Aukus

[Jacob]

Yeah, I expect there's some element we don't have full visibility on. The level of French upset doesn't seem proportional to a purely economic issue, and I don't find "oh they're just being emo" a particularly satisfactory explanation.

[Barrister]

Yeah, I expect there's some element we don't have full visibility on. The level of French upset doesn't seem proportional to a purely economic issue, and I don't find "oh they're just being emo" a particularly satisfactory explanation.

I dunno - 50 billion euros is a hell of a lot of money.  Maybe it puts the French shipyard at risk of closing or something.

[The Brain]

Was there a deal? If there was then surely the relevant clauses will provide at least some compensation?

[Duque de Bragança]

French press quotes figures between 250 and 400 millions euros,

Australia had already spent between 2 or 3 billions euros for the project.

[The Minsky Moment]

Other than the fat contract, what is it that France actually WANTS?

What they always want.  Same as Aretha Franklin.

[The Brain]

Everyone wants all you can eat dessert.

[The Minsky Moment]

I think France wanted this deal to further develop New Caledonia, to sign other cooperative agreements with Australia, and possibly New Zealand, to help in case of disasters, that kind of things.  Maybe even through in something for La Réunion, much farther away, but still closer to Australia than mainland France.

Except that as I said earlier, France may a power and France may be in the Pacific but it's not a Pacific power.

The core security concerns for France are Europe, the Med, and North/Northwest Africa.  France has made a negligible defense commitment to its Pacific possessions - essentially enough to keep local order and deter piracy.  That is a rational use of limited resources. 

From a strictly rational perspective, the only defense policy that makes sense for France's Pacific possessions with respect to outside threats is to free ride on the US security umbrella.  There is nothing shameful about that - hell it's part of what being in NATO is for.  France can carry its weight and more elsewhere.  The corollary to that principle is that - putting aside the lost contract and lack of prior consultation - from the strict POV of security of those islands, the AUKUS arrangement is beneficial.

[Sheilbh]

Was there a deal? If there was then surely the relevant clauses will provide at least some compensation?

Yeah - the Australians haven't signed a contract for the next phase of work, which they were meant to in April. My understanding is it will cost them to get out of the contracts.

Yeah, I expect there's some element we don't have full visibility on. The level of French upset doesn't seem proportional to a purely economic issue, and I don't find "oh they're just being emo" a particularly satisfactory explanation.

As I say I think a lot of it is a lot of French leaders who spent 20+ years internally fighting Gaullists for a more Atlanticist foreign policy - I think to an extent they feel that project, their career's work has been ruined by this and their opponents will be crowing that they were right all along.

So I think it's a combination of the commercial (not insignificant in an election year), the sense of betrayal, the personal for Macron and many around him of a project they were invested in and losing domestically to another faction/side - although actually I think it is a little bit of emo. Macron recalled ambassadors from Rome (first time since WW2) and Ankara (I believe first time since Ataturk) - at the time thpse were called "highly unusual" and "unprecedented". I don't know if it is anymore. Macron's recalled ambassadors from four treaty allies in as many years and I think it's losing the effectiveness of that as a move  - OvB said Biden has a petty streak, I think the same could be said for Macron.

More cynically - if it didn't happen great France is doing well in the Indo-Pacfic, as it's happened France can get into a massive row with the Anglo-Saxons in an election year which never hurts.

I'd also note - as Ulrich Speck - said that MAcron's big ideas for foreign policy have sort of failed in his first term and he might need a bit of a reset. The big ideas were to pacify the Sahel (still ongoing), reset relations with Russia (blocked by the rest of Europe), become Europe's leader on strategic affairs (a work in progress), become America's key European partner on a level with Five Eyes (not helped by the last week) and reassert independent French power in the Indo-Pacific (also not helped by the last week). I think part of the response probably reflects frustration at that. Especially because I imagine he would have thought Trump was to an extent the blocker on many of his goals because he imagines and positions himself as the embodiment of anti-populism and Biden is restoring America to the status quo before Trump - so I think there's shock there too.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Not to shit on France at all, but just to compare briefly French naval presence in the Pacific with American--the U.S. Pacific Fleet has two numbered fleets--Third and Seventh, the Naval Submarine Force, Pacific, and a number of other assets (independently operating warships, a number of Task Forces involving Naval special operations units etc etc.)

Just the 7th Fleet, that is only one of two numbered fleets in the Pacific--likely compares very favorably to the entire French Navy.

The 7th Fleet has:

1 Nimitz Class Air Craft Carrier (compared to 1 French carrier in existence) -- the USS Ronald Reagan is a 101,400 ton ship vs the Charles de Gaulle ~42,000 ton
3 Ticonderoga Class Cruisers (the U.S. is essentially one of the last navies to still operate ships in this class, the French Navy doesn't have a comparable vessel) - these are 9600 ton vessels
8 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (6900-9000 ton vessels)

The French Navy operates the de Gaulle and 21 smaller vessels (note I'm talking proper warships here and excluding things like mobile dock ships, tender ships, intelligence, survey, coast patrol, amphibious warfare etc support ships)--they have:

2 Horizon Class Destroyers (7000 ton)
7 Aquitaine Class Destroyers (6000 ton)
1 Georges Leygues Class Destroyer - (4900 ton)
5 La Fayette Class Frigates (3800 ton)
6 Floreal Class Frigates (2950 ton)

That's just the 7th Fleet. We have a whole second numbered Fleet just as large. On top of that the U.S. Pacific Fleet operates 38 nuclear submarines tasked to the region--versus 10 nuclear subs that the French have in their entire navy.

Edit to add: I forgot to mention the USS Blue Ridge--the 7th Fleet's Flagship in the count, it's a 19600 ton Blue Ridge Class Command Ship--if we count that as a warship, which is probably a push.

[The Minsky Moment]

(the U.S. is essentially one of the last navies to still operate ships in this class, the French Navy doesn't have a comparable vessel)

The Russians still have one of their Cold War cruisers active.

China has built and is building their "Type 055" destroyer which is significantly bigger than the Ticonderogas. It is a cruiser in all but name.

[PDH]

Not to shit on France at all

Which, of course no offense intended, means you are going to shit on France.

[Sheilbh]

Interesting piece in the Guardian on Japan's attitude (pre-AUKUS announcement):
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/20/japan-urges-europe-to-speak-out-against-chinas-military-expansion

I also think Gideon Rachman's piece today was right that what matters most/is most indicative is the positive reception the deal got from Japan and India. As, to an extent, French anger and Chinese cut and paste outrage is sort of a given.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Not to shit on France at all

Which, of course no offense intended, means you are going to shit on France.

I mean I'm not unfamiliar with recreational France bashing--but it's more to point that it should be understood there is like an order of magnitude difference in France as an Indo-Pacific ally and the United States.

One of the few things I don't usually shit on France too much for is their military--unlike a lot of European countries I admire the fact France vigorously maintains a capacity for independent military action (even when it has undermined NATO, but I can respect it even if I don't necessarily like some of its ancillary effects), and I think France invests a respectable amount into their military and gets good value for what they do invest. If you compare it to the German military--which is actually as well funded as the French, but frankly I think the German military is probably the least functional military in the world per dollar spent, and would probably struggle to conduct even the simplest of military operations by itself. Some of that is deliberate strategic positioning, some of it is multi-generational incompetence.

FWIW despite Sheilbh's common self-deprecating British nature, the British have a more capable military than France, particularly in naval operations. While the size of their surface and submarine forces seems very close, the British navy is built for genuine, sustained long term action if necessary. The RFA is bigger than all the auxiliary fleets of the other European countries combined, and this would be very important in any sustained military conflict as a fighting Navy requires supply ships, tender ships etc etc to stay at sea.

[Jacob]

... there is like an order of magnitude difference in France as an Indo-Pacific ally and the United States.

Absolutely. Still, it would be ideal if Australia, France, and the US were all allies in the Indo-Pacific.

[Sheilbh]

Absolutely. Still, it would be ideal if Australia, France, and the US were all allies in the Indo-Pacific.

I agree - but in that context Macron has said the EU needs "independence when it comes to our strategy with regard to China" and cannot be expected to automatically side with America, saying "Europe is not simply an obect or a territory for the distribution of influences. We are a subject of international geopolitics and we need to assert ourselves as such." I totally agree with him on rejecting a return to the "logic of the Cold War" - but I think that is an easier thing to say from London or Paris than Canberra. That's why I think that is part of what drove Australia to make the move it did: that it thinks its position is closer to the US than France and that it's become more urgent in the last five years.

I'd add I'm not convinced that Europe or any European country can act as a subject or assert itself if the sort of centre of gravity of global politics moves to the Pacific, which I think it is.

Edit: Or as Antoine Bondaz put it following Borrell's comments this evening (that he "regrets the partnership excludes European partners who have a strong presence in the Pacific"): neither the EU nor France want to align with the US in the Indo-Pacific, but they regret that an alliance (or rather Australia aligning with the US) excludes them. I think you can have one of those.