German defense minister to Macron: EU depends on US security guarantee

[OttoVonBismarck]

https://www.politico.eu/article/german-minister-to-macron-eus-dependence-on-us-is-sobering-facts/

German defense minister to Macron: EU depends on US security guarantee

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer says the EU needs more independence but will still depend on the US.

BY HANS VON DER BURCHARD
November 17, 2020 3:25 pm

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer doubled down Tuesday on her assertion that Europe must continue to rely on U.S. security guarantees, citing "sobering facts" in a response to criticism from French President Emmanuel Macron.

Kramp-Karrenbauer had become embroiled in an unusual public spat with Macron after the latter, in an interview with Le Grand Continent published Monday, criticized her over an op-ed in POLITICO in which she had argued that "Europe still needs America."

The French president said that he "profoundly" disagrees with Kramp-Karrenbauer's position and described her argument as "a historical misinterpretation," claiming that German Chancellor Angela Merkel doesn't agree either.

In a keynote speech on security policy Tuesday, Kramp-Karrenbauer tried to calm tensions by saying she agrees with Macron that Europe must do more to look after itself. "Only if we take our own security seriously, America will do the same. The French president has just stated this. And I agree with him," she said.

Yet the defense minister did not back down on her core argument — her insistence that the EU has no choice but to depend on the U.S. as a close partner. "For the foreseeable future" the U.S. will remain "the most important ally in security and defense policy," Kramp-Karrenbauer told the German army university in Hamburg in a virtual speech.

"Without the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the U.S., Germany and Europe cannot protect themselves. These are the sobering facts," she added.

Kramp-Karrenbauer's speech repeated, and defended, many arguments made during a previous speech in October as well as in the POLITICO op-ed in early November, in which the minister had argued that "illusions of European strategic autonomy must come to an end" because "Europeans will not be able to replace America's crucial role as a security provider."

Strategic autonomy is a concept championed by Macron, who argues the EU should become more powerful on the world stage and able to operate independently in a wide range of areas, from military operations to industrial policy — especially since the U.S. is increasingly shifting its focus from Europe to Asia.

"The idea of a strategic autonomy for Europe goes too far if it feeds the illusion that we could guarantee security, stability and prosperity in Europe without NATO and without the U.S.," Kramp-Karrenbauer told her audience.

She also referred to a speech by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier last week, who had warned that relying exclusively on military protection from the U.S. "would drive Europe into division" — seemingly alluding to the fact that French or Italian militaries, for example, might not be able or willing to defend the Baltic states against potential aggression from Russia as NATO and the U.S. currently do.

But Kramp-Karrenbauer said that Germany and France are united in wanting to increase Europe's military capability.

"Germany and France want the Europeans to be able to act independently and effectively in the future when it matters," she said. "We need the ability, in the event of a situation in which, for example, interests between the U.S. and Europe differ, that we can then potentially take action ourselves, even without the concrete support of the American side."

Yet, "this is something completely different from believing that a European army — however it might be set up and composed — can keep America completely out of Europe and replace America completely," Kramp-Karrenbauer said.

"We want Europe to be a strong partner for the United States on an equal footing and not a protegé in need of help," she added.

I would say she has a fairly adroit observation here, the idea that Europe will in any sense ever be militarily capable on its own is a fantasy.

[Grey Fox]

Might be a good idea to start getting away from it. If the republican stay insane, the USA will not be trustworthy.

[Valmy]

What do you mean by militarily capable here? I mean they probably cannot project power abroad to enforce their imperialist dreams but I don't see why them being capable of defending their territory and regional interests is fantastical.

[The Brain]

As long as France is in the EU and willing to nuke people over some Pomeranian grenadier's bones in Eastern Europe we'll be fine.

[celedhring]

What do you mean by militarily capable here? I mean they probably cannot project power abroad to enforce their imperialist dreams but I don't see why them being capable of defending their territory and regional interests is fantastical.

On paper we have everything to do it. France has the nuclear deterrent and the combined size of armies of all euro nations are over 1 million active personnel and the budget is roughly half of the US' (of course, the spending is not nearly as efficient due to all national armies having overlapping structures and capabilities). There's plenty of caveats, not the least a political will to really have a semblance of coordinated defence policy (the EU does have an equivalent of NATO's article 5, but no formal structures to enforce it), but the basic capabilities to defend the EU are there.

[Razgovory]

What kind of defense is Kramp-Karrenbauer thinking about here?  I think it is plainly obvious that Europe can't rely on the US anymore.  That is a painful admission and one that never thought I would make but it is true.

[Valmy]

What do you mean by militarily capable here? I mean they probably cannot project power abroad to enforce their imperialist dreams but I don't see why them being capable of defending their territory and regional interests is fantastical.

On paper we have everything to do it. France has the nuclear deterrent and the combined size of armies of all euro nations are over 1 million active personnel and the budget is roughly half of the US' (of course, the spending is not nearly as efficient due to all national armies having overlapping structures and capabilities). There's plenty of caveats, not the least a political will to really have a semblance of coordinated defence policy (the EU does have an equivalent of NATO's article 5, but no formal structures to enforce it), but the basic capabilities to defend the EU are there.

Yeah I think somebody on this board once described Belgium's armed forces as a pension program pretending to be a military organization.

The capability is the key. Currently the only force likely to threaten Europe physically is Russia and they are a bit of a paper tiger. If that situation ever changed and Europeans suddenly felt threatened they probably could put together a NATO-style joint command structure surprisingly fast.

[Sheilbh]

On paper we have everything to do it. France has the nuclear deterrent and the combined size of armies of all euro nations are over 1 million active personnel and the budget is roughly half of the US' (of course, the spending is not nearly as efficient due to all national armies having overlapping structures and capabilities).

That's true but doesn't go far enough. So, yes there's a similar budget but in a number of countries a huge chunk of that is actually on pensions (I think in Belgium it's something like half the defence budget) - so it's not just duplication but not spending enough on operational stuff.

Also the overlapping is sort of true but that implies that there are 27 functioning militaries that are about the right size for each country which would be defensible. That's not true either - there's been a number of stories across Europe indicating this, especially the various stories about German soldiers lacking very basic equipment even on NATO training exercises.

There's plenty of caveats, not the least a political will to really have a semblance of coordinated defence policy (the EU does have an equivalent of NATO's article 5, but no formal structures to enforce it), but the basic capabilities to defend the EU are there.

I'd almost flip it. The formal capabilities are there - there's an article in the treaties and a legal framework. The basic practical capability to actually do it isn't there. Just look at the recent issues between Greece and Turkey where France was the only EU country able to actively support Greece - and that one should be a given, both countries are in NATO, only Greece is in the EU. If the EU or member states can't back-up one of their member states that's an issue.

I think Macron is right on this, but AKK isn't entirely wrong. Europe will probably be within or under a US defence shield for a while and will need to remain so. But I don't think Europe can rely on the US to help secure Europe's periphery in the way it could during the 90s and 00s. I think the US will be far more focused on Asia-Pacific for very good reasons. What that means is that even if Europe relies on the US, it is likely that it will need to project power within its peripheries for its own interests. The Med (where the major powers are now France, Italy and Turkey), North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the eastern fringe are all areas that have a major knock-on effect in Europe and are places where the EU has interests - it's less clear what the US's are apart from counter-terrorism and being a good ally. France is acting (more or less alone out of European countries) in three of those areas - and in Libya was actually on the opposite side to the Italians. That's not feasible in the long-run and also European interests may not precisely overlap within French interests, but France is willing to engage.

I also think there is a naivete to some of German policies - at the minute it seems very shaped by that unipolar/neo-liberal moment. It's continuing with projects that could increase energy dependence on Russia, developing stronger commercial/economic relations with China and relying on American protection. We know now, unlike in the 90s and 00s, that Russia and China use energy and economic/commercial relations for political ends. They leverage them very well and, as I say, I don't think we can necessarily rely on America for anything short of an existential threat. That combination of policies seems risky to me.

And I think Europe (and I mean the UK and EU) needs to move quickly on this because I think we are moving into a different world with more power competition and less stability. I think there is something to that argument that the 20th century was short (1914-1989) but the 21st century is only just now starting after an end of history pause.

[OttoVonBismarck]

The EU is a 27 member-state body, I do not believe the EU or its constituent countries can independently guarantee the sovereignty and independence of all of the member states. I consider the notion that the EU has a practical nuclear deterrent to protect states like Latvia/Estonia/Lithuania to be fanciful. If Russia started really applying pressure on those states or started the kind of faux-war it has in Ukraine, there would be little that the EU could or would do about it. I even speculate a direct war of invasion against those three states would not be met by a French nuclear attack or a conventional resistance by larger EU countries.

Russia likely still fears American commitment to NATO enough not to do these things in the Baltics, I do not think it would feel similarly about an EU on its own.

I have no doubt the EU's sole nuclear state would use that deterrent in the face of certain aggression, probably against a larger EU country closer to France's own borders (like Germany for example), but do I really see the French being willing to use a nuclear weapon against Russia to protect the independence of countries like Bulgaria and Romania? I really don't. That's also the most extreme case involving thought of nuclear exchanges, the more likely scenario of Russian "irregulars" fracturing these border states with instability and quasi-occupation, I think the EU by itself would have no functional response to whatsoever, and I think some EU members would still want to mostly continue as-normal economic relations with Russia in such a scenario.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Eh, so I agree with the sentiment the EU and Europeans should not be banking on the United States as they did in the 20th century, and they should be trying to figure out a way to defend their interests in their immediate region. I don't think the EU needs to be able to perform the sort of late 20th century superpower global deployment shit the United States can or has done in the past--I'm not even sure China realistically ever aspires to that level of global force projection because it involves investment and strategic involvement in things that aren't obviously a positive return. I think Macron's sentiment is right, but AKK's analysis of the present is spot on. What is probably worth considering is Macron may have the right sentiment but the rest of Europe doesn't share it, and France cannot replace the US in the traditional role being talked about here, not without a massive increase in its military budget and the size and scope of its military. From everything I've seen the average European will just never care about these issues, and is thus simply unlikely to be on board for the sort of changes necessary for true military independence from the United States. That could be a problem when the United States may simply decide to make Europe militarily independent some day--whether the EU likes it or not.

[Tonitrus]

The capability is the key. Currently the only force likely to threaten Europe physically is Russia and they are a bit of a paper tiger.

That's not really true anymore.

Perhaps not "push through the Fulda Gap to the English Channel" capable...but as long as they're not looking at holding/occupying territory for the long term, they could probably make a wreck of the EU militaries on their periphery and force the greater EU to face some really tough decisions.

[The Minsky Moment]

The paper tiger recently annexed the Crimea and gobbled a chunk of Ukraine, receiving only a short retaliatory strike of tut-tuts in return.

The Baltics are potentially vulnerable to such a little green men strike. And the experience of Hungary shows how easily Russia can compromise the EU from within.

[The Brain]

Yeah. If Russia does a green men job in the Baltics many European governments will be very interested in using the fig leaf offered by Putin.

[Sheilbh]

Eh, so I agree with the sentiment the EU and Europeans should not be banking on the United States as they did in the 20th century, and they should be trying to figure out a way to defend their interests in their immediate region. I don't think the EU needs to be able to perform the sort of late 20th century superpower global deployment shit the United States can or has done in the past--I'm not even sure China realistically ever aspires to that level of global force projection because it involves investment and strategic involvement in things that aren't obviously a positive return.

I agree on China at this point. But a lot of US deployments are protecting the trade networks. I think China will look to similar deployments and arguably one of the biggest and most important shifts in the last 30 years is that China has moved from self-sufficient for oil to the world's largest importer and the US has become a net oil exporter. This may change from China's perspective depending on how serious Xi is about his recent net zero commitments and I'm not saying all of the US's military deployments are sort of based on oil. But I think countries generally commit militarily to defend or strengthen their interests - which starts with economics. I don't think China will try and project power in the way the US does but I think they will move in the near to medium term to protect their trade network, the one belt one road and I can see them, for example, helping stabilise a friendly regime in Africa or the Mid East - which is baby steps but would be a big shift.

And Russia does this as well - Russia's been quietly intervening in Africa quite a lot over the last 10 years because it's another income stream from resource production.

I think Macron's sentiment is right, but AKK's analysis of the present is spot on. What is probably worth considering is Macron may have the right sentiment but the rest of Europe doesn't share it, and France cannot replace the US in the traditional role being talked about here, not without a massive increase in its military budget and the size and scope of its military. From everything I've seen the average European will just never care about these issues, and is thus simply unlikely to be on board for the sort of changes necessary for true military independence from the United States. That could be a problem when the United States may simply decide to make Europe militarily independent some day--whether the EU likes it or not.

Agreed - and I agree with Minsky you know I'd have fears about how "European" other Europeans really see me if I were sat in Estonia.

The EU is a 27 member-state body, I do not believe the EU or its constituent countries can independently guarantee the sovereignty and independence of all of the member states. I consider the notion that the EU has a practical nuclear deterrent to protect states like Latvia/Estonia/Lithuania to be fanciful. If Russia started really applying pressure on those states or started the kind of faux-war it has in Ukraine, there would be little that the EU could or would do about it. I even speculate a direct war of invasion against those three states would not be met by a French nuclear attack or a conventional resistance by larger EU countries.

Yeah. In part this is why Macron's other big idea of a European foreign policy "forum" between the EU, UK and Russia actually makes a bit of sense - to try and tie everyone into a system. But the common official British view I've seen is that France and Germany are slightly blind and naive with Russia, and apparently the French view is that the UK is blind and naive with Turkey.

The one difference between the Baltics and Caucasus and Ukraine is that because they are NATO member states there are NATO forces in those countries so it is very likely that any Russian action there would kill (I just looked up Estonia) British and Danish troops (there are broader European NATO deployments in Latvia and Lithuania) which might, sadly, change the perspective of other governments.

[Valmy]

The paper tiger recently annexed the Crimea and gobbled a chunk of Ukraine, receiving only a short retaliatory strike of tut-tuts in return.

The Baltics are potentially vulnerable to such a little green men strike. And the experience of Hungary shows how easily Russia can compromise the EU from within.

We are not talking about that kind of thing though, we are talking about being a military threat.

Russia may win other ways but having a big well funded and centrally controlled military will not help the Euros much with that stuff.