Pickett's Charge

[HisMajestyBOB]

I am learning a lot about the battle 

And Civil War fighting in general.

[Berkut]

The fighting stopped because his attacks to drive away the federal cavalry had failed. Saying he "threatened" the Baltimore Pike doesn't mean anything - his job was to attempt to force the Union to react to his attack on their rear, and that failed. His command was not wiped out, so I guess that means he still existed and hence "threatened" the pike, but that doesn't mean anything since his actual attempt to make that threat into anything more than a threat was defeated, and there was no reason to suppose an additional attack would have succeeded where the first one failed. Given the situation, where both sides had roughly equal numbers, but the Union troops were better armed and actually well led (Gregg was an effective cavalry commander), and were NOT exhausted from having ridden all over Pennsylvania for the last week and a half, Stuart defeat at the Cavalary Field was conclusive. Meade was not concerned about his flank because 3000 rebel cavalry were riding around, followed around by an equal number of union cavalry.

The situation on July 3 was not the same as a hypothetical July 4 opening with the Confederates with a position on Cemetery Ridge.

On July 3, the Union had 2 roads leading into their Gettysburg positions, and cutting the Baltimore Pike would obviously still leave the Union with 1. If his job was to force the Union to react in their rear, his attack was unsuccessful. The cavalry did not fully commit to that attack - 3 of the 7 brigades were not involved in the attack, and a significant portion of the 4 that were did not engage. I don't know how many calvarlymen Stuart had (I think it was significantly more than the 3k you mention), but their losses were under 200 which shows the level of commitment to the attack.

On a hypothetical July 4, the Union is reduced to one road--the Baltimore Pike. The enemy cavalry would not be limited to only attacking the road in the immediate vicinity of the Union rear, but could raid further behind union lines.

As you know, the Union entered Gettysburg with 90k men and almost that many mules and horses. Supplying the army with one road that had enemy cavalry roaming around in the vicinity would not be an attractive proposition to Meade on the night of July 3 if he was unsure he could use the Taneytown Road.

You say things like "cutting the Baltimore Pike". Meade had more cavalry, and more troops. How exactly is 3000 guys on horses going to "cut" any road?

Cavalry, at no point in the Civil War, were able to "cut" a body of infantrymen off from anything. It isn't what they did - they lacked the density of combat power, especially southern cavalry which was not trained or inclined to fight dismounted (and were not armed to do so in any case).

Cavalry was used operationally to cut up rail lines and raid areas without troops. Stuart was pretty good at that, although not nearly as accomplished as the Western cavalry.

Tactically it was used to harass the flanks, not "cut off" formations from...what exactly? More importantly, their job was to scout and ascertain the position of the enemy, something that wasn't really necessary on the third day (but could have been critical on the first day, of course).

Meade didn't care that Stuart was running around to his east. At least, didn't care from the standpoint of it being relevant to his actual position. It could be annoying of course, if he found some supply depots or wagon trains, which is why Gregg was sent after him, and in fact checked his attack.

Your very, very, very hypothetical July 4th where the South uses magic to make Pickets charge succeed because the Union cannot respond to anything in 4 hours, would see the Union in a difficult position I guess because their interior lines had been broken, but Stuart being out there would be utterly irrelevant to that problem. Look at a map of Gettysburg. The reason there was a fight there was because there are so many roads in the area. You say "Oh noes, the Union would be down to one road!".

1. How many roads do they need?
2. You assume that they are somehow incapable of simply moving to another road. There are a lot of roads, and there are more Union troops than there are southern. You are imagining that the smaller force has somehow "surrounded" the larger, but of course that is simply not possible. The union could simply go take another road, if it was so critical that they get a road. You hypothetical has the South somehow taking the center of the Union positions with ten thousands troops they did not have, and apparently, this would not result in there being any less troops anywhere else.

You are, again, imagining that only one side has agency, and your hypothetical is that one side does whatever it likes, the other side is completely passive, and the only things that change in your hypothetical are the things that somehow make things better for one side. You imagine "What if there were more troops HERE" but don't subtract those troops from somewhere else. You imagine that the South wins their cavalry battle, which they lost, and claim that because they didn't lose enough men, they could have actually won. The Union hardly lost many men either - that is because cavalry engagements tend to not be particularly bloody - both sides can easily simply move away when things dont go well, and they mostly did. Cavalry fighting cavalry was always a relatively bloodless affair compared to infantry clashes. That doesn't mean the defeat was any less conclusive. How is that evidence of...anything?

[11B4V]

Cavalry, at no point in the Civil War, were able to "cut" a body of infantrymen off from anything. It isn't what they did - they lacked the density of combat power, especially southern cavalry which was not trained or inclined to fight dismounted (and were not armed to do so in any case).

Cavalry was used operationally to cut up rail lines and raid areas without troops. Stuart was pretty good at that, although not nearly as accomplished as the Western cavalry.

Thank you for that.

A Good book I enjoyed was "Failure in the Saddle". It's about a different battle in the civil war, but fascinating nonetheless on civil war cav tactics.

The stark difference IMO of how the U.S. and Europeans used calvary (Crimea and Franco-Prussian) war is a fascinating contrast to me too.

[Razgovory]

Was either side in the civil war able to destroy a field army in the field like at Saratoga or Austerlitz?

[Valmy]

Was either side in the civil war able to destroy a field army in the field like at Saratoga or Austerlitz?

Several armies were captured or destroyed but all in sieges I think

[Threviel]

I know that calvary played a very minor part in the Crimean war, but what did anyone care in the other wars?

[11B4V]

I know that calvary played a very minor part in the Crimean war, but what did anyone care in the other wars?

It's how they were used IMO. The second part of your question I don't understand.

[The Brain]

The success of calvary transcends the battlefield IMHO.

[Valmy]

During the Civil War anyway the Cavalry were by far the most important arm until actual fighting started, at that point they were almost useless.

[Habbaku]

The success of calvary transcends the battlefield IMHO.

Truly, we are blessed.

[Habbaku]

People here need to learn the difference between "cavalry" and "Calvary" and that Pickett has two Ts.

[Admiral Yi]

Have you ever crossed a pickett line?

[Valmy]

People here need to learn the difference between "cavalry" and "Calvary" and that Pickett has two Ts.

There was a church near by old house called the Calvary Church. If it had been the Cavalry Church I would have converted.

[The Brain]

I was in the cavalry.

[Syt]

During the Civil War anyway the Cavalry were by far the most important arm until actual fighting started, at that point they were almost useless.

Didn't they act as mobile infantry a lot of the time?