Why the Navy Needs Disruption Now

[Razgovory]

Now, he is correct that the Navy's leadership (like the leadership of any big bureaucracy) is made up of people who demonstrated mastery of skills and knowledge that were last valuable a decade ago,  and so the Navy isn't as innovative as it could be (his point about drones for refueling is dead on, and that's an idea that could easily be implemented tomorrow if the Navy's aviation top brass wasn't so afraid to give up cockpits - how many people know that half the line officers in the Navy, and therefor half the admirals, are aviators?) 

*Grumbler at a Navy R&D meeting in the 1980's*

"What are we doing about galley slaves?  I haven't heard anything on that front in a long time."

*uneasy silence falls across the room*

[mongers]

Now, he is correct that the Navy's leadership (like the leadership of any big bureaucracy) is made up of people who demonstrated mastery of skills and knowledge that were last valuable a decade ago,  and so the Navy isn't as innovative as it could be (his point about drones for refueling is dead on, and that's an idea that could easily be implemented tomorrow if the Navy's aviation top brass wasn't so afraid to give up cockpits - how many people know that half the line officers in the Navy, and therefor half the admirals, are aviators?) 

*Grumbler at a Navy R&D meeting in the 1980's*

"What are we doing about galley slaves?  I haven't heard anything on that front in a long time."

*uneasy silence falls across the room*

Raz, no need to put your oar in.

[Tonitrus]

Don't start up this row again.

[celedhring]

Sad to see this thread has had the wind taken of its sails. I thought it was interesting.

[The Minsky Moment]

I was hoping to get answers to my questions, given the knowledge base here.  They weren't intended to be rhetorical.

[grumbler]

I was hoping to get answers to my questions, given the knowledge base here.  They weren't intended to be rhetorical.

I'd guess the answers to your questions would be pretty highly classified.  I certainly cannot answer them.

[The Minsky Moment]

That makes it difficult to assess the strategic wisdom of placing more or less emphasis on drones.  The brass may be fossils protecting turf or they may be making rational decisions based on known but confidential vulnerabilities.

[Baron von Schtinkenbutt]

That's always a challenge with evaluating military decisions from the outside.  Sometimes it's legit, sometimes it's politics, sometimes it's decision makers with their heads up their asses.  Usually, it is come combination of all three.

On a related note, the analysis does make me wonder if the Navy, given their current and foreseeable future missions, might be wise to invest in more baby birdfarms.  Something between an LHA and a CVN, fixed-wing-first but with the facilities to air-deploy troops and supplies or evacuate people.

[mongers]

That's always a challenge with evaluating military decisions from the outside.  Sometimes it's legit, sometimes it's politics, sometimes it's decision makers with their heads up their asses.  Usually, it is come combination of all three.

On a related note, the analysis does make me wonder if the Navy, given their current and foreseeable future missions, might be wise to invest in more baby birdfarms.  Something between an LHA and a CVN, fixed-wing-first but with the facilities to air-deploy troops and supplies or evacuate people.

The UK-remnant will have a couple going for a song in a few years time. 

[frunk]

That makes it difficult to assess the strategic wisdom of placing more or less emphasis on drones.  The brass may be fossils protecting turf or they may be making rational decisions based on known but confidential vulnerabilities.

The specific current situation of the technology is probably classified, but the overall understanding of encrypted communication and control isn't.  For the most part it should be possible to safely remotely control a drone as long as there isn't a vulnerability in the hardware.  The biggest non-hardware dangers would be signal jamming, interception and analysis.  The threat of jamming would presumably require some sort of automated action in the case of losing signal, which might a big problem at critical moments of drone activity.  Interception shouldn't raise the concern of hijacking control provided the encryption is strong enough, but it could expose what the drone is doing or seeing given longer timeframes to crack the encryption.  Signal analysis is detecting drone activity based on their signals without knowing the content. 

Drones rely on two way communication.  The vulnerability of the signals could be asymmetric.  The directionality of an antenna is limited by size, so a small drone can't send as highly focused a signal as the potentially large controlling station/satellite/whatever.

[grumbler]

That's always a challenge with evaluating military decisions from the outside.  Sometimes it's legit, sometimes it's politics, sometimes it's decision makers with their heads up their asses.  Usually, it is come combination of all three.

On a related note, the analysis does make me wonder if the Navy, given their current and foreseeable future missions, might be wise to invest in more baby birdfarms.  Something between an LHA and a CVN, fixed-wing-first but with the facilities to air-deploy troops and supplies or evacuate people.

The problem is that the smallest baby bird farm isn't all that much smaller/cheaper than a big one, and certainly isn't cheaper on a per-airframe basis.   You need lots of room for avgas and ordnance, in particular, and those need to be at least somewhat protected.

The current LHA-6 class carries about 22 aircraft (6 will be STOVL F-35s) at a cost about 1/3 that of a Ford class.   It is optimized for air ops (not amphibious ops) and so is about what can be expected from a "baby carrier."  It lacks AEW and strike support aircraft capabilities, and only carries a max of about 18 strike fighters, so doesn't generate 1/3 of the capability at 1/3 the cost.  It does disperse the potential damage from a single hit, however.

[grumbler]

That makes it difficult to assess the strategic wisdom of placing more or less emphasis on drones.  The brass may be fossils protecting turf or they may be making rational decisions based on known but confidential vulnerabilities.

None of those issues impact the refueling mission, though, and that's a huge problem for the modern carrier battle group.  Once upon a time, there were specialized refueling aircraft, but those have been eliminated even as the navy has transitioned to gas-guzzlers like the F/A-18 (an F-18 loaded with buddy stores still burns more fuel than it delivers).  A carrier used to have strike ranges in the 700-mile range.  Nowadays, a 250-mile strike would strain its capabilities.

[Baron von Schtinkenbutt]

The problem is that the smallest baby bird farm isn't all that much smaller/cheaper than a big one, and certainly isn't cheaper on a per-airframe basis.   You need lots of room for avgas and ordnance, in particular, and those need to be at least somewhat protected.

The current LHA-6 class carries about 22 aircraft (6 will be STOVL F-35s) at a cost about 1/3 that of a Ford class.   It is optimized for air ops (not amphibious ops) and so is about what can be expected from a "baby carrier."  It lacks AEW and strike support aircraft capabilities, and only carries a max of about 18 strike fighters, so doesn't generate 1/3 of the capability at 1/3 the cost.  It does disperse the potential damage from a single hit, however.

Huh, didn't know the LHAs were so expensive.  In that case, yeah, I guess the only advantage is having 1/3 of a CVN in three different places at once.

[grumbler]

Huh, didn't know the LHAs were so expensive.  In that case, yeah, I guess the only advantage is having 1/3 of a CVN in three different places at once.

Probably considerably less than 1/3 of a CVN (given that there won't be strike support or AEW capable planes nor a nuke power plant), but that may be enough for most trouble spots.

They are only building two of these, though, because baby carriers just cost too much for what you get.

[mongers]

That makes it difficult to assess the strategic wisdom of placing more or less emphasis on drones.  The brass may be fossils protecting turf or they may be making rational decisions based on known but confidential vulnerabilities.

None of those issues impact the refueling mission, though, and that's a huge problem for the modern carrier battle group.  Once upon a time, there were specialized refueling aircraft, but those have been eliminated even as the navy has transitioned to gas-guzzlers like the F/A-18 (an F-18 loaded with buddy stores still burns more fuel than it delivers).  A carrier used to have strike ranges in the 700-mile range.  Nowadays, a 250-mile strike would strain its capabilities.

That's quite damning.