic States, Poland, Czechia and Romania who all, instead, identify the US as the best partner for their security.

It's part of the issue of European strategic autonomy doesn't necessarily mean being un-aligned with the US and would mainly support European goals in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. But because of French policy towards Russia (and I think something similar happened with Australia), other important European parties don't think France is aligned with them on security so aren't as willing to align with/fall in behind French leadership on other issues. I think it's a sort of paradox for France but to actually achieve more autonomy they probably have to align more with the US not because of the US, but the European nations who look to them for security.

Edit: And I think this by Helen Thompson is very insightful on the problem for France or Macron more specifically:

The crux of the French problem is that Macron wants something that Germany ensures is not on offer: European strategic autonomy. Macron is then prone to making decisions as if their consequences flow from the idea and not the reality of its absence.

If you already have everyone in Europe on board and working together and trusting French interests/attitudes - you can chart a compromise in the Indo-Pacific, or attempt a middle way with Russia. If you don't you're just further undermining the lack of trust and reinforcing the unwillingness to work together that is the problem to begin with.

[Berkut]

It seems like France wants to not rely on the US, and be more autonomous, and then gets mad when the US does not include them in the latest Pacific security arrangement.

It really sucks to have to cater to your populace where you have been leveraging anti-American bullshit for the last 50 years.

Kind of like how it sucks that the American politicians have to cater to their own ati-immigrant, anti-equality morons THEY have been stroking for the last 50 years.

[Jacob]

Apparently Vietnam and Japan just signed a defense procurement deal as well:

In a significant development, Vietnam and Japan have inked a defence equipment and technology transfer deal that will enable the export of Japanese-made defence platforms to Hanoi. The agreement came during Japanese defence minister Nobuo Kishi's recent visit to Vietnam and is expected to elevate the two countries' defence partnership to a new level. Of course, Japan and Vietnam deepening their defence cooperation has to be seen in the context of the strategic-security situation in East Asia. And China's growing assertiveness in this region – particularly in the South and East China Seas – is the main catalyst for the adjustments.

In fact, Japan has been making some interesting moves of late which are bound to have an impact on the larger geopolitics of East Asia. Reports have surfaced of Japan's plans to ramp up the defence of its remote southwestern islands that will also help boost Taiwan's defence vis-à-vis an aggressive China. The move will see the stationing of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles as well as hundreds of troops on Ishigaki island which is just 300 km from Taiwan. There are also plans afoot to put a Japanese electronic warfare unit on the island of Yonaguni, just 110 km from Taiwan.

Once these plans fructify, it should be difficult for China to launch a pincer attack on Taiwan with Japanese and Taiwanese defence syncing on the eastern flank. Add to this Japan claiming in its defence white paper published in July that stability in the Taiwan Strait is more important than ever. Then in late August, Taiwan and Japan's ruling parties effectively held the two sides' first 2+2 dialogue involving defence and foreign office officials.

Taken together, it is clear that Japan is going to play a crucial role in counterbalancing China in the days ahead. Of course, this is congruent with the larger US strategy in the region. As I had mentioned in one of my previous articles, a part of the reason that the US pulled out of Afghanistan was to focus on China. And we clearly see that with the Washington-Tokyo joint statement issued in April that included a direct reference to Taiwan and the recently unveiled AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, US and UK whose first agenda would be to deliver nuclear submarines to Canberra.

Thus, it is clear that the US is back to deploying smart strategy along with its allies to counterbalance China instead of the rather naïve 'America First' policy adopted by the previous Trump administration. For, China today presents a systemic challenge for the US. And it can only be countered through systemic approaches with allies. This also creates options for Asean nations like Vietnam which are economically reliant on China. After all, Asean is central to Southeast Asia. But China has been weaponising economic interdependencies with regional nations. In other words, Asean nations don't have a problem with economic relations with China. But when these relations are leveraged by Beijing to press its aggressive maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, it becomes a problem.

With US's latest moves, Japan is playing an increasingly active regional security role, Taiwan has become a prominent regional security agenda, Australia is getting strengthened as a regional defence player, the Quad (US, Japan, Australia, India group) is growing with each step, and Asean is getting options to resist Chinese belligerence. That's quite a lot for China to think about.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/talkingturkey/great-game-in-east-asia-from-japan-vietnam-defence-pact-to-aukus-us-and-allies-get-serious-about-countering-china/