Queequeg's 'Special' Threads: Roman-Persian edition

[The Minsky Moment]

Minsky, I seem to remember you posting a bunch of reviews of books on Dark Age history, actually I seem to remember I first heard of The Early Slavs in one of them.  Any reccomendations? Obviously my interests tend towards the east (anything on the Sarmatians, Huns, Iazyges, or Romano-Persian rivalry would be best).

The focus of my reading was really more on what is going on in the West - you might be most interested in Peter Heather's last book, b/c he focuses heavily on the Huns. 

http://www.amazon.com/Fall-Roman-Empire-History-Barbarians/dp/0195325419/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1247518056&sr=8-1

[Malthus]

There is from the records a sense that the later empire was sort of like Hitler in his bunker at the end of WW2 - sending out orders to distant provinces was pointless, the units that existed in the imperial records just did not exist in reality, except and to the extent that the emperor (or someone) was able to pay for them, and ensure the collection of taxes and payment were both more or less under his eye - otherwise the money was sure to be diverted.

I don't think that analogy quite works.  Take the example of Honorius' rescript - the problem was not that Britain had been entirely denuded of troops by Constantine III.  On the contrary, Honorius' instructions presume that Britain still had some means of defense and the little information we have suggests that the Britano-Romans were able to hold off various threats for decaded on their own resources.  It is a simple question of triage - the emperor was still coping with the aftershocks of the crisis of 408 and making a short-term decision not to focus limited mobile force resources on a peripheral front. 

The Roman empire was never a modern centralized state like the third reich - even after Diocletian's reform.  The empire always depended on a sort of horizontal cooperation between local urban elites - all of whom had a powerful interest in maintaining some connection to the "roman" center.  But the problem is the one you identified earlier - if the emperor sitting in Rome seemed weak or indecisive - there was always a temptation for the local elite in a far-flung province to turn to the man on the spot to make good on local concerns by seizing power himself.  So it is not a matter of troops and formations not existing.  It is more of a problem of the practical limitations of central control.  Note that this was ALWAYS a problem for Rome - going back to the times of the Late Republic.  What changed in the Late Empire was the interaction of this familiar dynamic with the arrival on the scene of more sophisticated, Romanized barbarians on the frontier who were dragged into or willingly joined in playing this traditional power game.

There is no question that the main problem was constant civil war. However, there was the additional problem - the slow and steady erosion of the numbers and quality of troops available in reality as opposed to in theory, on the "official" army rolls; plus the lack of subordinates capable (or trusted) with independent military command.

Towards the end of the empire, the theoretical size of the Roman army was the same (if not larger) than it was at the beginning; yet the records describe Caesars like Julian (pre-emperor) personally repelling minor barbarian incursions with mere handfuls of troops. This was something a provincial governor would have been able to do on his own, a couple of centuries earlier.

Something had gone wrong - the empire could no longer, for whatever reason, muster military force to defend itself from incursions, unless an emperor (or at least a "ceasar" of some variety) was there on the spot. Hence the necessity of inviting barbarians to do the defending. 

[Queequeg]

If you are talking about high feudalism, this does not arise until centuries after the traditional dating of the "fall" of Rome, and IMO is driven by responses to localized phenomena - certainly not any conscious or even unconscious adaptation of traditional Persian forms.

If this is true, it is still a fascinating example of convergent evolution, though I suppose they would have started from a similar place both materially and even socially (in most Indo-European societies cavalrymen come from nobility for obvious reasons) or religiously (monotheistic, revealed faith with comparable beliefs). 

That said, I think you can see why I'd think there might be something more at work.  Visual example;

To the untrained eye, the first word to come up to describe that man would be "knight".  And he'd be right, apart from the apparent quiver on his leg, perhaps the way his legs are positioned, the way he is holding the lance and the quality, age and composition of the sculpture. 

[Ed Anger]

I remember trying to research a planned book I was going to do on Rome in Gaul in the 5th century, and trying to ascertain any sizes of the armies involved was maddening. Especially how much the master militum per Gallias Aegidius, the comes Paulus and Syagrius had available.

[The Minsky Moment]

However, there was the additional problem - the slow and steady erosion of the numbers and quality of troops available in reality as opposed to in theory, on the "official" army rolls; plus the lack of subordinates capable (or trusted) with independent military command.

Towards the end of the empire, the theoretical size of the Roman army was the same (if not larger) than it was at the beginning; yet the records describe Caesars like Julian (pre-emperor) personally repelling minor barbarian incursions with mere handfuls of troops. This was something a provincial governor would have been able to do on his own, a couple of centuries earlier.

Something had gone wrong - the empire could no longer, for whatever reason, muster military force to defend itself from incursions, unless an emperor (or at least a "ceasar" of some variety) was there on the spot. Hence the necessity of inviting barbarians to do the defending.

I don't think there is a very sharp reduction in the total armed forces available to the Empire.  What does happen is that the rise of the Sassanian Empire in the East forced the Romans to devote the bulk of their military defense effort to face off against that threat.  In fact, when Julian undertook his ill-fated campaign against the Persians - the account suggests he took an enormous force (Ammianus does not tell us the size but he does observe that at one point Julian detached 30,000 men just to secure one of his flanks - which suggests a very substantial main force).  the need to bulk up permanent defenses in the East did mean thinning out the forces permanently stationed in the West - and encouraged the various defensive arrangements we previously discussed.

As for Julian's earlier campaign against the Alemanni - Ammianus' account indicates that Julian actually wasn't commanding the main Roman force in the region.  there had been a previous sub-emperor - Silvanus - who had intrigued against Constantius and was assassinated.  Command of Silvanus' old force passed to an infantry general - Barbatio.  So in the campaign against the Alemanni, the Romans disposed two forces: Barbatio with 25,000 men, Julian with at least 13,000 men.  That is nearly 40,000 available to deal with a single incursion - a quite respectable number of soldiers for a pre-modern force.  What happened was that the Alemanni attempted to defeat the two forces in detail - and succeeding in driving Barbatio out of Gaul - after which they turned with their full force to face Julian's smaller army.   Thus Julian's "against the odds" victry over the Alemanni does not so much indicate a peculiar lack of available forces, but was the consequence of poor strategic coordination between two newly appointed roman commanders.

[The Minsky Moment]

I remember trying to research a planned book I was going to do on Rome in Gaul in the 5th century, and trying to ascertain any sizes of the armies involved was maddening.

For Julian's era - we happen to be extremely lucky that a roughly contemporaneous history has survived in part.  Even there, all the usual caveats about numbers in ancient historical accounts have to be taken.

for the 5th century, forget about it.  For example, our principal source of the Battle of Chalons - probably the most significant battle that took place in Gaul in the mid 5th century - is Jordanes: a self-styled ethnic Goth writing propagandistic history in Constantinople for Justinian about 100 years after the battle took place.  Any connection this account bears to the real battle is likely to be coincidental.  Figuring out what is going on in the period involves a lot of supposition and guesswork.

[Ed Anger]

for the 5th century, forget about it.  For example, our principal source of the Battle of Chalons - probably the most significant battle that took place in Gaul in the mid 5th century - is Jordanes: a self-styled ethnic Goth writing propagandistic history in Constantinople for Justinian about 100 years after the battle took place.  Any connection this account bears to the real battle is likely to be coincidental.  Figuring out what is going on in the period involves a lot of supposition and guesswork.

I gave up. 

I remember copying down the notitia dignitatum for the Western Empire by hand (in the pre-internet days) and it being almost totally worthless. 

[The Minsky Moment]

I don't think there is a very sharp reduction in the total armed forces available to the Empire.

Let me qualify that a bit.  There was almost certainly a manpower impact from Valens having his entire army wiped out in 378.  How long that impact continued to be felt is unclear, but the fact that the Eastern Empire was paying off Huns decades later suggests a possible answer.

It is also the case that in the West, the need to keep the peasants tied down and taxed complicated recruitment, and hence explained the tendency towards greater reliance on recruiting ethnic barbarians.  But I would point out that it is questionable to assume that such forces don't count in some way because they aren't "really Roman".  Roman armies staffed by ethnic barbarians and even separate allied barbarian forces could be as legitimately a part of the "Army" as ethnic Romans in traditional legions.  The barbarized forces could prove unreliable, of course, but usually for the same reasons other Roman armies past and present had proved unreliable - ambitious commanders intringuing for power, influence or the purple itself, and problems with prompt payments.

[saskganesh]

maths.

there was the Roman expedition to Carthage circa 469-71, which was a joint Eastern/Western venture. of course it met with disaster. sources say it was 1000 ships, and which each ship holding/carrying an average of 100 men, the expedition's size was impressive. Even if you consider the flotilla's size to be something of a paper fiction or hyperbole, the strike force would still have been rather large, which is impressive as the Western Empire was financially rather distraught at the time.

when you look a half century later, armies could often get very small. Hastings was two sides @ 10K. Jerusalem in the first crusade was taken by assault with a similiar number. 

[Viking]

One pet peeve of mine from the period. The Ramp at Masada is NOT THE SIEGE RAMP. It was built for the TV Miniseries. This, however, does not stop pretty much everybody labelling the TV Ramp still at the Site as the Roman Ramp itself.

I'm pretty sure this isn't true. Do you have a cite for this?

For one, the ramp is freaking huge. Seems way too big to be built as part of a movie set. For another, I find it hard to believe that the Israelis, who are mad about Archaeology, would allow movie-makers to permanently change one of their most significant sites.

OTOH, you could still see some stuff from the mini-series on the site, like some faked seige engines.

There are two ramps, the real one which was used and the new one which was built for the miniseries. When I was there in 1990 the guide was bitching about precisely that. The real ramp is just too small (today) to look like it could have carried siege towers up to the top.

[grumbler]

There are two ramps, the real one which was used and the new one which was built for the miniseries. When I was there in 1990 the guide was bitching about precisely that. The real ramp is just too small (today) to look like it could have carried siege towers up to the top.

I am confused.  Is the picture of that huge-ass ramp that everyone puts on the internet the Roman ramp or the TV series ramp?

[Malthus]

I'm gonna echo Grumbler here. The huge ramp pictured was, I always assumed, the remains of the real Roman-era ramp. It seems incredible to me that it was made by guys making a mini-series (or that the authorities would allow such construction work).

If such is in fact the case, it would indeed be an interesting thing to know - but I'll need some sort of evidence. All the books I've seen on Masada appear to assume that is in fact the Roman ramp.

Edit: the pics also show just how strong the natural fortifications are. I can't imagine how difficult assaulting such a fortress would be, if the enemy knew of your presence.

[Malthus]

I don't think there is a very sharp reduction in the total armed forces available to the Empire.

Let me qualify that a bit.  There was almost certainly a manpower impact from Valens having his entire army wiped out in 378.  How long that impact continued to be felt is unclear, but the fact that the Eastern Empire was paying off Huns decades later suggests a possible answer.

It is also the case that in the West, the need to keep the peasants tied down and taxed complicated recruitment, and hence explained the tendency towards greater reliance on recruiting ethnic barbarians.  But I would point out that it is questionable to assume that such forces don't count in some way because they aren't "really Roman".  Roman armies staffed by ethnic barbarians and even separate allied barbarian forces could be as legitimately a part of the "Army" as ethnic Romans in traditional legions.  The barbarized forces could prove unreliable, of course, but usually for the same reasons other Roman armies past and present had proved unreliable - ambitious commanders intringuing for power, influence or the purple itself, and problems with prompt payments.

The problems were I understand two-fold: erosion of the ability to pay, and erosion of trust (totally understandable, really) in subordinate military commanders.

The effect was to decrease the real numbers of troops available for battle under normal conditions. Certainly, an exceptional emperor could cobble together an impressively large force, but increasingly this force did not resemble the professional armies of the early republic.

The later career of Belisarius illustrates these trends. He is a rare example of a successful subordinate commander. The tricks played on him by Justinian (even if exaggerated by Procopius) demonstrate the problem - an emperor can never trust a successful general. This may have been equally true in the early empire, but what was different was the apparent lack of subordination by the troops under his command - on several occasions the troops essentially force their general to attack when he would rather not. Moreover, only the troops of his own household and of certain barbarian contingents were of good quality; many troops he was forced to use were basically untrained levies.

These internal conditions, more than the oft-hearlded "barbarization" of the Roman army, decreased its real effectiveness.

The main issue of course is whether the West fell because the barbarians were more numerous and a greater threat towards the end of the empire of the West, or whether because of internal erosion of effectiveness. Probably a bit of both, as increased barbarian activity and raiding distrupted the ability to raise taxes, increased reluctance to empower subordinate commanders allowed for more frequent, unpunished barbarian raids, and a decreased tax base meant less pay and so less soldiers. 

[Grey Fox]

This is a good thread.

[Valmy]

but increasingly this force did not resemble the professional armies of the early republic

I presume you mean the early empire since the armies of the early republic were almost the platonic ideal of an amateur army.

I also want to note that even the Byzantine successor state never did really solve this problem (even after they reverted back to a fuedal type amateur army), and their eventual decision to rely on centrally controlled mercenary armies was the final nail in the Roman coffin.