EUIV and the Discipline of History

[saskganesh]

I am enjoying this guy's blog.

[jimmy olsen]

Part IV is very interesting

https://acoup.blog/2021/05/28/collections-teaching-paradox-europa-universalis-iv-part-iv-why-europe/

[The Minsky Moment]

What [Pomeranz] argues is that the key difference was the colonial empires that the European states had spent the previous two and a half centuries building (and also the use of coal instead of timber as a heating material) which by the 1700s brought in  tremendous resources in primary products  (raw materials and agricultural goods) which freed up land in Europe's interior to produce other goods more intensively, leading first into the second agricultural revolution and then the industrial revolution, which would provide European states with insurmountable economic advantages (which in turn enabled more colonialism).

This actually pinpoints the precise point IMO where Pomeranz's argument goes off the rails. European colonization in the 18th century did NOT bring in "tremendous resources in primary products" - it brought in large profit from luxury and prestige goods like sugar, tobacco, and precious minerals.  Pomeranz raises NAmercian timber exports to Britain but admits that such exports were negligible until 1800.  Britain of course had other potential sources of timber - Scandinavia, the Baltic, Russia.  There is a big increase in American timber imports in the early 1800s but the cause there is not a European shortage but the Napoleonic Wars and the Continental System, and then the subsequent system of trade preferences that benefitted the Canada trade.

If the argument was that ability to exploit the New World resources was the key differentiating factor than logically Spain should have emerged the dominant world power and maintained that power . . .at the same time France should have collapsed into the sick man of Europe after losing much of its American colonies.  The argument simply doesn't work.

Britain does not suddenly emerge from nowhere to become a dominant power in 1820.  Britain was a second rate power throughout the 1600s but clearly a first rate one in the 1700s.  A key development is the formation of the Bank of England and the development of British credit markets - a financial "force multiplier" that enhances Britain's ability to expand and finance trade and military enterprise alike., following and improving on similar innovations in the Netherlands. 

[Malthus]

You are not counting the overwhelming importance of fine beaver pelt hats. Clearly, these were the most significant source of European dominance! 

[The Minsky Moment]

I missed this from Part III:

As an aside, this is not a great model for actual trade. The mechanics seem to imply something closer to extraction with the main goal being to ship resources home (fitting with the mercantilist philosophy of the time, but remember that mercantilism was a deeply flawed economic theory; that needs must stressing: mercantilism was wrong)

Given two possibilities: (1) 17th and 18th century Europeans who adopted mercantilist policies and gave mercantilist explanations were ignoramuses who made stupid mistakes out of ignorance of basic economic theory that we all know better today and (2) the 17th and 18th century Europeans who adopted mercantilist policies and gave mercantilist explanations that we reject today did so because they were acting in a different institutional and economic context than early 21st century Europe  - I would be far more cautious about leaping to conclusion 1.

The 17th and 18th century European economy was an emerging commercial-monetary economy, with - by modern standards - a rudimentary credit system.  What we call "mercantilism" is actually a variant of what we call today "monetary policy".  If the supply of credit depends on sufficient supplies of specie and if economic actors and states lack the means to create or expand specie, then the logical and *rational* response is to pursue policies that conserve specie and guard against its net outflow.

Mercantalism was not "wrong" - it was a commonsense response to real life institutional limits and economic realities.

[Sheilbh]

Britain does not suddenly emerge from nowhere to become a dominant power in 1820.  Britain was a second rate power throughout the 1600s but clearly a first rate one in the 1700s.  A key development is the formation of the Bank of England and the development of British credit markets - a financial "force multiplier" that enhances Britain's ability to expand and finance trade and military enterprise alike., following and improving on similar innovations in the Netherlands.

Shamelessly stolen from In Our Time - but I think the interregnum is also key. The state at that point is the first that's really capable of projecting power outside of these isles since Henry V, and the military expenditure is, I think, quite important in developing the state. And in addition Ireland becomes a sort of experience of colonisation with training wheels.

But I think that state-building side, which is a world away from the early Stuarts, is essential for the later 17th and early 18th century imperial growth.

[Valmy]

So all the credit/blame for the British Empire goes to Cromwell? I presume that is what you mean by interregnum.

[Sheilbh]

So all the credit/blame for the British Empire goes to Cromwell? I presume that is what you mean by interregnum.

No, obviiously not.

[grumbler]

I missed this from Part III:

As an aside, this is not a great model for actual trade. The mechanics seem to imply something closer to extraction with the main goal being to ship resources home (fitting with the mercantilist philosophy of the time, but remember that mercantilism was a deeply flawed economic theory; that needs must stressing: mercantilism was wrong)

Given two possibilities: (1) 17th and 18th century Europeans who adopted mercantilist policies and gave mercantilist explanations were ignoramuses who made stupid mistakes out of ignorance of basic economic theory that we all know better today and (2) the 17th and 18th century Europeans who adopted mercantilist policies and gave mercantilist explanations that we reject today did so because they were acting in a different institutional and economic context than early 21st century Europe  - I would be far more cautious about leaping to conclusion 1.

The 17th and 18th century European economy was an emerging commercial-monetary economy, with - by modern standards - a rudimentary credit system.  What we call "mercantilism" is actually a variant of what we call today "monetary policy".  If the supply of credit depends on sufficient supplies of specie and if economic actors and states lack the means to create or expand specie, then the logical and *rational* response is to pursue policies that conserve specie and guard against its net outflow.

Mercantalism was not "wrong" - it was a commonsense response to real life institutional limits and economic realities.

The downside of mercantilism wasn't that it didn't work, but that it worked so well that the colonies got tired of its effectiveness and rebelled.  Mercantilism transferred wealth from the colonies to the homeland.  The American Revolution was one of the results of British mercantilism.

[jimmy olsen]

This thread should be merged with the full unmitigated pedantry thread.

[Eddie Teach]

So all the credit/blame for the British Empire goes to Cromwell? I presume that is what you mean by interregnum.

No, obviiously not.

Only in Ireland.

[jimmy olsen]

I'm really enjoying the current series on premodern generalship

https://acoup.blog/2022/05/27/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-i-reports/

https://acoup.blog/2022/06/03/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-ii-commands/

https://acoup.blog/2022/06/17/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-iiia-discipline/

[Josquius]

I'm really enjoying the current series on premodern generalship

https://acoup.blog/2022/05/27/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-i-reports/

https://acoup.blog/2022/06/03/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-ii-commands/

https://acoup.blog/2022/06/17/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-iiia-discipline/

Read the first one and it got me wondering back on something I've considered of how to better represent battles in games while still making it fun.

Strikes me it'd be like some kind of basic programming. Setting up if then statements for your generals, higher ability generals being able to take more on board and deliver them well, and then the battle basically plays out.
I did find the battles of the original suikoden entertaining diversions. They seem more realistic than more complex war games.

[Syt]

I'm really enjoying the current series on premodern generalship

https://acoup.blog/2022/05/27/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-i-reports/

https://acoup.blog/2022/06/03/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-ii-commands/

https://acoup.blog/2022/06/17/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-iiia-discipline/

Read the first one and it got me wondering back on something I've considered of how to better represent battles in games while still making it fun.

Strikes me it'd be like some kind of basic programming. Setting up if then statements for your generals, higher ability generals being able to take more on board and deliver them well, and then the battle basically plays out.
I did find the battles of the original suikoden entertaining diversions. They seem more realistic than more complex war games.

I liked the take that Spartan (and its predecessor, Chariots of War) had, where most of the planning goes into the mix of units you bring into the battle, the disposition of your troops, and the initial orders you give (wait for a bit, then advance, etc.). Kind of similar to the first Gratuitous Space Battles. With some more unlocked advances, you would also get some additional commands for use during the battle, but they would be simple stuff like "all charge", "all halt", "flanks advance" IIRC, and so on. I enjoyed that type of battle immensely, though I think it's not "hands on" enough for mass appeal. Besides the mentioned games there's only the Dominions games and its close relatives, the Conquest of Elysium series who do something similar, though the latter is completely hands off while the former lets you set "scripts" for your units and army dispositions.

[Syt]

Incidentally, I feel like the Total War games handle it quite badly, at least where Romans and Greek Phalaxes are concerned, because the engine focuses on one on one combat rather than (maintaining) formations, so having two phalanxes  clash immediately devolves into tons of single combat (if they even maintain any cohesion until they meet).